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Abstract 
The thesis investigates under what conditions the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) can influence the domestic employment policy of European Union member 
states. It aims to answer the question by examining two critical or ‘least likely’ cases: 
Greece and Portugal by focusing on three key areas of employment policy: public 
employment services, gender equality policies (mainstreaming, reconciliation and pay 
gaps) and ‘flexicurity’. The thesis employs the ‘Europeanization’ approach and tests 
the hypothesis that ‘if the EES altered Greek and Portuguese employment policy at 
all, it did so through one of three main Europeanization pathways: (i) policy 
learning; (ii) the domestic empowerment of policy entrepreneurs; (iii) financial 
conditionality.’ In examining the domestic impact of the EES the thesis does not 
presume an Europeanization effect a priori. Rather, the research begins from the 
domestic level (in a process-tracing method) and investigates whether, how and to 
what extent the EES had a role in the Greek and Portuguese domestic policy. The 
possibility of other variables, either external or internal, being pre-eminent is 
examined. The empirical study sought to triangulate a wide range of methods and 
sources. Although Greece and Portugal share a number of characteristics that may 
inhibit Europeanization in this type of area, empirical evidence largely supported the 
research hypothesis and suggested that two key conditions were conducive to the EES 
having a domestic impact in these cases: the existence of successful policy 
entrepreneurs who would actively use the EES as a policy window to promote their 
agenda and -when these were absent or lacked access to power and resources- the 
existence of the European Social Fund financial conditionality. Thus, soft power can 
be wielded in the world of neglect without policy learning which is considered the 
main ‘soft’ mechanism of domestic change in the literature. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Introduction 
Unemployment has been one of Europe’s long-standing problems. Since the 
early 1990s, in a growing number of countries employment rates are decreasing while 
unemployment rates are increasing (cf. Symes 1995; Esping-Andersen 2000; Gallie 
and Paugam 2000; Bermeo 2001; Giugni 2010). Structural unemployment is a central 
element of the unemployment problem of Europe. In addition, unemployment affects 
almost a fourth of the youth labour force compounding the social problems associated 
with unemployment. Moreover, labour markets are characterised by significant 
inequalities between highly skilled and low-skilled workers and between men and 
women (cf. Sapir 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990; 2002; 2009).  
In this context the European Union (EU) has developed its own employment 
policy which has three institutional pillars, each with a different mode of policy-
making and governance. The first, is the ‘legislated employment rights’ pillar based 
on a the standard Community method; the second, the ‘law via collective agreement’ 
pillar, which is a negotiated alternative to the first pillar and involves agreement 
among social partners prior to legislation; the third pillar is the ‘European 
Employment Strategy (EES)’. The EES is the most recent, more experimental and 
more ambitious pillar.
1
 At the 2000 Lisbon Summit the EES was used as a model for 
other policy areas under the umbrella of a new EU instrument – the Open Method of 
Coordination/OMC2 (de la Porte 2002; Zeitlin 2005). The OMC was perceived as a 
learning process, which would be open with regard to member states’ involvement 
and policy outcomes (Regent 2003: 210). Policy targets were set by the European 
Commission, but national responses were formulated at the national level with no 
formal sanctions (Hodson and Maher 2001: 724). Peer review and benchmarking 
were the fundamental tools for promoting policy learning (Regent 2003: 210). Even 
though all political actors (EU institutions, member states, social partners, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO’s)) were involved in the practical implementation 
of the EES, the coordinating role was given to the Commission (de la Porte 2002: 44).  
                                                          
1
 For a detailed discussion of the EES, see Rhodes 2005.  
2
 As the OMC represents a generalisation of the principles and method of the EES (cf. Zeitlin 2002; de 
la Porte 2011), in this thesis the terms will be used interchangeably.   
  
The significance of the EES has been hotly debated in the literature (for a 
succinct summary see: Borrás and Radaelli 2010; Kröger 2009; Zeitlin 2009; 2005; 
Rhodes 2005).  The first wave of scholars perceived the EES as the European 
employment policy’s ‘golden goose’: a new process which would transform European 
and national policy making content and procedures. The EES was perceived as a new 
mode of governance that signalled a significant shift from hard law to soft law and 
from employment protection to employment promotion (Rhodes 2005: 283-284; for 
an extensive analysis of the OMC novelties compared to previous soft law procedures 
see: Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 189-191). The EES and more generally the OMC 
would also increase input legitimacy as it would be open to as many actors as 
possible, including for the first time non-state actors, such as civil society 
organisations (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Jacobsson 2004; Maher 2004; de la Porte and 
Nanz 2004). The expectation was that all participants in the EES would reach 
consensus on policy outputs through the spread of best practices (Goetchy 1999; De 
la Porte 2002; Hodson and Maher 2001; Regent 2003). By contrast, others were quick 
to dismiss it as a process which was ‘too soft’; as a result, it would be incapable of 
promoting social Europe and altering member states’ employment policy (Scharpf 
2002; Chalmers and Lodge 2003). Likewise, some authors perceived the EES/OMC 
as ‘cheap talk’ and irrelevant for policy outcomes (Moravscik 2005; Hatzopoulos 
2007; Idema and Kelemen 2006; for a review, see: Borrás and Radaelli 2010; Kroger 
2009b). Initial research indicated that the EES had some impact on domestic policy 
which varied across member states and policy areas (cf. Foden and Magnusson 2003; 
Govecor 2004; Jacobson and Viffell 2007; Zeitlin et al. 2005; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 
2009). 
This thesis aims to shed light on the domestic impact of the EES on the 
employment policy of two under-researched member states (see: sections 1 and 6 of 
this chapter). In other words, the central question of this thesis is whether, how and to 
what extent the EES influenced domestic policy making in the specific areas of Public 
Employment Services (PES), gender equality policies (mainstreaming, reconciliation 
and pay gaps) and flexicurity. It attempts to explain an empirical puzzle observed in 
two countries of the Southern European periphery, and answer critical questions 
related to employment policy in Europe. In doing so, it aspires to provide an original 
contribution to the field of study and offer useful insights for researchers and policy 
makers in employment policy. In this chapter, the thesis puzzle and case studies are 
presented, followed by a description of the variables, conceptual framework and 
  
research hypotheses of the thesis. The research methodology, limitations and 
contribution are then discussed. Thus, the chapter will signpost the research that 
follows. 
 
1. Thesis puzzle and case studies  
The thesis aims to examine under what conditions the EES can influence 
member states’ employment policy. It will try to answer this question by examining 
two critical or ‘least likely’ cases: Greece and Portugal (King et al. 1994: 209; 
 anck  2009). Both countries have a number of features that could be expected to 
inhibit any significant impact of the EES. Yet, both appear to have implemented 
domestic policy reforms as a result of the EES. More specifically, both countries 
belong to what has been identified as the ‘world of neglect’ where neither political 
nor administrative elites adhere to the norm of compliance with EU law (Falkner et 
al. 2005: 325).
3
 In countries belonging to the world of neglect, compliance with EU 
law is not a goal in itself, such that negligence at the transposition stage is the 
defining characteristic of this world (Falkner et al. 2005: 325; Falkner and Treib 
2008). The typical reaction to an EU-related implementation duty is inactivity. The 
national adaptation process is initiated only after the Commission intervenes since 
without its intervention transposition obligations are often not recognized at all. In the 
most recent effort to examine the compliance record of the Southern European 
countries, it was argued that Italy and Spain should be included in the ‘world of 
domestic politics’, whereas only Greece and Portugal were classified as true members 
of this negligent club (Hartlapp and Leiber 2010). It should be noted that, although 
these studies focus only on one policy instrument (EU social directives), they are 
relevant for other types of measures. After rejecting a number of alternative 
hypotheses (including ideology, preferences, misfits and capacity), Falkner et al 
(2005) and Hartlapp and Leiber (2010) argue that the best explanation for any given 
country’s response to external instruments is a certain ‘compliance culture’ that exists 
in the political and administrative elites. Therefore, it can be expected that this 
compliance culture would be pervasive among political and administrative elites that 
respond to EU-related policy instruments irrespective of their degree of softness.  
In addition, Greece and Portugal share all the characteristics that authors have 
identified as key obstacles in the implementation of EU policies (for a succinct 
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 More recently, Falkner and Treib (2008) refined this type by renaming it ‘world of transposition 
neglect’. 
  
summary, see: Hartlapp and Leiber 2010: 471-474): (i) there is a very high ‘misfit’ 
between EU and national policies which usually results in inertia or even 
retrenchment (Börzel and Risse 2000; 2003; Risse et al. 2001); (ii) both countries 
have weak administrations
4
 and inefficient political systems which lack expertise, 
resources and coordination (La Spina and Sciortino 1993; Van den Bossche 1996; 
Linos 2007); (iii) their political systems are reactive (La Spina and Sciortino 1993), 
and party dominated (Ioakeimidis 2001); (iv) the gap between legislation and practice 
is generally high (Putnam et al. 1993); (v) they lack societal actors who will act as 
‘pull factors’, namely forces of full implementation according to the ‘bottom-up’ 
implementation theory (Börzel 2000; Lipsky 1978); (vi) there is a general absence of 
consensual and corporatist decision making tradition, which has been shown to 
promote transposition and implementation of EU policies.  
Moreover, both countries have similar socio-political backgrounds and welfare 
systems with common features. More specifically, the literature on the features of 
Southern European welfare systems follows mainly three distinct approaches. The 
first one argues that Southern European welfare states are perceived as the 
underdeveloped/poor version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Conservative or 
corporatist model. In contrast, the second approach argues that they share a set of 
distinctive features, which lead to a unique type of welfare model. Despite the 
numerous differences between these two schools, both agree that Southern Europe 
forms a group; yet they disagree on whether the similar characteristics result in a 
variety of Esping-Andersen’s conservative type or a new one (for a detailed 
discussion of these schools’ main propositions, see: Arts and Gelissen, 2002: 41-146). 
Finally, the third approach understands Southern Europe as welfare societies (Santos 
and de Sousa 1994; Hespanha 1999; Marinakou 1998). Despite their differences all 
these schools of thought agree on the weakness of the Southern European welfare 
states resulting in a high misfit between EU and domestic policies (Foden and 
Magnusson 2003; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008; cf. Börzel 2005). Consequently, 
one would expect to find a weak employment policy with limited resources and poor 
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 Bureaucracies in Southern Europe share the following characteristics: ‘extensive politicisation of the 
top administrative ranks; enduring patronage patterns in recruitment; uneven distribution of human 
resources; formalism and legalism’ (Sotiropoulos 2004a: 405; as cited in Sotiropoulos 2006). 
However, there are two notable differences between Greece and Portugal with regard to government 
capacity. First, clientelism is much more prevalent in Greece and Italy compared to Spain and Portugal 
(García and Karakatsanis 2006: 99-103). Likewise, (and probably as a result of clientelism) the score 
of Transparency International (TI) 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is higher for Portugal and 
Spain (5.8 and 6.1) than Italy and Greece (4.3 and 3.8) – the higher the score the lower the degree of 
respondents’ perceived corruption for their country.  
  
design and efficiency. This poses a significant barrier to the EES in achieving an 
impact on both Greece and Portugal as they may lack the human, financial and 
institutional resources to respond to the EES stimuli. Moreover, both countries have 
an under-developed employment policy which would not be able to provide the 
necessary support to their workforce and therefore be at odds with the core goals of 
the EES. Therefore, Greek and Portuguese pre-EES employment policies are 
expected to act as barriers to the incorporation of the EU stimuli. The latter treat 
social (including employment) policy as a productive factor of the economy, namely 
a factor which increases productivity and competiveness (cf. Schelkle 2008; Schelkle 
and Mabbett 2007; Andersson 2005). 
Further, while both counties were not classified by Hall and Soskice (2001:21) 
in their original typology of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), Greece and Portugal were 
later classified as two cases belonging into a third VoC type called Mixed Market 
Economies (MMEs) ( anck  et al. 2007; Molina and Rhodes 2007). The main 
characteristics of MMEs are (Kornelakis 2011: 55-56): strong institutional stability 
combined with low institutional complementarities and clustering; mixed 
coordination, that is both market and non-market. In MMEs the non-market element 
is provided mainly by the family given the absence of state intervention and the 
under-developed and inefficient welfare state ( anck  et al. 2007; Molina and 
Rhodes 2007). As a result, both Greece and Portugal can be considered as two 
countries which have few prospects of institutional change (Hall and Thelen 2009). 
In other words, the existing literature indicates that Greece and Portugal 
constitute two critical or ‘least likely’ cases in the EU-27 in examining the impact of 
the EES in their employment policies. In the EU-15, the world of neglect was the 
least likely to comply with EU law (Falkner et al. 2005). More recently, Falkner and 
Treib (2008) added the ‘world of dead letters’ to their typology to cover the Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In this category, EU directives are not 
systematically enforced and implemented despite their quick transposition. Therefore, 
the impact of EU directives on national policy is doubtful. The world of neglect and 
the world of dead letters share one key characteristic: compliance is often superficial 
as shortcomings in enforcement and application are quite common. Even though 
Falkner and Treib (2008) argue that enforcement and application problems are not the 
defining characteristics of the world of neglect, this cannot be said for Portugal and 
Greece. Specifically, their typical procedural pattern during the transposition stage 
was neglect, as well as significant enforcement and application problems (Falkner et 
  
al. 2005: 275). Consequently, Greece and Portugal combine the characteristics of both 
the world of neglect and that of dead letters: inactivity / negligence during 
transposition and problematic enforcement and application of EU social directives. 
Thus, one may justifiably regard Greece and Portugal as two least likely cases in the 
EU-27. In other words, there is a variety of literatures that that have characterised 
Greece and Portugal as least likely Europeanization cases – especially in the area of 
employment policy – hence justifying their selection as least likely cases in this 
thesis.  
Another typology used in studies of public policy is based on the types of 
political system. As noted above, both countries have similar political systems, 
namely they are both parliamentary democracies based on majoritarian political 
systems (cf. Lijphart et al. 1988). The key difference between them is that Greece is a 
clear case of parliamentary democracy where the president has almost no executive 
and legislative powers, whereas Portugal has a semi-presidential parliamentary 
democracy where the President is directly elected and has some say in cabinet 
appointment and dismissal, parliamentary dissolution, ministerial appointments, 
referral of legislative bills to judicial review, veto powers, and agenda-setting 
through going-public tactics (Neto and Lobo 2009: 234).  
Three policy areas were selected: (i) the activation of the unemployed through 
Public Employment Services (PES), (ii) gender equality policies (mainstreaming, 
reconciliation and pay gaps), and (iii) flexicurity. These policies were selected 
because they were deemed as three of the most important policy areas of the EES. As 
will be discussed in Section 2.2 of this chapter, ‘activation’ and ‘flexicurity’ have 
been the two mantras of the EES: activation was the headline policy of the EES 
during the period of 1997-2005. Flexicurity then dominated the EU agenda on 
employment policy (from 2007 onwards). As for the gender equality policies area, it 
was a key policy goal of the EES since 1997 and gender equality promotion has been 
one of the most significant policies of the EU since its creation (Walby 2004; Rossili 
2000; Ostner and Lewis 1995; Ostner 2000; Hantrais 2000). A limitation in the 
research design is that the time span of the three different EES stimuli (activation of 
the unemployed by the PES, gender equality policies and flexicurity) are not similar 
since the period of examination for the third and final policy area (the flexicurity 
stimuli) was shorter than the other two. As a result, it is not possible to compare 
longer term effects in the three areas. However, the flexicurity area was judged to be 
a good test case as it was a completely novel policy concept to which the two 
  
countries examined would have been relatively unexposed, and therefore changes in 
policy content would have been fairly easy to track. In addition, early in the 
investigation of this area, relevant documents indicated that Greece and Portugal 
showed divergent policy reform records even over this short time span, which posed 
an interesting research puzzle. The effect of the EES flexicurity stimuli was 
examined for the longest possible period i.e. up to 2009 after which the introduction 
of a major confounding factor (the EU financial crisis) would have made it 
impossible to compare the flexicurity case with the other two policy areas since the 
latter two had been examined in a period prior to the financial crisis. In addition, the 
study asks the same question in all three areas (whether and if so how and to what 
extent the EES altered Greek and Portuguese employment policy). 
Preliminary findings indicated that Greece and Portugal showed a puzzling 
reform record. Both countries were unlikely to show a significant EES impact yet 
both of them implemented potentially path-breaking reforms in their employment 
policy.
5
 In addition, as will be shown in the empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 
3-7), the reforms occurred in a divergent manner with regard to their content, timing, 
process and significance. More specifically, this thesis will examine the reforms of 
the Greek and Portuguese PES, which were implemented after decades of stagnation. 
Although there are considerable differences between PES across the EU member 
states (cf. Weishaupt 2010), they are all responsible for contributing towards 
matching supply and demand on the labour market through the provision of 
information, placement and active support services (Eures 2013; OECD 1998; 2001). 
Hence, as will be argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the PES are the most important 
organisation in national employment policies as they provide: (i) a unique and usually 
nation-wide service of labour market information regarding vacancies, training, 
education, and career change opportunities in particular to the unemployed who have 
to register with them (EC 1998a: 5); (ii) brokerage services between employers with 
job vacancies and jobseekers through matching and job search assistance; and (iii) 
market adjustment between supply and demand through the implementation of 
national employment policies (EC 1998a: 6).6 The observed policy change constituted 
a major break with the past in Greek and Portuguese employment policy as the goal 
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 When examining national employment policy this thesis will focus on: policy content; timing, 
process and significance of policy change (see also section 2.1). 
6 Chapters 3 and 4 will also discuss succinctly the definition, organisation and role in labour market / 
employment policy of PES. However, it should be stressed that this thesis does not focus on the PES 
as such but on the potential impact of the EES on them.  
  
of the reforms was to replace the old-style passive support with active support to the 
unemployed which was based on prevention, personalisation and integrated 
interventions for the unemployed. The content of these reforms bore important 
similarities to that of the EES soft stimuli of the first two 1997-2003 guidelines with 
regard to the activation7 of the unemployed (cf. Stiller and Van Gerven 2012: 121; see 
also below). These guidelines stated that a personalised (tailor-made) new start in the 
form of employment, training or other employability measure should be offered 
within six months of registered unemployment to every young person and within 
twelve months to all unemployed adults (see also section 2.2.1 of this chapter and 
Chapters 3 and 4). 
However, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Greece and Portugal 
implemented these reforms in a divergent manner with regard to their timing, content 
and process. Portugal initiated the PES reform in 1998 and completed it by 2000, 
whereas Greece began the reform in 2001 and completed it through a series of laws in 
2003 and 2006. In terms of content, Portugal implemented activation using the 
preventative approach
8
, while Greece focused mainly on the personalised and 
integrated support.9 Finally, Greece and Portugal employed different methods of 
reform implementation: Portugal implemented the policy change within the existing 
PES structure, while Greece bypassed the core PES organisation as it outsourced the 
implementation of the reforms to independent organisations especially created for 
these tasks. The divergent reform path of the Greek and Portuguese PES reforms is 
summarised in the following table.  
 
Table 1.1: Differences in PES’ Reform in Greece & Portugal 
 Content Timing Process 
Greece 
Activation through 
personalisation and 
integrated support to 
the unemployed 
No reform until 2000;  
three reforms after 2000 
(in 2001; 2003; & 
2006) 
Reform was outsourced to 
new independent entities 
called KPA & KPA2 
Portugal 
Activation though 
preventative approach 
Reform began in 1998  
& was completed by 
2000 
Reform took place within 
the Portuguese PES (IEFP) 
administration 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
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 For the concept of activation in the context of the EES, see section 2.2.1 of this chapter and Chapters 
3 and 4.  
8
 According to the 1998 reform each unemployed had to get a response from the PES in a pre-defined 
period of time (3 months for the young unemployed and 6 months for the adults). The goal of this early 
response of the PES was to prevent the newly registered unemployed from becoming LTUs.  
9
 As will be discussed in section 2.2.1 of this chapter the preventative approach, the personalised and 
integrated support constitute parts of the EES stimuli on the activation of the unemployed through 
PES.  
  
 
Coming back to the structural characteristics that make such differences in the 
reform record at first sight surprising, there is one feature in which the two countries 
differed considerably and this is female employment. Greece traditionally showed 
some of the worst performances in the EU on gender equality, while Portugal had 
one of the highest female employment rates and usually met the Lisbon targets (see 
tables 1.2 and 1.3). More specifically, the Portuguese labour market was 
characterised throughout the 1990s by: (i) low unemployment rates; (ii) one of the 
highest female full-time employment rates in the EU - similar to those in 
Scandinavian countries and almost twice the figures for the other Southern European 
countries (see table 1.2); and (iii) low rates of part-time work for both women and 
men (Silva 2003: 112).
10
 By contrast, over the same period Greece stood out among 
the EU-15 because of the huge gender inequalities in its labour market: it had the 
largest gender gap in employment rates and the second largest in unemployment 
rates; although, its ranking was close to the EU-15 average with regard to the gender 
pay gap (see table 1.3), it had the lowest scores for occupational segregation by sex, 
while, vertical segregation in terms of ‘glass ceilings’ was very high. Since the late 
1990s, however, female workforce participation in the Greek labour market 
improved; as a result, the gender gap in both employment and unemployment rates 
was reduced (see table 1.2). Only a third of the new jobs for women were low paid as 
the main area of employment was the public sector (Karamessini 2006: 247; 
Lyberaki 2010: 5). Yet, female unemployment remains the most significant problem 
of the female workforce.  
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 Based on data until 2000; employment levels have deteriorated since then. The main reason for this 
seems to be the loss of competitiveness of the Portuguese workers compared to their Eastern European 
ones resulting in many foreign companies relocating from Portugal to Eastern Europe (OECD 2004; 
EIU 2005).  
  
 
Table 1.2: Employment rates (%) 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 
Greece 55.1 56.5 56.3 57.5 58.7 59.4 60.1 61.0 61.4 61.9 61.2 
Lisbon 
gap
11
 
- 13.5 13.7 12.5 11.3 10.6 9.9 9.0 8.6 8.1 8.8 
Portugal 65.7 68.4 69.0 68.8 68.1 67.8 67.5 67.9 67.8 68.2 66.3 
Lisbon 
gap 
- 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.2 1.8 3.7 
EU-15 60.7 63.4 64.1 64.2 64.5 64.8 65.3 66.1 66.8 67.1 65.8 
Males 
Greece 72.1 71.5 71.4 72.2 73.4 73.7 74.2 74.6 74.9 75.0 73.5 
Portugal 75.5 76.5 77.0 76.5 75.0 74.2 73.4 73.9 73.8 74.0 71.1 
EU-15 70.6 72.8 73.1 72.8 72.7 72.7 73.0 73.6 74.2 74.1 71.9 
            
Females 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Greece 39.3 41.7 41.5 42.9 44.3 45.2 46.1 47.4 47.9 48.7 48.9 
Lisbon 
gap
12
 
- 
-
18.3 
-
18.5 
-
17.1 
-
15.7 
-
14.8 
-
13.9 
-
12.6 
-
12.1 
-
12.9 
-
13.1 
Portugal 56.5 60.5 61.3 61.4 61.4 61.7 61.7 62.0 61.9 62.5 61.6 
Lisbon 
gap 
- +0.5 +1.3 +1.4 +1.4 +1.7 +1.7 +2.0 +1.9 +2.5 +1.6 
EU-15 50.8 54.1 55.0 55.6 56.2 56.9 57.6 58.6 59.5 60.1 59.6 
European Commission 2010a and Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011). 
- Denotes does not apply as the Lisbon targets were introduced since 2000. For female employment 
rates the symbols - and + indicate a negative or positive gap with the Lisbon targets respectively. 
 
Table 1.3: Gender pay gap
13
 (%)  
 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Greece 25.5 20.7 21.5 22 
Portugal : 8.4 8.3 9 
EU-27 : 17.7 17.6 : 
Structure of Earnings Survey, Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011). 
: denotes missing data 
 
Despite their different settings, both countries followed a very similar path of 
employment policy reform, which may be partly responsible for the improvement of 
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 70% target as of 2000 to be reached in 2010 
12
 60% target as of 2000 to be reached in 2010.  
13
 The unadjusted gender pay gap represents the difference between average gross hourly earnings of 
male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings 
of male paid employees. For a discussion of the differences between unadjusted and adjusted pay gaps, 
see chapter 6.  
  
female employment and unemployment rates in Greece.
14
 This thesis explores three 
key areas of gender equality in employment policy: gender mainstreaming (GM); 
reconciliation of work and family life; and pay gap.15 As will be shown in Chapters 5 
and 6, both countries introduced measures promoting GM, reconciliation of work and 
family life and tackling gender gaps. However, in Greece, GM was introduced 
mainly after 2001 in the form of expanding training and employment creation 
subsidies to women. In Portugal, by contrast, it was introduced after 1999 in the form 
of employment creation subsidies for women, a novel monitoring system to evaluate 
the impact of public policies on women and an altered institutional framework for 
implementing and overseeing the promotion of GM in PEP. The new institutional 
framework consisted of: (i) a new GM committee within the office of the Presidency; 
(ii) the inclusion of two long-standing Committees with specific competence in equal 
opportunities and evaluation and monitoring duties (Committee for Equality in Work 
and Employment and Committee for Equality and Women's Rights) in policy design 
and policy evaluation processes; and (iii) the appointment of equality advisors to 
government departments (committees and ministries) to ensure gender equality 
promotion was taken into account in all governmental decisions (Rubery et al. 2001). 
Similarly, although both countries promoted reconciliation through the 
expansion of care facilities, this occurred after 2001 in Greece, while in Portugal it 
occurred mainly during 1997-2002 and 2005-2010. Finally in the area of pay gaps 
both countries did not alter their policy significantly – with Portugal showing more 
effort in tackling the problem than Greece. The comparison between the two 
countries with regard to these areas is summarised in the following table.  
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 As will be argued in chapter 2, it is impossible to establish a causal relationship between the EES 
and policy outcomes such as employment rates. 
15
 For the conceptual discussion of these areas, see section 2.2 of this chapter and Chapter 5.  
  
Table 1.4: Reforms promoting gender equality in Greek and Portuguese employment policy 
Gender Mainstreaming 
 Content Timing Process 
Greece 
Women identified as a group needing more training, 
support and subsidies for women-led business start-
ups 
 
Very few new measures (mainly pilot 
programs) before 2001 
 
Reforms are implemented after 2001 
Gender mainstreaming promoted primarily 
through vocational training and other 
employment creation subsidies 
Portugal 
 New institutional framework for implementing and 
overseeing the promotion of GM 
 Establishment of new organisations for GM 
 Expansion of vocational  training for women 
 Educational programmes to change gender 
stereotypes 
 Studies on gender equality and mainstreaming 
 Improving databases to monitor GM of policies 
Change starts in 1998 and is 
intensified until 2002 
 
During 2002-2005 changes subside 
 
The issue returns on the agenda after 
2005 
 Vocational training and other employment 
creation subsidies 
 Administrative and organisational reform 
 Improvement of monitoring capabilities 
 Measures to address stereotypes 
Reconciliation of Work & Family life 
 Content Timing Process 
Greece 
Promotion of care 
facilities 
Only some pilot programs until 2001; afterwards, expansion of care 
facilities 
Care facilities are funded mainly by the 
ESF 
Portugal 
Promotion of care 
facilities 
Expansion of care facilities takes place from 1997; the expansion is 
subdued during 2002-2005 and intensified after 2005 
Care facilities funded almost exclusively by 
national funds 
 
Pay Gaps 
 Content Timing Process 
Greece 
Very few measures; 
issue not on the agenda 
Some efforts after 2001 Measures to raise awareness and combat social stereotypes 
Portugal 
Public sector pay equalised but 
not private 
Measures to tackle the pay gap 
implemented from 1998 
Awareness-raising put in place; public sector pay gap is equalised; 
private sector gap remains unchallenged 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
  
 
The third area of EES stimuli that this thesis will examine is ‘flexicurity’, a 
concept that has been promoted by the European Commission since 2006 as a best 
practice for all EU member states. Flexicurity refers to a labour market model 
adopted by Denmark in the early 1990s, which combines flexibility in labour 
legislation with a high level of social benefits. The reform measures under this label 
consist of three principles (EC 2007a: 12; Gray 2009: 48; cf. Gwiazda 2011): (i) the 
reduction of the restrictions on hiring and firing in order to increase labour market 
flexibility; (ii) the provision of adequate and possibly more generous support to 
jobseekers; and (iii) investment in activation measures or the introduction of strict 
conditions to reduce the time spent in unemployment.  
Even though Greece and Portugal faced a significant misfit between the 
flexicurity model proposed by the European Commission and their domestic 
employment policy, they both responded to the Commission’s call to explore ways of 
incorporating flexicurity in their employment and social policy. Nonetheless, despite 
their similar domestic settings and misfits between their employment policy and 
flexicurity, the reform records observed in these two countries diverged significantly 
as follows. In the first instance there was significant support from the Portuguese 
government. However, the social partners reacted negatively to the idea of 
incorporating flexicurity and forced the government to remove the term from an 
ongoing labour market reform. Nonetheless, the Portuguese reform introduced novel 
measures towards promoting internal and time flexibility in the workplace seemingly 
in accordance with the EES flexicurity stimuli. Greece responded to the EES 
flexicurity stimuli by setting up a dedicated expert committee to examine how 
Greece could incorporate flexicurity into its labour market and employment policy. 
However, despite the relatively subdued reaction of the social partners the 
government, in an unprecedented move, did not accept the expert committee’s report 
and flexicurity was quickly removed from the agenda. Moreover, no reform took 
place as the government completely abandoned any effort to alter its employment 
policy. The divergent reform path of the two countries in the flexicurity area is 
summarised in table 1.5. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1.5: Promoting flexicurity in Greek and Portuguese employment policies 
 Content Timing Process 
Greece 
Efforts to incorporate 
flexicurity begin but 
are halted before the 
beginning of a labour 
market reform 
Greece responds 
immediately to 
the European 
Commission’s 
call for flexicurity 
Government sets up an expert 
committee; its report is not 
accepted and remains 
unpublished. The issue disappears 
from the agenda 
Portugal 
Flexicurity is 
discussed as part of 
the labour market 
reforms, and some 
measures are 
implemented 
Portugal responds 
in advance to the 
European 
Commission’s 
call for flexicurity 
Flexicurity included as a proposal 
by an already established experts 
committee. The issue becomes 
part of a wider debate. The 
concept is omitted due to a hostile 
reaction from social partners but 
reform is achieved 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
This divergence may itself be regarded as unanticipated given the many features 
that Greece and Portugal share relevant to the dependent variable under investigation. 
Summary indicators of their similarity include: levels of economic development (as 
measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) – 
see table 1.6); geographic size and demographics; socio-political backgrounds; and 
welfare systems (Leibfried 1993; Ferrera 1996; Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003) 
which had been highly resistant to reform (Rhodes 1997: 15; cf. Petmesidou and 
Mossialos 2006).  
 
Table 1.6: GDP per PPS for Greece, Portugal and EU-15 (%)
16
 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 
Greece 84
(p)
 84 
(p)
 86 
(p)
 90 
(p)
 93 
(p)
 94 
(p)
 91 
(b)
 92 
(p)
 90 
(p)
 92 
(p)
 94 
(p)
 
Portugal 78 81 80 80 79 77 79 
(b)
 79 79 78 80 
EU-15 115 115 115 114 114 113 113 
(b)
 112 111 111 110 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011); p indicates provisional data and b break in series.  
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  This table measures the Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) of Greece and Portugal as a percentage 
of EU-27 average (based on PPS per inhabitant). The unit is gross domestic product (GDP) at market 
prices. 
  
2. Research Design 
The empirical research will examine whether - and if so, how and to what 
extent - the EES altered domestic employment policy outputs. In the following three 
sub-sections the variables of the thesis are described.  
 
2.1. The Dependent variable  
The dependent variable of this study is the Greek and Portuguese employment 
policy. To measure a potential EES-induced change on Greek and Portuguese 
employment policy the thesis will use a number of indicators. Two of these are 
general indicators of EES-induced change and the rest are specific to the policy areas 
examined (PES, gender equality and flexicurity). The indicators are: 
 General indicators of policy change: 
o National Legislation in order to meet the EES benchmarks, guidelines, 
country-specific recommendations or the European Social Fund (ESF) 
conditionality; 
 
 Area specific indicators of policy change: 
o PES: the introduction of a preventative approach; the change from 
passive to active support; 
o Gender equality policies: the introduction of GM; the promotion of 
gender equality in employment policy through appropriate support to 
women, the  reduction of pay gaps; the promotion of reconciliation of 
work and family life through the expansion of care facilities; 
o Flexicurity: ‘protecting workers, not jobs’, namely a change of labour 
market policy toward reducing employment protection in return for 
high earnings replacement in unemployment benefits as advised by the 
EU’s Green Paper on flexicurity.  
 
Each indicator is further defined by the traditional ‘stages heuristic’ policy 
cycle model (Breyer and de Leon 1983; Anderson 1984). The stages heuristic model 
has received a number of criticisms (for a summary, see: Sabatier 2007: 7; Howlett 
and Ramesh 2003: 12-13), however, it helps separate the key parts of public policy in 
order to best explore each policy stage. The aim of this division is to gauge the EES 
impact in a systematic fashion. The model proposes five stages of policy making: 
  
1. Agenda-setting (problem recognition): did the EES influence the process by 
which problems came to the attention of domestic actors and governments? 
2. Policy-formulation (proposal of solution): did the EES influence the set of 
policy options which are formulated and proposed within governments? 
3. Decision-making (choice of solution): did the EES influence the process by 
which governments adopted a particular course of action or inaction? 
4. Policy-implementation (putting solution into effect): did the EES influence the 
process which governments used to put policies into effect? 
5. Policy-evaluation (monitoring results): did the EES influence the process of 
policy monitoring? 
 
One of the weaknesses of the stages heuristic model is that it can result in a 
dichotomous (yes/no) and, therefore, an incomplete assessment of the EES’s impact 
on domestic policy. To add a further dimension to the indicators and measure the 
degree of EES-induced change, the study uses the conventional Europeanization 
typology (Radaelli 2003: 37; Börzel 2005: 58-59). This typology has suggested five 
possible outcomes: 
 Inertia: no change at the domestic level as a result of the resistance of 
domestic institutions, policies, and beliefs to adapting to the European 
requirements. Thus, there is no domestic change. 
 Absorption: member states adapt some elements of their domestic policy 
to European requirements without altering its core. In other words, they 
absorb certain non-fundamental changes in order to avoid the costs of 
inertia without substantial modifications to existing structures.  The 
degree of domestic change is low. 
 Accommodation / Upgrading: member states accommodate the 
pressures of Europeanization by adapting existing processes, policies 
and institutions without changing their essential features and the 
underlying collective understandings attached to them. An example of 
this effect is to ‘patch up’ new policies and institutions onto existing 
ones without fundamentally changing the latter (cf. Héritier 2001). The 
degree of domestic change is moderate or medium. 
 Transformation: there is a major change at the core of domestic 
structures. Domestic institutions, policies and beliefs are either replaced 
by completely different ones or altered to the extent that their core 
  
features are fundamentally changed. The degree of domestic change is 
high. 
 Retrenchment: resistance to change may have the paradoxical effect of 
increasing the distance between domestic and European structures. 
Thus, Europeanization makes domestic policy ‘less European’. In 
essence, retrenchment refers to ‘negative’ Europeanization (Radaelli 
2003a: 37). 
 
This typology will be applied as the main analytical tool in the empirical 
chapters of the thesis. It provides a reference scale for change and will serve to 
distinguish the relative significance of EU-induced effects at the domestic level and 
evaluate the degree of change using a standard set of criteria, thus facilitating 
comparison of the EES impact across the policy areas examined in this thesis. It has 
the advantage of being widely used in the literature (cf. Börzel 2005; Radaelli 2003; 
Zeitlin et al. 2005; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Graziano et al. 2011; Graziano and 
Vink 2008). Its wide use offers comparability between this thesis and other studies 
following the same theoretical approach. The typology has a few limitations. In 
particular, the categorisation of outcomes in specific empirical cases may be a matter 
of judgment and therefore dispute. Moreover, what may appear to be relatively 
modest outcomes could mask high or complex levels of prior activity (cf. Radaelli 
2003). Nevertheless, as a measure of magnitude it offers a sense of the significance of 
EU causal effects - answering the ‘so what?’ question – while other, more hidden and 
short-term effects need not necessarily be discounted. The table below summarises 
this typology. 
  
 
Table 1.7: Typology of Europeanization outcomes 
Type of Europeanization outcome Definition 
Inertia No change 
Absorption Pre-existing programs are partially changed 
Accommodation/Upgrading 
Entire programs are changed  
or new ones are introduced 
Transformation 
The goal of national employment policy is 
replaced by the EES stimuli – a paradigm 
shift 
Retrenchment 
Greater distance between domestic and EES 
policy goals 
Source: Author’s analysis of the typology of Europeanization outcomes 
 
To further specify the evaluation criteria in measuring the EES-induced change 
using an ordinal scale, the above typology is combined with Peter  all’s (1993) 
typology of policy change to produce a three point scale of change (excluding no 
change and retrenchment). Hall describes three types of policy change (1993: 278):  
 First order change: the settings of policy instrument are changed while 
the basic types or categories of instruments and overall goals of policy 
remain the same; 
 Second order change: in addition to the settings settings the basic types 
or categories of instruments are altered even though the overall goals of 
policy remain the same; 
 Third order change: all components of policy are changed; in addition to 
instruments and settings the entire hierarchy of goals behind policy is 
altered.  
 
It should be noted that the term ‘settings’ does not  mean the location of a 
policy instrument but the instruments’ contents or component parts (for a more 
general critique of  all’s (1993) typology, see: Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 146). 
Hence, first order change refers to the alteration of some parts of an existing policy or 
agenda, second order change refers to the change of the instruments of a policy or the 
  
terms of the agenda and third order change refers to the change of the goals of the 
policy/agenda. For the thesis’ empirical case studies the evaluation criteria of EES-
induced change are defined through a combination of the Europeanization outcomes 
typology and  all’s (1993) typology of policy change as follows.  
 First order change will refer to absorption: a change in some parts of an 
existing employment program;  
 Second order change will refer to either accommodation or upgrading: 
in addition to  the above, existing programs will be changed in their 
entirety, either through the complete alteration of an existing program 
(accommodation), or the introduction of a new program (upgrading); 
 Third order change (transformation): includes not only change in parts 
of existing programs or the introduction of new programs but also 
change of the core employment policy’s goals. 
 
This combined classification is summarised in the following table.  
 
Table 1.8: Change scale based on the typologies of  
Europeanization and Hall (1993) to evaluate EES-induced change 
Change scale 
Type of 
Europeanization 
outcome 
Definition 
No change Inertia - 
First order change  
(low degree of change) 
Absorption 
Pre-existing programs are 
partially changed 
Second order change 
(medium degree of change) 
Accommodation 
/Upgrading 
Entire programs are changed or 
new ones are introduced 
Third order change  
(high degree of change) 
Transformation 
The goal of national employment 
policy is replaced by the EES 
stimuli – a paradigm shift 
Reverse change Retrenchment 
Increased distance between EES 
and domestic policy goals 
Source: Author’s analysis of the Europeanization and all (1993) typologies of change 
 
The above criteria for evaluating the degree of EES-induced change in policy 
content are further specified for application to each policy area as follows. In the PES 
  
area, if the policy response to the EES PES stimuli consists in modifying part of an 
existing program (e.g. provision of an employability measure within three to six 
months) without the complete overhaul of the program then the observed change will 
be classified as a first order change or absorption. If the policy response to the EES 
stimuli leads to the complete overhaul of existing programs and/or the introduction of 
new ones then this change will be considered a second order change or as 
upgrading/accommodation. For instance, if the national PES alters its programs 
(accommodation) or introduces new ones (upgrading) in order to provide 
individualised support to the unemployed that aims to enhance their employability 
through consultation, training, and employment subsidies this will be considered a 
second order change or accommodation/upgrading. Finally, if the goals of the 
national employment policy are replaced by those of the EES leading to a paradigm 
shift in national employment policy then the EES-induced change will be classified as 
a third order change or transformation. In the case of the PES this will be defined as a 
change in the policy goals of the national PES from those present pre-EES, to a 
prioritisation of the main goal of the EES which is to promote the activation of the 
unemployed such that there will be a change from passive support to activation and 
from support of the unemployed to a preventative approach. 
The same logic applies to the gender equality policies. If only parts of existing 
programs or policies are altered to include gender equality then this EES-induced 
change will be classified as first order change or absorption. An example of this 
would be the introduction of pro-gender equality goals typically favouring women, 
such as more funding for women in training, in existing employment policy 
programs. If the EES stimuli result in the introduction of new programs and/or the 
complete overhaul of existing programs that incorporate the principle of gender 
mainstreaming then the change will be classified as second order or 
upgrading/accommodation. For instance, if a (new or an existing but modified) 
program provides a holistic approach to gender equality and offers impact assessment 
with regard to gender equality, then this EES-induced change will be considered as a 
second order change or accommodation/upgrading. Finally, if the EES-induced 
change results in the replacement of the existing goals of national employment policy 
such that gender mainstreaming becomes prioritised as the key strategy to promote 
gender equality within national employment policy then the change will be classified 
as third order change or transformation. This will be equivalent to a paradigm shift in 
the goals of the national employment policy with regard to gender equality 
  
promotion. The same criteria apply to the other areas of gender equality policies 
(reconciliation of work and family life and pay gaps). 
Similarly, if parts of the existing employment policy programs are altered in 
order to incorporate the EES flexicurity stimuli then the EES-induced change is 
perceived as first order change or absorption. For instance, if flexibility inside the 
firm is promoted without further flexibilisation of the working arrangements of 
insiders then this change will be assessed as first order or absorption. If existing laws 
are completely overhauled or new ones are introduced then the observed EES impact 
is classified as second order change or upgrading/accommodation. For example, the 
promotion of a new employment policy where insiders have less security and 
outsiders less flexibility because of the EES then this change will be understood as 
second order or accommodation/upgrading. Finally, if flexicurity becomes the main 
goal of national employment because of the EES, then the EES-induced change is 
classified as third order change or transformation. In this case, employment policy 
will be completely reconfigured to promote flexicurity which will be the new 
paradigm for national employment policy.  
Finally, the same evaluation criteria will be applied to the domestic agenda of 
national actors in order to measure the EES impact on the agenda-setting (problem 
recognition). If only existing parts of the agenda are changed then the observed EES-
induced change will be a first order change or absorption; for instance, if domestic 
actors already favour activation/gender mainstreaming/flexicurity but alter their 
problem recognition due to the EES (e.g. by including new problems/issues) then this 
will be a first order change or absorption. If new goals are introduced or existing parts 
of the entire agenda are altered then the EES-induced change will be classified as 
second order change or accommodation/upgrading. An example of this change can be 
the inclusion of a limited number of EES goals (e.g. promotion of activation by 
PES/flexicurity) without altering their core pre-EES agenda. If the EES stimuli 
completely replace their pre-EES national agendas then the observed Europeanization 
outcome will be third order change or transformation. In this case, domestic actors 
will be seen to adopt an entirely new agenda resulting in a paradigm shift of their 
problem recognition in line with the EES stimuli. For instance, if actors who had first 
opposed EES goals, or had never considered activation, gender equality or flexicurity 
to be a priority for national employment policy subsequently change their agenda and 
adopt that of the EES, this will constitute third order change or transformation. 
  
 
2.2. Independent variable: the European Employment  Strategy (EES) 
The independent variable is the EES which is conceived in this thesis as being 
composed of two kinds of stimuli:17 (i) soft law instruments (EES guidelines, country 
specific recommendations and benchmarks); (ii) financial conditionality (funding 
from the ESF (Lopez-Santana 2006; Jacobsson and West 2009; Weishaupt 2009; see 
also section 2.2.3. of chapter 2). The ESF provides funding in accordance with the 
Structural Funds’ Regulations which since 2000 have been aligned with the EES soft 
law. Thus, the ESF operates as the EES’ financial tool, since member states are 
obliged to comply with the ESF regulations to receive funding. This 
conceptualisation of the EES diverges from most of the literature on the topic as the 
EES is usually treated primarily as a soft law instrument (cf. Hodson and Maher 
2001; Regent 2003; de la Porte 2002; for a review, see: Trubek and Trubek 2005; 
Kroger 2009b; Borrás and Radaelli 2010). The benefit of this understanding is that it 
encompasses all possible EES stimuli when examining the domestic impact of the 
EES.   
The EES began to take form after the Essen European Council (1994). It was 
the tool to implement the goals outlined in the 1993 White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness, and Employment. The next milestone in the development of the 
EES was the Treaty of Amsterdam where an agreement was reached on the form of 
EU employment policy: the multilateral process associated with EMU would be 
adapted to employment policy (de la Porte 2002: 46). The process envisaged in the 
Employment Chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty was operationalised during the 
Luxembourg European Council and was repeated on an annual basis. This process 
constituted a crucial element of the distinctive nature of the EES and entailed five 
stages: the European Commission, following the Spring European Council 
conclusions, proposes the Employment Guidelines which set out common priorities 
for member states’ employment policies after being adopted by the Council; member 
states draw up a National Action Plan (NAP) (until 2005) or a National Reform 
Programme (NRP) (after 2005) in which is described how these Guidelines are going 
to be implemented nationally; based on a Joint Employment Report of the 
Commission and Council, the European Council examines the employment situation 
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 The term stimulus refers to all aspects of the EES (guidelines, recommendations, benchmarks, and 
ESF funds) that may bring about / trigger change of national employment policies. As will be 
discussed below and in Chapter 2, the EES stimuli are not constant or the same across the three 
examined policy areas and over time. 
  
and may decide, by qualified majority, to issue country-specific Recommendations 
upon a proposal by the Commission; the Commission reviews the progress made at 
both national and Community levels - based on regular monitoring and on evaluation 
of the implementation of the member states national programmes - and publishes an 
EU annual progress report. 
The policy content of the EES was defined through the EES guidelines and the 
subsequent benchmarks which were introduced to monitor member states’ progress. 
The EES was modified twice - in 2003 and 2005 - in order to improve its efficiency. 
However, these reforms are likely to have weakened the EES soft stimuli and 
therefore the EES domestic impact on member states’ policies (see below). The first 
set of (nineteen) European Employment Guidelines was structured along four pillars 
(Rhodes 2005): Employability (more training; transition to activation measures and 
the easing of school-work transitions); Entrepreneurship (business start-ups; 
employment friendly taxation); Adaptability (modernising work organisation); Equal 
Opportunities (promotion of GM; tackling gender pay gaps; reconciliation of work 
and private life; aiding reintegration of the long-term unemployed and disadvantaged 
groups). In addition, a set of quantitative targets were established during the Lisbon 
Summit of 2000 that had to be reached by 2010: 70% overall employment rate; 60% 
employment rate for women. Finally, in the Stockholm summit of 2001 the target of 
50% employment rate for older workers was established. After 2003, however, the 
four pillars were replaced by three overarching objectives: full employment; quality 
and productivity at work; and cohesion and an inclusive labour market. These were 
to be achieved through action along ten ‘priorities for action’ (Council 2003; see 
also: Rhodes 2005). Even though most of the 1997-2002 EES soft stimuli remained 
intact, they were somewhat weakened. After 2003 the gender equality soft stimuli lost 
their ‘visibility’. In the 1997-2002 period gender equality was one of the four EES 
pillars while after 2003 its status was reduced to a single guideline out of the ten that 
formed the EES stimuli (Rubery et al. 2005; 2006). In addition, rhe EES soft law 
time-frame also changed as the European Council decided that, instead of annual 
evaluations of the implementation of the guidelines, the EES would acquire a three-
year perspective – allowing for more leeway for member states to reach the required 
targets and policy goals (Rubery et al. 2005; 2006).  
The EES was revised again as part of the 2005 Lisbon re-launch following the 
recommendations of the Kok report (EC 2004). The 2005 revision intended to make 
the EES more effective by reducing the number of EES guidelines and integrating the 
  
EES with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) in order to simplify the 
process. As a result, the EES was renamed the ‘European strategy for growth and 
employment’. However, it can be argued that instead of increasing its effectiveness 
and potential influence on national employment policies, the 2005 revision resulted in 
even weaker EES soft stimuli relative to the 2003 reform. More specifically, the 
integration of the EES with the BEPG meant that the document outlining the member 
states’ reforms to incorporate the EES guidelines was renamed to National Reform 
Programme for Growth and Employment indicating a double focus on economic and 
employment policy. Subsequently, member states had to respond in the same 
document for macro and micro economic issues as well as issues about employment. 
This double priority, however, was not equally balanced as most EU countries drafted 
their NRPs by clearly downplaying employment issues (Fagan et al. 2006; Rubery et 
al. 2006). In addition, instead of reporting specific policy measures, member states 
were allowed to report general policy priorities. As a result, member states had 
licence to report vague statements without the need to include specific reforms as 
evidence of their response to the EES soft stimuli. Further, the gender equality 
guideline was completely removed from the EES. In other words, the EES’s 
prioritisation of gender equality declined over the period of study (Mósesdóttir 2011: 
41-42). After 2006 the notion of flexicurity became the new EES mantra and member 
states were asked to examine ways of incorporating flexicurity into their labour 
markets (EC 2007a; Gray 2009: 48 – see section 2.2.3 below and Chapter 7).  
As mentioned above, this thesis will focus on three policy areas (activation of the 
unemployed through the PES, gender equality policies, and flexicurity). As will be 
discussed in the empirical chapters (Chapters 3-7), these areas constituted some of the 
most important EES stimuli for member states and are described briefly below. 
 
2.2.1. Activation of the unemployed by the PES 
The 1990s saw a revival of enthusiasm for active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) which refer to work, training or other programmes aimed at securing work 
for the unemployed or higher earnings for those already in employment (cf. 
(Robinson 2000). Thus, the activation of the labour market refers to the move towards 
active measures and away from passive measures which refer to the payment of 
unemployment and related benefits. PES constitute a key organisation through which 
activation of the unemployed can be implemented (Robinson 2000: 13-14). 
  
The EES activation stimuli were included mainly in the first two EES 
guidelines during the 1997-2003 period (cf. Stiller and Van Gerven 2012). These 
concerned the activation of the unemployed by the PES in order to shift the focus of 
employment policy from support of the unemployed to the prevention of long-term 
unemployment. More specifically, according to the the first two 1997-2003 
guidelines (see also Chapters 3 and 4), the incorporation of the activation paradigm 
into member states’ employment policies necessitated the offer of a personalised 
‘new start’ in the form of employment, training or other employability measures to all 
unemployed individuals. This new start had to be provided to every young person 
within six months of registered unemployment and every adult within twelve months 
of registered unemployment. Hence, the activation of the unemployed by PES reflects 
the shift in the policy approach of the PES from providing passive support (reaction 
to unemployment) to active support (prevention of long-term unemployment) via the 
offer of this personalised new start within a pre-specified time-frame (Stiller and Van 
Gerven 2012: 121).  
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the activation of the unemployed through the 
PES aims to promote the concept of ‘mutual obligations’, namely the reciprocal 
responsibility from both parties (state and the unemployed) to comply with certain 
criteria. On the one hand, the state is obliged to prevent the newly registered 
unemployed from becoming long-term unemployed (LTU) by giving them a job 
offer, training or a placement opportunity. For their part, the unemployed are obliged 
to actively aim to re-enter the labour market as soon as possible. This can be achieved 
by not declining jobs, placements, internships or training that the PES suggests to 
them as beneficiary for their labour market reintegration. In addition, the PES is to 
offer ‘personalised’ or ‘individualised’ services to the unemployed, which is achieved 
mainly by providing individually tailored services to each unemployed person in 
order to assist them in re-entering the labour market. The tailored services should be 
‘integrated’ or ‘holistic’ as they should include a multi-faceted set of measures 
providing financial, educational and psychological assistance to the unemployed.  
 
2.2.2. Gender equality policies 
This thesis will examine the three key areas in gender equality policies that the 
EES emphasised in order to promote gender equality in employment policy (cf. 
Rubery 2002; Walby 2004; Jacquot et al. 2011; Caune et al. 2011): the promotion of 
  
GM (guideline 1818), the reconciliation of work and family or personal life (guideline 
1719) and the reduction of pay gaps between men and women.20 Following Rubery’s 
(2002; 2004; 2005) categorisation of the EES gender equality stimuli, the empirical 
analysis will group the areas of reconciliation of work and family life and the 
reduction of pay gaps into the single area of dedicated equality measures in 
employment policy. Hence, in Chapters 5 and 6 the empirical analysis will distinguish 
between GM and gender equality measures in employment policy. The term ‘gender 
equality policies’ will be used instead of the EES term ‘equal opportunities’ in order 
to avoid unnecessary confusion since the latter is also used by the EU to promote 
anti-discrimination directives and the reintegration of old people into the labour 
market (cf. Walby 2004; Jacquot et al. 2011; Caune et al. 2011; Stratigaki 2005). As 
mentioned above, non-EES related stimuli such as EU directives are beyond the 
scope of the thesis. 
The GM related EES stimuli required member states to promote gender equality 
in all areas of employment policy by integrating a ‘gender equal’ perspective into 
policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. According to the UN 
Women – the United Nations’ Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women – ‘mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a strategy, an approach, a means 
to achieve the goal of gender equality’.21 The EES stimuli in the GM area necessitated 
member states to show that they had adopted this new approach in employment 
policy-making by putting gender equality on the centre-stage throughout the policy 
cycle. More specifically, the EES GM stimuli stressed that gender equality promotion 
should not be confined only to some ‘women-friendly’ measures (e.g. dedicated 
training for women) but be ‘spread’ or mainstreamed to all employment policy 
measures and all EES stimuli with a particular focus on (Velluti 2012: 97): (i) equal 
access to ALMPs among unemployed women and men; (ii) assessment of the gender 
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 According to guideline 18 member states should ensure that they ‘adopt a gender-mainstreaming 
approach in implementing the Guidelines of all four EES pillars [...].by providing for adequate data 
collection systems and procedures’ (Council resolution on the 1999 Employment Guidelines as cited in 
Eurofound 2011). For the concept of gender mainstreaming, see: EC 2008b; Rees 1998; Beveridge and 
Nott 2002; Daly 2005; Rubery 2002 and Chapter 5. 
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 According to guideline 17 member states should ensure that ‘there must be an adequate provision of 
good quality care for children and other dependants in order to support women’s and men’s entry and 
continued participation in the labour market’ (Council Resolution of 15 December 1997 on the 1998 
Employment Guidelines as cited in Eurofound 2007).  
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 Since 1999 the EES has included the reduction of pay gaps between men and women as a key goal 
for member states and has been one of the key EES indicators for gender equality (Plantenga et al 
2007: 7; cf. Plantenga and Remery 2006). The gender pay gap (GPG) refers to the difference in 
average wages between men and women (for the different indicators used, see Chapter 5).  
21
 Source: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/gendermainstreaming.htm.  
  
impact of tax and benefit systems; and (iii) the application of equal pay for work of 
equal value. To facilitate this member states had to establish an appropriate 
monitoring system to assess how existing policies impact on the life and labour 
market position of both women and men (Rees 1998; cf. Rubery 2002; Beveridge and 
Nott 2002; Daly 2005).  
The work/family reconciliation area encompasses a variety of policy options 
that are meant to allow parents to combine care obligations and career choices, such 
as parental leave, flexible working time arrangements, and childcare (cf. Fagan et al. 
2006). Indeed, female employment rates and the 2002 Barcelona targets for childcare 
provision (which required member states to provide childcare for at least 90% of 
children between three years old and the mandatory school age, and at least 33% of 
children below three years of age by 2010) constituted the two major EES 
benchmarks for gender equality promotion in employment policy. However, this 
thesis will focus only on the promotion of public and private child care services for 
children below mandatory school age divided into two age groups (children under 
three years old and those between three years and the mandatory school age) as this is 
the only measure that can be attributed directly to the EES reconciliation stimuli 
(guideline 17 – see above; cf. Lewis 2006; Leon 2003; Rubery 2002). By contrast, the 
area of parental leave is included under EU directives (cf. Jacquot et al 2011; Leon 
2003) and therefore falls outside the scope of this thesis as well as being linked to a 
completely different EU policy mechanism. As for the area of flexible working 
arrangements for women, it is linked to the adaptability EES stimulus as well as to 
the gender equality stimuli. Therefore, the establishment of a causal relationship 
between the EES gender equality stimuli and domestic change was deemed too 
problematic and was therefore excluded from the thesis investigation. 
With regard to the reduction of the gender pay gap (GPG), the EES stimuli 
prescribed the reduction of pay differentials between men and women for both public 
and private sector workers (Plantenga and Remery 2006). In 2003, the EES stimuli on 
GPG stated that: by 2010, member states should achieve ‘a substantial reduction in 
the gender pay gap [...] through a multi-faceted approach addressing the underlying 
factors of the gender pay gap including sectoral and occupational segregation, 
education and training, job classifications and pay systems, awareness raising and 
transparency’ (Plantenga and Remery 2006: 9). According to Eurostat (and the EES) 
the GPG is ‘the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid 
  
employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly 
earnings of male paid employees’ (Eurofound 2012).  
The EU uses two indicators to measure GPG: the adjusted and unadjusted pay 
gap. The reduction of the adjusted and especially the unadjusted GPG requires a 
multi-dimensional policy response from member states. One policy avenue is to 
reduce direct or indirect gender wage discrimination through inter alia legislative 
measures, information about pay structures and transparent job evaluation systems 
(Plantenga et al 2007: 7). Another policy avenue is to reduce horizontal and vertical 
labour market segregation through inter alia educational reform where women are 
encouraged to opt for male-dominated professions and vice-versa. A rather popular 
measure is vocational guidance and new programmes as well as initiatives aiming to 
alter gender stereotypes (Plantenga et al 2007: 8). Vertical segregation can be reduced 
by policy measures (quotas or other incentives) which increase female participation in 
management positions. Finally, a third policy avenue is linked to broader income 
policy. For instance, increasing the minimum wage may help to reduce GPG as more 
women have low-paid jobs; likewise, more co-ordinated or centralised wage 
bargaining may help the reduction of GPG to assist women in the business and other 
employment sectors that have weak bargaining powers resulting in lower earnings 
than men (Plantenga et al 2007: 8).  
This thesis does not attempt to cover the broader issues of gaps in educational 
attainment or in decision making (e.g. gender equality in politics and companies’ 
boards). Rather, the concern is with the impact (or otherwise) of the EES on Greek 
and Portuguese domestic employment policies - thus, it focuses only on gender pay 
gaps. The thesis does, however, consider the potential gender differences in 
employment and unemployment levels in order to contrast the domestic contexts of 
employment policy in Greece and Portugal. 
 
2.2.3. Flexicurity 
The final area of investigation is the domestic impact of the EES flexicurity 
stimuli. As will be discussed in Chapter 7 the flexicurity EES stimuli refers to the 
first component of flexicurity (flexible and reliable contractual arrangements), which 
focuses primarily on reducing the strictness of the EPL score and the first flexicurity 
pathway which stresses the importance for tackling labour market segmentation 
between insiders and outsiders by reducing job protection to the former (flexibility) 
and increasing protection to the latter (security) achieving thus a more ‘flexicure’ 
  
labour market. Thus, the thesis will not examine all the policy areas of the EES 
flexicurity multi-dimensional concept, namely lifelong learning, social security 
(pensions and minimum income schemes), and effective ALMPs.  
This thesis puts forward four main considerations regarding the EES. First, the 
EES consists of a variety of soft stimuli aiming to influence member states’ 
employment policy: the EES guidelines, quantitative targets, country-specific 
recommendations and the EES peer-review process. Second, in the policy areas 
examined the EES stimuli were neither constant nor identical (see Table 1.10), and 
therefore, a differential EES-induced change is expected (see below). More 
specifically, this thesis distinguishes between different variations of the EES stimuli 
in the examined policy areas by drawing on the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 
2000).
22
 The notion of legalization focuses more on the efficiency of policy 
instruments adopting a continuum between soft and hard law and has three 
dimensions (Abbott et al. 2000: 401):  
 Obligation: the degree to which actors or organizations are ‘legally bound 
by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behaviour is subject to 
scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of 
international law, and often of domestic law as well.’ (Abbott et al. 2000: 
401); 
 Precision: the degree of how rules ‘unambiguously define the conduct they 
require, authorize or proscribe.’ (Abbott et al. 2000: 401); 
 Delegation: the degree to which third parties have the ‘authority to 
implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and possibly 
to make further rules.’ (Abbott et al. 2000: 401). 
 
Each dimension entails different degrees of commitment to the actors or 
institutions involved in international agreements. The thesis argues that categorising 
the EES stimuli in a continuum of different types of legalization instead of using a 
hard law/soft law dichotomy is more accurate and useful for empirical research. The 
EES stimuli have a low degree of legalization (see: Abbott et al. 2000: 406) as they 
show a low degree of obligation and delegation (see: Table 1.10). The combination of 
weak EU stimuli applied to critical cases (Greece and Portugal) represents the most 
stringent form of testing of the effectiveness of the EES as a stimulus, as it is highly 
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unlikely for Europeanization to occur under such unfavourable conditions. Should the 
research findings of this study indicate that Europeanization did occur, they would 
demonstrate the significance of the EES as an Europeanization stimulus. In terms of 
obligation the EES soft stimuli are non-obligatory for EU member states as they are 
specifically framed as ‘guidelines’, ‘recommendations’ and ‘benchmarks’. As for 
delegation, the EES is concerned with coordination standards and is the result of 
institutional and political bargaining. In addition, despite being able to evaluate a 
country negatively and issue country-specific recommendations, the Commission has 
almost no intervening role in implementing the EES at the national level as it cannot 
initiate an infringement procedure (as with the EU directives) or impose any penalty 
or threat of penalty for defiant/negligent/indifferent member states.  
However, the degree of precision varies among the EES soft stimuli in the 
selected policy areas (see: Table 1.10). The EES stimuli relevant to the area of PES 
were very precise and left little room for interpretation by member states. The EES 
stimuli pertaining to the policy area of gender equality policies were moderately 
precise as they allowed a relatively moderate space for interpretation by the member 
states (see: Daly 2005; Rubery 2002; Fagan et al. 2005; Chapters 5 and 6). The EES 
stimuli related to the flexicurity policy area had low precision: instead of specific 
benchmarks and policy requirements, flexicurity was less prescriptive and ambiguous 
(Viebrock and Clasen 2009; see also: Chapter 7). In addition, the EES stimuli in the 
selected policy areas differed in their ‘visibility’ (see: Table 1.10). In areas of low 
legalization, visibility can be important in how significant the EES stimuli are 
perceived by member states (de la Porte 2010: 11; Rubery et al. 2004). In this vein, 
although ‘activation’ and ‘gender equality policies’ were two of the four 1997-2002 
EES pillars, they did not carry the same weight, since activation was the EES’s 
headline policy and remained so throughout most of the period examined in this 
thesis (see: Wincott 2003a; 2003b). After the 2003 EES reform and the abolishment 
of the pillar structure, the gender equality soft stimuli became weaker and 
disappeared altogether from the EES agenda after 2005 (Rubery et al. 2004; 2005; see 
also: Chapters 5 and 6). By contrast, when ‘flexicurity’ became the new EES 
buzzword after 2006 (cf. Viebrock and Clasen 2009; Gray 2009), it gained high 
visibility which lasted throughout the duration of this study.  
Further, this thesis argues that the EES is not comprised only of soft law. 
Besides the EES soft stimuli (guidelines, benchmarks, country specific 
recommendations and the peer-review process), the EES stimuli include the ESF 
  
funding. In the 1999 Structural Funds’ reform, the EC regulation 1260/9923 legislated 
that Structural Funds would promote the EES goals. Moreover, the ESF would 
constitute the financial tool of the EES. Even though the synergy is not perfect, it was 
after the Amsterdam Treaty and the institutionalisation of the EES that the ESF would 
be in accordance with the EES goals (for a discussion of the link between the EES 
and the ESF, see: Hartwig 2007). As a result, after 1999 all EU financed programmes 
(mainly the ESF and Community Support Framework (CSF)) were required to 
promote gender equality (as defined in the EES: gender mainstreaming and 
reconciliation of work and family), and to encourage the use of new policy tools, such 
as individualised/personalised services to the unemployed. These new EES inspired 
principles would be implemented in the next programming phase of 2000-2006. As a 
result, new programmes and services aligned with the EES would appear at the 
national level in 2001 and be reported in the 2002 National Action Plans. This 
significant time gap between the launch of the EES (1997) and the new ESF (and 
CSF) financed programmes (2001) is important in distinguishing the different types 
of Europeanization mechanism (for the mechanisms of domestic change, see: section 
3 of this Chapter and Chapter 2). Since the ESF became the financial arm of the EES, 
‘an assessment of the effectiveness of the EES (and other OMC processes) must 
incorporate the ESF as part of the story; otherwise, the independent influence of the 
EES will be overestimated’ (Lopez-Santana 2009: 6). While the ESF role in 
promoting Europeanization has been recognised in a number of other studies (Lopez-
Santana 2006; Jacobsson and West 2009; Weishaupt 2009; Zartaloudis 2010; 
Graziano et al. 2011; Verschraegen et al. 2011), this thesis contributes to the existing 
literature by suggesting an additional mechanism of EES influence: the ESF financial 
conditionality. In other words, the EES can arguably have a domestic impact on 
member states through the conditions set for ESF funding which, after 1999, were 
aligned with the EES policy goals (see section 2.2 of this Chapter and Chapter 2). 
The size of the ESF and CSF funds allocated to Greece and Portugal for the 
period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 is impressive by any standard and indicates the 
significance that these funds had for both countries (see: table 1.9). A total of 25 
billion (bn) Euros24 was allocated to Greece for the 2000-2006 programming period.25 
                                                          
23
 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999R1260:EN:HTML.  
24
 Source: http://www.hellaskps.gr/Index2_en.htm  
25
 This figure includes all EU structural funds, namely the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the ESF, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund - Guidance Section 
  
Of this amount, 4bn Euros were ESF funds dedicated to training programmes. This 
represented 78% of the total national budget dedicated to training programmes which 
is higher than the EU average of 75% (Nardo and Koncokova 2010: 69). Moreover, 
more than 20.4bn Euros were allocated to Greece for the 2007-2013 programming 
period (EC 2008: 30).26 Of this amount 4.4bn Euros were ESF funds, which 
represented 77% of the total national budget dedicated to training programmes (EC 
2012). Around 20.5bn Euros were allocated to Portugal for the 2000-2006 
programming period.27 Of this amount, 7.1bn Euros were ESF funds (Nardo and 
Koncokova 2010: 69). This represented a lower contribution to the total national 
budget dedicated to training programmes than Greece and was around 65% (Nardo 
and Koncokova 2010: 69). Moreover, 21.5bn Euros were allocated to Portugal for the 
2007-2013 programming period (EC 2008c: 12). Of this amount more than 6.8bn 
Euros were ESF funds which represented 72% of the total national budget dedicated 
to training programmes.28  
The EU funds for the 2000-2009 period contributed 1.2% of annual GDP in 
Greece and 1.6% in Portugal. The cumulative contribution of EU funds during 2000-
2009 was more than 11% in both countries (EC 2010c: 249). It should be noted that 
the 2000-2006 programming period was expanded to 2009, covering the entire period 
of inquiry of this thesis, as Greece and Portugal were facing numerous problems in 
absorbing the EU funds (COM 2010d). For instance, by 2006 it became obvious that 
Greece would end up losing more than 35% of the allocated funds as in 2006 it had 
only absorbed 58% of the allocated EU funds (Hardouvelis et al. 2008: 29). However, 
by 2008 the absorption rate had increased to 80% and by 2010 Greece succeeded in 
absorbing all the funds of the third CSF - including those of the ESF - (Hardouvelis et 
al. 2010: 29). As for Portugal, it had absorbed all EU cohesion funds and more than 
95% of the ESF funds (COM 2010d: 92). In addition, both countries spent around 
€100 per active person annually, which constituted the highest amount spent in all 
EU-15 member states (three times the EU25 average) making the ESF contributions a 
major part of the Greek and Portuguese labour market expenditures (ESF 2010: 5). 
The ESF was even more important for ALMPs as most of the ESF funds were 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(EAGGF Guidance Section), and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and the 
Cohesion Fund. 
26
 Financed through the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund. 
27
 Source: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/260&format=HTML&aged=1&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
28
 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=394.  
  
dedicated to their financing (ESF 2010: 6; cf. Papadopoulos 2006: 226). Given the 
size of the ESF contributions to Greek and Portuguese employment policy spending it 
can be expected that the ESF funding criteria and conditionality constituted a key part 
of the EES stimuli for both countries. 
The allocation of funds per ESF policy area in each country gives a clearer 
picture of the importance of the ESF as an EES stimulus. During the 2000-2006 
programming period the ESF allowed for five ‘policy fields’ to which funding could 
be allocated in member states (EC 2010e: 2): (i) developing and promoting active 
labour market policies; (ii) promoting equal opportunities for all in accessing the 
labour market; (iii) promoting and improving training, education and counselling as 
part of a Lifelong Learning policy; (iv) promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable 
workforce, innovation and adaptability in work organisation, developing 
entrepreneurship; and (v) specific measures to improve women's access to the labour 
market. Therefore, the ESF policy fields were not directly aligned to specific EES 
guidelines and/or pillars. Nonetheless, there was significant overlap. The first policy 
field mirrors the first EES pillar of employability; the third and fourth fields echo the 
third EES Pillar of adaptability; the fifth field mirrors the fourth EES pillar while the 
second field was applicable to all pillars (EC 2010e: 5).  
Table 1.9 shows the allocation of ESF funds per ESF policy area for Greece and 
Portugal as well as the EU15 average. Both countries had similar levels of allocated 
ESF funds for the policy fields of Social Inclusion and Lifelong Learning. While the 
allocations may look different for the area of ALMPs and Adaptable Workforce, it 
should be noted that these ESF fields are related to similar areas of domestic 
employment policy, namely training and counselling programmes (EC 2010e; EC 
2001). Therefore, put together these two fields represent 40% and 41% of total ESF 
funding in Greece and Portugal respectively. In terms of ESF funds allocated to 
women’s participation, it appears that Portugal did not allocate any funding to this 
field. However, to assume that no ESF funding was allocated to gender equality 
promotion would be erroneous because Portugal had mainstreamed gender equality 
promotion in all other ESF policy fields as stated in its NAPs (Rubery et al 2004: 
217; cf. NAPs 1999-2004). In any case, both countries repeatedly reported that the 
ESF constituted the main financial arm of their NAPs/NRPs (see also: Chapters 3-6). 
 
  
 
Table 1.9: ESF earmarked funds per policy field during 2000-
2006 as a percentage of total ESF funding29 
Policy field Greece Portugal EU-15 
Active labour market 
policies 
 
27% 
(1.1bn) 
16% 
(1.1bn) 
34% 
Social Inclusion 
15% 
(0.6bn) 
13% 
(0.9bn) 
15% 
Lifelong learning 
41% 
(1.64bn) 
45% 
(3.1bn) 
21% 
Adaptable workforce 
13% 
(0.5bn) 
25% 
(1.8bn) 
24% 
Women's participation 
4% 
(0.2bn) 
0% 6% 
Source: EC 2010e: 4 
 
The ESF funds included in the table above, cover the examined period of the 
thesis (2001-2009) and were absorbed over a timeframe consistent with the 
introduction of the EES and the period under study. In other words, in both countries 
the ESF funds were important in both absolute and relative terms and had the 
potential to promote EES-induced change in Greek and Portuguese employment 
policies through financial conditionality.  
The EES stimuli differed across the examined policy areas not only with regard 
to their soft stimuli, but also in terms of the availability of ESF funding (see: Table 
1.10). Activation and gender equality policies could utilise ESF funds since 2000, 
while flexicurity was based only on the weakest form of EES soft stimuli (pathways 
instead of a specific policy model). Flexicurity also tackled very controversial issues 
forming the core of labour market policy in Europe by trying to reconcile flexibility 
and security – something that is far from the norm in most EU countries (cf. Rhodes 
2005; Sapir 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990). In other words, in the flexicurity area, the 
EES stimuli are the weakest and are expected to face the strongest domestic 
opposition. The lack of ESF funding means that in the flexicurity area the EES cannot 
offer support and/or oblige countries to design EU funded measures implementing 
                                                          
29
 As mentioned above, the total ESF funding during 2000-2006 for Greece was 4bn and for Portugal 
7.1bn. The actual amount allocated per policy field is calculated in approximation by the author.  The 
actual amount spent at EU-15 level is not calculated as this is an average between very different 
countries in terms of size and wealth and thus does not represent a real value.  
  
flexicurity. Thus, in the selected policy areas the EES stimuli differed significantly; 
the main characteristics of the EES stimuli in the areas examined are summarised in 
Table 1.10.  
 
Table 1.10: EES stimuli in Activation, Gender Equality Policies and Flexicurity 
 Obligation Precision Delegation Visibility ESF funds 
Activation Low High Low High 
Yes 
(post-2001) 
Gender 
Equality 
Policies 
Low Moderate Low 
High (97-03) 
Medium (03-
05) 
Low (05-10 
Yes 
(post-2001) 
Flexicurity Low Low Low High No 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES Activation, Gender Equality and Flexicurity stimuli  
 
This study aims to examine whether the different features of the EES stimuli 
meant a different domestic impact on Greek and Portuguese employment policies. 
More specifically, the case studies allow the research to compare the effect of 
different types of soft EES stimuli; compare the effect of soft versus financial ESF 
stimuli; and test whether Europeanization outcomes depend on the kind of EES 
stimulus, the policy area, or on country-specific mediating factors. The thesis assumes 
that the EES will have greater impact in areas where the EES stimuli have higher 
precision, visibility and where ESF funding is available. In other words, it is expected 
that the domestic impact of the EES will be the highest in the activation area, 
moderate in the gender equality area and the lowest in the flexicurity area (Abbott et 
al. 2000; Daly 2005; Rubery 2002; Fagan et al. 2005; Rubery et al. 2004; Wincott 
2003a; 2003b; and Hartwig 2007). In addition, as will be discussed in detail in the 
empirical chapters (3-6) Greece and Portugal experienced comparable gaps between 
their domestic arrangements and the EES stimuli related to activation of the 
unemployed by the PES and to flexicurity, although Portugal had few problems in 
meeting the EES targets for female employment rates as these were already high. 
Despite the much better employment rates in Portugal, however, both countries faced 
similar challenges in terms of reforming policy content, because the actual content of 
pre-EES employment policy was almost identical in the two countries and therefore 
both had difficulties in incorporating the EES stimuli. 
  
 
3. Europeanization pathways and the research hypothesis 
The interplay between EU stimuli and the member states’ responses may be 
conceptualised as a process of ‘Europeanization’ and this will be further discussed in 
Chapter 2. To summarise, this thesis understands Europeanization as the impact of 
European integration on domestic (employment) policy. The impact is synonymous 
with change: Europeanization amounts to change of domestic policy because of the 
EU (in this thesis: the EES) stimuli. In other words, for Europeanization to occur the 
observed policy change should be in line with the EU (in this thesis: the EES) stimuli. 
The relationship between the independent (EES stimuli) and the dependent variable 
(Greek and Portuguese employment policies) is modelled by three mechanisms of 
EES-induced change or Europeanization pathways. These are extracted after a critical 
review of the mechanisms found in the literatures on Europeanization and the OMC 
(see: Chapter 2). The three key Europeanization pathways used to model EES-
induced change in this study are: (i) policy learning; (ii) domestic empowerment; (iii) 
ESF financial conditionality (see: Chapter 2). As will be discussed in Chapter 2, these 
pathways are distinct but not mutually exclusive as more than one pathway may be 
traced in one policy area, country, or between different stages of policy-making. 
Hence, the hypothesis of the thesis is that ‘if the EES altered Greek and Portuguese 
employment policy at all, it did so through one of three main Europeanization 
pathways: (i) policy learning; (ii) the domestic empowerment of policy 
entrepreneurs; (iii) financial conditionality.’  
Europeanization and OMC studies face also a number of methodological 
challenges in establishing causality between their independent (EU/EES stimuli) and 
their dependent variables (domestic policy). In the following, I will critically discuss 
these challenges arguing that in both cases it is possible to establish causal 
relationships between EU stimuli and domestic reforms. 
 
3.1. Causality in Europeanization studies 
The first argument against the possibility of establishing causal relationships in 
Europeanization studies is related to the concurrence of several external stimuli. In 
this vein, it is argued that examining the domestic impact of the EU is problematic 
because of the existence of parallel processes that simultaneously put pressures on the 
domestic level, such as globalisation and liberalisation (Haverland 2006: 135-137). 
Equifinality, however, is not Europeanization specific but a general problem of social 
  
sciences. Indeed, Mill has argued that the complexity of causal relationships 
encountered in social enquiry limits the possibility of discovering meaningful causal 
relations. This raises both technical (how to isolate and measure the impact of the 
independent variable(s) versus alternative explanations) and ontological (whether the 
alternative explanations are truly distinct from each other) problems. This thesis 
argues that given an appropriate and rigorous research design following social science 
methodology causal relationships can be uncovered – even when this involves 
multiple variables/causes.  
Regarding the technical problems, the main problem of causality is to isolate, as 
far as possible, a factor or a limited number of factors that appear(s) to produce - or at 
least are strongly associated with - changes in the dependent variable. Thus, the 
problem of causality becomes a problem of identifying possible ways to exclude the 
numerous potential confounding factors in the relationship between a set of variables 
(Peters 1998: 29; cf. Hancké 2009). As outlined above, this thesis adopts a ‘least 
likely’ research design where two similar countries are compared to explain the 
different policy outputs. The dependent and independent variables as well as its main 
research hypothesis are defined below. In order to test the research hypothesis 
alternative explanations (other external stimuli and purely domestic processes) will be 
examined and excluded. The elimination of alternative explanations as well as the 
linking of the EES stimuli and domestic policy changes to support the 
Europeanization research hypothesis of this thesis constitutes a mainstream approach 
in the social sciences. In other words, Europeanization will be subjected to the same 
methods of enquiry as other fields in the social sciences.   
Another technical problem that has been raised in Europeanization studies is 
case selection – namely that most of the Europeanization field examines only EU 
countries. It is argued that in order to trace the causal relationship between EU and 
domestic change researchers should compare EU countries and non-EU countries: 
where the ‘stimulus’ (the EU) is present and where the stimulus is absent – which will 
constitute the control group of the study (Haverland 2006: 139). Indeed, a number of 
studies have employed this research design showing mixed results with regard to the 
occurrence of Europeanization (cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Fontana 
2011; Afonso and Papadopoulos forthcoming; Graziano et al. 2011; Rumelili 2005) 
showing that the experimental approach cannot necessarily provide a definitive 
answer. Causality between the EU and the domestic level can be uncovered without 
the recourse to the controlled experiment approach, which originates from the natural 
  
sciences, and is not easily replicated in the social world (cf. Hancké 2009). Social 
science methodology such as before-after studies, process tracing and the 
triangulation of different sources of evidence are much more suitable for 
understanding the complex processes of policy making and impact. The findings may 
have a lower ‘internal validity’ but can produce rich data that is useful theoretically as 
well as in practice (Hancké 2009; King et al. 1994; della Porta 2010). This thesis 
follows the latter approach and argues that even without non-EU cases it is possible to 
establish with some level of certainty whether the EES had an impact on Greek and 
Portuguese employment policies. 
Regarding the ontological problems of Europeanization, a key limitation of 
establishing causality is linked to the similarities between EU and other non-EU 
policies (e.g. globalisation and domestic practices uploaded at the EU level). 
 owever, this argument implies that ‘uniqueness’ or a de novo status of the EU 
policy is a necessary condition for establishing a causal relationship between EU 
stimuli and the domestic level. This seems like an unnecessarily stringent, if not 
impossible, condition to fulfil since most policies the EU promotes already exist in a 
few of the member states. For example, the OMC is designed as a tool to spread best 
practices across Europe; similarly, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
based on the German model regarding the role of the Central Bank and the logic of 
monetarist policy (cf. Dyson and Featherstone 1999). In general, all EU policies have 
been (usually partially) uploaded by member states and are always the product of 
agreement between national governments. In other words, the EU stimuli in most of 
the cases are not sui generis but include many existing ideas, policies, policy making 
mechanisms and cultures. As a result, examining the EU stimuli’s uniqueness seems 
futile. Nonetheless, even in the (extreme) case that an EU stimulus might be a copy of 
another process (international/national/sub-national) the EU influence still has an 
added value in explaining domestic change. For example, even if we accept that EU 
membership has similar effects to globalisation, as it causes the opening of an 
economy through the Single Market’s ‘four freedoms’ it would be a mistake to doubt 
the causal impact of the EU across its member states. Similarly, although the EMU 
design is very close to the German monetarist model, researchers have not discounted 
its causal effect in promoting reforms not only across Europe but also in Germany 
where this design originated (cf. Dyson and Goetz 2003). 
  
 
3.2. Establishing causality in OMC studies  
As described in the above section on Europeanization studies, criticism against 
the possibility of establishing causality in the case of the OMC has been raised due to 
similar concerns. For example, since the EES/OMC stimuli coexist with those of 
other international organisations, such as the OECD (with its Jobs Strategy), that also 
aim to influence ideas and knowledge in policy making, it was declared impossible - 
or at best extremely treacherous - to attempt to distinguish between the EU and other 
external stimuli (Büchs 2008; Kröger 2009). One counter-argument to this is that the 
EU has added value even when the EU stimuli are identical to those of other 
organisations: if, for instance, the EU, the OECD and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) promote the same policy, but domestic policy change occurs as a 
result of EU related mechanisms uncovered through social science methodology then 
Europeanization can be accepted as an explanation of the observed policy change 
despite overlap in policy content with other international organisations (cf. 
Moumoutzis 2011). In addition, this critique neglects some key differences between 
the EES and the OECD stimuli identified in the existing literature: (i) the EES is 
different from the OECD Jobs strategy as was convincingly shown by Casey (2004) 
and Schelkle and Mabbett (2006); (ii) the recommendations of the OECD - contrary 
to EU policies - have no sticks and carrots as the EU can employ financial incentives 
(ESF funding) as well as other forms of persuasion and dissuasion (see section 2.2 of 
Chapter 1); (iii) the EES is characterised by a high level of political participation both 
in the policy formulation phase (through the input of the Council of Ministers) and in 
the monitoring process (through the annual European Council spring summits). In 
this respect, the EES differs substantially from the peer review process of the 
previous soft law in the EU, and those of the OECD where the monitoring phases are 
typically managed at an administrative level, and therefore, constitute an 
administrative and technocratic process than a political one (Borrás and Jacobsson, 
2004: 189). This does not mean that other external stimuli cannot be considered as 
alternative explanations for domestic policy change. As described in the first chapter, 
in the bottom-up research design of Europeanization studies researchers start from an 
empirical puzzle and ‘go up’ trying to find an explanation for it.  ence, research can 
examine whether Europe, the OECD, or any other external variable or domestic 
actors’ agenda can explain any given empirical puzzle. 
  
The second criticism levelled at the possibility of establishing causality between 
the EES/OMC and domestic impact concerns the EES/OMC decision making-
process: examining the impact of the OMC on member states is futile since: (i) the 
EES guidelines and country recommendations are voted by ministers or heads of state 
in the (European) Council; (ii) national actors upload their preferences to the EU level 
(Büchs 2008). However, the fact that national governments are key in defining the 
EES stimuli (cf. de la Porte 2011), does not necessarily mean that examining its 
domestic impact is conceptually or methodologically problematic. Arguing so may 
result from a misinterpretation of the EU decision-making processes. For instance, in 
both Unanimity and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) member states rarely impose 
their will on others since most of the time a consensus is achieved among different 
voices (cf. Hix and Hoyland 2010; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 
2001; Tsebelis G. et al. 2001; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006; for a similar argument on 
the theoretical and methodological issues of Europeanization studies, see: 
Moumoutzis 2011 and Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2010). The two existing in-depth 
studies of the EES meetings (Deganis 2006; Thedvall 2006) agree that the EES 
stimuli are the result of a fluid process where two loose coalitions of member states 
(one liberal and one pro-social model one) try to shape the EES agenda. These 
discussions are based on a consensual and deliberative spirit (Deganis 2006: 27). In 
other words, the fact that the Council is central to the EES, says nothing about its 
potential influence or not. A scientific analysis can then examine whether and, if so, 
to what extent any given member state downloaded the EES stimuli.  
In a similar vein, the OMC has been critiqued as being too vague and non-
binding (Scharpf 2002), and a gratuitous evasion of commitment and accountability 
that characterizes the Community Method (Chalmers and Lodge 2003). The logical 
question that follows is why national governments raised expectations and engaged in 
‘cheap talk’ which may end up being politically costly (Schelkle 2005: 150). OMC 
‘sceptics’ respond that the EES/OMC is another incidence of the ‘new politics of 
welfare state’ (Pierson 1996; 2000) where domestic actors use it opportunistically as a 
scapegoat to promote their agenda of unpopular welfare retrenchment. The role of the 
EU, therefore, is not causal; it is merely a tool in the domestic arena for pro-reform 
governments against domestic opposition rendering the EU’s importance marginal 
and/or false.  
This critique also has a number of weaknesses. If the EES were to be used as a 
scapegoat in domestic reforms then it would have a causal role as one could argue 
  
that without it, EES-related reforms would not go ahead. So while the EES may not 
be a sole cause in bringing about change it is a necessary one for reform to occur. 
However, scapegoating may not accurately depict the role of the EES in any case. It 
would be unlikely for national actors to claim that the EES makes change inevitable 
(and therefore use it as a scapegoat) as governments are not legally obliged to follow 
the EES recommendations. In addition, a number of Europeanization studies have 
shown that the EU can alter the structure domestic opportunities and lead to external 
empowerment (see Chapter 2) so what is labelled as a scapegoating process may 
more accurately be described as a process of empowerment.  
In sum, this section argued that not only is the examination of the EES’ 
domestic impact possible, but also that research in the field should include alternative 
(external and domestic) explanations.  
 
4. Methodology  
In testing the hypothesis of the thesis and the different Europeanization 
pathways, the empirical inquiry will not presume an Europeanization effect a priori. 
It will follow a ‘bottom-up’ approach (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). Accordingly, 
this thesis will begin its research from the puzzling reforms mentioned above and will 
investigate whether, how and to what extent the EES had a role in these reforms 
without excluding other variables. Indeed, in order to establish causality between the 
EES and domestic developments this thesis will test its proposed hypothesis against 
alternative explanations. As will be discussed in chapter 2, the main alternative 
explanations will be other international influences (namely the United Nations (UN) 
Beijing Action for Women and the OECD Jobs Strategy) and/or purely domestic 
explanations, such as existing (pre-EES) preferences and non-governmental actors 
(trade unions, NGOs, activists) demanding governmental action which led to these 
policy shifts. Empirical evidence confirming these alternative explanations would be: 
(i) the existence of a pre-EES domestic agenda that would define the observed policy 
change (for instance, an electoral promise made by the ruling party and subsequently 
implemented in the form of the examined policy shifts); and/or (ii) a policy change 
that was implemented as a response to a non-EES stimulus as apparent in the content, 
temporal sequence and rationale of the reform in question (for instance, domestic 
change would be consistent with the requirements of a non-EES stimulus and the 
events related to the change would show a weak association with the EES stimuli).  
  
The main methodology employed will be that of process tracing (cf. Van Evera 
1997 and Checkel 2005). This method focuses on the examination of the chain of 
events and temporal sequences between the independent and dependent variables. In 
this respect, the thesis will examine domestic policies and agendas before and after 
the introduction of the EES stimuli and will ‘go up’ to find whether the EES can 
explain the puzzle of this thesis (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009: 510). Process 
tracing is usually supported by the following tools: qualitative content analysis of 
official documents, media, academic and specialist publications; the examination of 
temporal sequencing of events and decisions; and interviews with key informants (in 
total 44 interviews were conducted; for a list of the people interviewed, see: 
Appendix I).  
Consequently, the empirical study will triangulate different forms of evidence 
and methods by taking into account the following: 
 Primary evidence from: 
o Semi-Structured interviews with key policy makers, informants, experts 
and trade unionists using a voice recorder complemented with personal 
hand-written notes. All quotes included in this thesis were recorded using a 
voice recorder. The Greek quotes are exact transcripts translated to English 
by the author of the thesis. The Portuguese quotes were recorded in English 
and are included as exact transcripts. The interviewees gave their consent 
for the use of their quotes and attributing the quotes to them. 
o The target population was defined as individuals involved directly (policy 
makers and advisors) or indirectly (experts) in the policy making process in 
Greek and Portuguese employment policy. The population did not include 
those who were not involved in the policy process (e.g. NGOs, research 
institutes, and most social partners) or those who were the target of 
employment policy (e.g. the unemployed). The study population was 
defined as such because the focus of the research is on Europeanization 
pathways (whether, how and to what extent the EES affected domestic 
policy making) and not on the social impact or implementation of policy 
public policy. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the EES and the plausible 
pathways of EES-induced domestic change are characterised by close-knit 
groups of policy makers which rendered the process elitist according to 
most of the literature. As will be shown in the empirical chapters (Chapters 
  
3-7) and discussed in the conclusions (Chapter 8) the elitist nature of the 
EES was corroborated by the empirical evidence collected in the thesis. 
o Purposive sampling was used to select the sample of interviewees from the 
population of individuals involved in the policy process. The sample was 
identified by using the snow-balling technique. This technique has been 
used in research to locate subjects belonging to concealed and hard-to-
reach populations, such as the deprived, the stigmatised (e.g. drug addicts) 
and the elites (Atkinson and Flint 2004). The main principle of snowballing 
is that researchers use informants to suggest other cases and informants that 
would be useful to be included in the study (Kemper et al. 2003). This 
technique is deemed appropriate to penetrate the unknown and rather close-
knit ministerial elites involved in Greek and Portuguese policy making.  
o EU documents and OECD reports published in the period of mid-1990s 
until 2012 (e.g. National Action Plans and evaluation reports); 
o National Governments’ documents including laws, reform announcements, 
policy papers and any other related material to the case studies of the 
thesis; 
o Party manifestos and key national policy documents which referred to the 
case studies of the thesis;  
o All relevant reports from the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound); 
o Speeches and statements made by members of government, opposition and 
social partners; 
o Parliamentary debates; 
 Secondary evidence from the academic and policy literature. 
 
The research was conducted in three main stages. The first included a 
preliminary review of the existing academic and policy literature on the EES and its 
effects on member states’ policy (Europeanization). This led to the identification of a 
significant research gap in the cases of Greece and Portugal. In addition, the literature 
revealed a number of reasons why both countries represented two least-likely cases of 
EES-induced Europeanization as discussed in section 1 of this chapter. To address the 
research gap on Greece and Portugal and their response to the EES, primary data was 
collected through interviews with key informants. Additional empirical evidence was 
collected through an extensive online search for secondary and primary documentary 
  
evidence (sources included the Eurofound database, and the EU’s web-portal 
Europa.eu.) as well as documents cited by the interviewees in this study.  
Interviewees were specifically asked to indicate public documents in which their or 
their party’s positions were outlined. Further, national press documents were 
reviewed using the databases of Kathimerini and TO VIMA newspapers in Greece 
and the databases of Público and Diário de Notícias in Portugal.  
The second stage was the implementation of the fieldwork which was 
comprised of the conduction of interviews. A total of forty four interviews were 
conducted during March-June 2009 in Greece and March-June 2010 in Portugal. 
Between these two periods, some interviews were conducted in Brussels during 
September 2009 and July 2010 with Greek and Portuguese representatives to the EU 
institutions respectively identified through the snowballing technique. Finally, the 
third stage involved the combination of the interview data the primary and secondary 
documentary evidence, and the examination of the material against the conceptual 
model described in the next chapter.   
 
5. Scope and limitations of the research 
Unsurprisingly, the project has certain limitations. The study design is limited 
to two countries and three policy sectors in its comparative method which limits its 
generalisability (cf. Héritier 2001). For instance, it is unlikely that the findings of this 
study will be applicable to countries with very different characteristics from those of 
Greece and Portugal. These include countries with a very efficient political system 
and bureaucracy; a very developed welfare state; a very active and strong civil 
society; a developed policy community; and citizens and elites holding a Euro-sceptic 
stance (cf. Graziano et al. 2011). However, the findings of this research may be 
relevant for other countries on the EU periphery. The scope of this thesis will be 
limited to one broad policy area (employment policy) and, thus, its findings are 
relevant mainly to regulatory social policies less applicable to transfer policies such 
as pensions or taxation.  
Additionally, this work does not deal with questions relating to the nature of the 
EU stimuli (EES and ESF) and the implications in EU governance, democracy, or 
legitimacy of policy making. Further, it will not examine the EES stimuli’s origin. 
These two avenues of research go beyond the scope of this study which - as described 
above - is concerned with the domestic impact of the EES on domestic policy. 
Moreover, this thesis is not a policy evaluation study as it does not examine the 
  
implementation on the ground of policy outputs, namely how far the policy changes 
made a difference in the domestic labour market (for the different types of public 
policy studies, see: Howlett and Maresh 2003). In other words, it seeks to be a policy 
agenda study which examines the reasons behind certain policy outputs rather than 
policy outcomes (employment/unemployment rates). The latter are affected by such a 
large number of variables that the delineation of the EES’s impact is practically 
unfeasible. In addition, proceeding into a policy evaluation study is that this research 
avenue goes beyond the scope of this study, that is, whether, how and to what extent 
the EES altered domestic policy.  
Another limitation of this thesis is that it has not collected fieldwork evidence 
from individuals who were not involved in the policy process (e.g. NGOs, research 
institutes and most social partners) or those who were the target of employment 
policy (e.g. the unemployed). The choice of the study population derived from the 
research question which was to trace and explain possible EES-induced 
Europeanization pathways. While information from these actors would have been 
useful for an evaluation of policy impact the latter was not the focus of the thesis.  
 
6. Contribution 
This study aims to make several empirical and theoretical contributions to the 
existing EES, OMC, Europeanization and comparative politics literatures. 
Empirically, it attempts to provide a sound explanation and better understanding in 
employment policy making and welfare reforms. It also aims to shed light on the 
impact of the EES on national employment policy making. Further, the thesis will 
examine different policy areas in which the EES stimuli differ. As part of its 
investigation of the effect of different types of EU stimuli, furthermore, the thesis 
will examine in depth the role of the ESF financial conditionality in promoting EES-
induced reforms - something that has been neglected in the literature. The goal of this 
comparison is to draw general conclusions on what kinds of EES stimuli and which 
conditions work best to promote substantive policy change in employment policy 
defined as Europeanization. In addition, because Greece and Portugal belong to the 
world of transposition neglect and also have a significant policy gap between their 
domestic policies and European policy, they pose a real test for the EES’s ability to 
influence member states’ employment policy. Thus, this thesis aims to find which 
conditions may promote Europeanization of member states’ employment policy 
when the EU stimuli are primarily based on soft law.  
  
Moreover, this study’s ambition is to fill an important empirical gap in the field 
of study. Existing literature on the EES impact on Greece and Portugal can be divided 
into two main categories: (i) comparative studies; and (ii) in-depth single case studies. 
The main comparative projects are the Govecor project (Govecor 2004; Linsenmann 
et al. 2007) and a number of edited volumes and special issues which tried to provide 
a broad account of the EES impact on member states (Zeitlin and Pochet with 
Magnusson 2005; Foden and Magnusson 2003; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Kröger 
2009; Graziano et al. 2011). This thesis builds on these studies but also advances the 
field of study by tackling some of their limitations. Greece is not always included in 
comparative studies, while Portugal is included only in the Govecor study. In 
addition, most of these studies are outdated as their last year of reference is the five 
year assessment of the first EES period of 2003 (Govecor 2004; Linsenmann et al. 
2007; Zeitlin and Pochet with Magnusson 2005; Foden and Magnusson 2003). 
Further, they do not follow a common theoretical and methodological framework – 
something that significantly limits the validity of their overall conclusions. The only 
comparative study available that includes both Greece and Portugal and has a time 
frame lasting until 2010 (see: Sotiropoulos 2011 for Greece; Zartaloudis 2011 for 
Portugal) does not focus on the key policy areas investigated in this thesis.  
Although both countries are under-researched and excluded from most 
comparative research projects, there have been a few studies on the Europeanization 
of social policy (including employment policy) in both countries (for Greece, see: 
Sotiropoulos 2004b; Featherstone 2005b; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; 
Petmesidou and Mossialos 2006; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas 2003; Johnson 2003; 
Feronas 2007; Karamessini 2006; Ioakeimides 2001; for Portugal see: Guillen et al. 
2003; 2001; Silva 2009; 2011). In addition, there have been some in-depth studies on 
labour market and pension reforms in Greece (Featherstone 2005b; Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008), on GM in Greece (Karamessini 2006), a number of comparative 
studies from the Expert Group on Gender, Social Inclusion and Employment 
(EGGSIE) on the measures included in the NAPs/NRPs for GM in all EU members 
(Rubery et al. 2005; 2006; 2007), two papers on the impact of the EES in Greece 
(Johnson 2003 and Feronas 2007). Besides Karamessini who examined the promotion 
of GM in Greece until 2002 and Silva who examined the Portuguese PES reform, 
none of the aforementioned investigations focus on the policy areas of the thesis. This 
thesis will build on these studies and try to advance the existing literature.  
 
  
Conclusions 
The EES was introduced in 1997 with the aim of promoting a stronger role for 
the EU in the co-ordination of member states’ employment policies. As the 
significance of the EES has been hotly debated in the literature, this thesis aims to 
explore its impact on two cases that are least likely to show evidence of significant 
EES-induced change. This chapter outlined the main components of the thesis: it 
presented the puzzle and case studies; it described its variables, conceptual 
framework and research hypothesis; and discussed its research methodology, 
limitations and contribution.  
The outline of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 will provide 
the theoretical framework of this study by critically discussing the Europeanization 
and EES/OMC literatures and justifying the conceptual framework of this work 
(briefly described in section 2.3 of this chapter). Chapter 2 will also argue that 
establishing causality in Europeanization and OMC studies is possible though some 
of the suggested EES-related Europeanization mechanisms are problematic in 
examining this area. Chapters 3-7 contain the empirical research conducted as part of 
the thesis investigation: Chapter 3 will examine the Greek PES reform, arguing that 
empirical evidence indicated that the EES altered the Greek PES significantly via the 
ESF conditionality; Chapter 4 will study the Portuguese PES reform arguing that 
according to the research findings it appeared that the EES transformed Portuguese 
employment policy by empowering a group of policy entrepreneurs aiming to alter 
Portuguese social (including employment) policy; Chapter 5 will discuss the Greek 
gender equality reforms arguing that -similarly to the Greek PES case- it appeared 
that the EES promoted gender equality in Greek employment policy through the ESF 
conditionality; Chapter 6 will focus on the Portuguese gender equality reforms 
arguing that the empirical evidence suggested that the EES impact occurred through 
the empowerment of a group of pro-gender equality experts; finally, Chapter 7 will 
examine the Greek and Portuguese flexicurity cases arguing that the evidence 
collected in the fieldwork suggested that the impact of the EES in both countries was 
very low. Chapter 8 will conclude by discussing the thesis findings, contributions and 
implications to the field of study and the limitations of the findings.  
 
  
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework of this thesis. It first critically 
reviews the Europeanization and Open Method of Coordination (OMC) literatures 
and presents the conceptual choices of this study. The second part of this chapter 
scrutinises Europeanization’s and OMC’s causal mechanisms.  ere, I argue that a 
number of them are not so useful in examining the impact of the EES on member 
states; hence, I propose that there are three key mechanisms for the impact of the EES 
on domestic policy.   
 
1. Europeanization: conceptualising the domestic impact of the European 
Union 
In order to examine the impact of the EES on domestic employment policy this 
thesis uses the Europeanization approach. This study will not employ the traditional 
compliance approach (cf. Falkner et al. 2005; Falkner and Treib 2008; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) as the EES stimuli are based on soft law, 
which are not legally binding and therefore do not produce an adaptational or 
compliance necessity. Consequently, any identifiable EES-induced change cannot be 
the result of compliance but of a more voluntary and open-ended process of (EU-
induced) change which can be best conceptualised using the Europeanization 
approach. This section discusses the Europeanization literature, arguing that studies 
using the Europeanization concept require the researcher to make a set of analytical 
choices. The notion of Europeanization, is quite recent in the academic literature (for 
a detailed study of the history, usage and typology of the term, see: Featherstone 
2003; Dyson and Goetz 2003; Olsen 2002). Even though the concept became 
increasingly popular, it faces some existential problems: few writers have sought to 
define its precise meaning (Featherstone 2003: 12); it did not develop as a theory; and 
it has been used as heuristic concept that has evolved in a variable and open-ended 
way to accommodate the need of scholars to capture the complex changes that result 
from European integration (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 14). This variety and the 
  
contradictory perspectives used to define the term, bring to mind Puchala’s (1972) 
classic metaphor of the blind men and the elephant.  
More specifically, the term has been used to describe both uploading and 
downloading processes. According to the literature, these two perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive. Börzel (2002) and Bulmer and Burch (2001) argue that 
Europeanization is a two-way process. Member states upload their preferences to 
Brussels via complex negotiations and download them from various EU policy menus 
(as cited in Radaelli 2003: 34). Likewise, Goetz (2002: 4) argues that 
‘Europeanization is circular rather than unidirectional and cyclical rather than one-
off’. This thesis, however, adheres to Radaelli’s view that in analytical terms a 
distinction should be made between the process leading to the formation of a certain 
policy, and the reverberation of that policy in national arenas because unless this 
distinction is drawn, Europeanization ‘would be exactly the same as the concept of 
‘EU policy process’, which included both uploading and downloading’ (2003: 34). In 
addition, in this thesis uploading is not perceived as compatible with the notion of 
Europeanization as this has been the focus of other theoretical approaches of 
European integration, namely neo-functionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism 
(cf. Radaelli 2003; Moumoutzis 2011).  
Europeanization as downloading can be seen in two perspectives (Dyson and 
Goetz 2003: 14-16): the top-down and the bottom-up. The top-down approach 
focuses on the changes induced at the domestic level as a consequence of the ‘misfit’ 
between the European and the national levels. The bottom-up approach focuses on 
domestic opportunity structures and illustrates how domestic actors make use of the 
EU in order to promote their own agenda and legitimise policy reforms, develop new 
policy solutions or minimize the costs of the implementation of European policies 
(Börzel 2005: 63). Consequently, this thesis makes the following conceptual choices. 
It understands Europeanization as a downloading process of EU policies. In addition, 
it adopts Radaelli’s definition which states that Europeanization refers to (2003: 30):  
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures, and public policies.  
 
Radaelli’s definition offers a number of advantages in the study of the impact of 
the EES on domestic employment policy. It has a clear downloading focus, stresses 
  
the importance of change, and encompasses all types of EU stimuli for domestic 
change by referring to ‘EU public policy’ (including those which are not targeted 
towards law making, such as the OMC). It also stresses the making of policy, without 
assuming that there is a coherent layer of EU decisions from which Europeanization 
descends. This allows for the examination of Europeanization in soft law areas where 
member states have significant freedom in the downloading process. It restricts 
Europeanization only to EU level developments in policy by ignoring processes that 
go beyond the EU dimension, such as the development of the European identity and 
culture, the imitation and transfer of policy between EU countries without the 
involvement of the EU (Radaelli 2003: 30-31). Thus, Europeanization refers to EU 
induced domestic change in discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies.  
However, the aforementioned definition has some limitations. Featherstone 
(2003) offers a succinct critique by highlighting three main problems: first, the focus 
on construction, diffusion and institutionalisation is wide-ranging; second, the 
emphasis on phenomena which start at EU level and then affect the domestic level 
‘begs a ‘chicken and egg’ question: which comes first? Or, who is affecting whom?’ 
(2003: 18); third, the notion of logic of domestic policies, discourse and structures is 
ambiguous. To overcome these shortcomings construction, diffusion and 
institutionalisation of EES stimuli were defined in terms of its dependent and 
independent variables (see: Chapter 1). Additionally, an analytical distinction is 
drawn between the creation of EU stimuli and their effect on domestic policy. The 
focus is not on how EU stimuli were constructed but their domestic impact. 
Moreover, the fact that member states participate in the formulation of EU policies is 
not necessarily an ontological limitation of Europeanization research (see Section 3.1 
of Chapter 1). Further, the case studies chosen to answer the research question of the 
thesis (as well as other Southern, Central and Eastern European countries) are 
characterised by institutional and policy voids, by low policy making capabilities and 
a lack of state resources necessary to upload national preferences to the EU level 
(Dyson and Goetz 2003: 19; see also: Börzel 2002). 
 
2. Europeanization’s Causal Mechanisms 
According to Börzel and Risse the main concern of the Europeanization 
literature is ‘no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in 
what direction, at what pace and at what point in time’ (2003: 60). This section will 
  
try to identify the causal mechanisms through which Europe can affect member 
states’ policies.  
 
2.1. The standard Europeanization mechanism and its weaknesses 
A number of causal mechanisms have been put forward in Europeanization 
studies (cf. Featherstone 2003; Börzel 2005). In summarising the literature, Börzel 
and Risse argue that most of them share two main propositions: first, in order for 
Europeanization to take place ‘there must be some degree of ‘misfit’ or 
incompatibility between European-level processes, policies, and institutions, on the 
one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions on the other’ (2003: 
58). This degree of fit or misfit creates a degree of adaptational pressure which is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for expecting domestic change. Domestic 
change is also dependent on mediating factors (actors, and/or institutions) that 
respond to the adaptational pressure and either enable or resist domestic change.  
 
2.1.1. Europeanization as a result of misfits? 
The necessity of misfit in answering the question of ‘how’ Europe affects 
member states, however, is not unanimously accepted. Four key objections have been 
raised: (i) EU and domestic legal frameworks, institutions and public policies have no 
absolute existence but are open to political interpretation and negotiation; thus, fits 
and misfits are not given; (ii) in the uploading perspective domestic actors seek to 
export their preferences to the EU level, so the misfits are purposively engineered 
(Dyson and Goetz 2003: 19); (iii) institutional and policy voids are increasingly 
observed across Europe: most of the 25 member states (especially Southern, Central 
and Eastern European countries) joined EU without fully developed institutional and 
policy frameworks; (iv) the goodness of fit explanation seems to be not so suitable for 
the various forms of horizontal Europeanization (e.g. the EES) which, contrary to the 
vertical mechanisms which work through adaptational pressure, involve different 
forms of framing (Radaelli 2003; Dyson and Goetz 2003).  
However, some of these objections are also problematic. The conditional 
existence of misfits does not mean that misfits are not necessary for the beginning of 
Europeanization as the process can start when misfits have been negotiated and 
interpreted. It is both theoretically and empirically impossible to assume that all 
negotiations between the EU and domestic actors always conclude with an agreement 
resulting in a fit between EU and national arrangements. Moreover, the obstacles that 
  
policy voids pose to the Europeanization pressures should not be underestimated. For 
instance, a policy void may exist in the area of gender equality (lack of gender 
equality promotion) but it is not possible to know in advance whether this is a result 
of underdevelopment or of a deliberate choice due to cultural and socio-political 
reasons. Thus, as policy voids exist for specific reasons that may result (especially if 
they exist for cultural, political or other reasons that go against EU policies) in a clash 
between EU stimuli and domestic arrangements. In other words, policy voids are 
considered to be a type of policy misfit between EU and domestic arrangements. 
However, the question is not whether a misfit exists or not but whether there is 
a concept that can encompass all potential EU-domestic inconveniences. Although 
the traditional definition of misfit is not directly applicable to soft law policy areas 
since soft law is non-coercive and the ECJ does not have any authority in its 
implementation, the concept is useful to identify any possible differences or gaps 
between EU and domestic arrangements. Therefore, in this research the existence of a 
misfit does not imply a deterministic adaptational pressure for member states: even 
though there may be a misfit between EU and national arrangements this difference 
does not entail a justiciable misfit, or an ensuing pressure for member states to act in 
order to resolve it. Rather, in this definition member states are able to interpret 
misfits, use them according to their existing agenda negotiate them or even ignore 
them.  
 
2.1.2. The different logics of EU-induced change 
The second part of the traditional Europeanization mechanism is related to the 
different approaches in understanding the context under which Europeanization takes 
place. In summarising the literature on the causal mechanisms of Europeanization, 
Börzel and Risse (2003) argue that there are two main logics of domestic change 
emanating from the theoretical traditions of rational and sociological institutionalism 
(see: March and Olsen 1989, 1998; Hall and Taylor 1996). Both approaches focus on 
domestic (intervening) actors and on the EU’s impact on their environment and 
behaviour. Studies drawing on rational choice institutionalism perceive EU-induced 
change as an emerging political opportunity structure which redistributes the 
available resources in the policy arena between actors. This redistribution results in a 
differential empowerment to rational profit maximizing domestic actors: European 
policies offer additional resources to some in exerting influence while others face 
additional constraints in pursuing their interests (Börzel and Risse 2003; Börzel 
  
2005). Consequently, domestic change is the result of actors behaving rationally after 
EU-induced differential empowerment. Whether, and to what extent, this will occur 
depends on the capacity of domestic actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid 
the constraints. Two mediating variables influence these capacities. First, veto points: 
the more power is dispersed and the greater the number of actors that have a say in 
the political system, the harder it will be to form a winning coalition which is 
necessary to introduce the Europeanizing pressure (Tsebelis 1995; Haverland 2000; 
Héritier et al. 2001). Second, facilitating formal institutions: when these exist they 
may provide domestic actors with material and ideational resources to exploit new 
opportunities, leading to an increased probability of change (Risse, et al. 2001). These 
resources may be material, such as utilizing European funding to facilitate change or 
ideational, such as importing ideas to the same end (Börzel 2005: 53).  
However, this framework perceives the preferences of national governments as 
constants or given. They are stable before and after the EU differential empowerment 
as the role of the EU is to change the balance of power between rational actors. 
Treating preferences as secondary derives from the ‘logic of consequentialism’ which 
the rationalist account uses (March and Olsen 1984; 1998). Moreover, 
Europeanization studies using this framework assume the existence of a misfit 
between EU and national level which creates adaptational pressure. Thus, the context 
of action is defined and redefined by the ‘goodness of fit’.  owever, in the case of the 
OMC this is not applicable as neither justiciable misfits nor adaptational pressures 
exist. As a result, it is up to national policy makers to promote change or ignore the 
EES stimuli. In other words, the ‘differential empowerment’ logic of domestic change 
in areas where there is no justiciable misfit is not automatic but dependent on whether 
it is highlighted by domestic actors (Dyson and Goetz 2003). 
However, in areas where there is no automatic redistribution of resources - as in 
the EES - and active involvement of domestic actors is required to the change of 
domestic opportunity structures, Kingdon’s (1984) model of policy windows provides 
a very useful theoretical framework for empirical research. According to this model, 
policy entrepreneurs exploit agenda-setting opportunities (policy windows) to move 
items onto formal governmental agendas. Such opportunities can be seized upon or 
not by policy entrepreneurs who are able to recognize and act upon them (Howlett 
and Maresh 2003: 135). Kingdon argues that there must be a combination of at least 
two of the three sets of streams for an issue to become policy: problem streams 
(problem recognition); policy streams (examination and choice of solutions) and 
  
political streams (change in governments, national mood and interest group 
campaigns). For Kingdon it is up to ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to link policy problems, 
solutions and opportunities. Policy entrepreneurs may be politicians, civil servants or 
pressure group leaders with issues they want to put on the public agenda – just like 
‘surfers waiting for the big wave’ (Kingdon 1995: 225). When these policy 
entrepreneurs achieve this linking a policy window is opened and public policy 
begins. The existence of policy entrepreneurs is not enough; they should also be 
successful in coupling problems, solutions and opportunities; success is more likely 
when policy entrepreneurs have access to power (usually) and resources that can 
enable them to push their agenda (Zahariadis 2007).  
Kingdon’s model allows a more nuanced understanding of the EES/OMC as an 
Europeanization stimulus. The EES can be perceived as a new opportunity, which 
allows domestic actors to link their problem recognition and identified solutions, and 
thus, succeed in putting their issues onto formal governmental agenda. As it is up to 
domestic actors to exploit the EES window of opportunity, this conceptualisation 
differs substantially from the classic rational choice differential empowerment model 
as it assumes a much less deterministic and automatic redistribution of resources: 
policy entrepreneurs have to actively exploit the EES opportunity and push their 
agenda of problems and solutions (for a more detailed discussion on the differences 
between Kingdon’s model and rationalism, see: Zahariadis 2007: 66-70; Howlett and 
Ramesh 2003: 135-8; Schlager 2007).  
The second approach of Europeanization is the sociological variant of new 
institutionalism which follows the logic of ‘appropriateness’ in which domestic 
change happens because domestic actors are socialised into adopting the ‘right thing 
to do’. Similarly to the rationalist institutionalism approaches, sociological 
institutionalism suggests that there are two main mediating factors which influence 
the degree of domestic change. First, there are ‘change agents’ or norm entrepreneurs 
who mobilize forces in the domestic context and persuade other actors to redefine 
their interests and identities by using moral arguments. Second, there is a political 
culture and other informal cooperative institutions which are conducive to consensus-
building and cost-sharing. As argued in chapter 1, Greece and Portugal do not have a 
consensual political culture and have weak cooperative institutions. With regard to 
the first mediating factor, the literature highlights two types of norm entrepreneurs: 
epistemic communities and advocacy or principled issue networks. Epistemic 
communities are defined as ‘networks of professionals with recognised expertise and 
  
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area’ ( aas 1992: 3). Epistemic communities 
are more influential in inducing change the greater the uncertainty about cause and 
effect relationships among policy makers in the particular policy area, the higher the 
consensus among scientists involved, and the more scientific advice is 
institutionalized in the policy process. In employment policy, such actors may be 
technocrats or high skilled policy makers or academics who are considered as 
national experts.  
Advocacy or principled issue networks are bound together by shared beliefs and 
values rather than consensual knowledge. They appeal to collectively shared norms. 
However, the thesis deviates from the traditional sociological account of reliance only 
on norms by following the traditional definition of advocacy coalition
30
 (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998) which acts upon both normative and interest 
based considerations. Nonetheless, this thesis argues that despite its merits, the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) framework is not useful for this thesis as it 
envisages that it will be highly unlikely to find an advocacy coalition in EU member 
states’ employment policy. This field of public policy is quite closed as it involves 
few actors and, therefore, usually deviates from the pluralist and multi-actor policy 
environment of US public policy – a criticism that has been widely raised against the 
ACF (cf. Skogstad 2001; Dudley et al. 2000).  
 
2.2. OMC-related Europeanization mechanisms  
The literature has used a plethora of concepts and mechanisms to conceptualize 
the domestic impact of the OMC, such as policy learning, policy transfer, 
deliberation, participation, peer-pressure, shaming, diffusion and mimicking. All 
these different approaches in conceptualising the OMC’s domestic impact have been 
categorised by Trubek and Trubek (2005) within a top-down versus bottom-up axis, 
arguing that these different mechanisms are not necessarily exclusive. However, 
bottom-up, horizontal, or non-hierarchical mechanisms
31
 are not incorporated into 
this thesis as they are incompatible with the definition of the concept of 
                                                          
30
 According to Sabatier and Jekins-Smith (1993) an advocacy coalition consists of actors from a 
variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs 
(policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate rules, budgets and 
personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time. 
31
 ‘Bottom up’ is understood as the efforts of national policy makers to influence the EU/EES agenda 
and/or policy; ‘horizontal’ refers to processes of influence between MS which is a rather 
intergovernmental process of policy change; ‘non-hierarchical’ pathways are also excluded as they is 
incompatible with the top down approach to Europeanization. 
  
Europeanization of this thesis. Hence this section will critically discuss only top-
down OMC-related mechanisms of domestic change. 
 
2.2.1.  Policy Learning  
The first and foremost mechanism suggested in the literature is policy learning. 
The OMC’s promise of ‘spreading of best practises’ led to the dominance of this 
mechanism in the literature (Begg and Berghman 2002; Berghman et al. 2003; de la 
Porte and Pochet 2002; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; Ferrera et al. 2002; Heidenreich 
2009; Trubek and Mosher 2003; Trubek and Trubek 2005; Wincott 2003; Zeitlin 
2005; cf. Kröger 2009: 1-5; Borrás and Radaelli 2010). Through this mechanism, 
policy change occurs because of a change in the perceptions of policy makers’. 
However, the concept of learning has been used in a twofold fashion in the literature.  
The first approach understands learning as the result of a voluntary and rational 
process during which policy makers evaluate past experiences and new information. 
 eclo (1974: 306) defines policy learning as a ‘relatively enduring’ change ‘in 
thought or behavioural intention’ resulting ‘from experience and/or new information 
concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives’ (Heclo 1974: 306). 
According to another key figure in this literature, policy learning should result in ‘a 
deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy’ and it is traced 
empirically when ‘policy changes as the result of such a process’ ( all 1993: 278). In 
other words, a change in the perceptions of policy makers albeit important is not 
enough as the ultimate evidence of policy learning is policy change. As the famous 
typology of Hall (1993) states, learning can involve policy change in the settings of 
these instruments (first order change – lowest degree of change), the techniques or 
policy instruments used to attain them (second order change – moderate degree of 
change), and finally, the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field (third 
order change – highest degree of change).32 The second approach can be found in the 
constructivist studies on social learning and deliberation (Risse 2000; Checkel 1999; 
2001, 2003; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001) and understands learning as the result of 
socialization and deliberation (Chiattelli 2008: 59).  
This study will employ the first variant of the learning concept. It will not 
examine the second as establishing the occurrence of this type of learning is 
impossible in this study. Establishing the existence of social learning would 
necessitate the close observation of group dynamics in isolated social environments, 
                                                          
32
 For an analogous classification see Argyris and Schon 1978 on single and double loop learning.  
  
such as closed networks and committee meetings. Besides methodological challenges, 
this kind of learning refers to a greater extent to issues of identity and general 
understanding which go beyond the focus of my thesis. Hence, in this thesis learning 
is rational and voluntary: policy makers alter their preferences because they choose to 
do so. This thesis argues that policy learning may be the Europeanization pathway 
when the observed policy change is linked to a learning process in which national 
policy makers changed their preferences with regard to their country’s employment 
policy content.  
 
2.2.2.  Naming and Shaming and Peer Pressure 
Another particularly popular mechanism in the OMC literature is naming and 
shaming and peer-pressure. The literature has used these mechanisms interchangeably 
to refer to the negative implications that national participants will face in the OMC 
meetings if their country is under-performing vis-à-vis the OMC’s benchmarks. As a 
result, member states will comply with the OMC’s soft law in order to avoid naming 
and shaming or because of the pressure of the OMC deliberations (Büchs 2008; 
Trubek and Trubek 2005). These two mechanisms provide an alternative to the hard 
law coercion as the OMC creates a need for compliance. In the following, it is argued 
that these mechanisms are not identical and that their assumptions are problematic. 
Therefore, their explanatory power is limited.  
To begin with, naming and shaming and peer-pressure should not be regarded 
as identical or synonymous as they entail one key difference: naming and shaming 
requires publicity, while peer-pressure does not. More specifically, it is argued that 
naming and shaming puts pressure to comply with the OMC stimuli through the 
OMC reviews in combination with publicity. As a result, national policy makers will 
be obliged to change their policy in order to avoid negative OMC feedback which 
highlights poor performance among member states’ (Trubek and Trubek 2005: 357). 
For instance, if every year a country is identified as a bad performer relative to the 
EES benchmarks, public opinion will react negatively (Büchs 2008). In this 
reasoning, there is a direct interplay between the OMC and national electorates: 
national governments have to maintain balance between EU and national spheres. 
They cannot allow being named and shamed by the EU as a country which fails to 
achieve common targets or underperforms in some benchmarks. To avoid the 
negative repercussions of the OMC’s ‘soft punishment’, governments will be 
incentivised to comply with the OMC.  
  
In contrast, peer-pressure does not require any publicity or interplay between 
OMC performance and public opinion. In this mechanism Europeanization is the 
result of a pressure that domestic policy makers feel when participating in the OMC 
meetings from the representatives of other member states. In order to satisfy their 
peers and avoid losing respect, national representatives will comply with the OMC 
recommendations. In other words, even though the EES stimuli are not compulsory, 
policy makers feel obliged to comply with them. Empirical studies conclude that 
national representatives in EU committee and Council meetings do feel the pressure 
to reach common targets and carry out mutually agreed commitments - or at least try 
to be seen to be doing so by the other participants (for a review, see: Zeitlin 2005).  
However, both mechanisms entail some inconsistencies and inaccuracies, which 
significantly limit their applicability and explanatory power. More specifically, 
naming and shaming can be effective only when: the electorate is familiar with the 
OMC; and concerned about their country’s evaluation.  owever, both prerequisites 
are far from given. Although public awareness for the OMC was moderate during the 
first years of the EES’s and Lisbon Strategy’s operation, it gradually disappeared 
from the media (Ardy and Umbach, 2004). In essence, the EES is known only to 
those who are directly or indirectly involved in the process. As a result, as Büchs 
(2008: 24) rightly argues ‘it is doubtful that shaming alone will increase the OMC’s 
influence and effectiveness’.  
In addition, the assumption that national electorates, even if they are aware of 
the OMC, do care about EU evaluations and will put pressure on their governments is 
problematic: in some countries with long traditions of welfare state (Scandinavians, 
Continentals) or national arrogance (Germany, France, the UK), voters may react 
negatively to EU evaluations and accuse their governments of appearing weak and 
accepting non-obligatory EU prescriptions; countries with problematic compliance to 
the EU social directives - especially those that belong to the ‘world of neglect’ 
(Falkner et al. 2005; Falkner and Treib 2008) - will have no ‘shame’ in ignoring 
OMC evaluations as they already ignore hard law. Therefore, the assumption that 
OMC evaluations will always be positively received by electorates is problematic. In 
other words, the core trigger of this mechanism seems at best very weak in putting 
pressure on governments.  
The assumption behind the peer-pressure mechanism with regard to the 
capability of the OMC participants to influence national policy is also problematic. 
Even if one accepts that participants feel (or try to show that they feel) pressure to 
  
comply with their peers’ advice, one cannot assume a priori that this pressure will be 
translated into domestic policy change for a number of reasons: OMC participants 
should be the key policy makers in their country; and they should have complete 
independence to ‘transfer’ peer pressure into national policy.  owever, this 
mechanism neglects the restrictions posed by the policy making environment: OMC 
participants have to persuade other members of government, the parliament, social 
partners and the public, but their consent cannot be taken for granted. In addition, 
empirical reality does not support this mechanism: in most countries participants in 
the OMC deliberations are low or middle level officials who only have a limited input 
in the national policy making process; in some countries there is a special EU 
relations office which is completely detached from the core policy making circle (for 
a comprehensive and succinct review of the influence of Economic and Employment 
Coordination on member states, see: Jacobsson and Viffell 2007). Hence, even if 
member states’ representatives feel obliged to comply with the EES stimuli due to the 
peer-pressure exerted in the EES meetings, the domestic hierarchy and division of 
labour severely limits the explanatory power of this mechanism.  
 
2.2.3. The financial conditionality of the ESF 
Until recently, the power of EU money to promote Europeanization was not 
taken into consideration in the Europeanization literature. Notable exceptions are the 
studies on the accession process of the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) where EU financial aid was acknowledged as ‘reinforcing the transfer of 
EU models, because the aid helps to pay for implementation’ (Grabbe 2003: 314). 
Similarly, the financial element of the EES stimuli was largely neglected in the 
EES/OMC literature. Indeed, de la Porte and Pochet argued that research was 
necessary to explore the role of the ESF and the EES-ESF relationship (de la Porte 
and Pochet 2004: 72). It was only after 2006 that the role of the ESF was 
acknowledged as significant in promoting national policy reformulation (Lopez-
Santana 2006; Jacobsson and West 2009; Weishaupt 2009).  
However, the mechanisms suggested by the existing literature are only partly 
useful. Lopez-Santana (2006) argued that countries which were exposed to the ESF 
programmes were influenced to a greater degree by the EES’s soft law because 
national policy makers were socialised by the ESF discourse. Thus, they accepted the 
EES stimuli much more easily. However, as described above, even though the ESF 
existed since 1957, it was only after 1999 that it was linked with the EES. Moreover, 
  
since the new (EES-inspired) ESF principles are defined by the hardest form of EU 
legislation (Regulations), whether EU funding works only as a discursive socializing 
force which diffuses policy frames from EU to the member state level is a 
questionable proposition (Lopez-Santana 2006). 
Another recently suggested mechanism argues that the ESF ‘has the potential to 
generate or sustain political will’ (Weishaupt 2009: 3). This mechanism is in line with 
Jacobsson’s and Viffell’s (2007) interpretation of the EES-ESF relationship - a 
strategic use in which national actors strategically use the ESF in order to achieve the 
EES goals. Even though this is a correct interpretation, it is incomplete since it does 
not encompass the possibility of a government being indifferent or against the EES 
goals. In this scenario, the ESF programmes would oblige the government to 
implement certain policy measures which have to follow the EES goals.  Thus, 
contrary to the aforementioned ESF mechanisms, research should examine a more 
standard compliance mechanism in which national policy makers are obliged to adapt 
national policy in order to receive EU funds.  
It should be noted that, albeit if the ESF serves the EES goals, the mechanism 
promoting domestic change is not ‘soft’. In other words, this thesis argues that the 
EES draws on what the EU studies literature has named as the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, 
which appears when soft law is linked to the existence of alternative and stronger 
policy instruments. This shadow refers to the indirect coercive mechanisms which 
would appear in case of failure of soft law: if soft law is not effective it will 
invariably unleash stronger policy instruments, with binding and sanction 
mechanisms, that is, hard law (Scharpf 2002; Héritier 2002). However, the ESF hard 
law is different from the traditional hard law in Europeanization studies - namely EU 
directives -   for several reasons: regulations do not have to be transposed to national 
legislation as they are automatically incorporated into national law; in the case of 
non-compliance the European Commission does not initiate an infringement 
procedure, but rather imposes financial penalties as it can immediately block the 
approval of the respective ESF funds. In other words, in the case of non-compliance, 
member states do not have any room for manoeuvre and additionally face 
direct/automatic financial penalties. Hence, the mechanism which promotes change is 
financial conditionality. If national policy makers do not comply with the ESF 
regulations, then their country will either not receive the respective EU funding or 
return the money back to the EU.  
  
Consequently, the thesis will test three main mechanisms of domestic change 
under the EES which are distinct but not mutually exclusive as more than one 
pathway may be traced in one policy area, country, or between different stages of 
policy-making (see summary in Figure 1 below):   
1. Policy Learning: in this pathway the observed policy change is linked to a 
learning process in which national policy makers changed their preferences 
with regard to their country’s employment policy content as a result of the 
EES stimuli. To empirically verify this pathway, the EES-induced reforms 
would have to plausibly result from a new governmental agenda and the 
preferences of policy makers regarding the desired content of national 
employment policy. The new agenda and preferences would have to: (i) differ 
from those present prior to the introduction of the EES, and (ii) occur in the 
absence of financial support from the ESF (cf. Weishaupt 2009: 3); 
2. Domestic Empowerment: the observed policy change is linked to a change in 
opportunity structures. To empirically verify this pathway the research would 
have to identify successful policy entrepreneurs (see: Kingdon 1984) who 
would take advantage of the EES policy window to promote their own pre-
existing agenda. The EES’ causal significance in this case would be twofold: 
opening a window of opportunity and determining the content of the reform. 
3. Financial Conditionality: the observed policy change would be linked to 
identifiable ESF regulations. To empirically verify this pathway the research 
would have to show that national policy makers altered domestic policy 
primarily due to the incentive of funding attached to the ESF-funded 
programmes, and that policy learning or strategic entrepreneurship had 
minimal role in the process. Therefore, domestic change would be primarily 
and self-consciously the result of an endeavour to meet the conditions for 
receiving ESF funding.  
 
Hence, the hypothesis of the thesis is that ‘if the EES altered Greek and 
Portuguese employment policy at all, it did so through one of three main 
Europeanization pathways: (i) policy learning; (ii) the domestic empowerment of 
policy entrepreneurs; (iii) financial conditionality.’ 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Europeanization pathways 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of the potential Europeanization pathways 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the theoretical framework of this thesis. It critically 
reviewed the Europeanization literature and suggested certain choices that any 
research project would have to make for the concept of Europeanization to be useful 
and applicable. It also critiqued the view that causality in Europeanization and OMC 
studies is impossible. The standard Europeanization mechanism were refined to 
generate research hypotheses on the role of mediating factors and whether they 
promote or hinder Europeanization. It then selected only three EES-related 
mechanisms of domestic change or Europeanization pathways to be tested in the case 
studies of this thesis. Two of them are quite common in the Europeanization and 
OMC literatures, while the third (ESF financial conditionality) is novel. It is 
incorporated in the thesis research because the EES domestic impact cannot neglect 
the role of the ESF which since 2000 operates as its financial tool. 
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Chapter 3: Public Employment Service’s Reform in Greece: 
Following the EU money? 
 
 
Introduction 
The functioning of the Public Employment Services (PES) is fundamental to 
employment policy. PES are core to all stages of the employment policy making 
cycle:  they contribute to problem recognition (Agenda-setting) by collecting and 
interpreting data to analyse the situation of labour markets; PES are also responsible 
for policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation and evaluation. 
Additionally, the PES manage national and EU financial resources as they usually 
have an independent budget dedicated to the provision of support to the unemployed. 
Thus, it can be argued that PES organisation, efficiency and policy orientation are a 
key component of a country’s employment policy.  
This chapter discusses the first case study of this thesis: the reform of the 
Greek PES or OAED.
33
 A number of international institutions (OECD, EU) 
perceived reforming the OAED as imperative for the overall improvement of Greek 
employment policy. Greece reformed its PES with successive laws during the late 
1990s and 2000s which marked a significant break from the historical legacy of 
immobility and lack of reform. According to the OAED’s webpage34 there have been 
three key moments in the organisation’s history: the creation of the institution which 
preceded OAED in the mid-1950s (law 2961/54) titled ‘Organisation for 
Employment and Unemployment Insurance’ (Οργανισμός Απασχόλησης και 
Ασφάλισης Ανεργίας - ΟΑΑΑ); the renaming and reorganisation of the OAAA to 
OAED in late 1960s (Law 212/69); and the two legal reforms in the 2000s (Laws 
2956/2001 and 3518/2006). Indeed, the research findings of the thesis suggest that, 
despite other legislative initiatives (laws 2639/1998 and 3144/2003), the main 
episodes of reform took place in 2001 and 2006 (see section 2.1). Hence, an 
interesting puzzle emerges: why after almost half a century of no reform three 
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 Acronym for the Organisation of Employment of Labour Force (in Greek: Οργανισμός 
Απασχόλησης Εργατικού Δυναμικού). As mentioned in Chapter 1, OAED is the key organisation 
responsible for designing, implementing and evaluating Greek employment policy (for a detailed 
discussion of the OAED’s responsibilities see section one of this chapter). In this chapter, the terms 
PES, Greek PES and OAED will be used interchangeably. 
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 http://portal.oaed.gr/portal/page/portal/OAED/Organization/Istoriki_Exelixi. 
  
different governments with different ideologies (two PASOK35 governments (1996-
2000 and 2000-2004) and one ND36 government (2004-2008)) implemented 
consecutive PES reforms?  
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the historical development of the 
OAED and I outline its main features before the implementation of the examined 
reforms. In the second part, I briefly summarise the EES recommendations for PES 
reform and present the history (events, timeline) and rationale of the Greek PES 
reforms. In the third part, I examine a number of alternative causes that may explain 
the Greek PES reforms. The research findings corroborate the literature in that the 
Greek PES reforms appear to be linked to the EES (Sotiropoulos 2004; Feronas 
2007; Sakellaropoulos and Oikonomou 2006; Venieris 2006; Seferiades 2006; VFA 
and Metronanalysis 2002); however, the findings of this chapter add to the existing 
literature by suggesting that the observed policy change was linked to identifiable 
ESF regulations (3
rd
 Europeanization Pathway: ESF conditionality). The ESF 
conditionality led to three main reform episodes: Greece upgraded its vocational 
training network in order to keep receiving EU (ESF and CSF) funds in 1998; and it 
reformed the OAED in 2001 and 2006 - when the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 CSF began respectively 
- to enable the OAED to provide a specific set of policies in accordance with the ESF 
regulations. In the fourth section, the degree of domestic change and EES influence 
will be evaluated.  
 
1. The OAED: the weakest link of Greek Employment Policy 
The first Greek PES (OAAA) was created in the 1950s. Its remit was to run 
adult occupational training services and ensure successful placements. After 1962, 
the OAAA became responsible for running apprenticeship courses, but also for the 
administration of unemployment insurance benefits and family allowances which it 
took over responsibilities from the Ministry of Labour and the Social Insurance 
Institute (IKA
37
) respectively (OECD 1998: 18). The reasons behind the creation of 
the OAAA were indicative of the policy priorities that the new organisation would 
serve. According to Konstantinopoulos (1993: 80), the OAAA became independent 
from IKA because of the excessive financial burden that the unemployment benefits 
had on pensions. In other words, the prime concern of Greek policy makers was not 
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 PASOK is the Greek acronym of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (in Greek: Πανελλήνιο 
Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) which has been the main centre-left party in Greek politics.  
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 ND is the acronym of the New Democracy (in Greek: Νέα Δημοκρατία) party. 
37
 IKA is the main social security fund for private sector employees. 
  
to enhance employment policy or ALMPs but rather limit the rising costs of 
pensions.  
Nevertheless, ALMPs were not absent as they existed in a limited fashion since 
the 1950s. The most important ones were: (i) the organisation of the apprenticeship 
and vocational training system and (ii) the short term hiring in the public sector.
38
 
For the first kind of ALMPs, the Greek PES - for the first time in Greek employment 
policy - created its own schools and centres for apprenticeships and vocational 
training with a direct link to the demand for skilled labour by certain big industrial 
firms (Konstantinopoulos 1993). Short-term hiring in the public sector was used 
mainly in the public works programmes organised by the Minister of Labour in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Works and Municipalities. These programmes 
provided low-skill and low-pay jobs for 30.000 to 35.000 unemployed persons 
annually for an average duration of one to two months. Out of the two main active 
measures of this period, the public works programmes constituted the dominant 
element in ALMPs spending (OECD 1998: 18). Since the beginning of the OAAA, 
therefore, the training and apprenticeship elements of ALMPs were of secondary 
importance.  
Further, ALMPs were unsuccessful in meeting the general shortage of skilled 
labour resulting from the intensive industrialisation and the labour shortages that the 
massive Greek emigration created in the late 1960s (Karamessini 2006: 240). The 
Greek state also lacked the necessary funds to support ALMPs. The policy of 
providing temporary employment to public works programmes was abandoned in the 
mid-1960s, as it was widely accepted that it became a clientelistic mechanism. In 
addition, unemployment was no longer considered an important social problem due 
to the mass migration out of Greece (Konstantinopoulos 1993; cf. Dedousopoulos 
1997: 15). Moreover, state interventionism, hiring into the public sector combined 
with an agrarian Greek economy lead to the marginalisation of the ALMPs. 
The OAAA was renamed to the OAED (Manpower Employment Organisation) 
and was decentralised into seven regional directorates to improve provided services 
according to the different needs of each Greek region in 1969. The policy orientation 
of the OAED, however, did not change: until the 1980s, the main mission of the 
Greek PES was to provide insurance to the unemployed and welfare benefits, 
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 Another active measure included incentives for the geographical mobility of labour but were very 
small in scale and thus had no significant impact on employment creation or the adjustment of supply 
to demand for labour (Karamessini 2006: 259). 
  
whereas ALMPs were further marginalised. In addition, the OAED failed to develop 
any meaningful services which would link supply (the unemployed) and demand 
(employers looking for employees) or provide vocational guidance and counselling 
to the unemployed (Dedousopoulos 1997: 15). Even though, since the early 1950s, 
there was a legal requirement for employers to hire from lists kept by the OAAA’s 
local offices, this policy had little - if any - effect. The OAAA was maintaining and 
updating the lists for job seekers and employers who were looking for employees; 
however, this system failed to deliver any results because employers were 
uninterested in recruiting from the OAAA lists (OECD 1965 cf. OECD 1998).  
After the return of democracy in 1974, the OAED gradually and progressively 
phased out the public works schemes, which was effectively phased out by the end of 
the 1980s (OECD 1998: 19). A marginal intensification of the development of 
vocational education and training occurred in the 1970s due to the instigation and 
financial support of the World Bank (OECD 1998: 19).
39
 Besides these marginal and 
piecemeal vocational training programmes, the OAED also implemented a number of 
localised and relatively unimportant programmes to boost geographical labour 
mobility in order to meet seasonal needs in the agricultural sector (Dedousopoulos 
1997: 14). Consequently, until EU membership, ALMPs ‘remained rudimentary and 
did not have any considerable influence on the overall structure of the social 
protection system’ (Katrougalos 1996: 54).   
After Greece became an EU member, ALMPs suddenly gained some 
importance as Greece was entitled to receive funding from the European Social Fund 
(ESF). Since its inception, the ESF was the main tool of the European Union to 
improve skills and the re-integration of vulnerable groups (youth, women, 
minorities) into the labour market through the funding of vocational training 
programmes. During the 1980s, the ESF funding strengthened the ALMPs mainly in 
quantitative terms: the OAED gained the resources to implement more vocational 
training programmes but the quality of the programmes was at best questionable. The 
main reason behind the programmes’ poor quality in terms of design and 
implementation (evaluation was hardly practised) was that the main goal of Greek 
governments was to maximise the absorption of the EU funds and as a result, ‘issues 
of design, coordination and management of the programmes were of secondary 
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predominantly ignored in GEP. Only external influences seem to be pushing for the enhancement of 
vocational training in Greece: before 1981 (EU membership) the World Bank and afterwards the EU. 
  
importance’ (Dedousopoulos 1997: 15). Hence, careful design of policy measures 
and their well-organised implementation - a key prerequisite of an effective 
employment policy (Dedousopoulos 1997; OECD 1998) - was missing in the Greek 
case.  
Another crucial element of efficient ALMP implementation is the adequate 
insurance coverage of the unemployed (Dedousopoulos 1997; OECD 1998). 
Providing sufficient passive support (unemployment benefits, tax exemptions and/or 
tax credits, benefits in kind, housing subsidies for, etc.) is necessary for the ALMPs 
to be effective. Following the Amsterdam meeting on the EES, the EU put activation 
at top of the agenda and promoted the transition from passive to active labour market 
policies. This was a contrast to the approach of the OECD, which has criticised 
ALMPs as too expensive and of questionable impact (see: OECD 1990; OECD 1994; 
OECD 1996). However, passive employment policies were still needed for the 
ALMPs to work effectively. The main reason for this rather counter-intuitive 
interdependence is that ALMPs have maximum effectiveness when they are targeted 
and specialised: they need to be tailored to provide trainees with the skills specific to 
the economic sector and geographical area in which they will seek employment. 
Thus, passive labour markets provide the general and basic coverage for all the 
unemployed and ALMPs supplement employment policy through targeted measures. 
In other words, ALMPs are not (and should not operate as) large programmes for all 
the unemployed expected to result in mass employment. If that were the case, then 
the ALMPs would become income support measures rather than specialised 
interventions aiming at the activation of the unemployed (Dedousopoulos 1997). 
Unfortunately, this was the case in Greece: ALMPs were perceived by both 
policy makers and the unemployed as an (additional) income support policy since the 
Greek welfare state was weak and the passive support to the unemployed was 
rudimentary: Greece traditionally spends the lowest total amount of its GDP on 
labour market policies (passive and active combined) of all OECD countries and the 
lowest among EU states (OECD 1990; OECD 2000 cf. Brodsky 2000: 33; OECD 
2006; see also Table 3.2). In terms of expenditure on passive labour market policies, 
Greece is one of the lowest in the OECD (after the US) and the lowest in Europe. 
The percentage of ALMPs in the public expenditure however is one of the highest. 
The majority of the unemployed found participation in the ALMPs as a method to 
expand the relatively short (12 months) period of unemployment benefit provision 
which was less than half of the minimum salary (approximately 300 Euros per 
  
month). The reason for this alternative use of ALMPs is the fact that after the end of 
the period, when an unemployed individual’s entitlement to unemployment benefit 
ends, there is no other welfare support (Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2001). Greece 
remains one of the few countries in the OECD and the only one in the EU where 
there is no minimum income scheme for individuals or families (EC 1999; 
Matsaganis 2005).  ence, Ferrera’s (1996: 20; cited from Lazaridis and 
Koumandraki 2001) early description of the Southern European welfare state is still 
applicable for Greece since: 
a person who is neither old nor an individual with special needs, but has 
neither a job nor contributory entitlements nor source of income, is not 
entitled to any support from the state, as evidence of low income and of 
living in poverty are not in themselves enough to entitle one to any 
support from the state.  
 
In other words, the main tool for labour market policies are ALMPs which are 
mostly EU funded. Hence, ESF and CSF funded programmes were ‘converted’ from 
activation or training tools to passive or income support measures. 
The third major prerequisite for an effective employment policy, and hence 
efficient ALMPs, is an effective public employment service. The OAED was not 
immune to the general problem of the Greek policy making apparatus: inefficient 
organisation and lack of a Weberian bureaucratic culture (Sotiropoulos 2006). 
Although these problems haunted Greek social policy since the birth of modern 
Greece (cf. Petmesidou 1991), they were exacerbated during the post-1981 period. 
The 1981-1989 PASOK governments of the populist Andreas Papandreou proceeded 
to expand the Greek state. This expansion led to raising the contribution of the public 
sector to Greek GDP from 40% in 1980 to 60% in 1990; additionally, public debt 
and deficits skyrocketed and explain to a large extent Greece’s current fiscal 
problems (Lyrintzis 1993; Pagoulatos 2002; cf. Hlepas 2003: 222).  
During this period, effectiveness and efficiency were completely neglected; the 
public administration was controlled by party cadres, and thus, converted to a 
fundamental component of Greece’s ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis 1984; 
Mavrogordatos 1997 cf. Hlepas 2003: 222). The dominant policy model was statism 
– namely the intervention of the state in economic and social activities. Statism was 
accompanied by clientelism, which marginalised any autonomous political 
organisation of the disadvantaged classes or groups (Diamandouros, 1983; 
Haralambis, 1989). Furthermore, the predominant role of the public sector in 
providing employment resulted in a strategic use of the public sector by political 
  
elites. They could satisfy voters and expand their electorate through the provision of 
employment in the public sector. Finally, trade unions were highly subordinate to 
parties and party politics, while the pressure from civil society, social partners and 
other societal actors for progressive redistribution was weak (Marinakou, 1998: 241).  
In the case of the OAED, these problems were exemplified by a number of 
organisational weaknesses including a lack of qualified staff and fewer PES staff 
numbers compared to the European average. In addition, despite the increase in 
OAED workload as unemployment rates rose significantly during that period the 
number of OAED staff was reduced in the 1990s which lead to the deterioration of 
its services (Dedousopoulos 1997). Finally, there was an inadequate territorial and 
managerial allocation of staff (Konstantinopoulos 1993). In theory, the OAED’s 
local offices should be staffed in accordance with the corresponding needs of their 
area of responsibility. Due to political favours, however, other reasons determined 
staff allocation, such as proximity to urban centres and to their place of origin. 
Consequently, flexible and localised services were more goals on paper than an 
actual practice and local OAED offices ended up implementing a centrally defined 
policy with some minor if any adjustments to local needs. 
Another problem highlighted by all Greek-related EES documents (country 
specific recommendations, joint reports, etc) and most interviewees is the 
problematic data collection and overall supervision of OAED’s policies and 
measures. The OAED had no databases or any other records to perform any checks 
on the registered unemployed. For instance, the OAED was unable to verify whether 
somebody was indeed unemployed or not.
40
 Moreover, the OAED had no evidence 
of the actual effectiveness of its measures. For instance, a systematic recording of 
what happened to the unemployed who had received its services (benefits, training, 
placements, etc.) after their completion was non-existent. In addition, the financial 
auditing of the OAED was at best rudimentary and mostly on paper since the 
organisation could not provide a detailed record of all implemented measures. For 
some interviewees, the OAED was the big ‘black hole’ of Greek Employment Policy 
since no one really knew either how much money was really spent on the OAED 
programmes or how these financial resources were used; and more importantly 
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 According to one Expert Advisor to the Minister of Employment and Social Protection during 2000-
2002 (A. Lyberaki – for further information on the interviewees, see: Appendix I) before the reforms in 
the  2000s one high-level official of the ministry visited the OAED to register as unemployed, in an 
attempt to test the OAED’s logistical capabilities. Despite being already employed in the same 
ministry that administered this particular OAED he was successful in doing so. 
  
whether spending on these programmes was effective or not (interviews with: 
Giannitsis, Tsitouridis, Matsaganis, Ioannou, Karamessini).41  
Surprisingly, Greek governments were not preoccupied with improving the 
operation of the OAED and neglected the need to reform Greece’s PES until the late 
1990s.  The only agents of change were some OAED Directors who tried to tackle 
some of the problems mentioned above. However, these unsystematic and piecemeal 
efforts were unsuccessful in any tangible change and improvement (Dedousopoulos 
1997). Instead of being a tool to improve the employment situation of the 
unemployed, the OAED constituted a part of the byzantine Greek clientelistic 
system. As such, the OAED served many functions for Greek political and economic 
elites: the main criterion in the hiring process of its staff was the satisfaction of the 
clientele’s demands for a permanent job in the public sector - a practice that resulted 
in the poverty of skills of OAED employees. In addition, the OAED was transformed 
from an agency responsible for employment promotion to a tool of favouritism and 
clientelism. The benefits were distributed arbitrarily to the unemployed, the area of 
economic activity related to their training (trainers, training schools, etc), and as 
indirect subsidies to companies (Dedousopoulos 1997). Part of the training for the 
unemployed was and still is the responsibility of private training schools (KEK
42
) to 
which the OAED outsources its training responsibilities. These schools usually are 
operated by free-lance short-term trainers who tend to get employed in various 
KEKs. The decision of which KEK will receive training programmes (and how 
generous these programmes will be) and who will teach the courses in these 
programmes was determined by clientelistic concerns and practices (various 
interviews; among others: Giannitsis, Matsaganis, Ioannou, Karamessini).  
As a result, all levels of the administration of the OAED were susceptible to 
clientelism, favouritism, corruption, and mismanagement. High-level officials were 
responsible for choosing the KEKs and allocating subsidies to private companies for 
virtual training or placements. Their main purpose was to provide the participating 
company and the unemployed with financial remuneration. Middle-level managers 
were responsible for the management of the financial resources and the low-level 
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 In this thesis the name of the interviewees will be mentioned to support the claims made which stem 
from the evidence collected from interviews. The names of some interviewees such as Matsaganis, 
Karammesini and Ferreira will be used also as references. When a name is mentioned without the 
reference to a year then it should be perceived as material from a semi-structured interview and not an 
academic publication. 
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 KEK is the Greek acronym for Κέντρα Επαγγελματικής Κατάρτισης; in English KEK means Centre 
for Vocational Training.  
  
employees were responsible for granting people with the status of unemployed. Once 
given official unemployed status one was eligible for social benefits and, after the 
end of the duration of the unemployment benefit, eligible for subsidised training. 
Over the years, the OAED accumulated a high number of mismanagement cases 
(interviews with: Giannitsis, Matsaganis, Ioannou, Karamessini, and Lyberaki). The 
OAED was in all respects part of the problem instead of the solution. In other words, 
the OAED constituted the weakest link of Greek Employment policy.  
2. Reforming the OAED: between domestic necessity and EU pressure  
Besides the domestic necessity for reforming the OAED in order to improve 
Greek employment policy, the issue of PES reform became a pan-European issue 
after the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). More specifically, the EES necessitated that all 
European PESs should be reformed in order to facilitate the shift from passive to 
active labour market policies. This shift was vital for the implementation of one of 
the core EES doctrines, namely the ‘activation’ of the European labour force. The 
OECD (2007: 208) has defined the quintessence of activation as to ‘encourage 
jobseekers to become more active in their efforts to find work and/or improve their 
employability.’ For the OECD, activation has five key elements (OECD 2007: 208): 
 Early intervention by the PES during the unemployment period and 
frequent contact between the unemployed and the employment advisors of 
the PES; 
 Regular reporting and monitoring of job availability and employment-
seeking actions;  
 Direct referrals of the registered unemployed to appropriate vacancies 
(matching);  
 Signing ‘back-to-work’ agreements or individual action plans; and 
 Suggestion to join ALMPs to avoid apathy, decreasing skills and 
employability due to the unemployed peoples’ enduring unemployment.  
 
The pillars of activation aim to promote the concept of ‘mutual obligations’, 
namely the reciprocal responsibility of both parties (the state and the unemployed) to 
comply with certain criteria. On the one hand, the state is obliged to prevent the 
newly registered unemployed from becoming long-term unemployed (LTU) by 
giving them a job offer, training or a placement opportunity. For their part, the 
unemployed are obliged to actively aim to re-enter the labour market as soon as 
  
possible. This can be achieved by not declining jobs, placements, internships or 
training that the PES suggests to them as beneficiary for their labour market 
reintegration. The PES has to ensure that the eligibility criteria are respected by its 
clients. In cases of non-compliance, the PES has licence to impose temporary or 
permanent sanctions with regard to benefit provision (OECD 2007). In addition, the 
PES is to offer ‘personalised’ or ‘individualised’ services to the unemployed, which is 
achieved mainly by providing individually tailored services to each unemployed 
person in order to assist them in re-entering the labour market. The tailored services 
should be ‘integrated’ or ‘holistic’ as they should include a multifaceted set of 
measures providing financial, educational and psychological assistance to the 
unemployed. Additionally, the PES should be able to offer all available support to the 
unemployed combining passive and active measures.  
The EES stimuli with regard to the activation of the unemployed by the PES were 
included in the first two 1997-2003 guidelines:  
 Guideline 1: Every unemployed young person is offered a new start before 
reaching six months of unemployment, in the form of training, retraining, 
work practice, a job or other employability measure. 
 Guideline 2: Unemployed adults are also offered a fresh start before reaching 
12 months of unemployment by one of the aforementioned means or, more 
generally, by accompanying individual vocational guidance. 
 
In other words, the incorporation of the activation paradigm into PES 
necessitated the offer of a personalised ‘new start’ in the form of employment, 
training or other employability measures to all unemployed individuals. This new 
start had to be provided to every young person within six months of registered 
unemployment and every adult within twelve months of registered unemployment. 
Hence, the activation of the unemployed by PES reflects the shift in the PES 
approach from providing passive support (reaction to unemployment) to active 
support (prevention of long-term unemployment) via the offer of this personalised 
new start within a pre-specified time-frame.  
Although the EES put the issue of reforming the PESs on the top of the EU 
agenda (Goetschy 2001), the reform of the OAED had always been high on the 
agenda of the European Commission and remains one of the key EU 
recommendations towards the Greek governments (Ioannou 2009). The EU was very 
keen on the OAED reform due to the organisation’s major role in Greek employment 
  
policy as it designs and implements Greek employment policy measures 
(Dedousopoulos 1997: 14). As a result, the OAED is central in the implementation of 
ALMPs and, therefore, the management of EU funds. As well as the EES guidelines, 
Greece received many country specific recommendations that asked the country to 
reform its PES (Council of the European Union 2000-2004). The main 
recommendations found in the Greek country specific recommendations have been 
summarised by Sakellaropoulos and Oikonomou (2006: 236-237) as follows: (i) 
improve the overall employment policy’s strategic framework by implementing 
coordinated and balanced policies in order to increase employment rates, especially 
female and youth ones, and prevent long-term unemployment; (ii) accelerate the 
PES’s reform; (iii) upgrade the statistical monitoring system to establish the 
provision of accurate and rapidly available indicators; (iv) to promote employment 
by abolishing distortions caused by high taxation on labour and early retirement; (v) 
develop a global strategy for life-long learning and increase funding to the 
educational and vocational training systems; (vi) improve regulatory framework, 
reduce red-tape and disincentives to business start-ups; (vii) implement, in agreement 
with the social partners, labour market reforms which promote part-time work, 
workers’ and companies’ adaptability, and achieve a balance between flexibility and 
security; (ix) to introduce measures to tackle gender inequalities in employment and 
unemployment rates, pay gap, and continue improving care facilities.   
After a long period of governmental indifference, successive PASOK 
governments implemented numerous reforms in the late 1990s. More specifically, 
three laws were passed in the Greek parliament, which significantly altered the 
structure and operation of the OAED. The first law was voted in 1998 (Law 
2639/1998), the second, two years later (Law 2956/2001) and the third, in 2003 (Law 
3144/2003). The current OAED’s organisational and operational framework was 
finalised during 2004-06 with a reform implemented by the ND government (Law 
3518/2006 - article 68) which allowed for the functioning of 119 (their number 
reached 121 in 2009) KPAs (OAED;
43
 Feronas 2007: 118).  
Hence, an interesting puzzle emerges: after almost a century of no reform, why 
did three different governments with different ideologies (two PASOK governments 
(1996-2000 and 2000-2004) and one ND government (2004-2008)) implement 
consecutive PES reforms? In the following, I examine possible reasons behind the 
OAED reforms and I argue that these can be explained by the ESF conditionality (3
rd
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Europeanization pathway). In addition, the extent of reform will be appraised and 
finally further challenges will be highlighted. 
 
2.1. Reforms of the Greek PES: paradigm change through ‘personalisation’ 
The first OAED reform occurred in 1998
44
 and constituted a turning point for 
Greek Employment Policy as it included numerous novelties and reforms: it altered 
working time arrangements; introduced Private Employment Agencies for the first 
time in Greek history; and legislated for special forms of employment (namely 
flexible and part-time contracts) even in the wider public sector (DEMEYB 1998:
45
 
3). These reforms were implemented in order to comply with the EU directive 
93/104/EC on working time; the 97/81EC Framework directive on part-time work; 
the articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty of the European Union; and the 1996 ILO 
International Labour Treaty (Law’s Explanatory Report:46 1; 6-7; DEMEYB 1998: 
3). Another EU-induced legislative initiative was the Law’s article 25 which 
incorporated partially
47
 and inadequately
48
 the 96/34EC directive on parental leave 
(DEMEYB 1998: 8). The Law 2639/1998 also promoted geographical flexibility by 
introducing ‘local employment pacts’ (Chapter A, articles 1-5). In addition, it 
introduced the Labour Inspection Body which would be responsible for the 
implementation of labour legislation in ‘all places where people are employed’ and 
capable of imposing penalties to the employers who do not abide by the Greek laws 
(Chapter B, articles 6-17). This change was a direct response to the ILO’s 1997  
notification to the Greek Government that an earlier administrative reform in which 
the Labour Inspectorate was put under the supervision of Local authorities (Law 
2218/1994), was against numerous (articles 4, 6, 19 and 20) articles of the 81
st
 
International Labour Treaty and to the negative reaction of social partners to the 
reform as they considered that the Labour Inspectorate was weakened (Law’s 
Explanatory Report:
49
 8). Moreover, the law introduced the official recognition of 
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 The Law can be downloaded from the Greek Parliament’s website at: 
http://www.vouli.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/ValidNomosxedio/950/NOM_NOM_AP_2639_UB10.DOC  
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 Each Bill and law proposal has to be accompanied by a ‘scientific report’ by the Directorate of 
Studies of the Scientific Service of the Parliament (Greek Acronym: DEMEYB), which submits a 
statement with its comments on the law’s content.  
46
 In the Greek legislative procedure it is ‘mandatory that Bills and law proposals are accompanied by 
an explanatory report which analyses the goals of the proposed regulation’ (from the Greek 
Parliament’s website: http://www.vouli.gr/english/organwsh/legisl.asp).  
47
 It excluded nautical work from the area of applicability –going against the directive.  
48
 It failed to secure gender equality especially for part-time workers were the majority employed in 
these contracts are women. 
49Available at the Greek Parliament’s website: 
http://www.vouli.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/EisigisiEpitropon/950/NOM_NOM_EE_2639_UB10.DOC. 
  
training in another EU country as part of the framework of the Single Market and the 
European Citizenship (Law’s Explanatory Report: 12). 
The OAED related legislation was not a prime concern for the legislator, as it 
was included in the ‘other articles’ section (Chapter C) of the legal document. In 
addition, there was only one long article (article 20) devoted to the main institution 
of Greek employment policy. The novel provisions of the Law were not directly 
applicable to the OAED, but to the private training schools (KEKs) that the OAED 
was cooperating with for its training programmes. More specifically, the Law 
2639/1998 introduced a stricter framework for KEKs which now had to be certified 
by the National Accreditation Centre for Continuing Vocational Training (Greek 
acronym: EKEPIS).
50
 The law introduced an obligatory framework of legal and 
technical prerequisites that the KEKs and the trainers should abide by to address the 
fact that the quality and adequacy of both was doubtful. In addition, the law made it 
compulsory to only hire unemployed persons who had been registered on the 
OAED’s unemployment list. Therefore, this condition made it ‘possible to verify that 
these placements are not monkey,
51
 that we don’t fool the [Greek] state and the 
European Union’.52 Thus, this law tried to improve the vocational training system by 
introducing specific requirements for the main beneficiaries of vocational training 
programmes to fight the misuse of funds and corruption. As the deputy minister said 
‘the reforms since 199353 […] give a real sense of change, that vocational training is 
linked with employment, that is evaluated and that KEKs are monitored’.  
Another significant innovation of the Law 2639/1988 was the legislation that 
introduced an obligatory traineeship period for the OAED-run schools (named IEK-
OAED).
54
 Until then, most unemployed individuals received training without any 
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 The National Accreditation Centre for Continuing Vocational Training (EKEPIS) was founded in 
1997 under the Law 2469/1997 (O.G. 38A/14-03-1997) and the Presidential Decree No 67 (O.G. 61A/ 
21-4-1997) and was renamed into its current name with the law 3385/2005. EKEPIS is the specialised 
agency which was established to certify organisations (schools) and people (trainers) who were 
involved in vocational training and lifelong learning programmes. 
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 The colloquial word ‘monkey’ refers to something fake; similar to the English expression ‘monkey 
business’.  
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 Statement of Christos Protopapas -Deputy Minister of Labour- at the Greek Parliament’s Social 
Affairs’ Permanent Committee discussing this law. Available at the Greek Parliament’s website: 
http://www.vouli.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/ProtasiEpitropon/NOM_NOM_PR_2639_UB10.DOC.  
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 Even though no previous reforms took place, Protopapas refers to the year 1993 because this is when 
PASOK took over power from New Democracy. He makes this link to imply that there is continuity 
between the current ‘modernisers’ (after 1996 with the win of Simitis at the party leadership contest) 
and the Papandreou’s old style PASOK that ruled from 1993-1996.  
54
 IEK stands for Institutes of Vocational Training. In Greece, also private IEKs exist which charge 
fees contrary to the public IEK-OAED ones. IEKs produce skilled workers (plumbers, electricians, 
hairdressers, etc.) and are the main option for school drop-outs or high-school graduates who haven’t 
entered higher education.  
  
further links to the labour market. This law tried to establish a stronger link between 
training and the actual job market by introducing a traineeship period in which all 
trainees would be employed by a private company (placements). It was envisaged 
that even if the trainees would not succeed in getting employed after the training and 
placement period, they would have gained job experience and possibly some helpful 
contacts in their area of interest. Hence, this new policy attempted to increase the 
efficiency of the IEK-OAED training programmes by establishing a legal link 
between training schemes and the job market.  
The next reform, which constitutes the most important one for the OAED, was 
implemented in 2001. In the law 2956/2001 titled ‘Reorganisation of the OAED’s 
services and other items’ the reorganisation of the Greek PES was the main issue.55 
The 2001 reform changed the organisational structure of OAED: even though the 
core structure of the OAED remained intact without any changes in its competences 
(DEMEYB 2001:
56
 (i) three new public limited companies (PLCs) were introduced 
as subsidiaries of the OAED. These PLCs were responsible for many of its 
competences. More specifically, according to the ruling PASOK MP responsible for 
passing the law - Ektoras Nasiokas - the OAED would ‘carry on the duties of 
unemployment recording and insurance, apprenticeships and other basic services.’57 
The new PLCs would implement the shift from passive to active labour market 
policies, which was the fundamental goal of this reform
58
 (Law’s explanatory 
report:
59
 1). The new PLCs were: (i) ‘ uman Capital Support Services PLC’60 which 
would provide personalised support to the unemployed and companies; (ii) 
‘Vocational Training PLC’61 which would be responsible for the provision of 
‘initial’, ‘continuous’ training and life-long learning to the human resources; and (iii) 
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 The ‘Other Items’ (articles 20-26) in this law were about the introduction of the controversial 
Temporary Employment Agencies, which would lend employees to companies for a fee. Trade unions 
called this reform as the ‘reinstatement of Slavery’ since employees would have no permanent job but 
rather be used for temporary needs by various companies. Another issue was the introduction of 
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 Available at: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/7b24652e-78eb-4807-9d68-
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representatives and Social partners. Available at: 
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 The other goals of this reform according to the law’s explanatory note were the following: to 
modernize the Greek PES in order to respond to the globalisation forces; to make PES the proper tool 
to implement the EES principles (activation, life-long learning) and to better utilize the ESF funds.  
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 Available at: http://www.vouli.gr/ergasies/nomosxedia/EisigisiEpitropon/a-oaed-eis.pdf.  
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 In Greek: Υπηρεσίες Υποστήριξης Ανθρώπινου Δυναμικού.  
61
 In Greek: Επαγγελματική Κατάρτιση Α.Ε.  
  
‘Employment Observatory Research – Data PLC’62 which would conduct research 
and publish studies on the Greek labour market as well as the provision of 
‘computerisation, technological and technical support of OAED services and of the 
above subsidiaries’ (Law’s Explanatory report: 3). 
The 2001 reform marked a turning point for the OAED in policy content terms 
as well. The 2956/2001 law introduced legal definitions for the terms ‘Personalised 
Intervention’ to the unemployed, ‘Individual Action Plan’, and life-long learning. 
The first two concepts would be put into practice by the ‘Centres of Employment 
Promotion’ (Greek acronym: K.P.A.).63 The KPAs, which should not be confused 
with the historic (since the 1970s) KPAs on vocational orientation,
64
 would be 
independent entities operating under the supervision of Human Capital Support 
Services PLC. The KPAs were entities that existed on paper as they were expected to 
be introduced in 1996 in order to modernize the OAED’s traditional employment 
offices in the following fashion: use a computerised system for job-matching; 
provide specialist guidance and counselling for people with special needs; improve 
links with employers; conduct local surveys to monitor the needs of local labour 
markets; and juxtapose data from other organisations, such as IKA (OECD 1998: 
110). However, they were inoperative until 1999 when the first KPAs were 
introduced (EC 2006a: 61-62; NAP 2000; Papadopoulos 2000). Nonetheless, it was 
only in 2001 that the KPAs became the main organisation of GEP which would 
implement the new policy paradigm. In other words, Greek policy makers delegated 
critical OAED competences to a relatively new entity of GEP which remained quite 
dormant until then with low input on policy implementation (interviews with: 
Ioannou, Giannitsis, Mavri, Koutsiaras and Karamessini). 
Further, with the 2001 reform, the KPAs were given completely new 
responsibilities as they would offer: information on vocational orientation; 
professional and career counselling; and placements either directly in a job vacancy 
or in a training program aiming for the (re)integration of the unemployed in the 
labour market. For this reason, the KPAs ‘cooperated with private companies, 
professional, social partners, scientific and any other related organisations that would 
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 In Greek: Παρατηρητήριο Απασχόλησης Ερευνητική – Πληροφορική Α.Ε. 
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 In Greek: Κέντρα Προώθησης Απασχόλησης (Κ.Π.Α.) 
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 Despite having the same acronym these KPAs are Centres of Vocational Orientation (in Greek: 
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age groups: 14-18 and 15-18. For more information, see: http://www.oaed.gr/Pages/SN_26.pg.   
  
facilitate their targets’ (Law 2956/2001, article 1.1).65 In addition, the KPAs would 
implement a novel approach that posed a turning point in Greek employment policy: 
‘personalised intervention’ to the unemployed (EC 2006a: 61-62; Zeis and Liapi 
2006: 5). After 2001, the mainstream of Greek employment policy would offer 
flexible, localised and ‘personalised’ services to the unemployed through the KPAs.  
The personalised approach consisted of three elements: the provision of 
consultative support to the unemployed aiming to improve their position in the 
labour market; the provision of vocational orientation services tailored to the 
‘greatest improvement of one’s qualifications, abilities, skills, and specific 
characteristics’ (Law 2956/2001, article 1.2); and the signing of a ‘personal action 
plan’ which included a detailed outline of the steps required for integration into the 
labour market. This plan would be tailored according to the ‘specific individual 
characteristics, professional preferences, interests, capabilities, and abilities with 
the assistance of the special professional consultant’ (Law 2956/2001, article 1.3). 
Another notion that was defined in the 2001 Law and introduced into mainstream 
Greek employment policy was ‘life-long learning’, namely the continuous upgrading 
of human resources through education and training throughout one’s professional 
career (Law 2956/2001, article 1.4). After the 2001 reform, Greek employment 
policy would promote integration into the labour market and life-long learning with a 
‘strategic plan’ (Law 2956/2001, article 1.5). The strategic plan would be further 
specified by ‘operational plans’ which implement the goals and methodologies of the 
strategic plan on an annual basis (Law 2956/2001, article 1.6).  
The 2001 reform constituted a turning point for Greek employment policy. 
According to the parliamentary minutes discussing the Law and semi-structured 
interviews with key policy makers involved in the reform, the organisational reform 
of the OAED was interlinked with the change in policy content of Greek 
employment policy. The fieldwork suggested that Greek policy makers considered 
the OAED as too bureaucratic, unmanageable, inefficient and inflexible (interviews 
with: Giannnitsis, Protopapas, Ioannou, Matsaganis, Lyberaki and Karamessini). In 
this context, any meaningful reform of the OAED was considered to be futile, unless 
the OAED was organisationally partitioned. In other words, the three new 
independent PLCs did not add any new responsibilities to the OAED’s remit as they 
restructured existing policies into three separate ‘clusters’. This clustering was 
deemed necessary to improve accountability, supervision and efficiency (Giannitsis 
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in parliamentary minutes – see footnote 51; various interviews and especially: 
Ioannou; Protopapas; Mavri).   
The new responsibilities and the new approach to policy-making were 
delegated to the KPAs. As with the organisational partition of the OAED, the 
introduction of new responsibilities and the establishment of new entities were 
interlinked. According to the fieldwork, it appeared that Greek policy makers 
believed that existing OAED structures and departments were incapable of 
implementing the personalised approach and therefore changing existing policy-
making. Thus, they delegated the new policy to an already existing entity (KPAs), 
which was small, flexible and was not actually set-up until late 1990s. Thus, it was 
possible to re-shape KPAs in a way that would allow them to implement a 
completely new policy approach in Greek employment policy. The empirical 
evidence suggested that Greek policy makers excluded the possibility that this could 
be done by the main OAED departments (interviews with: Giannitsis, Mavri, 
Ioannou, Matsaganis, and Karamessini). In this respect, the 2001 government 
continued a long tradition of setting up a new organisation when a new policy or a 
significant policy change was to be introduced (Hlepas 1999). This process is quite 
common in Southern European bureaucracies (Sotiropoulos 2004a) and has been 
termed ‘agencification’ (Sotiropoulos 2006: 225; Spanou 2008). Similar examples of 
creating new organisations to improve existing and problematic ones are the special 
agency on tax evasion (SDOE),66 and the one-stop centres of public administration 
offering most public certificates and documents (K.E.P).
67
  
The next reform took place in 2003 with the law 3144/2003, titled ‘Social 
Dialogue for employment promotion and social protection and other provisions’.68 
Similarly to the 1998 reform, the OAED was not the prime concern of the legislator. 
The law altered numerous labour and social security provisions and enriched existing 
legislation on Temporary Employment Agencies with regard to their licensing (cf. 
Arrowsmith 2009; Lampousaki 2008). In addition, this reform introduced ‘National 
Committees on Employment and Social Insurance’. According to the law, the 
Committees would serve as ‘forums for social dialogue between government, social 
partners and civil servants [...] and help reach common positions on the National 
Action Plans on Employment and Pensions’ (DEMEYB 2003; articles 1-2 of the 
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Law). However, these Committees would not be permanent but set up by ministerial 
decrees. The empirical evidence suggested that their ad-hoc nature was one of the 
reasons that after a couple of meetings they were abandoned and not convened again 
(Tsakloglou, Stratigaki, Matsaganis, Ioannou, Mavri and Giannitsis). According to 
two Committee members, these Committees were not proper social dialogue fora, but 
rather informal meetings between friends.
69
 Further, no decisions were taken and the 
OMCs were not properly debated in these meetings (interviews with: Tsakloglou, 
Koutsiaras, and Giannitsis). 
With regard to the OAED-related legislation, the 2003 law was a further effort 
to improve accountability and efficiency of the KPAs and their administration. In 
essence, the 2003 reform was another effort to implement the 2001 reform, which 
according to the 2003 Law, proved inefficient. The 2003 law envisaged the 
improvement of the OAED’s territorial efficiency with the creation of local OAED 
Offices for each Greek Periphery;
70
 abolished the PLC responsible for the KPAs; and 
replaced it with a new special independent department - entitled Special KPA Unit - 
which was directly accountable to the OAED director. In addition, a large number of 
KPAs were created in most prefectures in Greece.  
Both changes demonstrated the failure of the 2001 legislative reform: the 
independent PLC responsible for KPAs was terminated - something quite unusual in 
Greek bureaucracy - and replaced with a new one. The empirical evidence suggested 
that the reason behind this move was the poor operation of the Human Capital 
Support Services which was responsible for the KPAs creation (interviews with: 
Ioannou, Protopapas and Karantinos). Consequently, until 2003 very few KPAs were 
operating according to the provisions of the 2001 law and the whole reform towards 
‘personalisation’ remained mostly on paper. Therefore, the same government with a 
different minister (D. Reppas) had to further legislate in order to materialise the 2001 
reform related to the KPAs and the implementation of activation through the 
personalised approach towards the unemployed.  
The next OAED reform took place in 2006 with the New Democracy 
government’s Law titled ‘Restructuring of the sectors of Mechanics’ and Public 
Works Contractors’ Social Fund (Greek acronym: T.S.M.E.D.E.) and regulation of 
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other issues related to the competences of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Protection’.71 Most provisions of this law concerned the implementation of a pension 
reform. The empirical evidence suggested that the OAED reform was again an issue 
of low priority (interviews with: Ioannou and Mavri). This becomes even more 
evident when examining the legal text of the 2006 reform: out of the seventy-two 
articles of the law, only one (article 67) was devoted to the OAED. Nevertheless, the 
2006 Law put the latest touch on the long history of OAED reform with a significant 
change: the introduction of a new one-stop shop unit - entitled KPA2 - which was a 
further evolution of the KPAs.  
The KPA2 were the result of the merger between the OAED’s local services 
and the KPAs. The main difference was that they also included social security 
services. In other words, the 2006 Law replaced an organisation concerned 
exclusively with employment with one concerned with both employment and social 
security. The KPA2 were ‘one-stop shop’ entities aiming to provide comprehensive 
or integrated services to the beneficiaries of the OAED. Each KPA2 had three 
departments or ‘offices’: (i) Support office; (ii) Insurance office and (iii) 
Employment Office. The Support office was dedicated to all KPAs staff related 
issues and the efficient management of the agency. The Insurance office was 
committed to providing the passive support to the unemployed. The Employment 
was responsible for all the ALMPs and the new measures introduced after 2001. In 
particular, each Employment office offered the following services (Lioutas
72
 2008):  
(i) registration of the unemployed people to the PES system; (ii) 
information and support the unemployed, employees, businesses and 
other relevant organisations and development for this purpose an 
informational system; (iii) application of the methodological tools of 
personalised intervention, the Personal Individual Plan, the classification 
of the unemployed, their monitoring and evaluation of the intervention of 
the KPAs that they received; (iv) implementation of methods and 
programmes of vocational orientation, techniques of employment seeking, 
consultative services to promote business start-ups, group consultation, 
etc.; (v) linking local businesses with the job seekers; (vi) cooperation 
with local scientific organisations and social partners; (vii) maintenance 
of job seekers and job offers lists; (viii) implementation of training 
programmes through an ‘personalised intervention’ approach and 
monitoring of placements; (ix) approval, after the agreement of the 
Consultative Committee, of the health and work booklets
73
 for employees 
working in hotels.  
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The empirical evidence suggested that the rationale of the 2006 reform was 
twofold (interviews with: Kontos and Mavri). First, KPAs proved to be quite flexible 
and efficient. As a result, they offered better services to the OAED clients than the 
core OAED. Second, the ND government (as the previous one) was unable to reform 
the core OAED to improve services towards the OAED beneficiaries; hence, it used 
the same tool as the previous government. Consequently, the 2006 reform followed 
the ‘agencification’ logic of the 2001 reform, namely the creation of a flexible, 
independent and semi-autonomous entity outside the actual structure of the OAED 
which would provide personalised services to the OAED beneficiaries and act as 
one-stop shop.  
Moreover, the KPA2 would implement the new approach of Greek 
employment policy - the ‘integrated’ approach. The integrated support to the 
unemployed necessitates that the unemployed should receive a number of services on 
their first contact with the PES: training; placement; counselling; advice; vocational 
orientation; and social security advice. All these services were tailored to the needs 
of the unemployed (i.e. they should be personalised). Hence, the 2006 reform further 
strengthened the content of the 2001 reform as it completed the change of the Greek 
employment policy’s tools (KPA2) and logic (personalised and integrated services 
through one-stop shops outside OAED).  As a result, the OAED was further 
bypassed in Greek employment policy, as the KPA2 became the frontline one-stop 
shop providing almost all OAED’s pre-2001 services. The summary of the Greek 
PES reforms is provided in the following table.  
 
Table 3.1: Public Employment Services’ Reform in Greece 
 
Reform 
Content 
Timeline Process 
Greece 
Personalisation 
and integrated 
support to the 
unemployed 
 No reform until 
2000; 
 three reforms 
after 2000 
(2001; 2003; & 
2006) 
 No reform of the core Greek PES 
(OAED) 
 Reform occurred through one-stop 
shops called KPA & KPA2 which:  
1) became responsible for some of the 
OAED’s services;  
2) by implementing the new measures 
of personalisation and integrated 
support to the unemployed  
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
  
3. Explaining PES reform in Greece: ministerial empowerment, policy 
learning, or financial conditionality? 
The literature unanimously agrees that the OAED reforms were implemented 
within the EES framework (Sotiropoulos 2004b; Feronas 2007; Sakellaropoulos and 
Oikonomou 2006; Seferiades 2006; Venieris 2005; VFA and Metronanalysis 2002). 
In this line of argument, the emphasis of the EES soft law on the shift from passive 
to active employment policies was realised in the OAED reform. Some policy 
makers corroborated this view as well. For instance, to the question ‘name one 
reform that wouldn’t have taken place if the EES did not exist’ an experienced 
General Secretary of Employment
74
 (Mr. Kontos) answered that this was definitely 
the OAED reform. However, the Minister responsible for the 2001 reform 
(Giannitsis) argued that Europe had nothing to do with the PES reform; in his words 
‘we wanted to improve Greek employment and Europe was a good excuse to 
persuade people who resisted our suggested reforms’. Likewise, in the 2001 Law 
Committee’s parliamentary minutes, Giannitsis argued that the 2001 reform was a 
continuation of PASOK’s policy since 1985 -and especially since 1993.  
In the following, I will scrutinise these arguments by examining the possible 
reasons and causes behind the Greek PES reforms. I will argue that the predominant 
factor behind these reforms was the ESF financial conditionality. In other words, the 
examination of the temporal sequences of the Greek PES reforms vis-à-vis the EU 
and national stimuli, as well as empirical evidence deriving from a number of semi-
structured interviews, suggested that the OAED reforms were linked with ESF 
regulations over and above of a process of policy learning or domestic 
empowerment.  
 
3.1. The Greek PES reform: the result of a purely domestic agenda (domestic 
empowerment)?   
The first possible explanation was suggested by the Labour Minister of 2000-
2001.  According to Giannitsis, the Greek PES reforms were not related to the EES 
stimuli, but were part of the government’s agenda. In this respect, the EU was a mere 
justification and empowerment tool used by the Ministerial elite to promote its 
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agenda against opponents (according to Giannitsis these were OAED originated). In 
his own words:
 75
 
The EU had nothing to do with the reform of the OAED; we weren’t at all 
influenced by the EES and we would do the 2001 reform anyway. We 
mentioned the EU’s pressure to reform the OAED in the reform process, 
but this was an additional argument to strengthen our own agenda. We 
reformed the OAED because we wanted to improve the poor services that 
it was offering to the unemployed.  
 
Nevertheless, in the following I will argue that this statement cannot be taken 
at face value and that it is one of the cases where national policy makers downplay 
the role of Europe to present the EU-induced reforms as their own. This tendency - 
as well as the exact opposite, namely the exaggeration of the EU influence - has been 
widely documented in the Europeanization literature and it constitutes one of the 
methodological challenges of the field with regard to the establishment of causal 
relationships between the EES and domestic reforms (cf.: Kröger 2009; Weishaupt 
2009; Zeitlin 2005; 2009; Haverland 2005, 2006; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008; 
Büchs 2007).  
The empirical evidence suggested that there are four fundamental reasons why 
the successive reforms of the Greek PES - including the 2001 reform - were not 
driven by a domestic governmental agenda. First, the claim that the (1998 and 2001) 
Greek PES reforms were a continuation of the time-honoured PASOK agenda which 
goes back to 1985 and continued from 1993 onwards
76
 is factually incorrect. As 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, the OAED had been the weakest link of 
Greek employment policy and no meaningful reform took place until 1998. In 
addition, it is arguable that there was only a single significant reform which occurred 
in 2001 since the 1998 reform concerned the Vocational Training Centres (KEKs) 
co-operating with the OAED and not the OAED itself and, the 2003 reform was a 
reiteration of the 2001 reform as the latter was not successful. Hence, there is only 
one significant OAED reform under the PASOK period in office, that is, one for 20 
years.
77
 Consequently, it is highly unlikely that the 2001 PES reform was part of a 
long-standing previously existent reform agenda of PASOK governments.  
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 PASOK was in power during the following periods: 1981-1989; 1993-2004; 2009-present.  
  
Second, reforming the Greek PES was never an issue of discussion before 
elections and, more importantly, neither was it when PASOK was in government. 
Similarly, none of the PASOK Labour ministers - including Giannitsis - included the 
issue in their agenda before taking office or during their public statements when in 
office. In addition, the background and previous career of Giannitsis as well as his 
very short term in office (2000-01) indicate that the reform of the OAED was not 
included beforehand in his ministerial agenda. Throughout his career, Giannitsis was 
concerned with issues of macroeconomic stability, the EMU, the economics of 
technology, foreign investment, and other relevant issues but neither with 
employment policy nor the OAED.
78
 In addition, his main mandate when appointed 
by the Premier Simitis as a non-parliamentarian
79
 Labour Minister was to offer a 
technocratic solution to the pensions problem.
80
 His views on the relationship 
between employment policy and unemployment levels are indicative of the relative 
low priority that the minister had ascribed to this policy area. In his own words: 
The Minister of Labour is usually blamed for high unemployment levels; 
however, employment policy is hardly influencing them. Employment 
levels are determined by economic policy, by growth rates and the overall 
developmental policy. Labour legislation plays only a minor role; this is 
why I tried to reform some parts of labour legislation related to overtime 
and tried to make it more expensive. The rationale was that employers 
would be forced to hire more people instead of having the same number 
of employees and asking them to work overtime. However, the Law 
didn’t work and social partners did not use the new legal system.  
 
Third, the content of the 2001 reform was not based on any previous practice, 
logic or measure existing in Greek Employment policy. As mentioned above, the 
notions, goals and practices of the 2001 reform, such as ‘personalised approach’, 
‘life-long learning’ ‘operational, strategic and personal plans’ marked a break from 
past practices and a turning point for Greek employment policy. The KPAs were 
chosen as the implementation vehicles of these novel instruments which transformed 
Greek Employment policy because the OAED was perceived as ‘too rigid, unwilling 
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 According to one Expert Advisor to the minister Giannitsis (Koutsiaras – see Apendix): the pension 
reform was the main issue of the ministry; thinking about Giannitsis’ strategy in retrospect, I would 
argue that the labour market reform was designed as a prelude for the pension reform: a great 
opportunity to win both employers and trade unions. However, Giannitsis rejected such claims since 
‘one of his key mandates was to tackle unemployment which had reached some of the highest levels’. 
However, his statement about the role of the Minister of Labour on influencing 
employment/unemployment levels contradicts this ‘fighting unemployment’ mandate. In addition, 
none of the empirical evidence suggested that the 2001 OAED reform was linked to increasing 
employment or reducing unemployment.   
  
and incapable’ to transform itself and implement this new policy (interviews with 
Giannitsis, Ioannou, Matsaganis and Karamessini). This assessment was vindicated 
in the years following the 2001 reform, as an additional reform had to be 
implemented in 2003 in order to make the KPAs operational under a completely 
independent authority which was unrelated to the OAED.  
Fourth, the preamble of the 2001 law is indicative of the origin and rationale of 
the respective reforms. Even though the first paragraph of the 2956/2001 Law links 
this piece of legislation with the general governmental agenda of modernisation, the 
EMU entry and the ‘real convergence with the more economically and socially 
advanced EU countries’, it directly states that one of the main goals of the law was to 
implement the national and European Employment strategy. In addition, reforming 
the PES was justified in the Law’s introductory report as ‘complementary to the 
great choices and the structural changes that have taken place the last years’ (Law’s 
Explanatory Report: 1). These ‘meaningful adaptations’ were necessary in order to 
complete the shift from passive to active labour market policies and implement 
further structural reforms. However, besides the effort to link the 2001 law with the 
overall Simitis’ so-called ‘modernisation’ agenda (cf. Featherstone 2005a), the whole 
reform process was linked explicitly to developments in other European countries 
and the EU, with a particular focus on the European Employment Strategy. 
Unsurprisingly, the OAED reform was one of the key examples of Europeanization 
of Greek employment policy (cf. Sotiropoulos 2004b; Sotiropoulos 2011; Feronas 
2007).  
To sum up, the research findings suggested that the ‘domestic agenda’ 
hypothesis was not supported for a number of reasons. First, contrary to the 
Minister’s statements, the OAED reform was never included in the governments’ 
agenda and it was largely neglected throughout the history of modern Greece. 
Despite its numerous problems, the OAED was never reformed until the late 1990s. 
Second, neither the government and the minister discussed or presented the need and 
rationale for a PES reform; in addition, the short term in office of the minister and his 
background as well as his views on employment policy indicate that reforming 
OAED was not a previous consideration. Third, the 2001 reform was a turning point 
for Greek Employment Policy introducing an entirely new content with new 
concepts, goals and methods, which were alien to the Greek context. Research 
indicated that there were no domestic societal actors outside the policy making hub 
  
of the labour ministry (e.g. trade unions, NGOs, PES staff and/or experts) asking for 
such reform.  
 
3.2. The Greek PES reform: the result of the influence of EES soft stimuli?  
The justification and rationale of the numerous PES reforms - especially the 
1998 and 2001 Laws - were strongly linked with European developments. This led 
most scholars to link the OAED reforms with the EES soft stimuli. In this line of 
reasoning, after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the institutionalisation of the 
EES, Greece was influenced significantly in its employment policy-making process. 
As a result, Greek governments reformed the OAED in order to facilitate the 
transition from passive to active labour market policies in accordance with the EES 
‘activation’ mantra.  
However, the collected empirical evidence from the thesis fieldwork did not 
provide adequate support for the hypothesis that the observed policy change resulted 
from the influence of the EES soft stimuli. First and foremost, it contradicts the 
overall Greek response to the EES. The empirical evidence suggested that Greek 
policy makers perceived the EES as a mere bureaucratic burden in the form of 
NAP/NRP-writing (interviews with: Stratigaki, Lyberaki, Karantinos and 
Matsaganis). Hence, the government’s main concern was to make sure that the NAP 
was produced and submitted properly and that Greece was not drawing negative 
attention through this process. Avoiding negative attention was a far-reaching 
concern of the newly elected government of PASOK under the leadership of the 
premier Simitis (for this preoccupation of Greece to stop being ‘Europe’s patient’, 
see: Simitis 2005: 34; for Simitis’ view on the role of Greece in Europe and his plan 
which he wanted to implement, see: Simitis 2005: 33-45; for a succinct description 
of Simitis’s government agenda and first years in government, see: Featherstone 
2005a).  
According to the fieldwork evidence, other issues such as the actual 
participation of Greece in the EES; the examination of what Greece could download 
or use selectively to the Greek labour market appeared to be absent from the 
governmental and ministerial agenda. This apparent lack of interest regarding the 
actual purpose of the EES (emulating best practices across Europe), seemed to 
originate from two factors: (i) the high misfit between the EES stimuli and Greek 
employment policy; (ii) the long-standing preoccupation of Greek ministerial elites 
with almost exclusively remuneration issues. With regard to the first reason, it 
  
appeared that the immense misfit discouraged Greek policy makers from a 
meaningful engagement with the EES and its implementation to Greece as they 
perceived this task as unrealistic since most of the EES goals and notions sounded 
too alien for the Greek context. According to D. Mavri (Prime-Minister’s advisor 
during 1996-2000; 2001-2002 advisor to the Minister of Employment and Social 
Protection):   
I was responsible for keeping track with the EU developments related to 
the EES and then the Lisbon strategy at the Prime minister’s office and 
reporting to the Prime Minister. I vividly remember how all of us at the 
PM’s office perceived Gutierrez’s EU presidency not only as quite a 
novel one, but also as really alien and distant from the Greek reality. In 
fact, all of the notions, goals and practises that were included in the EES 
were so different from our existing policy that seemed to come ‘from 
outer space’. Activation, gender equality, reconciliation of work and 
family, and later on after 2002 flexicurity were completely unknown for 
Greece. All of us were worried about how Greece would be capable of 
incorporating these goals. [...] In my opinion, the fact that nowadays the 
discourse in GEP is in accordance with the EES discourse as well as the 
sum of measures which were implemented in accordance with the EES’s 
direction is astonishing. 
 
With regard to the second reason, historically in Greece the government was 
perceived as the manager of the state resources whose allocation was the main prize 
of the societal struggle. Hence, the Greek Labour minister is entirely preoccupied 
with issues related to remuneration of workers such as pay increases, working time, 
the calculation and pay for over-time, etc. Other issues of employment policy, such 
as health and safety, gender equality, or training are of almost no importance since 
they rarely matter for the people involved in the negotiations. The exclusive interest 
of Ministers and trade unions for pay and working time arrangements was confirmed 
by a number of interviewees. Two of them presented this preoccupation most 
vividly. According to an EES expert from the National Centre of National Research 
(interview with: Karantinos):  
Over the history of Greek employment policy and until now the main 
actors in the policy process, that is, the Labour ministers and the social 
partners are preoccupied only with pay, overtime, and all the issues 
related to the cost-benefit aspect of employment. Employers ask for less 
labour costs, employees for more pay, benefits and leisure whereas the 
minister tries to balance these contradictory demands; all other issues are 
neglected. Any EU-related issues, such as activation, gender equality, and 
flexicurity are simply non-existent for these people.  
 
Likewise, Prof. Matsaganis (the PM’s advisor on social policy (health) – see 
also Appendix I) argued that: 
  
Whatever the positions of social partners it is all about money: trade unions (who 
predominantly represent public sector employees)
81
 ask for rises in pay whereas 
the employers want to keep costs low; other issues are absent from social 
dialogue.
82
  
 
However, the empirical evidence suggested that even the task of NAP-
authoring did not have any discernible impact on Greek employment policy as it was 
outsourced to external experts until 2004 (interviews with: Karamessini, Stratigaki, 
Drakou, Giannitsis and Protopapas); according to Prof. Antygoni Lyberaki who led 
the team of experts during 2001-2003 the whole NAP-authoring task was a window-
dressing process since the EES soft stimuli had no influence on Greek policy 
making. The only change that the EES caused was the set up in 2001 of a special 
Unit of Documentation
83
 responsible for the data collection needed for the NAP. 
Nevertheless, this Unit was only partially utilised until 2004 since, as it was 
described above, the NAPs during Giannitsis’s term were written by an external team 
of experts. It appeared that this outsourcing followed by the PASOK governments 
during 1998-2004 prevented policy learning for Greek officials, public servants and 
also went against the EES logic, that is, to spread best practices and lead eventually 
to some kind of policy learning (interviews with: Lyberaki, Stratigaki, Matsaganis 
and Ioannou).  
According to the evidence collected in the interviews, the decision to delegate 
the NAP-authoring task to external affiliates was necessitated by the extremely low 
levels of qualifications of the staff of the Labour Ministry (interviews with: 
Giannitsis; Tsakloglou; Matsaganis; Stratigaki; and Lyberaki).
 
It appears that all 
ministers had great difficulty in designing and implementing any policy since the 
ministry lacked the qualified staff that could help them in the policy making process 
(interviews with: Tsakloglou, Giannitsis and Ioannou). According to all ministers 
interviewed and all the experts (both academic and policy), the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Protection has been historically one of the weakest in terms 
of significance and quality of staff from all other ministries of Greece. The main 
reason for this ‘neglect’ is the lack of advanced competence in the field of policy; as 
was argued above (section 1 of this chapter but see also section 1 of Chapter 5), 
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employment policy in Greece was almost non-existent until the 1980s. In addition, as 
argued above, historically and until today for the main actors evolved in policy 
making their understanding of employment policy is not related to any concrete 
public policy but rather to piecemeal benefits, the settlement/definition of pay and 
working hours/overtime. Hence, staff selection was predominantly determined by 
clientelism and favouritism compared to the rest of the ministries in Greece.
84
  
It was only after the election of the ND government in 2004 where the 
NAPs/NRPs began to be written by a specialised group within the Labour Ministry. 
However, this novel administrative practice was not related with the EES. According 
to the interviews, there are a number of different explanations with regard to this 
decision. For instance the ND General Secretary of Employment – Ministry of 
Employment and Social Protection (Kontos) argued that the government decided to 
‘keep and safeguard the knowledge inside the ministry’. Others, however, argued 
that this decision originated from political necessity: all previous affiliates 
responsible for the NAPs were PASOK affiliated, and therefore, not appropriate to 
work with the new government; in addition, the new centre-right government could 
not find any external academics and/or experts on employment who were 
ideologically or party affiliated to ND (interview with: Karamessini). A senior 
official in the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection who was appointed as 
assistant
85
 to the General Secretary of Employment argued that the Ministry had to 
utilize the new graduates of the National Centre for Public Administration and Local 
Government (E.K.D.D.A.)
86
 who were hired after the 2004 elections. However, as 
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decided to use its graduates at the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection can be evaluated as a 
  
was discussed above, the 2004 change of the NAP-authoring process was not linked 
to the EES but to domestic developments.  
Another key aspect of the neglect of the EES by Greece can be found when one 
examines the participation of the country in the Employment Committee (EMCO) 
meetings. The empirical evidence suggested that in all the EES meetings the role of 
the Greek representatives was marginal as they could not suggest any best practices 
to their counterparts or present success stories (interviews with: Drakou and 
Ioannou). This resulted in a rather secondary and quite passive role - at best - for the 
Greek participants in the EES meetings. Indeed, Deganis (2006) who studied the 
proceedings of the EMCO meetings does not mention the Greek delegation at all in 
her study and Greece is not included in any of the identified EMCO ‘camps’. 
According to the recollections of Greek EMCO participants, their main role was to 
hear other countries presenting their best practices or experiences and to examine 
whether this can be applied to Greece. The answer was almost always negative or 
very qualified since in most cases the ‘alien’ policies were considered to be too alien 
and too difficult to implement in the Greek context. It appeared that Greek EMCO 
representatives were passive, defensive and were involved in a somewhat ‘damage 
limitation’ behaviour: although they were participating in the meetings without 
causing any disagreements or criticising both the process and the content of the 
suggested policies, they were always trying to exclude out any possible influence 
from the EES. For instance, as one EMCO representative during 2007-08
87
 argued 
about the EES-originating policies and related measures:  
albeit Greece finds them very good and agrees with most of them the main 
problem of actual influence and direct implementation of what is deemed as best 
practices is that they cannot be implemented and work in the Greek context. [...] I 
would say that this is a long-standing position in our meetings: O.K., we agree but 
we cannot do it as it does not fit our employment model.  
 
Another major impediment in the functioning of the EES as a learning 
instrument for Greece appeared to be the lack of a relatively cohesive group of 
people (experts, policy makers, and/or bureaucrats) who would participate in the EES 
meetings and would act as facilitators between the EU and domestic levels (cf. 
Kröger 2009). More specifically, the people participating in the EES meetings 
differed every year. It appeared that the composition of the Greek representatives 
                                                                                                                                                                    
very positive step towards the improvement of the staff’s quality in one Greek ministry which employs 
some of the most under-skilled public sector employees.  
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was always changing because the participation in the EMCO meetings was perceived 
as a perk of the job (interview with: Koutsiaras). Thus, the leadership of the Labour 
Ministry was involved in a balancing act with the aim to avoid grievances among the 
ministry’s staff. As a result, the Greek representatives were not always the most 
qualified or experienced staff in the ministry. Additionally, participation was not 
always the rule - especially in the Mutual learning programmes. According to 
Ioannou, finding a Greek representative for the Mutual Learning Programme was 
always a daunting task since everybody was trying to avoid it; as a result, in many 
cases there were no participants from Greece attending the meetings. In addition, in 
many EES meetings (especially the mutual learning ones) the Greek participants 
were not always public officials but independent consultants or experts, who were 
not related to the actual policy making process. The main reason for this poor 
attendance record was that Greece was never interested in the EES and never 
perceived it as a learning opportunity for domestic policy. In sum, the empirical 
evidence suggested that Greek policy makers generally neglected the EES soft 
stimuli. Hence, it is quite unlikely that Greek governments were influenced by the 
EES soft law. In addition, all the Greek interviewees stated that no policy learning 
took place within Greek employment policy making with regard to the EES goals, 
benchmarks or recommendations, and that the EES stimuli were generally neglected. 
This finding is in accordance with the worlds of compliance typology which argues 
that Greece neglects EU soft law (Falkner et al. 2005).  
The causal significance of the EES soft stimuli is further weakened when one 
examines the timing and sequence of the examined reforms. Greece reformed its 
vocational training centres (and not the OAED) one year after the introduction of the 
EES but then waited four years before implementing the first OAED reform. If these 
reforms happened because of the EES soft law the sequence should have been 
reversed: Greece should have first reformed the OAED and then the certification of 
vocational training centres because the OAED is much more crucial for the shift 
towards activation. In addition, neither the Minister nor any other governmental 
official linked the first reform - the certification of the KEKs in 1998 - with the EES 
in any public document or the law’s explanatory report. This is unexpected 
considering the novelty of the EES and the significant political and communicative 
momentum it had gathered during the first years of its implementation in most EU 
countries (cf.: Ardy and Umbach 2004). Even though the EU and the EES are 
mentioned in the 2001 reform, the five year gap between the launch of the EES and 
  
the implementation of the specific reform raises doubts regarding the direct link 
between the EES soft stimuli and the specific reform. In particular, during 1997-2001 
the PASOK governments did not attempt to initiate a legislative reform of the OAED 
(interviews with: Ioannou; Matsaganis; Mavri). Hence, the EES soft law hypothesis 
seems weak as an explanation for the timing and sequence of domestic reforms.  
Another finding that does not support the hypothesis regarding the importance 
of the EES soft stimuli in explaining domestic policy change in the Greek PES case 
is that there has been no shift from passive to active labour market policies: Greece 
did not change its overall spending pattern in labour market policies; the balance 
between passive and active labour market policies was not altered towards an 
increase in ALMP spending. On the contrary, the percentage of ALMP spending 
decreased during 2000-2007: labour market policy expenditure in 2000 was 23.6% 
(as a percentage of GDP in active measures) and after reaching its peak of 24.9% the 
following year it followed a downward trend reaching the extraordinarily low level 
of 5.6% in 2005. Passive measures retained the public expenditure’s lion share 
throughout these years and in 2005 constituted exactly 40% of labour market 
spending (see: Table 3.2). In other words, Greece followed the exact opposite 
direction to that suggested to member states by the EES soft: not only was there no 
transition from passive to active labour moved in the opposite direction.  
 
Table 3.2: Greek LMP expenditure as % of GDP 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Active 
Measures 
        
Greece 0.236 0.249 0.169 0.89 0.141 0.056 : : 
EU15 : : : : 0.609 0.534 0.531 0.491 
EU27 : : : : : 0.516 0.511 0.473 
         
Passive 
Measures 
        
Greece 0.393 0.355 0.33 0.369 0.405 0.40 : : 
EU15 1.229 1.21 1.306 1.394 1.406 1.387 1.247 1.077 
EU27 : : : : : 1.334 1.196 1.025 
Source: EC 2009a: 89 
- Denotes missing data 
 
  
Fourth, the EES hypothesis cannot explain why the ‘PES reform’ 
recommendation was accepted by Greece while other reforms (outlined above in 
section 2) of equal - if not of higher importance - were not, especially when one 
considers that Greek policy makers neglected the EES as mentioned above.
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3.3. The Greek PES reform: the result of ESF conditionality 
The empirical evidence collected in this thesis suggested that the Greek PES 
reforms are best explained by the ESF conditionality. The EU Commission, obliged 
Greece to comply with its requirements, through its capacity to control and even stop 
the flow of EU money to Greece unless specific reforms were implemented with 
regard to Public Employment Services and the cooperating KEKs. In this respect, the 
sequence and timing of the reforms is telling: even though all reforms occurred after 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and the launch of the EES, the reforms were causally 
linked with the ESF regulations (3
rd
 Europeanization pathway). In the following, I 
present the evidence supporting the 3
rd
 Europeanization pathway in explaining the 
Greek PES reforms.  
To begin with, the 1998 reform, despite occurring after the EES was 
introduced, was not related to the latter but to the ESF requirements that the EU 
Commission had set up in order for Greece to continue receiving EU funds. In the 
mid-1990s, a series of big scandals were reported in which numerous Greek KEKs 
were involved in widespread fraud and misuse of ESF money. This was nothing new 
in the Greek–EU relations concerning the management of EU money: in the first 
CSF (1988-1994) large-scale corruption and inefficiency was documented 
(Kontiadis, 1997: 141–3; 148–9; Petmesidou 2000: 317, as cited in Sotiropoulos 
2004: 280). In particular, it was revealed that many of the OAED-cooperating KEKs, 
instead of providing training services to the unemployed, existed only on paper: they 
had no students or teachers resulting in the non-execution of the vocational training 
programmes. The OAED and Greek governments were fully aware of this situation 
but did not do anything to prevent this fraudulent practice because most of the 
fraudulent KEK owners were either local party members or direct/indirect party 
supporters (interviews with: Giannitsis, Ioannou and Matsaganis). In addition, the 
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existence of virtual KEKs and the participation of the unemployed to virtual training 
programmes served the short term clientelistic game of political favours involving 
the government, national and local elites and the unemployed. The EU (ESF, CSF) 
money constituted the fuel for this network which provided significant resources to 
all actors involved: subsidies for the government to manage (and therefore 
manipulate by transforming it into a clientelistic tool) and direct cash for KEK 
owners, teachers and the unemployed who were depending on favours to get into 
these programmes. In this clientelistic management of EU funds, local elites in 
cooperation with the national government and the ruling party secured some 
compensation to the unemployed who perceived the EU subsidies as substitutes for 
unemployment benefit/support (interviews with: Giannitsis, Matsaganis and 
Ioannou).  
The revelation of the widespread misuse of EU funds led the Commission to 
demand that Greece ensure the thorough regulation and certification of the KEKs by 
an independent authority. However, Greece continued to ignore these demands. As a 
result, the Commission imposed a freeze of payments bringing all EU-funded 
vocational training programmes in Greece to a complete halt (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 
280). The Greek government was then forced to comply by introducing the 1998 
reform where EKEPIS would certify the KEKs and trainers for their suitability in 
providing vocational training. This non-OAED certification met the Commission’s 
prerequisites regarding the operation of vocational centres in Greece. In other words, 
the 1998 reform was linked with specific terms to receive EU funds and the ESF 
conditionality explains why the KEKs were reformed earlier than the OAED: Greece 
was responding to the ESF conditionality
89
 rather than the EES soft stimuli. The 
deputy Labour minister of the time (Protopapas) who had the responsibility to reform 
the KEKs and also led the secretariat for the ESF in the ministry put very candidly 
the rationale of the government with regard to the 1998 reform as follows:
90
 
When the Commission stops the money flow you have very few options but to do 
as they wish. We had to make sure that Greece would continue receiving EU 
funds. For this fundamental priority we had to reform the framework of the KEKs. 
This was the only way to secure the EU money which were and are vital for the 
Greek economy.  
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 Semi-structured interview in June 2009. 
  
Similarly, the empirical findings suggested that the most important PES reform 
- the one implemented in 2001 - was also linked to the ESF conditionality. However, 
this ESF conditionality was closely linked to the EES as now the ESF constituted 
part of the EES stimuli. More specifically, in the 1999 revision of the Structural 
Funds, which defined the rules of the 2000-2006 programming period, the eight 
articles of the EC regulation 1260/99
91
 dictated that the ESF would be adapted to 
concur and implement the EES goals. As a result, the ESF programmes had to 
promote new goals, such as GM; reconciliation (EYSEKT 2003); and new policy 
tools such as personalised services to the unemployed. Consequently, if after 2001
92
 
the OAED could not provide personalised services to the unemployed and make 
operational, strategic and individual plans that would add programming to the entire 
training process, the ESF could not co-finance vocational training projects in Greece. 
The research findings collected in interviews suggested that Greek policy makers 
could not afford the financial and political costs of losing EU funds again. It 
appeared that receiving EU funds was crucial for their political and economic 
interests. As a result, they implemented consecutive reforms which were all aiming 
to meet the ESF conditionality. 
This finding was supported in a number of semi-structured interviews with key 
informants (interviews with: Protopapas, Stratigaki, Mavri, Ioannou, and 
Matsaganis). The first key policy maker to link the 2001 OAED reform with the ESF 
conditionality of post-2000 was Protopapas who was also responsible for the OAED 
reform. In his own words:  
As with the KEKs, the OAED could not operate as before; it had to radically 
change its services to the unemployed. After 2001 Greece had to provide an 
individualised approach to the unemployed as it was set out in the ESF criteria for 
funding. [...] Although most people perceive the ESF as something technical or 
like a cash cow, in my opinion it is deeply political. After 1999 it has been 
completely integrated with the EES – so when we speak about the EU we cannot 
really distinguish between what the EES says and what the ESF asks. They both 
want the same things. [...] As I said for the KEKs, Greece could not afford again 
to lose crucial EU funds because of poor governance and inability to fulfil the ESF 
rules.  
 
Another policy maker who was involved in the 2001 OAED reform and also 
had expertise on the OMC, Lisbon and the EU-Greek relations was a special advisor 
to Giannitsis - Mrs Mavri. In her words, the 2001 reform was a response to the EU 
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stimuli – which in accordance to Protopapas was perceived as a package of various 
instruments:  
With the 2001 reform Greece tried to respond to what the EU was asking for 
member states to do in their employment policy. With the 2001 reform we tried to 
put Greece into the group of countries that was providing active support to the 
unemployed. [...] In my opinion, we cannot really distinguish between Lisbon, the 
EES and the ESF. All EU policies were asking us to do the same thing. However, 
the ESF rules could not be overseen. Greece under no circumstances could be 
allowed to lose EU funds as it happened some years ago. The 2001 reform had to 
be implemented at all costs as this would be a major problem for the country.   
 
This view was echoed in an interview by Ioannou who was inter alia advisor to 
Giannitsis (see also Appendix I):  
I vividly remember the annual visits of the ESF fund officials which one way or 
another were concluded by the demand to radically improve the OAED. This was 
a long-standing problem in Greece and even today the ESF people are not happy 
with the Greek PES apparatus. [...] 
 
Although Greece had to respond to specific EES guidelines, the ESF pressure was 
immense. What happened in 2001 was that the ESF was part of a wider EU 
agenda: the ESF, the EES and the Lisbon agenda had all been aligned and the PES 
reform was at the forefront of a number of EU policies. [...]  
 
Greece could not hide anymore. The issue had to be tackled without any other 
delay and it was up to us to do it. By any standard, it felt like an impossible task if 
one considers the weaknesses of the OAED and more importantly the strong 
resistance from the OAED bureaucrats who had an interest to leave things as they 
were until then.  
 
The link between the ESF and Greece’s response to the EES stimuli was also 
confirmed by other interviewees. For instance, Professor Matsaganis (see Appendix 
I) recalled in a semi-structured interview with the author that:  
Although I was not directly involved in the EES, I remember that what Greece 
was listing in the NAPs as its response to the EES was dictated by the Structural 
funds. New training measures, novel approaches in policy making, new policy 
goals and new targets were in accordance with the Structural funds. Almost all 
policy measures were ESF funded; Greece did almost nothing without the ESF 
support.  
 
It appeared that Greek policy makers faced a huge obstacle in implementing 
the personalised approach to the unemployed: the rigid and inefficient OAED with 
its uncooperative staff which was unwilling to change existing practices and 
methods. The empirical evidence suggested that to circumvent the OAED’s 
resistance they decided to delegate the new approach and method of policy making to 
a new, independent and flexible organisation - the KPA (interviews with: Giannitsis, 
  
Protopapas, Ioannou, and Mavri). All interviewees who were involved in the 2001 
reform maintained that it was only such entities that would be able to deliver the 
personalised support to the unemployed. This choice was seemingly vindicated, as 
the reform did not materialise until 2003, when the government had to pass another 
law which gave even more autonomy to KPAs and by abolishing the initial OAED-
related supervising entity because of the continuation of former practices.  
The 2006 reform was also strongly linked to the ESF funding as without them 
the KPA2 could not be funded. More specifically, the empirical evidence suggested 
that even though the KPA2 were legally introduced in 2006, they started to be 
established in 2008 (interview with: Kontos). This delay was related to the financial 
support from the EU: the funding for the KPA2 was included in the 4
th
 CSF – 
renamed as National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF; Greek acronym: 
ESPA) for the 2007-2013 programming period. The Greek government included the 
KPA2 funding in the Official Application
93
 of the Operational Program (O.P.) 
‘ uman Resources Development’ under the ‘General Objective: Facilitating Access 
to Employment’. As a result, it was only after the beginning of the ESPA/NSRF in 
late 2008 that KPAs2 were set-up (Lioutas 2008; Apodimos 2009). The KPA2 
became operational and constituted one of the main units of Greek employment 
policy concerning consultation, employment promotion and unemployment 
insurance during 2009 (Apodimos 2009). More importantly, the new approach that 
the KPA2 would introduce in Greek employment policy - the integrated support to 
the unemployed - was also necessitated by the 2007-2013 ESPA.
94
 Consequently, the 
2006 reform was also caused and determined by the EU Structural Funds and the 
new requirements for the 2007-2013 programming period. It appeared that neither 
the EES soft stimuli nor any domestic agenda caused the 2006 reform.  
In addition, the empirical evidence suggested that the principles and policy 
goals of the ESF funded programmes were dictated by the European Commission 
against the preferences of the Greek authorities.
95
 This was also supported by one 
joint statement
96
 in April 2009 of the ND’s Greek Minister of Labour and Social 
Solidarity, Mrs Fani Pali-Petralia, and the then EU Employment, Social Affairs and 
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Equal Opportunities Commissioner, Mr. Vladimir Špidla. The statement outlined the 
priorities of the O.P. Human Resources Development that had been agreed between 
the Greek government and the European Commission. The wording of the statement 
is indicative of the crucial role of the EU in promoting the KPA2 reform. According 
to the Petralia-Špidla joint statement ‘both parties confirm their commitment to work 
towards the speeding up of the program’s implementation’. In the statement, both 
parties also outlined a wide range of novel policy measures to be implemented (with 
some of them being a reinvigoration of previous EU demands).
97
 Further, the two top 
politicians justified the introduction of the KPA2 as a further improvement of the 
Greek PES services since ‘the upgrading of the PES network was foreseen into a 
unified system of one-stop shops providing integrated services’. Greek efforts in 
realising this particular reform were appraised:  
In this framework, the Greek authorities and the European Commission recognise 
the progress that has been established, and note that 105 KPA-2 have been already 
upgraded and operate according to the one-stop shop logic, whereas the operation 
and the spatial installation of the rest 16 KPA-2 will be completed until July 2009.  
 
When reading the statement one is led to wonder why the Commission had to 
commit to a national program and how it can contribute to its execution when the 
sole responsibility for its implementation would lie with the Greek government. 
Interviews with key people involved in the negotiations between the EU and the 
European Commission on the ESF (interviews with: Karastamati; Ioannou) 
suggested that the statement’s puzzling wording can be explained by the ‘politics’ 
between the Commission and the member states in which the Commission avoids 
any direct public involvement in domestic issues, since social policy (including 
employment policy) is a national prerogative which member states are historically 
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very reluctant to delegate (see Rhodes 2005). In other words, this statement contains 
the Greek government’s commitment to the Commission regarding the O.P.s smooth 
implementation. Additionally, the two day visit of the Commissioner in Greece and 
the meeting with Ms Petralia occurred to assess in meeting various EU requirements 
one of which was the full implementation of the KPA2 reform (interview with: 
Karastamati).  
In summary, the above analysis examined alternative hypotheses and, after 
rejecting the domestic empowerment and EES soft stimuli (learning) hypotheses, 
concludes that the PES reforms in Greece were linked with identifiable ESF 
regulations and conditions. In other words the best explanation of the Greek PES 
reforms is the ESF conditionality / 3
rd
 Europeanization pathway.  
 
4. Evaluating the Greek PES reform: degree of change and extent of EES 
influence  
This section will summarise the change in policy content of the Greek PES and 
try to gauge the impact of the EES in this process. Following the PES reforms 
examined above, Greek employment policy was able to offer individualised and 
integrated support to the unemployed including: placements; training; counselling; 
employment and social security advice. The KPAs and later the KPA2 provided 
every unemployed individual with a tailor-made two year action plan with specific 
targets and deadlines. The plan was evaluated biannually with implementation 
reports (EC 2006a: 42). The unemployed are profiled according to four categories 
(EC 2006a: 42): (i) ‘job-ready’ (little support needed); (ii) ‘limited support’ 
(requiring some short-term training and/or placement before they start searching for 
employment); (iii) those with skill deficits (requiring intensive support is necessary); 
and (iv) ‘hard-to-place’ clients (requiring intensive and additional support). The last 
category refers to the unemployed who belong to vulnerable groups (e.g. minorities; 
Roma). There was a significant increase in coverage of the unemployed by 
KPA/KPA2. While in 2004 only less than 10% of the unemployed were interviewed 
and given an individual action plan, in 2006 this number increased to around 70% 
with the prospect of covering all the unemployed by the end of 2006 (EC 2006a: 63; 
for some data on the evaluation of the efficiency of KPAs finding a job to the 
  
unemployed, see: EC 2006a: 63-64). The number of KPA2 has been gradually 
increasing and their network gradually covered the entire country.
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However, according to the evidence obtained from the Greek sample of 
interviewees, the EES impact was confined to only two of the five policy stages of 
GEP. The reason for this limited impact in terms of policy stages appeared to be 
linked to the Greek policy makers’ neglect of the EES: most Greek interviewees 
highlighted that the EES was not included in their agenda or in their proposed 
solutions to reform the OAED – since the issue was not of interest to them. By 
contrast, the ESF conditionality appeared to have altered the third and fourth policy 
stage (Decision-making and Policy-implementation respectively).  
The degree of EES-induced change appeared to be in the category of second 
order change as GEP introduced new programs through KPA and KPA2 in order to 
provide individualised support to the unemployed and thus enhance their 
employability through consultation, training, and employment subsidies. However, 
the EES did not succeed in replacing the pre-existing goals of GEP as the KPA and 
KPA2 did not replace the OAED as the main institution of GEP. In addition, the EES 
did not affect the OAED which continued its pre-EES mode of operation unaffected. 
Indeed, despite the change of the GEP’s content, the OAED remained intact and 
Europeanization was ‘outsourced’ to small independent agencies which would be 
responsible for the new EES-induced policy. As a result, the EES cannot be said to 
have produced a paradigm shift (third order change or transformation) in GEP. In 
other words, the EES impact on the Greek PES appears to have been a second order 
change or accommodation/upgrading in that Greece merely adjusted existing 
processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features or the 
underlying collective understandings attached to them. Finally, the empirical 
evidence suggested that despite the need to provide evidence for the ESF 
programmes, the Greek PES appeared not to alter its policy evaluation capabilities. 
Thus, there was inertia concerning the Policy Evaluation stage as there was no 
change at the domestic level despite the specific EES stimuli to improve the policy 
evaluation capabilities of GEP. The EES effect on the Greek PES is summarised in 
Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: EES impact on Greek Public Employment Services 
Policy stages Degree of EES-induced change 
Agenda-setting (problem recognition) Inertia (no change) 
Policy-formulation  
(proposal of solution) 
Inertia (no change) 
Decision-making (choice of solution) Upgrading (second order change) 
Policy-implementation 
(putting solution into effect) 
 
Upgrading (second order change) 
Policy-evaluation (monitoring results) Inertia (no change) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the Greek PES reforms. After discussing the situation of 
the Greek PES prior to the reform episodes, I analysed the timing, sequence, content 
and rationale of the reforms. Then, I examined alternative explanations and 
concluded that the reforms were linked to the ESF financial conditionality (3
rd
 
Europeanization pathway). The research findings of the thesis were that the EES 
impact seemed to be confined to the Decision-making and Policy-implementation 
stages of Greek employment policy. The degree of change was in the category of 
‘upgrading’. This result was reached by employing the method of process tracing and 
its tools: the examination of the temporal sequence, rationale and goals of Greek PES 
reforms and the juxtaposition of national developments with EU stimuli. In addition, 
the triangulation of methods and sources through the analysis of legal developments, 
documents, press releases and interviews with key policy makers and informants 
who were involved in the reforms, made it possible to cross-examine the data and 
therefore make the findings more robust when testing the proposed hypotheses and 
drawing conclusions from the research. 
  
Chapter 4: Reforming the Portuguese PES: Europeanization 
through soft law empowerment? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the reform of the Portuguese PES (Portuguese acronym: 
IEFP)
99
 which occurred during 1995-2000. It is argued that the examined reforms 
introduced path-breaking changes in the operation and policy orientation of the IEFP, 
and therefore, Portugal’s employment policy. The first part of this chapter discusses 
the characteristics of the Portuguese PES before the examined reforms. The second 
part discusses the content of the PES reforms and the third examines the possible 
causes behind the observed policy changes. Finally, the fourth section evaluates the 
degree of change and extent of EES influence on Portuguese PES reforms.  
The research findings suggested that the reforms implemented during 1995-1997 
were linked to a pre-existing domestic agenda, while the 1998 reform (introduction of 
the Inserjovem and Reage programmes) was linked to the EES soft stimuli on 
activation. It appears that it was the ‘domestic empowerment’ (the second 
Europeanization pathway) that explains how and why the EES influenced the reforms 
of the IEFP.  More specifically, the empirical evidence suggested that a small group 
of successful100 policy entrepreneurs who held key positions in the Portuguese Labour 
Ministry
101
 exploited the EES policy window to promote their own pre-existing 
agenda. These entrepreneurs shared a pre-EES agenda of reforming Portugal’s social 
and employment policy including the PES. Their rise to power coincided with the 
launch of the EES which opened a policy window (Kingdon 1984; see also Chapter 
2) that enabled them to promote their agenda by downloading the EES stimuli. This 
finding seems to be in sharp contrast with the Greek PES case, where domestic 
change appeared to be linked to the ESF conditionality.  
                                                          
99
 Since the Portuguese PES does not operate in the Atlantic islands of Azores and Madeira, for 
simplicity, ‘Portuguese’ apply only to the mainland. As in Chapter 3, the terms PES, Portuguese PES 
and IEFP will be used interchangeably. 
100
 As discussed in Chapter 1, successful policy entrepreneurs are those with access to power and 
resources.  
101
 The Ministry responsible for employment policy, labour market legislation and social security 
(pensions, poverty) has taken various names such as Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, Ministry of 
Social Security and Employment. During 1995-1997 the ministry was divided between the Ministry of 
Qualification and Employment and the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Security. For simplification, 
this chapter will use only the title Labour Ministry.  
  
1. The Portuguese PES before the 1995-2000 reforms: focusing on passive 
employment support and the long-term unemployed  
Portugal’s modern PES was created on 29 December 1979 with the Decree-Law 
no. 519-A2/79 titled ‘Institute for Employment and Vocational Training’ (in 
Portuguese: ‘Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional’ - IEFP102). It started 
operating in 1982 and replaced the previous PES entitled the Manpower Development 
Fund (Portuguese acronym: FDMO) which focused mainly on passive support and 
training to workers (for a comprehensive history, see: IEFP 2010a). The IEFP and the 
Directorate-General for Employment and Labour Relations within the Labour 
ministry are the two key organisations responsible for the Portuguese labour market 
and employment policy (Royo 2003: 6). According to its 1985 statute the IEFP has 
legal, administrative and financial autonomy. This autonomy, however, is 
significantly curtailed by the Labour ministry as it supervises and determines the 
internal structure of the IEFP to a significant extent. Thus, Portugal’s Labour ministry 
is ‘the main policy-setting authority’ (OECD 1998: 63). In other words, Portugal’s 
executive is responsible for the first three employment policy stages outlined in 
chapter 2 (agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making), while the IEFP’s 
independence is mainly in decision-making related to the remaining two stages 
(policy implementation and evaluation). This independence, however, is partial as the 
IEFP operates within a framework of budget provisions and programme entitlements 
determined by legislation defined by the executive (OECD 1998: 61). 
Initially, the main responsibilities of the IEFP were: provision of a free service 
for finding employment; vocational training information; and the provision of 
training and rehabilitation services (Mota et al. 1987). Over the years, however, the 
IEFP gained more responsibilities, such as: operating as a public placement agency; 
supporting job creation activities; conducting labour market studies; and running 
vocational schools. Thus, the IEFP gradually became the most important organisation 
of Portuguese employment policy (Royo 2003: 6; IEFP 2010b). Yet, the IEFP does 
not have a monopoly on job placements as both temporary work agencies and private 
placement agencies operate in Portugal since 1989 when the country signed the ILO 
Convention 96 (OECD 1998: 60). Similarly, the IEFP’s role in unemployment 
benefits is secondary (evaluating additional labour market eligibility criteria) as they 
are administered by a network of regional social Security Centres (Segurança Social) 
(OECD 1998: 59). After Portugal’s EU entry, furthermore, the IEFP acquired a 
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function related to ESF funds by overseeing requests for ESF grants and overseeing 
ESF funding for individual local-level projects (OECD 1998: 58). This feature cannot 
be found in the Greek PES which never had sole responsibility for managing the ESF 
funds. In addition, the OAED did not have supervisory responsibilities besides that of 
overseeing its own training centres.   
Unlike Greece where there was a long-term inertia until the late 1990s (see: 
Chapter 3), Portugal promoted the efficiency and organisational capabilities of the 
IEFP in the early 1990s. More specifically, the IEFP had fully developed an 
automated system for job-brokering - titled ‘SIGAE’ - since 1993. SIGAE was used 
to: facilitate the matching between the unemployed and employers; monitor and 
manage the IEFP’s Job centres and regional offices through monthly indicator based 
reports. The system maintains the following data: full employment and educational 
history of job-seekers; their contact details; job offers to each job-seeker and refusals 
to accept a suitable job; and a unique profile for each individual entering the system 
and their social security number as a second identification tool. In addition, employer 
officers by using SIGAE can report the benefit status of their clients and update their 
contact details and profile. Hence, the IEFP was able to comprehensively monitor the 
registered unemployed (OECD 1998: 83) and conduct regular surveys of the 
effectiveness of vocational training (OECD 1998: 185). Moreover, Portugal 
established the Observatory for Employment and Vocational Training (OEFP) in 
1993. The OEFP was responsible for examining quantitative and qualitative 
employment trends and assessing Portugal’s employment policy outcomes (OECD 
1998: 85). Further, the IEFP has developed since late 1980s an internal training 
division which designs, develops and implements multi-annual training plans for its 
entire staff. The staff members are trained both following recruitment and during their 
career (OECD 1998: 81). In other words, the IEFP appeared to be a better equipped 
organisation than its Greek counterpart. A number of key Greek interviewees 
confirmed that there was a lack of coherent policy for staff development and training 
for its employees (Ioannou, Matsaganis and Karamessini). Unsurprisingly, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the OAED was considered by Greek policy makers to be the 
weakest link in Greek employment policy due to its lack of organisation, monitoring 
and staff performance. 
The IEFP is financed from a variety of sources: it receives around 5% of the 
revenues of a social insurance fund which was introduced in 1986; an ‘employee-
friendly’ general levy (as it taxes employers higher (25%) than employees (11%));  
  
and is given a small percentage of VAT (OECD 1998: 68; Höcker 1994). In addition, 
the IEFP’s budget is financed by EU funds (ESF and ERDF). The significance of EU 
funds is immense as 70% of them were spent in training and constituted over 40% of 
the IEFP’s finances in the 1990s (OECD, 1998: 68). The majority of training for the 
unemployed was conducted within the IEFP’s training centres titled ‘Direct 
Management Centres’ and ‘Participatory Management Centres’. For instance, out of 
the 14,452 unemployed individuals who were trained in Portugal 11,272 of them 
were trained in the IEFP centres in 1996 (OECD 1998: 184). In contrast, the majority 
of ESF funds were channelled to large firms, private training companies and social 
partner training centres (Figueredo et al. 1997; OECD 1998: 176). This is another 
important difference between the Greek and Portuguese PES as the former was a 
recipient of ESF funds instead of being responsible for its allocation to large private 
firms and social partner training centres (see also Chapter 3). 
Until Portugal entered the EU, less than 1% of the Portuguese labour force 
participated in ALMPs annually. Following entry to the EU and the subsequent 
receipt of ESF funds, there was a significant increase in labour force participation in 
ALMPs unlike the case of Greece which this did not occur (see: Chapter 3). For 
instance, by 1997 the percentage of the workforce participating in ALMPs increased 
to 7% annually (OECD 1998: 34). The number of vocational training schools grew 
significantly resolving the overcapacity problem (OECD 1998: 33). In addition, the 
ALMPs proliferated both in type and number (OECD 1998: 34), such that by the late 
1990s Portugal’s ALMPs accounted for over 50% of total labour market spending. 
This was considerably higher than the OECD average of 35%. Alas, the higher 
unemployment rates of the 1990s resulted in a decrease of Portuguese ALMP 
spending because passive support (mainly in the form of unemployment benefits) had 
to increase (OECD 1998: 158; Pedroso 2005: 111).  
Similarly to Greece (see Chapter 3), neither the concept nor the practice of 
activation was known in Portuguese employment policy (Hespanha 2007: 209). Until 
the mid-1990s, vocational training spending was still targeted towards working 
adults, despite the rise in funding of the new ALMPs. The remaining resources were 
allocated to direct job creation; private sector hiring subsidies; and business start-ups 
(OECD, 1998: 158). Portugal and Greece were the only OECD members to spend 
more on training the employed rather than the unemployed adults (OECD 1998). 
Additionally, the IEFP prioritised training of the long-term unemployed (LTU) over 
that of recently registered ones. Until the mid-1990s, the IEFP perceived the LTU as 
  
the group with the highest difficulty in entering the labour market (Addison and 
Portugal 2002: 509).
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 The main exception to this rule were the ESF co-financed 
Community Initiatives ‘NOW’, ‘ ORIZON’ and ‘YOUT START’ which focused 
on equal opportunities for women, reintegration of the disabled and disadvantaged 
groups and youth vocational training respectively (OECD 1998: 220). However, their 
impact on the content of Portuguese employment policy was negligible as the novel 
features of these vocational training programmes did not expand beyond these 
Community Initiatives. In other words, as had occurred in Greece (see Chapter 3), 
they remained confined to these initiatives and were not adopted in any other 
employment policy measure.   
The flow of EU funds was a mixed blessing for the IEFP. On the positive side, 
the IEFP benefited from the increase of resources because of the ESF funds, and its 
staff became familiar with the new policy goals and methods that the EU funded 
training schemes introduced. However, the IEFP appears to have then been 
transformed into an EU-funds managing organisation.
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 This had major implications 
for the IEFP’s policy orientation. The IEFP staff and resources were principally 
devoted to the management of ESF funds as the main priority was to maximize their 
absorption rates. Other policy initiatives that may have been equally appropriate for 
Portugal’s labour market, but did not meet the ESF goals and funding criteria were 
side-lined. This neglect for non-EU funded policies resulted from the inability of the 
IEFP staff to cope with the increased workload that the new EU financial resources 
necessitated. As a result, the IEFP did not develop measures tailored to the needs and 
context of the Portuguese labour market. For instance, the IEFP did not develop a 
tangible policy for tackling informal work and the working poor phenomenon - 
although vocational training measures may have tackled the latter indirectly (Pedroso 
2005: 114). Moreover, vocational training provision followed a rather dubious path of 
trying to match the IEFP clients with training programmes instead of designing 
programmes that would suit the unemployed (Silva 2009: 135). Finally, the IEFP 
disregarded traditional PES competences, such as managing supply and demand and 
labour market intermediation. Consequently, it can be argued that, despite the multi-
faceted benefits of the ESF funds, their effect was detrimental to the IEFP’s policy-
making efficiency.  
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The second major implication of the ESF funding was that the IEFP became 
suddenly a major manager and distributor of the ESF money which was all 
channelled to private training centres. Some of these entities were owned by social 
partners, others were private corporations and others were run by local authorities. 
The IEFP’s tripartite management structure (representatives of government, 
employers and employees with a representation ratio of 8/4/4 respectively - see: 
Höcker 1994) meant that in many cases the social partners’ representatives were 
approving applications for ESF funding for their own or their colleagues’ training 
centres. This practice resulted in numerous mismanagement and corruption cases.
105
 
Overall, the first ESF programming period in Portugal was characterised as chaotic 
since there was not really any adequate institutional and policy framework to 
implement the ESF co-financed programmes (Silva 2009: 114). The situation was 
significantly improved in the second and third programming period as the ESF 
criteria became progressively much stricter.  
 
2. Reforming the IEFP: paradigm change through activation  
The examined IEFP reforms occurred during 1995-2000. In 1995 a new period 
began for Portuguese politics as -after many years in opposition- the Socialist party 
(in Portuguese: Partido Socialista; acronym: PS) won the 1995 elections. Portugal’s 
Socialists renewed their term in office in the 1999 elections and remained in power 
until 2002. As will be discussed in the next three sub-sections, the purpose of the 
IEFP reforms was two-fold: to curtail some of the IEFP’s powers which were the 
source of corruption; and to alter the policy orientation of the IEFP towards an 
inclusive and comprehensive intervention for the unemployed. According to the 
OECD, Portugal was included in the group of countries that witnessed ‘a sea change’ 
during the 1990s with regard to the modus operandi of their PES (OECD 2001). This 
section will examine these reforms and analyse their features and impact on 
Portuguese employment policy. It argues that, of all the IEFP’s reforms that occurred 
during 1995-2000, the 1998 reform - when the Inserjovem and Reage initiatives 
where introduced - is the most important and transformative as it resulted in a IEFP 
paradigm shift. This reform record contrasts with the Greek one as in the latter the 
most important change was introduced in 2001 and implemented in 2003. In addition, 
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reforms continued throughout the 2000s and were completed in 2006 with the 
introduction of the KPA2 (see Chapter 3).  
 
2.1. Reforming the organisational and institutional set-up of the Portuguese PES  
After the 1995 elections, the newly elected Socialists implemented a series of 
reforms aiming to change the institutional framework of Portugal’s employment 
policy-making. More specifically, as soon as they took office, they divided the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Security into two different ministries: the 
Ministry of Qualification and Employment and the Ministry of Solidarity and Social 
Security. The IEFP was supervised by the former, while the social security network 
by the latter. It appeared that that this separation was mostly symbolic as according to 
the fieldwork evidence the PS government wanted to stress the priority of 
qualifications and the independence of employment policy from the rest of Portugal’s 
social policy (interviews with: Silva and Pedroso). Nonetheless, the reform also had a 
substantive operational element as it appeared that the Socialists aimed at a better 
management of Portugal’s social policy by separating employment from social 
security policy (interview with: Dornelas). Thus, instead of one minister 
administering both fields - with the danger of favouring the much more salient social 
security policy (as had happened until then) - Portugal would have two ministers – 
with one entirely devoted to employment and vocational training policy and the other 
to social security issues such as poverty and pensions (interviews with: Silva, Pedroso 
and Madelino). However, this ministerial set-up did not last for long as in 1997 the 
division was reversed with the merger of the two ministries into one which was 
named Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity. Despite the different title, the new 
ministry had the same organisational structure as the previous Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security. Surprisingly, the ministerial split had no discernible 
impact on the IEFP and its activities (OECD 1998: 90).  
Nevertheless, the second organizational change that the PS government 
implemented significantly altered the IEFP responsibilities. In 1996, the IEFP lost the 
management of the ESF funds, which - as discussed in the previous section - was one 
of its most controversial responsibilities. The management of the ESF funds was 
delegated to an independent department within the Labour Ministry (Departamento 
para os Assuntos do Fundo Social Europeu (Department for European Social Fund 
matters / DAFSE)), which became the body that would authorise and distribute the 
ESF funds to both the IEFP and other independent / private organisations (OECD 
  
1998: 58). This change rendered the IEFP a mere recipient of ESF funding, which had 
to be approved by a non-IEFP related organisation. It appeared that for the PS 
government this reform was imperative in its effort to modernise Portugal’s PES. In 
particular, empirical evidence collected from interviews with the key policy makers 
that implemented the reform (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva and Madolino) 
suggested three reasons for this reform: (i) it was perceived that any further 
corruption scandals would almost certainly be avoided, since the previous 
arrangement allowing the IEFP to manage and allocate the ESF funds to 
organisations linked with the IEFP’s management committee was no longer in place; 
(ii) the efficiency of the IEFP would be improved as the organisation could devote 
more energy into designing and implementing Portugal’s employment policy; (iii) it 
was expected that the management of the ESF funds would be significantly improved 
as a dedicated independent unit within the Labour Ministry would be responsible for 
the task (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva and Madolino). This agencification process 
was repeated in March 2000 with the launch of the Institute for the Management of 
the European Social Fund (in Portuguese: Instituto de Gestão do Fundo Social 
Europeu; acronym: IGFSE), which was also supervised by the Labour Ministry. This 
reform aimed at establishing a nationally centralised system of management and 
financial control of the programmes supported by the ESF for the 3rd CSF (IGFSE 
2010).   
The Socialists implemented another organisational change in 1997 with the 
creation of the Institute for Innovation in Job Training (in Portuguese: Instituto para a 
Inovação na Formação; acronym: INOFOR). Its mission was to: conduct studies on 
the forthcoming educational and vocational training needs; to monitor training 
requirements; and suggest novel vocational training measures that would match the 
needs that the organisation would have identified. In other words, the INOFOR aimed 
at creating a more structured system of training which would be suitable to the needs 
of individuals and organisations.
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 In addition, the INOFOR would be responsible 
for the accreditation of training establishments which would apply for ESF funding. It 
should be noted that, as Greece did one year later, in 1997 Portugal made the 
accreditation of organisations receiving ESF money obligatory (OECD 1998: 179). 
The INOFOR would be the second independent agency to contribute to the study of 
employment and labour market policy. In 1993 the Observatory for Employment and 
Vocational Training (OEFP) was established. The OEFP responsibilities were to 
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monitor employment trends; and to evaluate the efficiency and effects of employment 
and vocational training measures. Both the OEFP and the INOFOR would serve as 
key sources of information for policy makers and the IEFP in designing and 
evaluating Portugal’s employment policy (OECD 1998: 85).  
The above reform record differs from the one observed in the Greek PES with 
regard to its timing and content. Regarding timing, the Greek government did not 
implement any organisational reform of the Greek PES until 2001. With regard to 
content, Greece did not have to remove the management of the ESF funds from the 
OAED as this had never been within the OAED’s remit (see Chapter 3).  
 
2.2. Introducing activation ‘on paper’ 
Besides the aforementioned organisational changes, after 1995 the IEFP 
witnessed the most significant reform of its policy goals and methods, namely its 
‘activation’. The concept of activation meant a paradigm shift for the IEFP because - 
as mentioned in the previous section - it was following the exact opposite principles 
and practices. Firstly, the IEFP was not providing tailor-made services and vocational 
training programmes to the unemployed, but was allocating them to various 
vocational programmes in order to fill in the empty slots in the available training 
programmes. Secondly, the IEFP prioritised the completely ‘wrong’ group of 
unemployed individuals compared with the activation model: instead of trying to re-
integrate the newly registered unemployed into the labour market as quickly as 
possible, it neglected them completely and was focused on the LTU who were 
considered as the top-priority group. Thirdly, despite having some reporting and 
monitoring capabilities, the IEFP had neglected its ‘traditional’ responsibilities, such 
as managing supply and demand. 
The reforms aiming to activate the IEFP started as soon as the PS government 
came to power. Initially, there was a tentative effort to improve employer services 
and activate employment counselling services for job-seekers (OECD 1998: 89). In 
addition, the Individual Assistance Plan (IAP) was introduced, which included a 
written action plan for the unemployed. The main target group of the IAP, however, 
was the over six-month unemployed who received benefits (OECD 1998: 107). The 
PS government also implemented an overhaul of the IEFP’s Job Clubs (clubes de 
emprego). These entities were created by the previous government in 1993 
(Implementing Order No. 295/93) in an effort to decentralise some of the IEFP’s 
work. Since their introduction, Job Clubs focused on LTU (OECD 1998). It was only 
  
after 1995 (Implementing Order No. 247/95) that the Job Clubs - instead of simply 
allocating their clients to ESF-funded programmes - began to implement specific 
measures for preventing and combating unemployment which aimed at the quick 
reintegration of the unemployed and of those at risk of unemployment (Silva 2009: 
117; Misep 2007: 104). Again, it was after 1998 that the Job Clubs started also 
focusing on the young unemployed and extended their services by providing 
scholarships, information, guidance, incentives for geographical mobility and 
referrals of young people.  
Some new measures were included, furthermore, in the short-term social pact, 
which was signed in January 1996 as the role of the newly created Insertion into 
Active Life Units (in Portuguese: Unidade de Inserção na Vida Activa; acronym: 
UNIVA) was highlighted in the Employment chapter of the pact (CES 1996a: 8-9). 
UNIVAs were created in August 1996 (Normative Dispatch No. 27/96 of 3 August) 
with the aim to ‘provide help, information and vocational guidance and support and 
monitoring of young people during their experiences of entering the world of work 
and in seeking training and/or a job’ (Misep 2007: 103). The UNIVAs constituted 
IEFP’s new strategy of extending the reach of its labour market services with a 
particular focus on the young unemployed (OECD, 1998: 113). The UNIVAs were 
accredited and financed by the IEFP and could be set up in a variety of organisations 
such as schools; vocational training centres; youth centres; private charitable 
institutions (IPSS); local authorities; social partners and other associations (Misep 
2007: 103). The UNIVAs started as pilot programmes at first, but then expanded 
considerably as by the end of 1997 there were 400 units (OECD 1998: 113). The 
UNIVAs aimed at promoting the completion of regular education by helping young 
people to manage their school-to-work transition. The introduction of the UNIVAs 
aimed at tackling a long-standing problem of Portugal, that is ‘the completion of a 
regular school course and assistance in managing the school-to-work transition’ 
(OECD 1998: 113). In addition, the UNIVAs provided comprehensive assistance to 
young people by offering them information and vocational and/or school guidance, 
support with job searching and placement, training, and promotion of networking to 
enter the labour market (Misep 2007: 103).  
The activation of the IEFP was formally put on the agenda in the December 1996 
Strategic Co-operation Agreement (in Portuguese: Acordo de Concertação 
Estratégica; acronym: ACE). The ACE was a social pact between the government and 
all social partners (with the exception of the largest and Communist orientated trade 
  
union General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (Confederação Geral dos 
Trabalhadores Portugueses; acronym: CGTP-IN)). The ACE included many labour 
market measures for the period 1996-1999 (cf.: Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003: 56; 
Christovam 1998; Christovam and Martins 1997). The pact was divided into two 
parts: the first included general principles, and the second, binding commitments 
under 10 headings (Christovam 1998). In the first part of ACE the activation of the 
IEFP was included in the wider goal of ‘active policies for employment, training and 
education’. It read as follows (CES 1997: 41):  
To reform employment services so as to be able to ensure a personalised and 
integrated response to receiving people, guidance, training and support for the 
placement of each unemployed person, with priority for attending to the long-term 
unemployed. This reform, now under way, combines the bolstering and retraining 
of the technical teams at the employment and training centres, new methodologies 
in the way they work and remodelling the computer system in order to apply the 
potential of the information society to the management of the job market (in 
1996/98).  
 
However, the PES reform was only one of the many goals included in the first 
part of the ACE document. In particular, the ACE put forward the goal of increasing 
the IEFP placements by 20% annually for 1997-1999 and the expansion of job 
creation programmes from 30.000 in 1996 to 60.000 in 1999 (CES 1997: 41). 
Additionally, the PS government announced a wide-ranging expansion of the ALMPs 
by expanding already existing programmes and introducing new ones. For instance, 
the Socialists considerably increased existing private sector hiring subsidies and 
investment in vocational guidance and placements (OECD 1998: 34), while they 
introduced the 1996 Social Labour Market Programme which included both new and 
old job creation measures (OECD 1998: 168).  
However, these reforms hardly promoted activation. Contrary to the Social 
Labour Market Programme and other related training and placement opportunities, 
the IEFP-related measures either constituted pilot programmes with minuscule 
spending devoted to them, or remained on paper (OECD 1998: 107; Silva 2009: 120). 
For instance, although the IAP measure was legally defined in 1995, until October 
1997 it was not yet implemented. Similarly, all the measures mentioned above 
remained marginal for the IEFP in financial terms: the resources for Job Clubs in 
1996 constituted one four-hundredth of spending on hiring subsidies for the young 
unemployed (OECD 1998: 107). More crucially, the IEFP staff completely neglected 
these novel measures resulting in their non-advertisement to potential users. As a 
result, they were scarcely used (Silva 2009: 121).  
  
The limited implementation of the measures included in the ACE was not 
restricted to the PES as most of the measures included in the pact were either delayed 
or inadequately implemented (Christovam 1998; 2000). After a reaction from the 
Portuguese social partners, the government recognised the failure of the AES and was 
forced to re-initiate the ‘strategic concertation’ process in which it proposed social 
partners the negotiation of a new tripartite central agreement.
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Thus, although the 
goal of activating the PES was certainly existent since late 1996, it was neither among 
the top priorities nor did it have any salience. In addition, albeit existent, activation 
was not implemented or explicitly defined (Silva 2009: 125). Finally, despite the 
introduction of a wide-ranging list of measures targeting the young, the IEFP still 
prioritised the LTU. Hence, the reforms suggested in 1995-96 did not substantially 
alter the policy orientation and practices of the IEFP.  
The above reform record differs significantly from the Greek one. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, in Greece the concept of activation did not appear until the 
institutionalisation of the EES and more specifically after the early 2000s with the 
2001 and 2003 reforms. In sharp contrast to the Greek case, the concept of activation 
had emerged (in official documents and in reforms) in Portugal before the EES. In 
addition, it appears that - contrary to Greece - Portugal implemented a number of 
reforms until 1998. In other words, in Portugal the reform of the IEFP was a pre-
existing priority that was implemented before the emergence of the EES in 1997(see 
also below Section 3.1).  
 
2.3. Inserjovem and Reage: the transformative change of the Portuguese PES  
The major reform of the IEFP was initiated in 1998 with two headline 
programmes - Inserjovem and Reage - which the PS government launched with a key 
press conference. Inserjovem (translated as insertion of the young) was devoted to the 
young unemployed (16-24 years old), while Reage to adult ones (over 25). Despite 
their different target groups, both initiatives employed the same principles and 
methods which were aligned to an active and preventative approach in tackling 
unemployment. In particular, the main tools of Inserjovem and Reage were early, 
personalised interventions combined with follow-up guidance (NAP 1998: 15-16). In 
practice, this meant that the IEFP had to classify the unemployed into three different 
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priority groups: the newly registered unemployed; the unemployed who were 
registered for less than 3/6 months; and the unemployed who were registered for over 
3/6 months (CIDES, 2003: 41). Each individual would receive a personalised 
response according to the group he/she was assigned to, as well as his/her specific 
needs. Both initiatives necessitated the PES to meet certain targets for its clients with 
regard to promoting their employability, by offering them a new opportunity (in the 
form of employment; vocational training; professional experience; job placements; or 
internships) and personalised professional guidance within a specific time-frame. The 
logic of the time limit was to prevent the IEFP clients from staying unemployed for a 
long period, and therefore, becoming an LTU (NAP 1999: 48). The targets differed 
between the young and the adult unemployed as they were supposed to be given a 
new opportunity before reaching six and twelve months of registered unemployment 
respectively.  
To achieve these targets Inserjovem and Reage employed a path-breaking model 
of intervention, which was based on the preventative approach for tackling 
unemployment. This model utilised four key tools (NAP 1999: 48): 1): the Personal 
Employment Plan (PEP); (ii) the Follow-up Convention; (iii) the Insertion Team; and 
(iv) the Individual File of each unemployed individual. The PEP constituted a tool of 
socio-professional insertion which would be co-authored by the unemployed (who 
would be categorised after visiting the PES as a ‘candidate’) and the IEFP ‘Insertion 
Team’. The PEP included an array of steps that the candidate and the IEFP would 
take, such as the anticipated schedule of the intervention; the organisations 
responsible for the candidate’s labour market insertion; the intervention plan; and the 
PEP follow-up and implementation. The Follow-up Convention was the formalisation 
of the individualised and extensive follow-up of the unemployed individual or 
candidate, as well as the latter’s active participation in the employability measures 
which the PEP would foresee. These interventions would be agreed and signed by 
both the unemployed and the Director of the Job Centre. The Insertion Team was a 
specialised group of expert counselling advisors and employment professionals 
located in all Job Centres. The Insertion team would contribute in the PEP preparation 
and administer the unemployed person’s file as well as the corresponding 
employability measures deemed as necessary for the individualised follow-up 
process. The Individual File of each unemployed would maintain all the PEP’s 
information (Follow-up Convention, PEP Record, Individual Report and Inclusion 
  
Difficulties Prognosis Grill). The file would be managed and updated by the IEFP in 
order to use them in any future contact with the candidate. 
Further, in order to diagnose the needs of the candidate the PES was required to 
signal the candidates before reaching three months of registered unemployment for 
the young unemployed; and six months for the adults. The signalling process included 
two steps (NAP 1999: 48-49): (i) the File Management and (ii) the Attendance Flow. 
In the File Management step the IEFP staff would identify every young and adult 
candidate using SIGAE before reaching the target of three or six months of registered 
unemployment respectively. The IEFP would also spot the young and adult 
unemployed who were reaching the limit of the target date of reintegration without 
having received any reply from the IEFP. For this purpose, the SIGAE was further 
upgraded and adapted to the needs of the Inserjovem and Reage to monitor the 
responses of the candidates and the IEFP. The SIGAE could monitor the number and 
type of response; the profile of the candidates with or without response; the effort 
indicators of the IEFP (number and type of interventions); and the number of PEPs 
(NAP 1999: 50). In the second step (Attendance Flow) the PES staff had to classify 
the candidates who were visiting the IEFP for registration or re-registration by using 
the ‘Inclusion Difficulties Prognosis Grill’. The latter constituted an assessment score 
of the personal characteristics of the candidates in order to measure their degree of 
employability. The goal at this stage was to verify whether the candidates were facing 
additional risks in order to receive additional support.  
After the classification and diagnosis of the unemployed, the IEFP had to 
implement the next stage of the Inserjovem and Reage model of intervention which 
was the summoning of the candidates. The IEFP had to call the candidates within the 
period of three and six months for the young and adult unemployed respectively. 
When the candidates were summoned, the Job Centres of the IEFP had to offer them 
an employability measure aiming towards labour market integration either as an 
employee (placement) or as a self-employed. The IEFP had to offer vocational 
training to candidates with no, insufficient or inadequate qualifications. In addition, it 
would provide all candidates with Employment Programmes according to their profile 
and individual requirements. Personalised guidance would be a condition for 
vocational training provision (NAP 1999: 50). At all stages of the IEFP intervention - 
and especially three months after the provision of an employability measure - the 
IEFP Insertion Team had to ensure the follow-up of the candidate through regular 
  
communication either in person (visits), or by telephone and/or postal contact (NAP 
1999: 49).  
The IEFP would use a variety of intervention techniques to assure the labour 
market integration of the candidates according to their profile and needs (NAP 1999: 
49). The first technique would be the Elaboration of the PEP, which would be the 
final stage of the IEFP intervention before the candidate accepted the employability 
measure. The PEP could be authored and signed during a placement interview, 
provided the candidate’s profile matched with available job offers. If the candidate 
could not find a job immediately, then he/she would undergo the 1
st
 Level 
Counselling Interventions, if the candidates could not succeed in getting a job or 
placement due to ‘employability deficits’ which necessitated alternative measures 
(NAP 1999: 50). The 1
st
 Level Counselling could be either a group information 
session or an individual interview. Its purpose was to recognize available or potential 
opportunities of employment. If this was successful, then the process would be 
finalised, by the elaboration of the PEP, as well as the signing of the mutual 
agreement and responsibility of the two parties (candidate and IEFP). If the candidate 
needed to receive intensive professional guidance, he/she would proceed to the 2
nd
 
Level Counselling where candidates would receive personalised professional and/or 
vocational guidance either in groups or alone. If the candidates also needed 
psychological support, they would be referred to the 3
rd
 Level Counselling where 
besides the personalised services provided in level 2 the candidates would receive 
psychological support especially with regard to raising self-esteem.  
To sum up, the Inserjovem and Reage initiatives resulted in a transformative 
change of the IEFP operation and policy orientation. Instead of allocating its clients to 
ESF funded vocational training schemes just to fill-in available positions, the IEFP 
was required to: signal, diagnose, provide any required personalised service to its 
clients; author and sign a mutual agreement in the form of PEP; and make sure that 
the unemployed person either got a job or an alternative employability measure in a 
pre-defined period which would result in the ending of their joblessness status. The 
goal was to intervene early (six months for the young and twelve months for the adult 
unemployed) in order to prevent them from becoming LTU. In other words, instead 
of maintaining a continuous focus on the LTU, with the Inserjovem and Reage 
programmes the IEFP had to focus on the newly or recently registered unemployed 
and find them in a specified timeframe a tangible alternative from unemployment.   
  
Unsurprisingly, the two initiatives created a great burden for the Portuguese PES 
as they required a path-shifting change of its functioning. The government chose to 
implement them gradually in order to ensure the full implementation of the new 
model of intervention that the Inserjovem and Reage programmes required from the 
IEFP. The programmes were announced in 1998 and were initially executed only in a 
few pilot areas, with the goal of extending the new methodology of the programmes 
nationally in 2000. The areas selected were the ones where the PS government had 
already established Regional Networks for Employment (RNE) and Territorial Pacts 
(TP) (see: NAP 1998: 13; Moniz 2002: 9-10; OECD, 1998: 60), which ‘constituted 
tools of promoting innovation within the IEFP’ (interview with: Madelino – see 
Appendix I). The empirical evidence suggested that this choice was made for three 
key reasons. First, the IEFP leadership responded that an immediate national 
implementation was impossible, and a gradual implementation would be more 
realistic (interview with: Soares). Second, the RNEs and TPs were established in 
areas where the IEFP was more efficient; thus, the introduction of Inserjovem and 
Reage and the subsequent novel methods that the IEFP staff had to employ had a 
bigger chance of success (interview with: Soares). Third, starting a gradual but 
nonetheless full implementation of the new preventative approach meant that the 
IEFP staff would not neglect or side-line the required change of operation since 
‘gradual implementation meant incremental 100% application’ (interviews with: 
Soares, Pedroso, Madelino, Silva). It appeared that the PS policy makers expected 
that once fully implemented - even in few areas - the new method of intervention 
would be gradually expanded in the same fashion. As a result, the change would be 
perennial resulting in the activation of the IEFP at a national level (interview with: 
Soares).  
The PS government was very keen to expand the new methodology as soon as 
possible. In July 1998 it launched Inserjovem and Reage in nine RNEs and three TPs 
covering around 25% of the total population and 30% of the registered 
unemployed.
108
 At the beginning of 1999 the target was to reach 45% of the total 
population which had to be increased to 75% at the end of the year. Finally, by 2000 
the new method of intervention had to cover all Portuguese continental area (NAP 
1999: 50). These targets were met and, by 2000, the new active and preventative 
approach that Inserjovem and Reage demanded from the IEFP was enforced at 
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national level (NAP 2001: 39). The rapid initial reaction and maintained pace of the 
PS government in reforming the IEFP resulted in two noteworthy positive 
assessments: (i) in 1998, Portugal was included among a handful of EU countries 
(Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Spain, France and Luxembourg) which had already 
reformed or were beginning to reform their PES according to the preventative 
approach of the EES (EC 1998b: 28);
109
 (ii) the design and implementation of the two 
initiatives as well as the change of the IEFP operation was so successful that 
Inserjovem and Reage were included in 2001 in the EES mutual learning programme. 
Six countries (Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) 
were invited to Lisbon to review Portugal’s ‘best practice’, compare it with their own 
PES intervention models and examine whether the Portuguese novel method of 
intervention could be transferred to their countries.
110
  
Additionally, contrary to Greece, Portuguese ALMP spending showed a 
significant rise during 2000-2004 and in 2007 spending rose above the year 2000 
levels. Hence, Portugal did not follow the Greek spending pattern where ALMP 
spending decreased during the period under study,111 and Portuguese spending on 
passive measures was much closer to the EU-15 and EU-27 average (see: Table 4.1). 
However, similarly to Greece, passive measures retained the public expenditure’s 
largest share throughout 2000-2007.  
 
Table 4.1: Portuguese LMP expenditure as % of GDP 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Active 
Measures 
        
Portugal  0.354e  0.466e  0.427e 0.510e 0.545 0.517e 0.451 0.387 
EU15 : : : : 0.609 0.534 0.531 0.491 
EU27 : : : : : 0.516 0.511 0.473 
         
Passive 
Measures 
        
Portugal  0.824  0.976 1.150e 1.089 1.151 1.287 1.265 1.090 
EU15 1.229 1.21 1.306 1.394 1.406 1.387 1.247 1.077 
EU27 : : : : : 1.334 1.196 1.025 
Source: EC 2009a: 89;  - Denotes missing data; e denotes estimated value 
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For the corresponding peer review executive summary, see: http://www.mutual-learning-
employment.net/uploads/ModuleXtender/PeerReviews/49/Exe-sum-port.01.pdf. 
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The reform record of the Portuguese PES was substantially different from the 
Greek PES reform record. First, the IEFP reform was completed by 2000 having 
started in 1998, while the Greek PES reform only began after 2001 with successive 
legislative reforms enacted by the Greek parliament in 2001, 2003 and 2006. Second, 
in Portugal the reform was implemented within the IEFP whereas in Greece policy 
makers decided to bypass the OAED and implement their reforms through a process 
of extensive ‘agencification’ (see Chapter 3). Third, the EU considered the reform of 
the Portuguese PES as one of the EES success stories (and was therefore included in 
the mutual learning program). An equally positive evaluation was published by the 
OECD (OECD 2001; see also introduction of this chapter). By contrast, the Greek 
PES was considered to be the weakest link in Greek employment policy even after the 
observed reforms by both national policy makers and the EU evaluations (see Chapter 
3). The summary of the Portuguese PES reforms is provided in the following table.  
 
Table 4.2: Public Employment Services’ Reform in Portugal 
 Reform Content Time Process 
Portugal 
Activation  
& 
 preventative 
approach 
Reform began in 
1998  & 
 completed by 
2000 
Reform took place within 
the Portuguese PES (IEFP) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
3. Explaining IEFP reforms: policy entrepreneurs empowered by the EES 
The Inserjovem and Reage initiatives were included in the first Portuguese NAP 
of 1998 as a response to the first two EES guidelines (for the respective EES 
guidelines, see section 2 of Chapter 3 and section 2.2.1 of Chapter 1). One could 
easily assume that the IEFP reform through the Inserjovem and Reage constitutes a 
prime example of the EES impact on Portuguese domestic policy as the Portuguese 
programmes seemingly copy the content of the two guidelines. However, correlation 
does not mean causation. Additionally, the fact that the issue of the IEFP reform was 
already existent in Portugal before the EES necessitates the examination of the 
alternative hypotheses and mechanisms of domestic change of this thesis. To 
delineate the cause (s) of the IEFP reform and the role of the EES, the thesis 
employed: process tracing; the examination of temporal sequences; and evidence 
collected from interviews with key informants. 
  
In explaining the IEFP reforms, the thesis will test alternative hypotheses 
regarding potential Europeanization pathways (see chapter 2). To examine the 
potential causes of the IEFP reforms the thesis employed two criteria: (i) the timing of 
the observed reforms in relation to the EES stimuli; and (ii) the pre-reform 
preferences of domestic policy. Regarding the first criterion (the timing of reforms), if 
the observed policy change occurred prior to 1998 which is the first year EU 
members were required to report on their response to the EES guidelines to the EU, 
then it can be deduced that this is likely to be related to a pre-existing domestic 
agenda rather than a result of an EES impact. In addition, the temporal sequence of 
events between EES guidelines and national developments should show that domestic 
reforms followed the EES stimuli. Regarding the second criterion (the preferences of 
domestic actors), the observed policy change can be linked predominantly to a 
domestic agenda if Portuguese policy makers had already (prior to the EES) outlined 
their intention to reform the PES and explicitly defined an agenda regarding the 
content of the reforms observed at a later stage.  
 
3.1. Explaining the 1995-1997 reforms 
As in Portugal the PS government implemented a series of PES or PES-related 
reforms before 1998, then the EES stimuli cannot explain the 1995-1997 IEFP 
reforms. Indeed, as will be shown below, the empirical evidence suggested that the 
pre-EES agenda of the PS government included both activation and the need to 
reform the IEFP. However, it appeared that it did not include the novel method of 
intervention that was materialised through the Inserjovem and Reage initiatives (see 
below). More specifically, the most important document of the pre-election agenda is 
the 1995 electoral manifesto of the Socialist party. The document presented an 
elaborated account of the ideology and policy proposals of the party. Further, it 
included the concept of activation and active employment policies in its preamble as 
one of its key policies for employment promotion. Additionally, social and 
educational policies were presented as crucial to promote employment and were 
described as an indispensable part of public policy. By emphasising the need for a 
comprehensive public policy to promote employment, the Socialists aimed to criticise 
their main rival - the centre-right Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata 
- PSD). The PSD stressed the importance of macro-economic stability and was 
dismissive of a more interventionist social and employment policy during its term in 
  
office (1985-1995), and especially in the run-up for the final stage of the EMU (Silva 
2009: 122). However, as issues of employment and poverty became prominent in the 
pre-election debates, the Socialists tried to distinguish themselves both from the PSD 
and the PS traditional ideology by recognising the importance of social issues and the 
need to develop a comprehensive policy inventory to adequately address these issues 
(Nunes 2000).  
However, the IEFP was not mentioned in the PS manifesto. More importantly, 
the issue of activation was confined to the social inclusion area and the introduction 
of the GMI (Guaranteed Minimum Income) policy and did not encompass the IEFP. 
According to Dr. Paulo Pedroso, the head of the GMI taskforce while in opposition 
and the minister responsible for passing and implementing the GMI with the PS 
government: 
‘During the election campaign we argued in favour of ‘activating’ Portuguese 
social policy. But our activation proposal was not so much about the IEFP but 
about the minimum income. Another policy related to activation was the 
expansion of vocational training but this was marginal compared to the centrality 
of GMI.’  
 
Indeed, the link between the GMI and activation had already been made in the 
EU 1992 (92/441/EC) Recommendation on sufficient resources and social assistance. 
The recommendation established common principles for minimum income schemes 
during the Portuguese Presidency of the European Council. These principles greatly 
influenced political debates in Portugal and the Socialists referred to them in order to 
justify their positive stance against the GMI (for the link between the 1992 
recommendation and the GMI reform, see: Guibentif 1997; Ferreira 2005; Capucha et 
al. 2005; Zartaloudis 2011; for a detailed account of the political discourse 
concerning the GMI see: Silva 2009: 83-85). According to Paulo Pedroso:  
‘In order to reply to the standard right-wing PSD criticism of ‘budget 
irresponsibility’, ‘welfare system abuse’ and ‘reward people for doing nothing’, 
we argued that the GMI would promote the activation of poor people which 
basically meant the insertion of the GMI recipients to the labour market. The 
GMI was based on a contractual mutual agreement in which the recipient had to 
ensure that they would try to re-enter the labour market. The PSD was adamant 
that this was a really bad idea - especially for achieving EMU entry. We had two 
answers against the PSD criticism: the EU had advised member states to adopt a 
minimum income scheme; and all EU countries -besides Greece - had a similar 
scheme already.’ 
 
 
As will be discussed below, although the PS manifesto referred to the concept of 
activation, this was not related to the IEFP but to the introduction of a minimum 
  
income scheme (see sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter). Nevertheless, the 
Portuguese Socialists - contrary to their Greek counterparts (see Chapter 3) - had 
already formed an agenda for the Portuguese PES. It appeared, however, that the PS 
agenda was shaped much earlier than the 1995 elections as it resulted from the 
incorporation of new - outside the PS - actors who formed a cohesive group of policy 
entrepreneurs sharing a common platform for social and employment policy reform 
(see section 3 of this Chapter below). The members of this group dominated 
Portuguese social and employment policy making during the PS governments as all 
of its members held key positions in the Labour Ministry during 1995-2002 and 
2005-2010.
112
 These policy entrepreneurs were employed by the Portuguese 
university ISCTE-IUL
113
 and, according to one member of the group, shared the 
conviction that ‘public policy is the only way to improve social policy, and therefore, 
Portugal’ (Madelino). The evidence collected through interviews suggested that these 
entrepreneurs were experts on Portuguese and European Social policy with a 
particular emphasis on employment and social security (see below). Moreover, part of 
their academic and research career was devoted to performing evaluations of EU 
initiatives and ESF-funded programmes implemented in Portugal. As a result, they 
had expert knowledge on the advantages and drawbacks of the IEFP and had 
formulated a tentative reform agenda before entering Portuguese politics (see below). 
Drawing on Kindgon’s model they constituted a group of policy entrepreneurs with a 
specific agenda waiting for an opportunity to promote their agenda in public policy.  
However, it appeared that as they were not professional politicians, they had a 
very weak position in the PS party (interviews with: Madolino, Silva). Their role was 
upgraded when the PS decided to ‘open up the party to society’ in 1994 in order to 
renew its social and political agenda. This process was a response to a disappointing 
decade of numerous losses in all (national, local and European) elections. The 
relatively young and highly educated ISCTE-IUL academics provided an exceptional 
opportunity for the Socialists to portray a new image to the Portuguese electorate and 
rejuvenate their positions (Nunes 2005). As a result, these policy entrepreneurs got 
the opportunity to have a large impact on the definition of the PS electoral manifesto, 
particularly with regard to the PS positions on social (including employment) policy. 
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This renewal process was not unknown to Portuguese politics. In a semi-structured 
interview with the author, Paulo Pedroso (see Appendix I) summarised why: 
In Portugal, political parties are weak. They are not trusted and the same applies 
to politicians. This originates from Portugal’s troubled history where big parts of 
the population were oppressed and persecuted during the dictatorship. This 
problem was worsened after the restoration of democracy as the parties were 
completely top-down elitist organisations. Their connection with society was and 
remains weak and people do not actively participate in politics. This applies also 
to the PS which is very different from most Socialist parties in Europe: it has 
very few members, weak trade union representation and limited connections with 
the working class. For instance, the PS was created in Germany from a group of 
expats – it was not a movement within Portugal.  
 
[...] On the contrary, Portuguese people highly regard educated people. After all, 
we are a society with very low educational and qualification levels. In this 
context, the most common practice of political parties to strengthen their position 
and gain legitimacy is to recruit academics. In Portugal’s recent political history 
the majority of ministers had a doctorate or were academics.  
 
Besides the existing practice of recruiting academics, this group had an extra 
advantage. Its leader was another ISCTE-IUL Professor - Ferro Rodrigues. In 
addition to being an experienced academic, Ferro Rodrigues was a key figure of the 
PS party. After the 1995 elections, Rodrigues became the Social Security Minister 
during 1995-1997 and from 1997 until 2000 the Minister of Labour and Social 
Solidarity. His party career peaked during 2002-2004 when he became the PS leader. 
It appears that the powerful position of Rodrigues with the PS party facilitated the 
smoother and faster incorporation of the entire ISCTE-IUL group into the mainstream 
of the PS party (interview with: Dornelas). It appeared that his influence within the 
party was very strong and derived from his very long PS membership as he started his 
involvement in politics as a student leader (interviews with: Dornelas and Madolino).  
According to evidence collected in a number of interviews (interviews with: 
Dornelas, Madolino, Pedroso and Ferreira), it seems that since then, his ‘right hand’ 
was Vieira da Silva who later became a colleague of his in ISCTE-IUL and fellow 
cabinet member. Silva during 1995-1997 was an advisor to F. Rodrigues at the 
Ministry of Social Security. After 1997 he was assigned by Rodrigues to become the 
head of a key directorate in the Labour Ministry - titled the Cabinet for Strategy and 
Planning. This department was responsible for the general design and implementation 
of Portugal’s employment policy and after 1997 it also became the one responsible 
for the EES: its head was also the NAP coordinator; a member of the Employment 
Committee (EMCO); and the Economic and Social Council (in Portuguese: Conselho 
Económico e Social; acronym: CES), which was the key social concertation 
  
institution in Portugal (Eurofound 2009). In other words, Silva became ‘Mr EES’ and 
a key actor in Portugal’s employment policy until 2002. When the Socialists rose to 
power again in 2005, Silva became the Minister of Labour and Social Solidarity 
during 2005-2010.  
The third key policy entrepreneur was Dr. Paulo Pedroso. Pedroso was also an 
ISCTE-IUL academic.  e and Silva constituted the ‘theoretical and technical minds 
of the group’ (interview with: Madelino).  Additionally, Pedroso ‘had a much 
consolidated vision about social policy which he implemented with ferocious 
militancy’ (interview with: Madelino). This was significantly different from the 
standard Portuguese model of social policy. The vision is presented succinctly in the 
following quotes from a semi-structured interview with Pedroso:  
Portuguese policy makers had a golden rule: copy what France is doing. I 
completely disagreed with this tradition. I always argued: let’s see what all EU 
partners are doing and let’s try to import the best practises to Portugal. That’s 
what we did for the GMI: the report on what other EU countries were doing and 
its recommendations were used by the taskforce I was heading to write the law.  
 
[…] As an academic, and more crucially as a policy maker, I had a very strong 
conviction about transforming Portugal from a ‘welfare society’ to a country 
with a ‘welfare state’. The only way to achieve that was by a wide-ranging 
expansion of Portuguese public and social policy. 
 
Louis Capucha confirmed the existence of a very self-conscious group which 
shared a specific agenda: 
Without wanting to sound arrogant, I can say that I am very proud that I was part 
of a very close group of people who knew what they wanted and were also very 
determined to fight for their vision. [...] We all wanted a new Portugal and 
especially a new social policy for our country. We knew we had to give a big 
fight almost against everybody: the opposition, parts of the bureaucracy and even 
with some people within our own party. But it was clear that Portugal could not 
afford to continue on the previous path.  
 
This central role played by Pedroso’s vision of social policy was confirmed by 
external independent experts on Portuguese welfare state. They stated that ‘the 
‘Pedroso model’ provided a clear roadmap that defined PS social policy making’ 
(interviews with: Virginia Ferreira; Karin Wall), and was directly applied to the IEFP. 
The newly elected PS government in 1995 had a specific goal to ‘expand the IEFP’s 
capabilities and coverage to include all the unemployed’ (interviews with: Madelino, 
Silva, Pedroso and Soares). According to another member of the ISCTE-IUL policy 
entrepreneurs, Professor Francisco Madelino (see Appendix I), this agenda was 
defined in the late 1980s in parallel with the UGT and IEFP scandal regarding the 
mismanagement of ESF funds: 
  
I remember being part of numerous meetings with F. Rodrigues, Silva, Pedroso, 
Maria Joao Rodrigues, and Luis Capucha regarding the IEFP when Cavaco Silva 
was in power (SZ: Cavaco Silva was the PSD premier during 1985-1995). We 
were really concerned about the mismanagement of EU funds and the overall 
IEFP’s poor performance. We had all concluded the three policy priorities that a 
PS government had to pursue with regard to the country’s social policy were:  
1. The management of the ESF funds had to be separated from the IEFP. 
The ESF funds had to be managed by an independent authority. The 
main reasons for this decision were that EU money was used in a corrupt 
fashion and that both the IEFP and ESF interventions were simply not 
effective.  
2. Portugal’s modernisation could not be achieved by its elites or the highly 
trained people; the top-down solution could never work as the vast 
majority of the population would not follow due to lack of skills and 
education. Therefore, the Portuguese PES had to focus on the poor and 
untrained members of our society. Only by expanding training could we 
promote Portugal’s modernisation.114 
3. Portugal had to incorporate a minimum income policy as soon as 
possible.  
 
Maria Candida Soares confirmed the criticism of the IEFP’s pre-1995 operation: 
IEFP was supposed to do everything: manage unemployment; counsel the 
unemployed; manage the ESF; conduct vocational training; author labour 
market studies; etc. In the end, however, it failed to do most of these tasks. It 
was simply too much and the concentration of power was doing more damage 
than good.  
 
Pedroso was more critical with regard to the incentives and preferences of the 
IEFP staff:  
The IEFP personnel had developed a kind of closed-circuit clientele receiving 
the EU funded subsidies: the same training companies, the same LTUs, the 
same problems again and again. It was a closed system of receiving the state’s 
support. The vast majority of Portugal’s unemployed people were excluded. 
This had to stop.  
 
The above seem to explain, to a great extent, the 1995-1997 reform activism of 
the PS regarding the IEFP. As analysed in section 2, the PES reforms during 1995-
1997 implemented three key changes: (i) the management of the ESF was delegated 
from the IEFP to an independent authority within the Labour ministry; (ii) training 
was expanded to more target groups, with a particular emphasis to the young; (iii) the 
PES, would offer personalised services to its clients, instead of mechanically 
assigning them to vocational training programmes in order to fit the available 
vacancies.  owever, as discussed in section two, the reforms concerning the IEFP’s 
policy orientation had not been fully implemented until 1997, and novel measures 
constituted a miniscule part of the IEFP’s operation. According to the evidence 
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collected from interviews with key Portuguese informants, the reasons for this limited 
progress appeared to be: (i) the low priority the PS government assigned to these 
measures as its main focus was on organisational changes (ESF management; 
INOFOR, etc.); (ii) the focus on expanding the reach of the IEFP quantitatively; (iii) 
the reluctance of the IEFP personnel to alter their policy making approach. Although 
this reluctance has been attributed to inertia (Silva, 2009: 135-138), the research of 
this thesis suggested that there was also a strong opposition concerning the new 
model of intervention suggested by the EES. For instance, Professor Mário Caldeira 
Dias (the IEFP director during 1995-2004 and President of the OEFP since 2004) was 
very critical of activation and the EU’s social policy direction. In his opinion it was 
and remains probably useless for Portugal:  
Activation works only when the GDP is growing. But activation has little 
impact on improving the fate of the unemployed when the economy is 
stagnant or in recession as we had been in the last decade. [...] I always found 
this obsession with activation absurd. [...] This is because I strongly believe 
that without passive measures - which I consider the best - activation cannot 
work as it becomes too expensive. [...] When I was leading the IEFP I raised 
my concerns with the political leadership of the ministry but nobody wanted 
to listen. [...] Who was right? I can only say that the IEFP staff since 1998 put 
a lot of hard work for the Inserjovem and Reage in order to meet the EES 
benchmarks. And what was the result? Since 2002, with the economic crisis, 
unemployment in Portugal rose to unprecedented levels and is now around 
10%.  
 
3.2. Explaining Inserjovem and Reage initiatives: enter the 1998 reform  
The timing of the 1998 reform allows the possibility for a causal relationship 
between the EES soft stimuli and the introduction of the new method of intervention 
that Inserjovem and Reage necessitated. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggested that 
the 1998 reform was greatly influenced by the EES soft stimuli on activation 
(interviews with: Pedroso, Madolino, Silva and Dornellas). It appeared that domestic 
actors had not defined the preventative approach and the concept of activation 
remained rather vague. The recollections of two key actors in the IEFP reform make 
this apparent. According to Madelino:  
The EES had a great impact on the IEFP. Until 1998, all policy measures and 
reforms were about ‘reacting’ to unemployment as the IEFP waited to be 
contacted by the unemployed. The EES introduced a completely new 
approach of ‘preventing’ unemployment as the IEFP had to act in advance to 
promote employment. As a result, in practical terms the IEFP was obliged to 
be proactive and contact the unemployed before a certain time limit and offer 
them a specific employability measure.  
 
Pedroso also agreed about the role of the EES in defining the PS policy agenda:  
  
Reforming the IEFP was part of our broader agenda of creating an efficient 
and strong Portuguese welfare state. For the IEFP this approach meant that it 
should constitute the main body that would help the unemployed find a job 
and extend its services to as many people as possible. [...] Although the 
IEFP’s activation was included in our pre-1998 reforms, it was about a 
quantitative expansion of coverage than a qualitative change in policy 
making. Moreover, the term originated mainly from the GMI and referred to 
mutual responsibilities. With the EES we could push our initial agenda 
through Europe-wide requirements.  
 
In addition, according to key policy makers involved in the 1998 IEFP 
(interviews with: Pedroso, and Madolino) reform the role of the EES was decisive in 
defining and implementing the 1998 IEFP reform. According to the fieldwork it 
appeared that without the EES guidelines, the IEFP reform would remain on paper as 
the previous reforms (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva and Madolino). According to 
main actor responsible for the IEFP reform - Pedroso:  
The EES and the subsequent evaluation were crucial for us because for the 
first time I could use the EU evaluation to support my argument and reform 
agenda. [...] This was the grave importance of the EES: there were also 
specific benchmarks that had to be met by the IEFP. This gave us a great 
advantage in promoting the IEFP reform: with the EES, the IEFP was not 
accountable simply to the government but to the EU. [...] There should be no 
doubt about this: without the EES guidelines and the corresponding 
benchmarks, the IEFP reform would not have been completed simply 
because, with the EES, the IEFP could not escape implementation.  
 
According to the policy makers involved in the 1998 IEFP reform, the EES was 
paramount to the implementation phase of the reform (interviews with: Pedroso, 
Madolino, Silva, Dias and Dornellas). In particular, according to key interviewees 
implementing the reform the importance of the EES in bringing about the observed 
policy change was to assist the PS ministerial elites in overcoming the resistance of 
the IEFP staff to the introduction of the new policy paradigm of preventative 
approach (interviews with: Pedroso, Madolino, Silva, Dias and Dornellas). In other 
words, the PS entrepreneurs used the EES policy window to empower themselves 
against domestic opposition. Even though this domestic opposition permeated almost 
all levels of the IEFP hierarchy, the main barrier to the implementation of the 1998 
reform was the resistance of the IEFP president at the time (Dias). As a result, 
significant tension arose between the Secretary for Employment and Training
115
 
responsible for implementing the 1998 PES reform (Pedroso) and Dias (interviews 
with: Pedroso, Dias and Madolino). It appeared that the EES guidelines and 
benchmarks were crucial for the PS policy entrepreneurs to curb the IEFP resistance 
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and especially Dias’ reluctance to the preventative approach. As Pedroso recalled in 
his interview: 
The IEFP was very reluctant to implement the preventative approach. The 
IEFP president of the time told me - and I also heard this from many heads of 
departments and Job Centres - that they were employment technicians not 
social workers. They perceived the 1998 reform as an effort to convert the 
IEFP into a social work institution. […] They also didn’t like the fact that the 
new way of doing things would put so much pressure on them to meet certain 
deadlines and provide personalised services to the unemployed. [...] At one 
meeting I said to the IEFP head (Dias): ‘these guidelines have to be met; 
either we improve the indicators or one of us will have to quit his job.’  e 
knew that I was not intending to resign so at that meeting he probably got the 
message about how important was to implement this change. 
 
Therefore, it appeared that the initial progress in meeting the EES benchmarks 
was very slow and Portugal was perceived by the EU as an unlikely candidate to meet 
the EES guidelines due to the immense gap between the EES stimuli and the IEFP 
policy orientation (interview with: Pedroso). Nonetheless, the Portuguese policy 
makers (contrary to their Greek counterparts) seemed to have a very strong 
commitment in implementing a significant overhaul of the IEFP by using the EES 
guidelines. The key members of the group of PS policy entrepreneurs who held key 
positions in Portugal’s Labour Ministry and IEFP (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva, 
Madolino, Capucha and Ferro Rodrigues) had numerous meetings with high, medium 
and low level IEFP managers in order to ensure that the implementation of the EES 
guidelines should be their top priority (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva, Madolino and 
Capucha). According to Pedroso: 
I had many meetings with the IEFP head and other key staff of the 
organisation including many managers of IEFP offices and Job Centres both 
at national and local level. In all these meetings we were telling them that the 
first two EES guidelines were THE guidelines and that Inserjovem and Reage 
are not just two new programmes but THE programmes. I clearly remember 
that in all the meetings, I was making sure that my discussant understood the 
importance of the guidelines and the associated targets and that there would 
be consequences if they would not be met.  
 
According to the people involved in the reform, the existence of a coherent and 
homogeneous group in the Labour Ministry which shared a common agenda was vital 
to the success of the implementation of the 1998 IEFP reform (interviews with: 
Pedroso, Silva, Madolino and Capucha). For Pedroso having a group of people 
promoting the IEFP reform meant that the IEFP would respond to a governmental 
agenda and not merely a ministerial one. In addition, it was easier for the PS 
ministerial elite to implement the reform as most of the key positions within the 
  
Ministry and the IEFP were held by members of the group of policy entrepreneurs 
who, therefore, acted in a co-ordinated fashion to ensure implementation of the 
preventative approach (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva, Capucha and Madolino). For 
instance, key members of the PS and Labour ministry ministerial elite (interviews 
with: Pedroso, Madolino, Silva, Capucha and Rodrigues) held regular meetings every 
three months in order to evaluate the progress of the IEFP in meeting the EES 
guidelines. It appeared that the PS policy entrepreneurs aimed to formalise the policy 
change procedure to achieve successful implementation of the new policy paradigm 
that the Inserjovem and Reage initiatives were bringing about as a response to the 
relevant EES guidelines.  
According to the evidence collected through interviews, it appeared that the 
reason the PS government was so committed to the EES and its first two guidelines 
was primarily instrumental: the EES was empowering the PS policy entrepreneurs to 
implement their reform agenda by utilising the EES soft stimuli (second 
Europeanization pathway). This was stated in a number of interviews (interviews 
with: Silva, Pedroso, Madolino and Capucha) as illustrated by the following quotes 
from two key member of the group of PS policy entrepreneurs:  
 
Silva:  
The EES came in a period when we had started a full reconfiguration of 
Portuguese social policy which was met with scepticism from our political 
opponents, the bureaucracy, and I would say some members within our own 
party. For this reason, Europe was important for our position and agenda: 
when we were arguing that we do this or that because Europe says so or 
because other countries have done that, very few people could openly 
disagree. [...] The big IEFP reform of 1998 was implemented because we 
sincerely thought that the preventative approach of the EES would serve our 
agenda of reforming the IEFP into a more inclusive and efficient institution.  
 
Madelino:  
Just imagine: a new government with new actors within the party and the 
political system trying to reform the biggest and strongest organisation of 
Portugal’s employment policy. The EES was like a gift to us. Now we could 
implement the reform not in words but in reality: the EU benchmarks meant 
that the IEFP had to change its operation dramatically. And more importantly, 
the extent of change was measured by EU indicators. Every year the EU 
would evaluate the IEFP’s response to the unemployed.  
 
In addition, the policy makers promoting the IEFP reform stated that they did not 
alter their views as a result of their interaction with the EES. In other words, the third 
Europeanization pathway (policy learning) provided a weak explanation of the EES-
  
induced change. In particular, according to the key actors in Portugal’s employment 
policy at the time the EES served as the best legitimacy lever in promoting the pre-
existing IEFP reform agenda of the PS entrepreneurs since the EES activation 
guidelines were aligned with this agenda (interviews with: Silva, Pedroso, Madolino 
and Capucha). Put differently, the group of PS policy entrepreneurs took advantage of 
the EES policy window of activation/prevention of long-term unemployment to 
empower themselves in order to promote their agenda. In Pedroso’s words:  
 
I can say that there was a 100% match between our agenda and the first two 
guidelines of the EES. We wanted to reform the IEFP in a way that it would 
stop being an almost useless organisation. Instead of helping the same people 
again and again, we wanted it to be as inclusive and as efficient as possible. 
We wanted it to focus on the poor and the weak members of our society who 
were and still are so many, not some friends of the IEFP staff. The EES not 
only said that, but also specified a certain policy model as well as particular 
targets to be met by 2002. Our commitment to the IEFP reform was so great 
that we met the EES indicators by 2000. I think this says everything about 
how much we wanted to implement the preventative approach.  
 
 
However, the large investment made by the PS policy entrepreneurs in the EES 
had positive and negative repercussions for the PS governments during 1995-2002. 
According to the interviewee statements, the PS government was able to push its 
agenda in the IEFP on the one hand, but on the other the government became 
vulnerable to criticism whenever it failed to achieve the EES benchmarks and 
subsequently received country-specific recommendations from the Council 
(interviews with: Pedroso and Silva). It appeared that in Portugal the EES received a 
relatively high level of attention from the media because the PS government 
presented the NAPs at major press conferences as part of their national political 
agenda rather than a European one (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva, Madolino and 
Capucha). This strategy was deemed as the best in order to promote their pro-reform 
agenda and empower themselves against opponents (interviews with: Pedroso and 
Silva).  
In summary, the 1998 reform was the most important change for the IEFP. The 
reform was greatly influenced by the EES. It appeared that domestic actors had not 
defined the preventative approach and the concept of activation remained rather 
vague. In addition, the evidence suggested that the PS entrepreneurs used the EES 
policy window to empower themselves against domestic opposition (second 
Europeanization pathway). According to the main people involved in the 1998 
reform, the EES also added new elements to their agenda and resulted in a reform 
  
outcome that was not previously defined as such. This evidence is confirmed by a 
number of observations: there was no concrete debate about the IEFP as the issue 
never gained any salience (Silva 2009); and the reforms before 1998 did not include 
the preventative approach either in content or in specific quantitative targets that the 
IEFP had to meet. Although the PS policy entrepreneurs wanted to reform the IEFP, 
their pre-EES agenda was limited in tackling some chronic problems of corruption 
and expanding the IEFP coverage. The preventative approach and the use of 
quantitative targets to evaluate the IEFP performance concerning its response to its 
clients were alien to Portugal. In other words, the EES soft stimuli shifted the 
Portuguese employment policy and the IEFP towards a new direction that was not 
planned originally by the policy entrepreneurs. 
In contrast to the Portuguese case, the observed policy change in Greece appeared 
to be linked to the ESF conditionality rather than the activity of a domestic group of 
policy entrepreneurs who were empowered by the EES soft stimuli. Additionally, the 
EES soft stimuli seem to have been neglected by Greek policy makers as the observed 
policy change only occurred when Greece had to comply with the ESF funding 
criteria.  
 
4. Evaluating the PES reform: degree of change and extent of EES influence 
The data collected in the interviews from the Portuguese sample suggested that 
the EES soft stimuli had an impact on all policy stages of PEP related to the IEFP 
(see table 4.2). More specifically, in the Agenda-setting and Policy-formulation 
stages the EES-induced change appears to be a second order change or 
accommodation/upgrading because the Portuguese policy makers included the new 
goal of activating the IEFP in their agenda and policy proposals but did not replace 
their pre-EES agenda with the EES goals. The EES impact does not fulfil the 
conditions for classification as third order change or transformation as the pre-EES 
agenda included plans for reforming the IEFP, although the EES enriched it and 
further specified the problems that needed addressing and proposed specific solutions. 
In other words, Portuguese policy entrepreneurs altered only part of their agenda 
without changing the core pre-EES agenda. As defined by the 
upgrading/accommodation category of Europeanization outcomes, the observed 
change in the Agenda-setting and Policy-formulation stages was a ‘patch up’ of new 
ideas and terminology onto existing ones without changing the latter.   
  
Nevertheless, the EES resulted in a third order change or transformation effect in 
the remaining policy stages, since it defined the choice of solution, its implementation 
and added an entirely new system of policy evaluation through its PES-dedicated 
benchmarks. More specifically, both the Inserjovem and Reage initiatives resulted in 
a paradigm shift of the IEFP since they replaced the pre-EES policy measures of the 
IEFP which were completely different from the new EES-inspired initiatives. This 
consisted in a change of approach from the uniform provision of the same support 
measures to all the LTU, to the prevention of long-term unemployment by rapid 
activation for the newly unemployed through personalised interventions. Similarly, 
the new PES-dedicated benchmarks, which were introduced as a result of the EES 
preventative approach, replaced the pre-EES IEFP approach because the Portuguese 
PES now had to respond within a specific timeframe to measurable targets. In other 
words, the IEFP incurred a complete overhaul of its method of intervention and the 
new EES-induced Inserjovem and Reage initiatives replaced its pre-EES modus 
operandi. The EES impact on the Portuguese PES is summarised in the following 
table.  
 
Table 4.3: EES impact on Portuguese Public Employment Services 
Policy stages Degree of EES-induced change 
 
Agenda-setting (problem recognition) 
 
Upgrading (second order change) 
 
Policy-formulation  
(proposal of solution) 
 
Upgrading (second order change) 
 
Decision-making (choice of solution) 
 
Transformation (third order change) 
 
Policy-implementation  
(putting solution into effect) 
 
Transformation (third order change) 
 
Policy-evaluation (monitoring results) 
 
Transformation (third order change) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
The degree of policy change in the Portuguese PES case is very different to that 
in the Greek PES. At all stages of policy making, the Portuguese case shows a much 
greater degree of policy change. This indicates that empowerment (second 
Europeanization pathway) had a greater degree of impact than the ESF conditionality 
(third Europeanization pathway), in that when domestic policy makers actively 
  
exploit the EES to promote their own agenda then the observed policy change will be 
more significant than a case where domestic policy makers try to comply with ESF 
conditionality without having any pre-existing interest in reform. In other words, the 
higher degree of policy change in Portugal compared with Greece suggests that 
ownership may be more important than conditionality. 
 
Conclusions  
After the examination of: (i) the timing and temporal sequences of the observed 
reforms, and (ii) the pre-reform preferences of domestic policy makers, it appeared 
that the majority of the IEFP reforms in Portugal that took place between 1995-1997 
were predominantly linked to  a  pre-EES domestic agenda. This agenda was 
promoted by a cohesive group of policy entrepreneurs who held the key positions of 
Portugal’s employment ministry interchangeably.  owever, the EES had a crucial 
influence on the 1998 reform when the preventative approach was introduced with the 
Inserjovem and Reage initiatives. This reform was the most important one and had a 
huge impact on the IEFP’s operation as it transformed its main approach on how to 
deal with its clients.  
The reason the EES had such an influence on the 1998-2000 reform was twofold. 
First, the content of the first two guidelines served a long-standing policy goal of the 
group of policy entrepreneurs consisting of the PS ministerial elite. Second, the two 
guidelines had specific targets that had to be met by member states which provided 
the policy entrepreneurs with a window of opportunity not only to push their agenda 
using the EES stimuli but also to evaluate the IEFP’s progress towards both meeting 
the EES benchmarks and satisfying their goals. Hence, the mechanism explaining the 
EES-induced change is the one of domestic empowerment (second Europeanization 
pathway). This empowerment took the form of extra pressure against bureaucratic 
inertia or resistance; a shield against potential criticism from political opponents; and 
a broader legitimacy during the reform process.  
Further, the empirical evidence did not provide support for either of the other two 
proposed pathways of EES-induced change. With regard to policy learning, the EES 
did not alter the beliefs or preferences of the Portuguese policy makers as they were 
neither against the EES nor against activation or the preventative approach. In 
addition, when they implemented these reforms, they did so not because they believed 
that activation or a preventative approach was the best policy option but because the 
EES stimuli were in harmony with their own agenda. In other words, the PS policy 
  
entrepreneurs already had strong convictions regarding the IEFP which were not 
altered by the EES. Likewise, the ESF conditionality was not influential in the 1998 
reform. The timing of the examined reforms is a proof of the insignificance of ESF 
funding: the EES-induced reform happened in 1998 and was completed by 2000, that 
is before the 2000-2006 programming period; the ESF funding was not used for the 
preventative approach; from all the reforms which took place during 1995-2000 the 
only reform that can be associated with the ESF conditionality was the stronger role 
in certification of the training centres by INOFOR. However, this is not relevant to 
the main 1998 reform which altered the modus operandi of the IEFP.  
In terms of the comparative analysis of this thesis’ cases studies, the differences 
between the Greek and Portuguese cases of the PES reform are striking, and lead to 
some interesting conclusions regarding both the cases and the EES. Although both 
governments faced significant opposition/inertia from their respective PES, the IEFP 
reform was completed in approximately two years (1998-2000), whereas the OAED 
needed almost 8 years (1998-2006) with the main reforms happening in 2001 and 
2003. The Portuguese response to the EES was immediate as the content of the 
reform was outlined in the first NAP, while Greek governments neglected the EES 
and, without the ESF conditionality, the reforms would most likely not have 
materialised. 
  
Chapter 5: Tracing the Europeanization of Greek Employment 
Policy (GEP) with regard to gender equality promotion: following 
the ESF money? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of the EES on Greek employment policy 
(GEP) with regard to gender equality promotion. This chapter is divided into four 
parts. The first part discusses the content of GEP before the introduction of the EES. 
The second part examines the reforms promoting gender equality in employment 
policy after the introduction of the EES. The third examines the EES’s influence on 
domestic employment policy with regard to gender equality promotion focusing on 
two areas: gender mainstreaming (GM) and dedicated equality measures in 
employment policy (reconciliation of work and family and pay gaps). The fourth 
evaluates the observed policy change and the EES impact on GEP.  
It is argued that the EES impact on GEP occurred through the ESF 
conditionality (3
rd
 Europeanization Pathway). In other words, Greek policy makers 
did not change their views nor use the EES to empower themselves to promote a pre-
existing agenda. This is deduced from the fact that they were obliged to adapt and 
conform to the ESF’s regulations on gender equality in order to keep receiving the 
ESF funds. The EES impact varied between the different policy stages and can be 
described overall as moderate.  
 
1. Gender equality promotion in Greek employment policy until the late 1990s: 
absent due to ideology and clientelistic politics  
An analysis of the characteristics of the Greek employment policy with regard 
to gender equality before the introduction of the EES is vital in order to gauge the 
domestic aftermath of the EES stimuli. In the following, it is argued that gender 
equality promotion in the GEP was absent, first because it was neglected by the 
Greek elites and political system, and secondly because of the underdevelopment of 
the Greek welfare state.  
During the post-war period the Greek state gradually increased its involvement 
in social and economic processes. The dominant policy model during this period was 
  
statism, that is, the state’s intervention in national economic and social activities. 
Statism was accompanied by clientelism, which marginalised any autonomous 
political organisation of the disadvantaged classes or groups (Diamandouros 1983; 
Haralambis 1989). Statism and clientelism, furthermore, operated within an 
environment in which the public sector had a predominant role in providing 
employment. This resulted in a strategic use of the public sector from political elites 
in that, through the provision of employment in the public sector, they could satisfy 
voters and/or expand their electorate in a self-serving manner. Trade unions were 
highly subordinate to party politics, while pressure from civil society, social partners 
and other societal actors for progressive redistribution was weak (Marinakou 1998: 
241). According to Petmesidou (1991), statism and clientelism can better explain the 
non-existent employment policy, and more broadly, the limited, highly fragmented 
and uncoordinated social policy in Greece at the time, than underdevelopment or 
economic pressures can (such as periods of recession, lack of resources). In this 
framework, social provisions and welfare resources were not allocated on the basis of 
social need and social citizenship rights, but on the basis of access to political power 
and the state machinery (Petmesidou 1991: 32). Social (including employment) 
policy was restricted to scant, piece-meal measures taken by the state in cases of 
emergency (Iatrides 1980). Most of the measures that could help promote 
employment (e.g. training, subsidies to companies to hire the unemployed as trainees 
and employment friendly legislation) were rudimentary. Moreover, the improvement 
and regulation of human capital were at the margins of social (including 
employment) policy considerations of state officials, politicians and industrialists 
throughout the post-war period (Petmesidou 1991: 36-37).  
Gender equality in employment policy was absent from the GEP and the policy 
agenda for a number of other possible reasons besides statism and clientelism (cf. 
Karamessini 2006; Lyberaki 2010; Marinakou 1998): (i) unemployment was not a 
major problem in Greece during the 1970s so the state generally neglected policies 
that would ease access to the labour market (gender equality and employment 
policy); (ii) the structure of the - predominantly agrarian - Greek economy did not 
necessitate the development of vocational training and gender equality measures, as 
the majority of working women was employed in this sector as informal family 
labour; (iii) the necessary funds to support active labour market policies were 
lacking; (iv) female participation in the labour market was generally weak which, 
combined with a weak feminist movement in Greece, resulted in the absence of 
  
agents either inside or outside the labour market to promote gender equality in 
employment policy.  
Even though the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 marked, in many ways, a new 
period for Greece, especially in terms of democratisation and a new era for Greek-
EU relations, the post authoritarian period witnessed minimal change related to 
gender equality in employment policy until the mid-1980s. In particular, the period 
between transition to democracy (1974) and EU membership (1981) in Greece is 
very short and generally reproduced the aforementioned model of social and 
employment policy. Likewise, even though the early 1980s, with the 1981 elections 
and the Greek entry into the EU, marked a turning point in Greek political and 
economic history, gender equality promotion in Greek employment policy remained 
absent. It was only after the introduction of the EU financed vocational programmes 
targeting women in the mid-1980s that the unemployed women could receive some 
specific help designed and targeted especially for them. This is quite surprising, 
considering the pro-gender equality agenda of successive PASOK governments. In 
the following, I argue that in the 1980s gender equality in employment policy was 
neglected as a result of the reproduction of the traditional model of employment and 
gender equality policy described above. Indeed, despite PASOK’s rhetoric about the 
necessity of change (Allaghi) and gender equality, none of the barriers to the 
introduction of gender equality in employment policy were abolished as PASOK’s 
policy focused mainly on equal rights, family and reproductive health issues.  
Although during the 1980s social expenditure increased significantly, this 
concerned only pensions
116
 whilst expenditure on other social policies remained 
unchanged or grew only slightly (Petmesidou 1991: 42). Despite PASOK’s extensive 
rhetoric before and after the 1981 elections regarding the need to improve welfare 
provision and policies, as well as the overall promotion of social and economic 
development, no specific tools were identified for these goals to be achieved nor did 
any learning process in social and other planning take place (Petmesidou 1991: 45). 
Similarly to the pre-1981 period, the main concern of policy makers throughout this 
period was to satisfy the economic demands of their voters through the strategic use 
of the state apparatus, and its funds, combined with the preferential tax provisions 
favouring small businesses and the self-employed. In this context, PASOK 
implemented a number of employment policy reforms mainly in order to satisfy the 
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demands of voters (who were viewed by the party mainly as clients). In particular, 
the government proceeded to award substantial salary increases for (wider) public 
sector employees, which were above the robust inflation rate (Venieris 2006). This 
policy, however, had a negative effect on unemployment, which became an acute 
problem, and was especially pronounced among the young and among women 
(Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003: 59). Despite being struck harder by unemployment 
there was no concern to identify any vulnerable
117
 groups that should receive 
targeted help among the young and women. 
Focusing on gender equality, PASOK’s liberal pro-equality and pro-women 
agenda provided a fertile ground for growing hopes of a sweeping step forward 
regarding gender equality policies during the 1980s. Indeed, during the 1980s the 
PASOK governments introduced a radical agenda for women’s equality in the 
workplace and protection of motherhood. The decriminalisation of abortion and the 
free provision of family planning by all state hospitals marked a turning point in the 
role of women in Greek society. These, by any standard, decisive changes regarding 
the state’s treatment of women and their legal and social rights, created a rosy picture 
of the gender sensitivity of PASOK governments. For instance, in the European and 
American Press, Greece was portrayed almost as a paradise for women (Marinakou 
1998: 245). However, family policy did not include any incentives for the increase of 
female employment. In the mid-1980s only 5% of children aged up to four years old 
could find a place in state kindergartens and only 30% of the population of children 
aged four to five and half years old could be accommodated in state nursery schools 
(Pantelidou-Malouta 1994: 203).  owever, most of the PASOK’s pro-gender 
reforms concerned family policy while gender equality promotion in employment 
policy was neglected. Lack of previous experience, the aforementioned 
characteristics of the Greek social and employment policy together with a weak 
women’s movement, which despite its contribution to a series of legislative reforms 
related to gender equality had neglected the field of employment, are the main 
explanations for the absence of a gender orientated employment policy (Karamessini 
2006: 239). 
Gender equality promotion in the GEP appeared only after Greece’s EU 
membership. The EU influenced GEP through two main policies (Karamessini 
2006): (i) its anti-discrimination and equal pay legislation; (ii) the EU funded 
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programmes which imposed the goal of gender equality promotion. The EU (mainly 
ESF but also CSF) funded programmes were mainly ALMPs in the form of training; 
female entrepreneurship; counselling and other advisory support. Among the EU 
funded programmes the New Opportunities for Women (NOW) Initiative adopted in 
1990 had significant implications for the GEP as it financed numerous new 
organisations that filled a pre-existing gap in Greece: the development of information 
and counselling services for women; the formation of women’s cooperatives; the 
creation of support structures for female entrepreneurship; after-school childcare 
facilities; and the establishment of the Research Centre for Gender Equality 
(KETHI)
118
 which proved to be an important institution for the design of equality 
policy and experimentation in innovative positive action programmes (Karamessini 
2006).  
Because of these EU-funded measures - for the first time in the history of the 
GEP - women were recognised as a priority group and, therefore, the recipients of 
support. This support was different both quantitatively and qualitatively. First, the 
availability of resources and programmes was unprecedented; and second, the 
support for the young and women was not based on the employment into the public 
sector but on ALMPs. Despite this however, gender equality was not included into 
the mainstream of Greek employment policy. Alas, it remained confined to the EU 
vocational programmes only (either financed in full or co-financed by the EU).  
Greece traditionally shows some of the worst performances in the EU on 
gender equality (female employment, unemployment rates and gender pay gap). 
More specifically, throughout the 1990s Greece was among the countries with the 
highest unemployment rates in Europe especially for women. It also stood out among 
the EU-15 because of the significant gender inequalities in its labour market: it had 
the largest gender gap in employment rates and the second largest in unemployment 
rates; although, its ranking was close to the EU-15 average with regard to the gender 
pay gap (GPG), it had the worst score for occupational segregation by sex, and 
vertical segregation in the form of ‘glass ceilings’ was very high. From the late 
1990s, however, female workforce participation in the Greek labour market 
improved; as a result, the gender gap in both employment and unemployment rates 
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was reduced. Only a third of new jobs for women were low paid, with the main area 
of employment being the public sector (Karamessini 2006: 247; Lyberaki 2010: 5). 
Yet, unemployment remains the most significant problem of the female workforce as 
its employment levels remained significantly lower than those of men (see table 5.1).  
The high inequality levels that existed to the disadvantage of women in the 
Greek labour market are illustrated in the following tables which present data from 
two crucial EES indicators on gender equality: employment levels and pay gap. 
These two indicators have been widely used as EES benchmarks and research 
indicators for the examination of gender equality (cf. Rubery 2002; Rubery et al. 
2005; Eurofound 2010). Employment levels are more representative of female labour 
market participation than unemployment levels because the latter does not do not 
account for the greater tendency of women to be pushed towards inactivity (Rubery 
et al. 2003a: 485).  
 
Table 5.1: Greek Employment rates (15-64) (%) 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total  
Greece 55.1 56.5 56.3 57.5 58.7 59.4 60.1 61.0 61.4 61.9 61.2 59.6 
Lisbon 
gap
119
 
- 13.5 13.7 12.5 11.3 10.6 9.9 9.0 8.6 8.1 8.6 10.4 
Males  
Greece 72.9 71.5 71.4 72.2 73.4 73.7 74.2 74.6 74.9 75.0 73.5 70.9 
Lisbon 
gap 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Females  
Greece 39.3 41.7 41.5 42.9 44.3 45.2 46.1 47.4 47.9 48.7 48.9 48.1 
Lisbon 
gap
120
 
- 18.3 18.5 17.1 15.7 14.8 13.9 12.6 12.1 12.9 13.1 12.3 
Source: EC 2010a; Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
- Denotes does not apply as the Lisbon threshold was introduced since 2000 and was applicable only 
for total and female employment rates (70% and 60% respectively), thus excluding male ones.  
 
The table above provides the Greek employment levels aggregated by sex. Two 
main conclusions can be drawn from the Greek employment levels during the 2000s: 
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(i) total employment levels were very low (Greece had some of the lowest total 
employment levels of the EU15) and never reached close to meeting the Lisbon 
target of 70%; (ii) employment levels were very unequal as men had relatively high 
employment rates (more than 70%) while women had some of the lowest in the EU.  
Pay gap rates are provided both unadjusted and adjusted (see tables 5.2 and 
5.3). Unadjusted pay gap rates represent the total GPG, while the adjusted pay gap 
rates control for a number of individual and workplace variables that potentially 
influence the remuneration of employees e.g. education, employment sector, hours 
worked. Thus, the adjusted pay gap is a more direct measure of discrimination 
against women because of their sex as other factors are controlled for. However, 
even the adjusted GPG may underestimate female discrimination as the controlled 
differences (education, sector of employment, hours worked) can originate from 
indirect discrimination rooted in gender stereotypes and social structures (Eurofound 
2010: 28; Rubery et al. 2003b). 
 
Table 5.2: Greek Adjusted gender pay gap
121
 (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Greece 15 18 17 11 10 9 10 
National sources, Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
 
Table 5.3: Greek Unadjusted Gender pay gap
122
 (%) 
 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Greece 25.5 20.7 21.5 22 
EU-27 : 17.7 17.6 : 
Structure of Earnings Survey, Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
: denotes missing data 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that the unadjusted Greek gender pay gap has been 
high, and indicate that more than half of it resulted from direct discrimination against 
women when comparing the unadjusted and adjusted figures for 2006 (20.7% and 
10% respectively). This indicates a highly unfavourable situation for Greek women. 
Although the adjusted GPG had decreased in the 2000s, pay differentials remain 
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male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings 
of male paid employees. 
  
relatively the same according to the unadjusted GPG figures. This means that despite 
some (considerable) improvement in the outright pay discrimination against women, 
the structure of the Greek labour market and the work environment seem to have 
both remained unchanged by keeping women at the lower end of pay. Therefore, 
Greece does not seem to conform to the general EU trend. In most EU countries have 
experienced an increase in the adjusted pay gap, and a decrease in the unadjusted pay 
gap, whereas Greece shows the reverse (Rubery et al. 2003a: 490; cf. Rubery et al. 
2003b).  
 
2. Gender Equality after 1997: gender mainstreaming and reconciliation  
This part of the chapter will discuss the Greek reforms promoting gender 
equality in employment policy after the introduction of the EES. This discussion will 
cover two main policy areas: GM and dedicated equality measures in employment 
policy (reconciliation of work and family life and pay gaps). As discussed in Chapter 
1, this division mirrors the EES stimuli (Rubery 2002: 501; 2005) and is chosen in 
order to better gauge the influence of the EES on the GEP. Before discussing the 
domestic reform record, some additional conceptual clarification of the EES stimuli 
is required. In the next two sections the reform record of Greece is discussed with 
regard to gender equality promotion in GEP. It is argued that after 2001 there was a 
substantial policy change in GEP with regard to gender equality promotion which 
can be traced in two areas in particular: (i) expanding training and start-up subsidies 
to women; and (ii) expanding care facilities to promote the reconciliation of work 
and family life.  
 
2.1. Gender mainstreaming 
The first change of GEP took place in 1998 when the Greek government 
established two new entities which would be responsible for providing targeted 
support to women. In particular, Regional Committees for Equality started to operate 
in every region aiming at the promotion and strengthening of gender equality. These 
entities would provide localised support in the form of information and counselling 
only to women for the first time in the GEP (Karamessini 2006). In addition, the 
‘Regional Social Integration Units’ were created to support women coming from 
excluded groups of the population (such as Roma). In order to accomplish their 
mission, these new organisations were supported with new funding - mainly EU 
funds - and employed highly educated staff (such as psychologists, sociologists and 
  
economists). However, the empirical evidence suggested that these entities were not 
particularly involved in the promotion of GM as it appeared to operate as local 
advisory and counselling offices without being involved in the design and evaluation 
of GEP (Stratigaki and Karamessini). The only organisation that was involved in the 
evaluation of GEP was the long-standing General Secretariat for Equality (GGI),
123
 
which, since 1998, participated in the respective Supervision Committees of all 
Operational Programmes (O.P.s) of the CSF programmes. Consequently, the concept 
and practise of GM remained absent from the GEP until 2000.  
It was only in 2001 that the concept of GM was introduced in the Greek NAPs. 
Greece established the Special Inter-ministerial Committee for Gender 
Mainstreaming, which was created in order to co-ordinate ministerial efforts in 
gender equality promotion. Although this Committee constituted the main 
institutional innovation with regard to the promotion of GM, it convened only once 
in 2001 (the year it was created) and did not meet again since then (NAP 2001; 
Rubery et al. 2004). Nonetheless, in 2001 there was a change in GEP with regard to 
gender equality promotion. As seen in the tables 1.1-1.3 of Appendix II, until 2001, 
there were very few measures included under the first three pillars, whereas after the 
2001 NAP, their number increased significantly. In addition, a qualitative turn is 
observed: until 2001 they consisted of preferential treatment provisions in job 
creation schemes and positive action measures to promote female entrepreneurship; 
after 2001 new positive action measures were included such as training of job 
counsellors in KPAs. 
Similarly, in the 2002 NAP the effort to include GM measures was intensified. 
Besides maintaining existing measures introduced after the EES (New Jobs and 
Young Entrepreneurs), new methods of promoting GM were introduced, such as, 
individualised counselling for women in the regional action plans in the context of 
KPA, and a quota of 60% for women in training programmes and in subsidised 
employment. The 60% quota becomes an overarching policy which makes Greece 
one of the countries that has strongly gender mainstreamed active labour market 
measures (Rubery et al. 2007). In addition, new programmes were introduced 
especially in the field of education and training under all the Operational 
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the national context of a positive climate for Gender equality, they were really activated through their 
participation in European developments and policies.’ 
  
Programmes of the 3rd Community Support Framework, with special emphasis on 
improving the skills of women to boost their employability and entrepreneurship.
124
 
These new programmes were part of the second National Action Plan for Gender 
Equality (NAPGE)
125
 2001-2006. Even though in the 2003 and 2004 NAPs some 
GM measures are reported, the empirical evidence suggested that they were a 
continuation of previous measures listed in previous NAPs which began in 2001 
(interviews with: Stratigaki, Karamessini and Lyberaki).  
In 2004 the General Secretariat for Equality published the 3
rd
 National Plan for 
Equality (2004-2008). In a similar fashion to the first, according to its authors, the 
Plan was inspired by the Fifth Community Action Programme on Equal 
Opportunities (2001-2005) since all its priorities ‘were in line’ with the latter. In 
addition, this program reiterated Greek efforts to comply with international (both EU 
and UN) pressures. In the preamble of the Plan, the Minister of Interior (Prokopis 
Pavlopoulos) states the following:  
I would like to say from the start that these measures are measures in accordance 
with the Greek Constitutional Provisions for equality and with the respective 
European ones especially the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, as well as with the 
obligations we have to the International Organisations such as the UN, the 
Council of Europe and the International Labour Organisation (ILO).  
 
The plan was more important than the previous one in many ways. First, in 
terms of discourse, the NAPGE 2004-2008 highlighted the general change of 
perspective and goals related to gender equality promotion in Greek employment 
policy. Contrary to the early 1980s, when gender equality was promoted as an issue 
of social justice, under the EU’s influence gender equality was perceived also as an 
issue that hinders economic development and competitiveness. In particular, 
according to the authors of the NAPGE (2004), even though gender equality is 
promoted by numerous international institutions besides the EU, such as, the UN, the 
Council of Europe, and the ILO, it is only the EU that stresses the economic aspect 
of gender equality; all the others focus only on the political aspect, that is, on 
equality of rights, participation, etc. Second, for the first time in GEP the 3
rd
 NAPGE 
introduced the tool of ‘proactive’ legislation. This type of legislation is about non-
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the obligations that Greece had against international organisations (the UN and the EU) in promoting 
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(Karamessini 2008: 284-285).  
  
binding commitments of social partners and private companies to implement gender 
equality promotion measures; the provision of positive incentives from the state; the 
development of corporate responsibility (Karamessini 2008: 284). Third, contrary to 
the first one, the plan was followed by a progress report which was published in 
2006. The report reviewed initiatives taken up to that point, including relevant policy 
measures and practical support services, by the regulatory framework and training 
provision and proposed future plans and actions (Karakioulafis 2007).  
Furthermore, in 2004 Greece provided gender disaggregated statistics on stocks 
and flows of registered unemployed for the first time, as well as their participation in 
active labour market programmes (Rubery et al. 2007: 76, 137-138). The fact that 
these data were given after 5 years of the beginning of the EES is indicative of the 
weak capabilities in data collection from the Greek authorities –namely the Greek 
Public Employment Service (OAED).
126
 In the Greek 2005 NRP, while GM is not 
mentioned, a new focus on female labour market participation and promoting equal 
opportunities is specified as among the top five policy priorities (Rubery et al. 2005: 
14). In addition, there was greater emphasis (compared with the previous two NRPs) 
on female labour market participation rather than female employment, and a greater 
focus on supply rather than demand issues. The only new measure in 2005 was the 
orientation of distance learning education programmes towards ‘working students or 
women obliged to stay at home’ under the human capital guideline.  
In 2006 the ND government introduced a number of new policy measures 
which aimed at enhancing female employability and entrepreneurship. Although 
such programmes were a constant aspect of Greek employment policy after 2001, 
from 2006 several novel features were introduced in the ALMPs targeting women. 
First, some of the new programmes were based on the notion of ‘integrated 
intervention’ which was materialised as integrated intervention schemes for 
unemployed women only (see tables 1.1.-1.3 in Appendix II for further details about 
these programmes; Chapters 1 and 3 for the description of the integrated intervention 
approach). As for the rest of the unemployed (see Chapter 3), integrated intervention 
schemes meant a significant change in gender equality promotion in Greek 
employment policy as women would receive a multi-faceted intervention combining 
counselling, training, a personalised approach and support after the vocational 
training. In addition, after 2006, following a period of immobility, the number of 
advisory centres of KETHI was increased by the establishment of five new branches.  
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In 2006, furthermore, there is a breakthrough in the participation of social 
partners with regard to gender equality promotion in GEP. For the second time in 
Greece, gender equality was an issue not only of governmental policy but also of 
social partners. In particular, the negotiations between the government and a wide 
number of Greek Employers’ Organisations (SEV, ΕSΕΕ, GSΕVΕΕ, ΕVΕΑ)127 and 
the Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility were successful and 
resulted in the ratification of: (i) a Protocol of Cooperation between the social 
partners aiming to promote equal opportunities for women and men in enterprises; 
and (ii) of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the General Secretariat for 
Gender Equality and the Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
aiming at further promoting equal opportunities between women and men in 
enterprises. However, it should be noted that the trade unions were absent from this 
agreement. The empirical evidence suggested that they were neither invited to sign 
the protocols nor did they make any relevant statement (interview with: 
Karamessini).   
 
2.2. Dedicated equality measures in employment policy: gender equality 
through care facilities 
This section discusses the observed policy change with regard to dedicated 
equality measures in employment policy (reconciliation of work and family life and 
pay gaps). It is argued that the greatest change was observed in the arena of 
reconciliation where Greece significantly expanded its care facilities. In the area of 
pay gaps, there was no substantial change aside from a few research projects, 
awareness campaigns and educational programmes. No legislative or other reforms 
were introduced in order to promote equal pay for equal work between genders.   
In particular, as with the GM case, the reconciliation of work and family life 
was introduced mainly after 2001.
128
 The new policy initiatives exclusively referred 
to public care services for children and elderly aiming to tackle the main problem of 
Greek women that halts them from entering the labour market, namely, taking care of 
the vulnerable members of the family (NAP 2001; NAP 2002). These measures were 
the following: the extension of operating hours in nurseries and the institution of all-
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terms of policy change (see: Karamessini 2006).  
  
day kindergartens and primary schools; the creation of new crèches, nurseries, and 
kindergartens; the establishment of care centres for the elderly, and finally, the 
creation of new after-school recreation centres for children. Since 2001 the 
expansion of care facilities and all-day schools continued every year and was the 
main policy change aiming to promote the reconciliation of work and family life. For 
instance, according to the data presented for the 2003 NAP, the financial resources 
for ‘New spending on employment and the family’ went from being non-existent in 
2003 to 426 million (Euros) in 2004, rising to 545m in 2006, up to 905m in 2008 
(NAP 2003: 22). In addition, KETHI completed a number of studies on the 
challenges in achieving reconciliation of work and family life and a series of 
awareness programmes to highlight the problem to social partners and policy makers.  
Care facilities in Greece after 1998 expanded considerably. Until 1998, there 
were hardly any institutions providing care services or all-day schooling to alleviate 
the family responsibilities of women. But by 2006, there were 396 operational 
structures (partially funded by the O.P. ‘Employment and Vocational Training’), 
employing 1,972 persons and serving a total of 50,000 people (the elderly, children 
and those requiring assistance); the Regional Operational Programmes supported the 
operation of 1,120 structures employing 4,400 individuals and serving another 
50,000 persons. In sum, as of 2006, a total of 1,516 care facilities were operational, 
employing 6,372 persons and serving 100,000 persons. In addition, until the end of 
2006, there were 4,500 all-day schools and 2,000 all-day kindergartens in operation. 
As stated in the interviews of relevant Greek policy makers, all these institutions had 
been created under the influence of the EES (NAP 2006: 45; interviews with: 
Karamessini, Tragkris and Mouriki). The examination of the Greek NAPs and 
interview statements highlights that the crucial year in which change occurred was 
2001. Until then, only a few unimportant pilot programmes had been implemented 
and the vast majority of care facilities introduced only afterwards (cf. Karamessini 
2006). 
However, the impact of these measures is doubtful and should be considered to 
be low, especially in the private sector where labour protection was at best weak. The 
2005 report of the National Thematic Network on reconciliation of family and 
working life
129
 stressed the lack of action by social partners (especially employers) 
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on promoting measures at the national, sectoral and enterprise level aimed at directly 
or indirectly facilitating the reconciliation of family and work. The report highlights 
the following factors (Kretsos 2006):  
the negative attitude of senior executives in relation to such initiatives, which 
undermine traditional working methods; the limited application of working time 
flexibility due to concerns of increasing labour costs, particularly in small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the loss of managerial control; the 
rigidity of the statutory framework, which in certain cases has an inhibitory 
effect on the process of reform of the labour standard and the use of workers’ 
rights. For example, parental leave is unpaid in the private sector; the prevalence 
of traditional standards and attitudes in relation to the division of family 
responsibilities; other structural factors, such as low pay which forces workers to 
work overtime and take second jobs; the predominance of SMEs in the business 
sector of the economy which underlines the difficulty of offering more 
flexibility in the organisation of employment programmes due to high cost; and 
an inadequate social care infrastructure. 
 
While the EES had a guideline on tackling GPGs, the issue did not appear to 
ever be of major concern for Greek policy makers. Measures for GPG reduction were 
limited again to EU funded measures, that is, initiatives aiming to raise awareness, 
increase knowledge and reduce the differences between genders in pay, 
representation and social stereotypes. These constituted mainly studies on gender 
gaps and educational programmes aiming at tackling social stereotypes and promote 
gender equality. The main development during the 2000s was a plethora of new 
measures which were introduced in 2006 in order to tackle gender gaps in education 
and combat social stereotypes of gender relations. 
In sum, Greece implemented numerous measures to promote gender equality in 
its employment policy which marked a significant break from the previous model of 
Greek employment policy. The content, timeline and process of the observed policy 
change are summarised in the following table.  
 
Table 5.4: Summary of Gender equality promotion in Greek employment policy 
Gender Mainstreaming 
Reform Content Time Process 
Women identified as a 
group needing more 
training, support and 
subsidies for women-led 
business start-ups 
Very few new measures (mainly 
pilot programmes) before 2001 
 
Majority of new measures are 
implemented after 2001 
Gender mainstreaming 
promoted primarily 
through vocational 
training and other 
employment creation 
subsidies 
 
Reconciliation of Work & Family life 
Reform Content Time Process 
Promotion of care 
facilities 
Only some pilot programmes 
until 2001; afterwards, 
New facilities and new 
staff employed  
  
expansion of care facilities 
 
Pay Gaps 
Reform Content Time Process 
Combating social 
stereotypes and raise 
awareness  
New measures are implemented 
only after 2001 
Pilot programmes, studies 
and public events  
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
Table 5.4 shows that the majority of the new measures were promoted only 
after 2001. In the Gender Mainstreaming area, Greece focused predominantly on 
creating and/or expanding opportunities in training and business start-ups for women 
without the introduction of either any noteworthy institutional changes or a more 
holistic approach to the promotion of gender equality as the GM required (cf. Rubery 
2002). Similarly, Greece implemented only a few awareness-raising measures as 
well as a limited number of ESF-funded exploratory studies on the GPG. By contrast, 
the change of GEP was significant in the area of reconciliation of work and family 
life with a significant expansion of care facilities. However, other measures were 
scarce (for the evaluation of the observed policy change see section 4 below).  
 
3. Explaining the observed policy change: Europeanization through ESF 
conditionality 
This part of the chapter will examine the causes of the observed policy change. 
It is argued that research evidence suggested that the observed reforms were the 
result of the EES influence. It appeared that in both policy areas (GM and dedicated 
equality measures in employment policy) the EES influence occurred through the 
ESF conditionality (3
rd
 Europeanization Pathway). In other words, according to the 
fieldwork evidence (interviews) Greek policy makers did not seem to change their 
views nor to use the EES to empower themselves to promote a pre-existing agenda. 
The following two sections presents the empirical evidence explaining each reform 
mentioned above. As in part two of this chapter, the discussion is divided into two 
sections: (i) GM, and (ii) dedicated equality measures in employment policy (cf. 
Rubery 2002; 2004; 2005; Rubery et al. 2004; 2005; 2006).  
 
3.1. Gender mainstreaming 
As was argued above, gender equality promotion in GEP was non-existent 
prior to the EES. Unsurprisingly, this also applied to GM. Hence, both annual 
planning of employment policy through the NAPs, gender equality promotion in 
  
employment policy and GM (in equality and employment policy especially) were 
novel processes for the Greek policy makers (Stratigaki 2002). However, the 
empirical evidence suggested that Greek policy makers neglected the EES soft 
stimuli and, consequently, the promotion of GM (Lyberaki and Stratigaki). More 
specifically, in the first 1998 NAP gender equality was of marginal concern; likewise 
the introduction of the GM guideline in 1999 didn’t mean anything for Greek policy 
makers. No new measures were introduced as a result of the new guideline or the 
numerous EU country specific recommendations which were very critical of 
Greece’s efforts in gender equality promotion in employment policy.  
The first observed policy change in the area of GM was the creation of a few 
regional bodies that would provide specialised support to women and the upgrading 
of the GGI in the supervision of the CSF funded programmes. The Greek NAPs 
presented these changes as a response to the EES GM guideline and country specific 
recommendations - a view that is reproduced in the 2002 Greek EES evaluation 
(VFA and Metronanalysis 2002: 68). However, it appeared that GM was absent from 
GEP until 2000. Two main observations support this finding: (i) it appeared that the 
new organisations were not responsible for GM (see also section 2.1); and (ii) the 
GGI role in the CSF supervision was secondary and hardly adequate to promote GM 
which involves a much wider change in all policy stages of policy making (see also: 
section 4.1 of this chapter and section 2.2.2 of Chapter 1).  
By contrast, the empirical evidence suggested that these changes were linked 
with the ESF regulations and the pressure from the European Commission on Greek 
authorities to include gender equality promotion in their EU-funded vocational 
training programmes (interviews with: Stratigaki, Karamessini, Matsaganis, 
Karastamati, Mavri and Protopapas). As a result, new funding was available for new 
local organisations and the GGI was expected to participate in the EU-funded 
programmes. Further evidence indirectly supporting the observation that Greek 
policy makers neglected GM and that the policy change was associated with the ESF 
conditionality was the fate of the Special Inter-ministerial committee for GM which 
was established in 2001 only. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3, 2001 was the first 
year of implementation of the 2000-2006 programming period of the ESF and the 
third Community Support Framework (CSF). As with the activation of the 
unemployed by the PES, after 2001 all ESF funded programmes had to promote the 
EES goals. Hence, gender equality promotion (GM and reconciliation) went from 
being voluntary (1988-1993 and 1994-1999 programming periods) to being 
  
compulsory (EYSEKT 2003a: 35). Although the establishment of this committee 
could be perceived as a suitable response to the GM guideline, the empirical 
evidence suggested that, since it was not involved in the ESF funding, it met only 
once without any discernible influence on the GEP policy making process (Stratigaki 
and Karamessini).  
Likewise, the ESF conditionality explains the timing of the actual introduction 
of measures promoting GM. As mentioned in section 2.1, the key measures 
promoting GM were introduced only after 2001. In other words, domestic change 
occurred not because of soft law or a process of policy learning but because of the 
financial incentives of domestic actors to use the ESF funded programmes and the 
hard legal and financial conditionality of these programmes.
130
 According to the 
2002 NAP, in 2002 the promotion of GM was linked with the provision of 
individualised counselling for women in the regional action plans as part of the KPA. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the provision of individualised services to the 
unemployed was temporally associated with the reform of the Greek PES – which 
itself appeared to be associated with the ESF conditionality. In other words, contrary 
to the 2002 NAP, the provision of individualised support to women was not related 
to the promotion of GM in GEP.  
Nonetheless, the 2002 NAP rightly mentioned the introduction of a quota of 
60% for women in training programmes and in subsidised employment as a measure 
to promote GM. The 60% quota became an overarching policy and made Greece one 
of the countries that had strongly gender mainstreamed active labour market 
measures (Rubery et al. 2007). All these measures were ESF/CSF funded. In 
addition, the empirical evidence suggested that the introduction of the 60% quota 
was a delayed compliance with one of the terms of the 3
rd
 CSF’s central agreement 
between the European Commission and the Greek government. According to a 
number of interviewees (interviews with: Karastamati; Stratigaki; Karamessini) the 
introduction of the 60% quota was the ‘translation’ of the wording ‘Quantified goals 
will be set’. In particular, the agreement states the following (Stratigaki 2006: 290): 
Promotion of Equal Opportunities between men and women is a horizontal 
principle, which applies to the whole of the CSF. For this goal’s achievement a 
gender equality strategy will be designed, which will not be confined to 
specialised assistance measures for women, but will achieve the mobilisation of 
all general policies and measures, actively taking into account, from their initial 
(design) stage, the possible implication that their implementation may have on 
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the relative position of women and men. Quantified goals will be set, statistical 
evidence will be collected for the two genders and the adequate monitoring 
indicators will be used.  
 
The next development with regard to the promotion of GM in Greece was the 
introduction of several programmes in the field of education and training under all 
the Operational Programmes of the 3rd CSF, with a special emphasis on improving 
the skills of women to boost their employability and entrepreneurship.
131
 These new 
programmes were part of the 2
nd
 NAPGE 2001-2006 (interviews with: Stratigaki, 
Mouriki and Karamessini). Even though the 2002 EES evaluation argued that the 
NAPGEs were introduced under the direct influence of EES GM guideline (VFA and 
Metronanalysis 2002: 68), the fieldwork the empirical evidence suggested an 
alternative explanation. Although the NAPGEs were important in symbolic and 
presentation terms as a concrete and structured plan for gender equality promotion, it 
did not add anything new to the existing measures (interviews with: Stratigaki, 
Mouriki and Karamessini). In addition, the 2
nd
 NAPGE was not EES inspired but it 
mirrored the Fifth Community Action Programme on Equal Opportunities (2001-
2005) (Karamessini 2008: 284).
132
 In particular, the NAPGE promoted four strategic 
targets: the promotion of equality between men and women in economic life;
133
 the 
promotion of equal participation and representation in the political social and 
economic sectors;
134
 the promotion of equal access and of equal application of social 
rights for men and women;
135
 the promotion of a change of gender roles and 
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 Actions in the sectors of employment, information society, vocational training, promotion of 
women's entrepreneurship, of equal pay and harmonisation of professional and family obligations 
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 Legal regulations institutionalising quotas; actions aiming at promoting women in decision taking in 
the economic and political fields; the leading boards in the public and private sector; trade union 
committees; and professional agencies. 
135
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actions for women belonging to socially excluded groups. A basic action for this target is the 
application of legislation, the information and awareness rising of the citizens 
  
stereotypes.
136
 In addition, GM was introduced as a strategic goal of policy making 
especially in relation to the management of the EU funds.  
The 2
nd
 NAPGE was the result of the close cooperation between the two 
organisations responsible for the promotion of gender equality in Greece (which as 
mentioned above were created and operated with the support of EU funds), that is, 
the GGI and KETHI. According to the European Database on Gender 
Mainstreaming, it was the collaboration of these two institutions and their active 
participation in planning for the 3rd CSF and the related NAPs which resulted in the 
inclusion of many actions for gender equality in the Operational Programmes
137
 of a 
number of Ministries including the Ministries of Labour, of Development, of 
Education and of Agriculture (EDGM 2001). Nonetheless, according to Karamessini 
(2006: 251) the inclusion of gender equality as a separate axis (with 11.8% of the 
total budget) in these programmes was not due to these institutions but to the 
European Commission’s pressure during negotiations with the Greek government. A 
number of interviewees confirmed the latter argument. As a result, that this reform 
aiming to promote GM in GEP was seemingly linked to the Structural funds’ 
regulations and the direct pressure of the European Commission. Similarly, it 
appeared that this was also the case for the ESF financial plan for the period 2007-
2013 as well as with the ‘4th CSF’ or National Strategic Reference Framework 
(NRSF) (interviews with: Karastamati and Stratigaki).  
Although formally the ESF national implementation plans are the result of the 
mutual agreement of the European Commission and each national government, the 
empirical evidence suggested that the Greek government was obliged to accept the 
Commission’s conditions with regard to gender equality promotion (see below). This 
top-down influence was denied by some Greek government representatives in the 
interviews as they argued that the role of Europe in setting the ESF goals is 
overestimated. According to the former EYSEKT
138
 director of the 2004-2009 ND 
government Mr. Tsoutsoplidis: ‘everything is the result of a mutual agreement 
between them and us’; likewise the former Labour Minister of ND - Tsitouridis - 
argued that: ‘we agree with the EU goals and we find EU funding extremely useful in 
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fulfilling our shared values to promote the European Social Model’.  owever, the 
empirical evidence suggested that such statements are most likely stating what is 
politically correct rather than being factual, as they present Greece as an equal to the 
European Commission and a country that shares the broader EU agenda. By contrast, 
according to the people directly involved in the negotiations for both programming 
periods and some retired political personnel the reality was different. For them 
(interviews with: Protopapas, Karastamati, Stratigaki, Ioannou) the Greek 
government was usually indifferent or against most of the EU goals, namely Reform 
of Public Employment Services, Gender Equality, allocation of EU funds to the local 
level and trade unions. Regarding the 2001-2006 financial plan, Mr Protopapas was 
clear:  
‘The Commission had an agenda which was different from ours (i.e. the Greek 
government) and we had to reach a compromise. However, this compromise 
always favours the Commission because it is much more powerful than us: they 
are the ones who provide the money and we are the recipients of it. [...] When 
they say you have to have x or y in the ESF programmes or do z in order to gain 
approval for the funded projects then we can’t do otherwise. If we do, we’ll lose 
significant EU money for Greece. [...] Greece could not afford to lose any EU 
funds as they are vital for our economy, society and the State. So when I was in 
office I was always vigilant about any problems in receiving ESF funds.  
 
Ms Karastamati’s (see Appendix I) account on the 2007-2013 negotiations was 
almost identical: 
The negotiating period was long and difficult mainly due to the great 
disagreement between the Commission and the Greek government with regard 
to two novel suggestions which the Commission put forward for the 2007-2013 
programming period: in particular, the Commission proposed to allocate part of 
the ESF funding on the one hand to the trade unions and on the other hand to the 
local level, that is, municipalities, prefectures, etc. Both of these suggestions 
were received with great hostility by the Greek government; they were really 
opposed to the idea of sharing any EU money with other actors than themselves. 
The negotiations were long and hard but in the end the Greek government was 
forced to accept the Commission’s proposals.  
 
The empirical evidence suggested that the 3
rd
 NAPGE (2004-2008) was 
inspired by the Fifth Community Action Programme on Equal Opportunities (2001-
2005), and therefore, all its priorities ‘were in line’ with the latter (interviews with: 
Stratigaki and Karamessini). In addition, this program reiterated Greek efforts to 
comply with international (both EU and UN) pressures. In the preamble of the Plan, 
the Minister of Interior (Prokopis Pavlopoulos) among others states the following:  
I would like to say from the start that these measures are adaptation measures to 
the Constitutional Provisions but also to the respective European ones and 
especially to the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, as well as to the obligations we have 
  
to the International Organisations such as the UN, the Council of Europe and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO).  
 
The principle of proactive legislation that was mentioned for the first time in 
the 3
rd
 NAPGE was implemented through the two agreements of 2006 between the 
government and the employers’ associations. Although the participation of social 
partners in the OMC and the national employment policy-making process has been a 
goal of the EES since 1997 (de la Porte and Nanz 2004), this EES recommendation 
was neglected in Greece. The main reasons for this indifference appeared to be: (i) 
the overall reluctance of the government to do so;
139
 (ii) the scepticism of trade 
unions about the suggestions of the EES;
140
 and (iii) the general lack of interest of 
social partners in gender equality in employment policy.
141
  
The empirical evidence suggested that the main actor behind this agreement 
was the Head of the GGI, Ms Evgenia Tsoumani (interview with: Karamessini). 
Tsoumani was a long-standing advocate of gender equality: According to her CV, 
Ms Tsoumani was a Legal advisor on labour law and labour relations to the 
Federation of Greek Industries, Head of the Labour Relations and Social Affairs 
Department of the Federation of Greek Industries and specialised in collective 
bargaining, collective agreements, social dialogue, mediation and arbitration. She 
had also been involved in European social policies. In addition, she had been the 
Greek representative to the UN Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
Committee, as well as a member of the EU Councils of Ministers of Equality. Finally 
she was a Member of the National Delegation at the 4th World Conference on 
Women (Beijing, 1995). It appeared that before joining the GGI, Ms Tsoumani was 
working for the SEV and had good links with the government and other employer 
organisations (interview with: Karamessini). Hence, when she became head of the 
GGI she could push her pro-gender equality agenda which she had advocated until 
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then. Greece’s international obligations empowered her and the GGI in promoting 
Gender Equality while her connections made this possible. The empirical evidence 
suggested that the trade unions were sceptical of her agenda and the suggested 
agreements because she was perceived as a person of the SEV and government 
(interview with: Karamessini).  
Finally, the rather puzzling introduction of new vocational training measures in 
2006 appears linked to the ‘road map for gender equality’ and to a gender equality 
pact by the Council of Ministers in 2006 (Rubery et al. 2007). Both EU 
developments were accompanied by additional EU funds which provided an 
unexpected source of funding for new GM measures. Consequently, after 2006 a 
number of new policy measures related to gender equality took place at the domestic 
level.  
In summary, the temporal sequences of the observed reforms aiming at GM 
promotion as well as the empirical evidence collected in interviews with key 
informants leads to the conclusion that GM promotion in GEP was linked to the EES 
through ESF conditionality (3
rd
 Europeanization pathway). According to the 
fieldwork discussed above, it appeared that the EES soft stimuli (guidelines, 
benchmarks and recommendations) were largely neglected. As a result, the 
weakening of the EES soft stimuli with regard to gender equality promotion (see 
Chapter 1 - section 2.2.2) did not matter for the observed domestic change as the 
EES soft stimuli were not relevant to Greek policy makers (see also section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3). The only exception to this rule is the 2006 agreement between the 
government and the employers’ associations, where the  ead of the GGI tried to 
empower herself against domestic indifference and opposition to promote her pro-
gender equality agenda. 
   
3.2. Dedicated equality in employment policy  
As will be shown in this section, it appeared that as in the GM case, domestic 
change in the area of dedicated equality measures in employment policy was also 
associated with the ESF conditionality. It is argued that the greatest domestic impact 
of the EES was observed in the area of reconciliation because of the availability of 
ESF funds. Similarly, the empirical evidence suggested that tackling pay gaps 
occurred only when some measures (training; studies; and awareness programmes) 
provided access to EU funding. More specifically, it was only after 2001 - when the 
3
rd
 CSF and the new ESF financial period were introduced – that the expansion of 
  
care facilities and all-day schools began to be fully implemented. As in the GM case, 
the authors of the Greek NAPs tried to present these EU funded measures as a direct 
response to the EES. For instance, the 2002 NAP claimed that, as a direct response to 
the 2002 Council’s recommendation142 which urged Greece to extend the care 
facilities for children and other dependants, Greece expanded its care facilities. 
However, the empirical evidence suggested that the expansion of care facilities did 
not occur in order to meet the EES guidelines and recommendations (interviews 
with: Stratigaki, Tsagkris, Mouriki and Lyberaki). On the contrary as discussed in 
section 2.2, the expansion of care facilities appeared to be linked to the ESF 
regulations which satisfied the Greek efforts to absorb as much EU money as 
possible.  
Likewise, as discussed in section 2.2., the evidence suggested that the issue of 
pay gaps was largely neglected by Greek policy makers (interviews with: Stratigaki, 
Karamessini, Mouriki and Lyberaki). As discussed above, the only available 
measures for tackling pay gaps in Greece were some studies and awareness 
campaigns. Alas, even though Greece (as well as Malta, Spain and Italy) had some of 
the highest GPGs in Europe,
143
 it remained one of the few countries in the European 
Union with a very rudimentary policy on tackling the GPG. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, Portugal, which had a lower GPG than Greece, developed a variety of 
measures besides awareness-raising campaigns. It appeared that Greece did not focus 
on reducing its GPG because it was developing measures that could be funded from 
the ESF – any other issues were not of interest to Greek policy makers (interviews 
with: Stratigaki, Matsaganis, Karantinos, Karastamati, and Ioannou). The empirical 
evidence suggested that the availability of EU funds explains the unexpected 
introduction of numerous measures in 2006 (interviews with: Stratigaki, Mouriki and 
Karastamati). These measures appeared to be funded from the European pact for 
gender equality which reiterated the closing of gender gaps and the combating of 
social stereotypes (Rubery et al. 2007). Thus, according to the fieldwork evidence 
collected in the interviews, the issue never gained salience on the domestic agenda as 
the government was interested mainly in the absorption EU funds.  
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Another important reason for the neglect of GPG (and gender equality in 
employment policy more generally) appeared to be the lack of demand ‘from below’ 
as there was no demand from the social partners for governmental action on this 
issue. According to the evidence collected in the interviews, the reduction of GPG 
was a non-issue for employers since this would mean higher costs for most 
businesses, especially for SMEs which constitute the majority of Greek companies. 
The trade unions also seemed to be indifferent to the reduction of pay gap because 
they are male-dominated and they over-represent public sector employees who enjoy 
much better conditions than private-sector employees (Matsaganis 2007). The 
empirical evidence suggested that this indifference on behalf of the trade unions 
applied to most gender equality issues (interviews with: Stratigaki, Karamessini, 
Matsaganis and Karantinos). 
  
 
4. Gauging the importance of the observed policy change: gender inclusion 
and support for the employed women 
This part of the chapter critically discusses the significance of the observed 
policy change in GEP. Once again, the discussion is analytically divided into the 
areas of GM and dedicated equality measures in employment policy. It is argued that, 
despite the significant change of GEP in the form of new concepts and practices, the 
EES effect that was mediated through ESF conditionality did not succeed in altering 
the GEP towards an adequate GM and reconciliation promotion. Section 4.1 
discusses the significance of the observed change in the GM area; section 4.2 
critically examines whether expanding care facilities is enough to promote 
reconciliation; and section 4.3 evaluates the EES effect on all stages of GEP with 
regard to gender equality promotion.  
 
4.1. Gender mainstreaming or gender ‘inclusion’?  
This section evaluates the significance of the observed change in GEP with 
regard to the promotion of GM. It is argued that the measures listed in the NAPs as 
the Greek response to the GM guideline and country specific recommendations do 
not meet the basic criteria of GM promotion. Instead, Greece witnessed a significant 
‘gender inclusion’ push, that is, the incorporation of gender equality into areas of 
GEP where it was non-existent. Even though Greek women benefited to a large 
extent by this gender inclusion as they gained access to targeted training, business 
start-ups and counselling support, the GEP did not become more gender 
mainstreamed. Hence, one of the core EES goals was not promoted in Greece.  
To begin with, as discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter 1, the most fundamental 
feature of GM which is the transformation of employment policy-making by 
integrating a gender equal perspective into the design, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of any given policy measure was not materialised. In other words, the 
GEP did not incorporate the new approach in policy-making where gender equality 
promotion would be taken into consideration throughout the employment policy. The 
authors of the Greek NAPs during 1998-2002 tried to conceal the lack of an 
integrated and holistic approach in GM promotion by listing various measures to 
promote GM in the all pillars of the EES (employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability). However, as was argued above, these were not linked with a new 
approach to policy making; rather, Greek policy makers listed the EU (ESF and CSF) 
  
financed programmes as the Greek efforts to promote GM. These programmes, as 
was also argued above, did not constitute a substantial change of the policy making 
process in GEP.  
Another key feature of an adequate GM promotion which is still missing from 
GEP is the sufficient monitoring (qualitative and quantitative), and therefore, 
appropriate evaluation of gender equality promotion in employment policy. It 
appeared that for Greece this was the most difficult requirement of the GM approach 
to meet. Despite some improvement, the empirical evidence suggested that the 
monitoring capabilities of GEP never achieved an adequate level to implement GM 
because it was countered by the chronic problems of Greek bureaucracy and PES 
(interviews with: Ioannou, Matsaganis, Lyberaki, Karastamati and Stratigaki). As 
mentioned in section 2.1, it is telling that it was only after five years of the 
introduction of the GM guideline and six years after the introduction of the EES that 
Greece could include gendered statistics in its NAPs/NRPs. The only monitoring and 
evaluation of the implemented measures were several ad hoc independent studies 
which were commissioned for the evaluation of the EU-financed programmes. As 
with all other GM-related measures, the empirical evidence suggested that these 
studies were not a Greek response to the EES soft law but were necessitated by the 
ESF conditionality as every country receiving ESF (and CSF) funds is obliged to 
provide independent evaluations for the EU-financed programmes at the end of each 
programming period (interviews with: Stratigaki and Karamessini). Consequently, 
most of them were published in 2006 in order to serve both goals: evaluation of the 
previous period and suggestions for improvement for the 2007-2013 programming 
period (cf.: DATA RC 2006; EEO and EKKE 2006; EETAA 2006a and 2006b; 
IDRYMA TYPOY 2006; MI.TH.E. 2006a, 2006b and 2005; Logotech et al. 2005; 
ASTIKI DIAXEIRISI 2004; PA.PI.
144
 and ICAP
145
 2004; EYSEKT 2003b).  In other 
words, Greece was never concerned with the impact of its policies on women. It had 
to be coaxed by the ESF financial conditionality, since the European Commission 
required independent information on how the EU money was spent and whether the 
Structural Funds’ regulations on gender equality were met.  
Most of the studies examine whether the 60% quota of female participation in 
EU-funded ALMPs. This appears to be another indirect indication that this target was 
related to the ESF conditionality. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggested that the 
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European Commission was particularly interested in assessing whether the 60% 
quota was actually implemented (interviews with: Stratigaki; Karastamati). 
Nonetheless, most studies (EEO and EKKE 2006; EYSEKT 2003; see also: 
Karamessini 2008; 2006) found that this goal was not met in most ESF funded 
programmes as female participation in most evaluated ALMPs ranged from 52-58%. 
However, these results should be treated with caution due to the significant 
limitations in data collection. For instance, the EYSEKT study could provide only 
informal / approximate data for the O.P. ‘Information Society’ as the contact details 
for most programme participants were either false or not updated when changed. 
Likewise, other studies had problems in collecting representative data because 
programme participants were reluctant to answer the mailed questionnaires or 
participate in the surveys with a phone interview (see: MI.TH.E. 2006a: 2-6; 2006b: 
17-18; 2005: 23-28; PA.PI. and ICAP 2004). In some studies, furthermore, data were 
not gender disaggregated (PA.PI & ICAP 2004; Astiki Diaxeirisi 2004; as cited in: 
Karamessini 2008: 300).  
Besides the quantitative aspect, Greece failed to promote GM in qualitative 
terms too, as the quality of the EU-funded programmes varied significantly. The 
requirements for GM promotion set by the Structural Funds regulations undeniably 
posed an immense challenge for the under-skilled, inexperienced and under-funded 
public and private authorities responsible for the implementation of the GM 
measures. Second, because many training centre owners, trainers and trainees 
perceived the EU funding as a substitute for the unemployment benefits they 
neglected the main goal of the subsidy, that is, to promote GM. The summary of the 
3
rd
 CSF Greek experience offered by Stratigaki (2006: 291 as cited in Karamessini 
2008: 288) is telling:  
The loud and bold public declarations regarding a strong political will did not 
find full correspondence in action and did not lead to the design of holistic and 
effective equality policies. The measures and actions that were successful were 
fragmentary initiatives of organisations and people who already had experience 
in gender equality issues and worked against the bad-management problems and 
the dangers of distorting the initial targets of gender equality promotion which 
appeared quite often during the 3rd CSF’s implementation. 
 
The same applies to the overall GM promotion in GEP. In a cross-country 
comparative study, Daly (2005: 443) classifies Greece as well as the UK, Spain, and 
France in a group where ‘gender mainstreaming efforts, while present, are highly 
fragmented, being confined either to a particular domain or to a specific program 
  
within a policy domain, and generally disconnected from general governmental 
policy on gender’. The same results are found in other policy areas, such as 
education and pension reform (cf. Stratigaki 2008b). 
Despite all the problems mentioned above, the research findings discussed in 
this chapter suggested that GEP definitely moved towards a more pro-gender 
direction. Because of the ESF conditionality, for the first time in the history of the 
Greek welfare state, women received targeted help. This help aimed at improving the 
position of women in the labour market by the provision of training, financial 
support to start up their own business and a multi-faceted counselling support. 
However, this change did not contribute to GM but to ‘gender inclusion’ in the sense 
that gender was incorporated in GEP as an independent goal with women receiving 
dedicated and targeted support.  
 
4.2. Dedicated equality measures in employment policy: expansion of care 
facilities  
As discussed in section 3.2, in the area of dedicated equality measures in 
employment policy, domestic change was observed only when ESF funds were 
available in the form of the expansion of care facilities and some secondary measures 
(studies and awareness programmes) for tackling pay gaps. The empirical evidence 
suggested that in the area of reconciliation a significant change occurred due to the 
ESF funds, which resulted in a considerable enhancement of the Greek welfare 
system. In particular, according to most interviewees (interviews with: Tsagkris, 
Mouriki, and Karamessini) the use of EU funds in this policy area is one of the 
success stories. In particular, according to Tsagkris:  
[...] of course there have been problems in management, corruption, etc. but, on 
the one hand, this is not a Greek phenomenon [...] I remember vividly that while 
working at the European Commission we had one of the worst cases of EU 
funds’ mismanagement in the Netherlands; on the other hand, whatever the 
problems and limitations of the EU funded programmes, one would be unfair to 
the great benefit they have offered Greece and the Greeks. People were trained; 
many new policy initiatives were created which dramatically changed Greek 
social and employment policy, such as care facilities, the all-day schools. These 
two measures have transformed Greece’s policy towards women, families and 
dependants.  
 
Likewise, Lyberaki, Mouriki and Karamessini stressed that the EU funds 
marked a significant qualitative improvement of care facilities as they could hire 
specialised staff for the provision of their services (psychologists; nurses; teachers; 
and counsellors). In other words, the ESF actions in Greece defined the core 
  
employment and family policy in Greece and considerably enhanced the capabilities 
of the Greek welfare state. Mouriki’s recollection is evident: 
Even though the EU funding amounts to 75% of the funded projects (the rest of 
the 25% has to be covered by national resources) in many cases in care facilities 
the EU contribution was raised through various tricks up to 100%. A very good 
example of this practise is that in many cases when for some reasons the EU 
funds were delayed some schools or care facilities had to close or their staff 
would remain unpaid until the EU money arrives.  
 
The two studies that examined the impact of care facilities on the female labour 
market status (Data RC 2006; EETAA 2006b) provided three main findings: (i) the 
expansion of care facilities contributed to the activation of women as it was easier for 
them to look for employment; (ii) only a third of the women who tried to enter the 
Greek labour market succeeded in gaining employment; (iii) the women who 
benefited the most were the ones who already had a job as they used public care 
facilities to maintain or improve their job position (Karamessini 2008: 315). As 
discussed above, domestic change was minimal in the area of pay gaps. More 
importantly no legislative reforms took place to tackle the problem. Hence, the 
significance of the new measures (namely some studies on stereotypes, awareness 
programmes and training) was marginal. Needless to say, these programmes did not 
result in any discernible change in GEP. The high pay gaps between men and women 
still haunt GEP.  
 
4.3. Evaluation of the EES impact on GEP with regard to gender equality 
promotion 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the thesis employed the Europeanization typology 
of EU-induced change to assess the domestic impact of the EES (Radaelli 2003: 37; 
Börzel 2005: 58-59): inertia (no change); absorption (minimal change); 
accommodation (moderate change); transformation (maximum change); and 
retrenchment (further distancing from the EES stimuli). In addition, as outlined in 
Chapter 1, to avoid over-estimating or under-estimating the EES effect on domestic 
policy the thesis used the traditional ‘stages heuristic’ policy cycle model (Breyer 
and de Leon 1983; Anderson 1984). This model was chosen to analytically separate 
the key parts of public policy in order to best explore each policy stage.  
The EES - similarly to the PES - appeared to have no impact on the 
government’s Agenda-setting, Policy-formulation and Policy-evaluation stages in the 
GM area. In other words, as the inertia category of Europeanization outcomes 
describes, no change at the domestic level could be linked to the EES stimuli during 
  
these stages. Nonetheless, the EES resulted in a first order change or absorption at 
the Decision-making and Policy-implementation stages, as only parts of existing 
programs or policies were altered to include gender equality promotion. More 
specifically, Greece included women in vocational training programmes for the first 
time in its history. It was obliged to assign quantitative targets for female training 
(60%); and incrementally promoted gender equality in all employment policy 
measures. In addition, GEP did not alter its monitoring and evaluation capabilities – 
a fundamental prerequisite for GM promotion. Consequently, the EES cannot be said 
to have produced a transformative change in GEP regarding GM promotion as the 
pre-EES GEP policy content was not replaced by the EES stimuli.  
Similarly to the GM area, the EES appeared to have no impact on the 
government’s Agenda-setting, Policy-formulation and Policy-evaluation stages in the 
reconciliation area. Nevertheless, the EES through the ESF conditionality led to a 
major expansion of care facilities and the introduction of new programs for the care 
of dependants (children and the elderly). However, this change did not constitute a 
paradigm shift for GEP as promoting reconciliation did not replace the pre-EES 
goals of the GEP. In other words, the expansion of care facilities meant an adaptation 
of the pre-existing processes, policies and institutions of GEP through a ‘patch up’ of 
new policies and institutions onto existing ones without a change in their essential 
features or the underlying collective understandings attached to them. In the pay gaps 
area, the EES resulted in a first order change or absorption in the Decision-making 
process, as Greek policy makers partially changed a limited number of pre-existing 
programs (a few ESF funded measures such as training, evaluation studies, and 
awareness programmes). In other words, they adapted some elements of their 
domestic policy to European requirements without altering their core. However, in 
all other policy stages there was inertia, as no change appeared to occur as a result of 
the EES stimuli. The following table summarises the EES effect on GEP with regard 
to gender equality promotion.  
  
 
Table 5.5: EES impact on Greek employment policy - Gender equality 
Policy stages Mainstreaming Reconciliation Pay Gaps 
Agenda-setting 
(problem recognition) 
 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Policy-formulation 
(proposal of solution) 
 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Decision-making 
(choice of solution) 
 
Absorption  
(first order 
change) 
Upgrading 
(second order 
change) 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Policy-implementation 
(putting solution into effect) 
 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Upgrading 
(second order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Policy-evaluation 
(monitoring results) 
 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Source: Author’s evaluation of the EES impact on GEP 
 
Conclusions  
In this chapter, I examined the EES influence on Greek employment policy 
with a particular focus on gender equality, arguing that, the EES influenced GEP 
essentially via its ESF conditionality (3
rd
 Europeanization mechanism). In other 
words, the collected evidence suggested that Greek policy makers changed GEP not 
because they changed their views through a learning process (1
st
 pathway) or by 
empowering themselves to promote their pre-existing agenda (2
nd
 pathway). The 
EES soft stimuli failed to alter GEP because it was ignored by domestic policy 
makers and social partners; as a result, domestic change occurred only in the areas 
where EU funds were available for domestic policy makers. The EES effect was 
moderate in two of the five policy stages (Decision-making and Policy 
Implementation), while it was minimal to nil in the other stages.  
Nevertheless, the significance of the EES-induced change in promoting gender 
equality in GEP should not be completely dismissed as for the first time in the 
history of GEP: (i) gender equality was included as a goal of GEP; and women 
received significant economic support; training; and new opportunities. However, 
GEP cannot be characterised as a gender neutral policy because gender promotion is 
still insufficient and more effort is needed in all fields of employment policy in order 
to claim that domestic policy is achieving gender equality (Rubery et al 2004; 2005; 
2006; Daly 2005).  
  
Chapter 6: Gender Equality promotion in Portuguese employment 
policy: Europeanization through domestic empowerment 
 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the Portuguese employment policy reforms with regard 
to the promotion of gender equality. As in the Greek case, for analytical reasons this 
inquiry is divided into two policy areas: (i) GM; and (ii) dedicated equality measures 
in employment policy (cf. Rubery 2002; 2004; 2005). The first part of the chapter 
outlines the features of Portuguese employment policy (PEP) before the mid-1990s 
with a particular focus on gender equality promotion. The second part examines the 
reforms that took place after the mid-1990s which aimed at promoting GM and 
dedicated equality measures in employment policy. As in all other cases of the thesis, 
this division is made in order to examine the temporal sequences of reforms and the 
content of the agenda and policy before and after the EES and thus, establish any 
causal significance of the EES (see also section 3.2 of Chapter 1). The third part tries 
to explain the observed policy change using empirical evidence collected in the 
fieldwork of the thesis. The fourth part evaluates the degree of change Portuguese 
employment policy with regard to gender equality promotion and the EES influence 
on domestic reforms.  
 
1. Gender equality promotion in Portuguese employment policy before the 
EES  
The contemporary Portuguese welfare state - and thus employment policy - 
was mainly built after the fall of Salazar’s authoritarian regime that dominated the 
country for almost fifty years (1926-1974). Salazar was a devout Catholic who 
perceived his mission as restoring the social order in Portugal. Hence, he introduced 
conservative policies in both economic and social fields, with stringent controls on 
political activity (Hampson 1996: 2). The "Carnation Revolution" of 1974 
represented a significant change in all fields of Portuguese society while the 
transition to democracy led to major change of all fields of Portugal’s social 
(including employment) policy. During the very first years of the Revolution, a large 
number of reforms were implemented in order to create a strong social protection 
  
system including: minimum wages; a social pension; labour and social rights; and 
holiday entitlements. As a result, social expenditures grew enormously, effective 
rights were guaranteed and benefits and wages skyrocketed. The main reasons for 
this substantial rise in social expenditures and salaries were both the pre-existing low 
levels of social protection and the political and social mobilization with a very leftist 
almost socialist ideology (Guillen et al. 2001: 19). For instance, the new constitution 
of April 1976 has been called ‘the most radical anywhere in the non-communist 
world’ (Gallagher 1983: 229).  owever, this ‘golden age’ of the Portuguese welfare 
state was suddenly interrupted almost two years later due to: (i) the severe economic 
crisis of the late 1970s; (ii) the ideology driven and unrealistic post-1974 policies that 
led to high public deficits; (iii) Portugal’s efforts to become an EU member (then of 
the European Economic Community - EEC). As a result, the period from 1976-1986 
was a period of ‘permanent austerity’. Nevertheless, even during that period there 
was some extension of social rights, but without the same intensity of the previous 
period (for a more detailed discussion of this period, see: Maravall 1997; Guillen et 
al. 2001).  
With regard to gender equality promotion in PEP, the first provisions were 
introduced in the revolutionary year of 1974 when women could be employed in: the 
public administration (Decree law (DL) 308/74 of 6 July 1974); in the diplomatic 
service (DL 308/76); and in the courts (DL 492/74). In addition, in the 1976 
Constitution discrimination because of sex became illegal (Article 13.2). Although 
the principle of non-sex discrimination underpinned the entire Portuguese legal 
system (Royo 2003: 22), the most important measure to implement this principle was 
the Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Work, 
Employment and Vocational Training law (DL No 392 of 20 September 1979). The 
392 law included numerous provisions to prevent any discrimination on the grounds 
of sex in training, work (equal pay) and employment (Royo 2003: 22; Santo et al. 
2007: 3). The 1979 reform introduced what was considered as one of the most 
progressive equality laws in Europe (Threlfall 1989: 228-229). All the above pieces 
of legislation were the result of some small yet activist women’s organizations 
(Barbosa 1989: 478). Because of the coupling of their pro-equality agenda with the 
significant political and social change taking place at the time, Portugal became one 
of the UN members to ratify the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in 1980 with no restrictions or reservations (Threlfall 
1989: 228-229). The final reforms before Portugal’s EU entry were the law regarding 
  
Maternity and Paternity leave (Law 4/84) and the very restrictive legalisation of 
abortion in 1984. In 1986 a new period started for Portugal in political and economic 
terms. The country achieved membership in the EEC with direct consequences for its 
financial situation and welfare arrangements (Guillen et al. 2001: 21). The EU 
influenced domestic employment policy with its ‘hard’ legislation (directives) and 
with EU (CSF and ESF) funded programmes which resulted in the generalization of 
vocational training, in order to face the extremely low levels of qualification of the 
Portuguese working population, and the expansion of the educational system 
(Guillen et al. 2001: 22). For instance, Portugal’s vocational training was boosted in 
the 1990s by the EU funds, with annual enrolment figures rising to 8% of the labour 
force in 1993 from 5% in 1990 (EIU 1996: 22).  
Nonetheless, in Portugal the EU funding dedicated to gender equality was 
miniscule compared to other areas (Pedroso 2005). This is in sharp contrast to 
Greece (see Chapter 3) where EU and ESF funding was directed to women since EU 
entry. As discussed in Chapter 3, the reason for this divergence appears to be the 
differing situation of women in the two countries: Greece had one of the worst 
performances in female employment while Portugal demonstrated one of the best 
performances in the EU-15. Hence, gender equality never gained prominence in EU-
funded projects in Portugal as there was no need for targeting women for extra 
vocational training. Indeed, Portugal deviates from the other Southern European 
countries, which show relatively poor performances in terms of both employment 
and unemployment, as its employment levels traditionally approach those of the 
Scandinavian countries (Silva 2003: 112). More specifically, Portugal during the 
1980s and 1990s demonstrated: low unemployment rates and high employment rates 
for all groups of the workforce; it had one of the lowest youth unemployment rates in 
Europe; female full-time employment was one of the highest in Europe - almost 
twice the figures for the other Southern European counties; and there were low rates 
of part-time work for both women and men. These features differ from those of other 
European countries where high female employment participation is usually 
associated with high female part-time work, and from the rest of Southern Europe 
where employment of women is traditionally high in the atypical economy or inside 
the home (Silva 2003: 112). Portuguese female employment rates were surprising in 
this respect and stimulated the interest of scholars who seemed to find difficulty in 
explaining them. For instance, Daly (2000: 508) argued that ‘patterns [of female 
labour force participation] in Portugal defy many if not all of the conventional 
  
explanatory frameworks and they have served to challenge at key point the analysis 
undertaken’ (as cited in: Silva 2003: 113). In addition, Portuguese female 
employment challenged one of the most common features of the Southern European 
labour markets, namely their ‘Janus face’ structure:146 employment levels are high; 
unemployment rates low; women do not face any problems in entering the labour 
market; and more importantly, there is no difference between the male breadwinners 
and the rest of the labour force groups in terms of employment levels. In the 
following tables (tables 6.1 - 6.4) Portuguese employment and unemployment rates 
are presented in order to gauge the overall labour market situation of women since 
the early 1990s. The tables show that Portugal has clearly been an outlier compared 
to the rest of the other Southern European countries, as it enjoyed high employment 
rates for both sexes and especially for women. It was one of the very few EU 
countries to meet the Lisbon target of 60% female employment throughout the 
2000s.  
 
Table 6.1: Portuguese Employment rates during 1990-1996 (%) 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total : : 66.6 65.1 64.1 63.7 64.1 
Males  : : 78.1 75.8 74.5 73.5 73.9 
Females : : 55.9 55.0 54.4 54.4 54.9 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
: denotes missing data 
 
Table 6.2: Portuguese Unemployment Rates per Gender in % (1990-1997) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total 4.8 4.2 4.1 5.5 6.8 7.2 7.2 
Males 3.3 2.8 3.5 4.6 6.0 6.4 6.4 
Females 6.7 5.9 5.0 6.6 7.9 8.1 8.2 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
 
Table 6.3: Portuguese Female Employment rates in % (1997-2009) 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Portugal 56.5 60.5 61.3 61.4 61.4 61.7 61.7 62.0 61.9 62.5 61.6 
Lisbon gap - +0.5 +1.3 +1.4 +1.4 +1.7 +1.7 +2.0 +1.9 +2.5 +1.6 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
 - Denotes does not apply as the Lisbon threshold was introduced since 2000.  
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 Katrougalos and Lazaridis argue that one of the main features of the Southern European labour 
markets is their Janus face: one side is characterised by rigidity and the other by flexibility and 
irregularity (2003: 42).  
  
 
Table 6.4: Portuguese unemployment rates per gender during 1997-2008 (%) 
 1997 2003 2008 2009 2010 
Total 6.7 6.4 7.7 10.6e 12.0e 
Males 8.8 7.3 6.7 10.7e 11.8e 
Females 7.6 7.3 9.0 10.5e 12.2e 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
e denotes estimated value 
 
However, there are some possible country-level explanations for the high 
levels of female labour market participation in Portugal. The first explanation is the 
very long Colonial war of 1961-1974 which necessitated the mass entry of women 
into the labour market. Contrary to other European countries, which experienced a 
similar process during the World War II, the very long duration of the Portuguese 
war meant that the entry of women to the labour market was much more enduring. 
Moreover, the high female employment in Portugal was not reversed after the end of 
the war. Additionally, the 1974 revolution and the progressive 1976 Constitution 
made permanent the new labour market environment (Torres 2006: 16). In parallel, 
the widespread poverty coupled with low wages for men forced women throughout 
the decades to enter the labour market, as the male-breadwinner model could not 
operate in Portugal (Torres 2006: 17). In other words, contrary to Scandinavia, 
Portugal’s high female employment rates originated more from the country’s 
economic hardship than an egalitarian revolution.  
Despite its very good performance since the mid-1980s, the Portuguese labour 
market continues to be based on predominantly low-skilled labour: a large 
percentage of the workforce - especially women - is employed in low-skilled jobs 
even by Southern European standards (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 55). 
Additionally, low-skilled women are employed in traditional sectors, such as textiles, 
the cork industry and farming, which do not require any training or long-term 
investment in workers. By contrast, when it comes to highly skilled labour, women 
are equal or doing much better than men since they tend to be more educated than 
their male counterparts. The final part of the Portuguese jigsaw is the very high level 
of school drop-outs, which hit young males harder. In other words, women’s high 
employment levels, the concentration of women in low-skilled sectors of the 
economy, and the equal or sometimes better educational levels of upper class women 
did not create any considerable demand for more training. Hence, in Portugal 
  
vocational training of the female labour force was never an issue of concern and 
remained absent or low on the agenda of policy makers. The same applies to the 
promotion of gender equality in PEP: after the late 1970s reforms, the issue lost 
salience and disappeared from the agenda. Two main reasons might explain this de-
prioritisation during this period (cf. Portugal 1999; Torres 2009; Wall and Leitão 
2008; Zartaloudis 2011b): (i) the relatively good situation of women – especially 
with regard to employment levels; and (ii) the ten years in power of the conservative 
PSD party which dominated Portuguese politics between 1985 and 1995.  
Another crucial aspect of the Portuguese case is its care regime, as 
reconciliation of work and private life became one of the EES mantra. Hence, it is 
worthwhile examining the Portuguese situation before the introduction of the EES 
stimuli. The key feature of Portugal’s social care is the ‘privatisation’ of this task to 
family members, a characteristic shared by all Southern European countries (Daly 
and Lewis 2000: 289). In this model, care is performed by other family members - 
usually for free - and the provision of public care is rudimentary. Secondly, 
concerning both child and elderly care, Leitner classified Portugal in the ‘implicit 
familiarism’ type, that is, a country that ‘neither offers de-familisation nor actively 
supports the caring function of the family through any kind of familialistic policy’ 
(2003: 359). Thus, there is an implicit reliance on family for care provision (Leitner 
2003). The latter constitutes a considerable strain on Portuguese women who have to 
combine care with employment, as employment rates are high in Portugal (see also 
below). It should be noted that this problem was not as prevalent for Greece due to 
the significantly lower employment rates of women as well as a more traditional 
male-breadwinner household model where women were responsible for care.  
Similarly to Greece, in Portugal the family was the principal caretaker, as there 
was no alternative for care provision: during the 1990s almost 90% of children of 0-3 
years are cared for by their families (especially by grandmothers, see: Cousins, 2000: 
117), or through informal care arrangements (usually cheap immigrant labour), and 
only 12% of this group attend some form of regulated full-day crèche. The mystery 
of high female employment rates and low childcare provision has puzzled 
researchers who have not found a definite answer to this paradox. Some authors 
suggested that Portuguese families either leave their children alone at home or take 
them to their workplace (EWCO, 2005; Torres, 2009: 48); others have questioned the 
reliability or comparability of Portuguese childcare facilities’ data (Bettio and 
Plantenga, 2004: 101). Surprisingly, qualitative evidence shows that Portuguese 
  
families, despite putting more pressure on women for childcare, combine all 
available care options, which transcend the care/welfare typology as their choices 
follow more socio-economic factors than a national model/culture (Larsen 2004). 
Moreover, family care provision has been traditionally highly feminised. Even 
though working hours are gender balanced (around 9 hours for men and 8 hours for 
women), household and family work are not: employed men spend around 1.5 hours 
per day in unpaid work, whereas employed women spend 4 hours (Perista, 2003). In 
other words, the high employment rate for Portuguese women was a mixed blessing 
as they had to combine work with the obligations placed on them by a familialistic 
welfare state where women still devote disproportionately more time to care 
compared with men.  
 
2. Gender equality promotion in employment policy after 1995  
After 1995, contrary to the previous period of immobility since the Portuguese 
entry to the EU (1986), a plethora of measures and reforms took place aiming at 
promoting gender equality in PEP. Although the reforms coincided with a pro-gender 
equality PS government (Wall and Leitão, 2008: 294), there was a substantial gap 
between the PS electoral victory (1995) and the introduction of the reforms which 
happened in 1997. The next sub-sections discuss the post-1995 reforms, arguing that 
their intensity was concentrated around two periods: 1999-2002 and 2005-2007. As 
in Chapter 5, the discussion is divided into two policy areas: GM and other dedicated 
equality policies (reconciliation of work and private life and pay gaps). Moreover, 
the degree of observed policy change varies among different policy sectors. The 
greatest change appeared to have taken place in the area of care facilities 
(reconciliation); in the GM area the observed change was confined mainly to the area 
of vocational training; finally, equality of remuneration was applied only in the 
public sector. Thus, there are important similarities between the Portuguese and the 
Greek case with the one difference being that Portugal significantly reduced the 
gender pay gap in the public sector while Greece did not.  
 
2.1. Gender mainstreaming  
The first major reform promoting gender equality in PEP occurred during the 
Constitutional revision of 1997 when gender equality promotion became one of the 
main responsibilities of the state (art. 9 paragraph h). However, GM was absent from 
both the post-1995 governmental agenda and the 1997 Constitutional reform. The 
  
concept of GM was introduced only later in the Global Plan for Equal opportunities 
which was voted by the Portuguese Council of Ministers with the resolution 49/97 of 
24
th
 of March 1997. Its goal was to alter the entire structure of equality laws and 
policies. The Global plan was the first ever effort of the PS government to promote 
exclusively equal opportunities in all areas of public policy making (Santo, et al. 
2007: 5). It included 51 measures grouped under seven main objectives –one of them 
being GM (CEDAW 1999: 9).  
The next milestone in promoting GM was the Portuguese National Action Plan 
(NAP) for Employment of 1999, which outlined Portugal’s response to the respective 
EES stimuli. Even though GM was mentioned in the first NAP of 1998, concrete 
measures were introduced mainly after 1999. The key change that occurred in 1999 
was the significant improvement of female access to active labour market policies 
(ALMPs): from a marginal element of policy making, ALMPs targeting women 
became gradually one of the core tools to boost female employment. In particular, 
Portuguese policy makers adapted most of the new policy measures introduced in the 
1998 NAP to boost employability under the respective EES pillar in order to promote 
female accessibility, after the introduction of the GM guideline in 1999. After 1999, 
Portugal introduced a number of new measures to improve the access of women to 
ALMPs in order to boost their employability. Additionally, in 1999 the PS 
government introduced a number of measures aiming to promote female 
entrepreneurship – mainly subsidies for business start-ups.147 Both measures can be 
perceived as unexpected in the Portuguese context given the high levels of female 
employment. Moreover, Portugal compiled a national list of professions which were 
demonstrating significant gender discrimination in order to create a framework for 
the targeted application of ALMPs. The fieldwork suggested that this list would be 
used in order to prioritise and incentivise (through higher subsidies) the participation 
of women working in professions with high gender inequalities in ALMPs (interview 
with: Karamessini). This measure was accompanied by the introduction (and 
systematic improvement thereafter) of greater incentives for young women to acquire 
professional experience in professions where women were significantly under-
represented.  
Besides the promotion of gender equality in ALMPs for employment and 
entrepreneurship, GM necessitates an advanced monitoring system in order to assess 
the gender impacts of all public policies. Indeed, in the 1999 NAP Portugal 
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committed to develop an adequate monitoring system to provide evidence for the 
application of GM in public policy. For this purpose, a set of NAP indicators, which 
would allow the follow-up and evaluation of the progress made in this area, was 
deemed necessary. In addition, since 2001 Portugal was consistently setting national 
targets for female employment and GPGs; in 2004 it was the only EU country 
outlining explicit commitments to close gender employment gaps even though it did 
not link specific policies to support this target (Rubery et al. 2004: 75).  
Further, in contrast to Greece, Portugal significantly changed its institutional 
framework for implementing and overseeing the promotion of GM in PEP: (i) it 
established a new GM committee at the office of the Presidency; (ii) it upgraded two 
long-standing Committees with specific competence in equal opportunities and 
evaluation and monitoring duties (Committee for Equality in Work and Employment 
and Committee for Equality and Women's Rights); and (iii) equality advisors were 
appointed to government departments (committees and ministries) to ensure gender 
equality promotion was taken into account in all governmental decisions (Rubery et 
al. 2001). In addition, the ‘Observatory for Equality in Collective Bargaining’ (in 
Portuguese: Observatório para a Igualdade na Contratação Colectiva) was created. 
It was composed of members of social partners, representatives of the public 
Commission for Equality in Labour and Employment, representatives of the Labour 
Ministry, and several independent experts. Its goal was to scrutinize collective 
agreements in order to identify discriminatory practices against men and women with 
regard to wages; job definitions; career ladders; flexibility schemes; and measures of 
reconciliation of work and family life. Since 2001, however, this observatory has not 
been very active due to shortage of human and material resources (Rubery et al. 
2007: 47).  
After the election of the centre-right PSD-CDS-PP148 government in 2002 and 
the EES revision in 2003, Portugal did not upgrade its GM policies substantially. 
Even though vocational training was reinforced for workers of the under-represented 
sex in occupations (Rubery et al. 2004: 117), Portugal just followed the course of the 
previous period, that is, the promotion of training schemes
149
 in order to boost female 
employability and entrepreneurship especially in areas in which women were 
underrepresented. These new measures, however, did not constitute a noteworthy 
                                                          
148
 In 2002 a coalition government was formed between the PSD and the CDS-PP party (Democratic 
and Social Centre – People's Party (in Portuguese: Centro Democrático e Social - Partido Popular).  
149
 See respective tables 2.2 and 2.3 in Appendix II. 
  
alteration of PEP. Finally, after 2002 a serious backtracking occurred regarding the 
institutions responsible for promoting gender equality policies. Even though their 
restructuring was announced since 2002, this did not take place until 2006 – that is, 
after the re-election of the PS in office.
150
 Hence, these organisations were 
effectively inoperative during 2002-2005. 
On the contrary, in May 2004 the Portuguese statistics service (in Portuguese: 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística; acronym: INE) launched a Gender Database which 
constituted a significant leap forward with regard to GM promotion (Rubery et al. 
2004). The Database provided approximately one hundred indicators disaggregated 
by gender in a wide range of areas, such as population; family; activity; employment 
and unemployment; education and training; reconciliation of work and family life; 
decision-making; health; crime; and violence. Hence, Portugal diverged significantly 
from Greece in the establishment of adequate monitoring systems which are 
necessary for GM promotion. This difference becomes apparent when the NAPs of 
the two countries for the year 2004 are compared. The Portuguese NAP provided 
ample empirical evidence of the impact of the policies implemented during the 
previous period. For instance, extensive data were provided on the participants of 
ALMPs documeting that women participate overwhelmingly in educational and 
vocational programmes;
151
 the large increase in the number of beneficiaries’ parental 
leave;
152
 and the increase of the coverage rate of pre-school education.
153
 Overall, 
during the 2000s Portuguese data are more adequately disaggregated by gender -
something that was never the case in the Greece. The evidence collected in the 
interviews suggested that this difference between Greece and Portugal can be 
explained by the efforts of Portugal’s INE to improve its statistics. It appeared that 
this process began in the early 1990s and was intensified after 1995 in parallel to the 
PS’ efforts to reform the IEFP (Madolino and Ferrerira; see also Chapter 4). In other 
words, GM promotion benefitted from the prompt Portuguese response to the EES 
with regard to its PES reform and a more efficient statistical office – two features 
lacking in the Greek case. 
In 2005, the Lisbon agenda was re-launched and the EES was further revised. 
In the same year the PS was elected to office. After 2005, similarly to Greece, there 
                                                          
150
 See below.  
151
 The ratio was above 70% for women; see table 2.2 in Appendix II.  
152
 From 112 in 1999 to 30.637 in 2002 and 40.577 in 2003, while remunerated parenthood leave 
increased from 146 in 2000 to 16.282 and 27.384 in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
153 
The coverage rate has been constantly increasing (from 70,9% in 1998 to 90,4% in 2002, for 5 years 
old children and from 59% to 70,6%, in the same period for 3 and 4 years old children). 
  
was no mention of GM in the Portuguese NRPs. However, Portugal implemented 
two measures that constituted positive steps towards GM promotion (Rubery et al. 
2006: 28): (i) representatives from gender equality bodies participated in the working 
groups preparing the NRP; (ii) after a long delay, new heads were appointed in 2006 
for the two governmental gender equality mechanisms, namely the Commission for 
Equality and Women's Rights (CEWR) and the Commission for Equality in Labour 
and Employment (CITE). In addition, the 3
rd
 National Plan for Equality was 
announced in 2006. Finally, a few new measures aiming to improve employability 
and entrepreneurship were added to those that already existed in 2005 (one measure) 
and 2006 (three measures),
154
 which were not significant with regard to GM 
promotion in PEP, as was the case for those of the 2002-2005 period. Nonetheless, 
the PS government deferred the launch of the planned Observatory of Collective 
Bargaining due to shortage of resources (Rubery et al. 2006: 18). 
The Portuguese reform record is similar to the Greek one as both countries 
tried to promote GM through the provision of vocational training and employment 
subsidies (business start-ups). Nonetheless, Portugal showed a greater degree of 
policy change in the institutional framework needed for GM promotion and in the 
collection of statistical data necessary to implement GM. However, neither country 
implemented an adequate institutional framework for GM promotion (see also 
section 4 of this chapter below), and neither of them fully implemented the reforms 
that were initially announced and planned.  
 
2.2. Dedicated equality measures in employment policy 
The other policy area under examination is the dedicated equality measures in 
employment policy. In a similar fashion to Greece, Portugal demonstrated the most 
significant reform activity in the area of reconciliation compared to the one of pay 
gaps. However, contrary to Greece, which started expanding its childcare services 
after 2001, Portugal introduced the goal of reconciliation and care facilities’ 
expansion in 1997 with the 1
st
 National Plan for Equality (Plano Nacional para a 
Igualdade – PNI; reconciliation was one of the Plan’s seven key objectives). 
Reconciliation would be promoted through sensitization campaigns, the introduction 
of new ways of organizing working hours, flexibility in working schedules and the 
creation of care facilities for dependants (children and the elderly) (CEDAW 1999: 
9). In addition, the PS government revised article 59 of the Constitution (with articles 
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1 and 2 of the Constitutional Law 1/97) in order to introduce the right for both men 
and women to be able to ‘reconcile professional and family life’ (CEDAW 1999: 
29). Nonetheless, it was only after 1998 that reform efforts were intensified with 
Portugal introducing wide-ranging reforms in order to improve the reconciliation of 
work and private life. More specifically, since 1998 Portugal expanded substantially 
its national pre-school network care facilities and promoted care services for 
dependants; provided subsidies to families in order to pay private care within the 
house (usually immigrant workers taking care of dependants); and established 
networks of services for home support for dependants.  
The two most important programmes were the Local Employment Initiatives 
(Iniciativas Locais de Emprego) and the RIME programme (Regime de Incentivos às 
Microempresas – micro-enterprise incentive scheme). Of the 4000 jobs created 
between 1997 and 1999 under these initiatives, about a third was in the field of 
family services or related activities (Guerreiro 2000: 2). Moreover, Portugal 
introduced a broad range of novel measures which supplemented and extended 
existing programmes aiming at updating family services. In addition, Portugal sought 
to gradually cultivate the emergence of a new vision of care services provision to 
families with financial difficulties. The concept of a social support network, namely 
care services targeting both dependent elderly persons and unemployed women was a 
prime example of this new approach to reconciliation policy (Guerreiro, 2000: 2). It 
also contained the elaboration of codes of good practices in companies, vocational 
training and an extension of the pre-school network.  
 Further, the 2001 NAP introduced - for the first time in Portugal’s history - 
quantitative targets for care facilities: by 2006, pre-school education attendance 
should have been provided to all five year olds and to 75% of 3-4 year olds by 
building and equipping another 1800 classrooms during that period; and the 
government had to guarantee that 100.000 children aged up to three would be able to 
attend day nurseries.
155
 This was a clear contrast to the Greek case, as Greek policy 
makers did not commit to specific quantitative targets and did not seem to respond to 
the Barcelona targets (see chapter 5). According to the authors of the 2001 NAP, 
these changes corresponded to the need to incorporate the new elements ‘resulting in 
particular from the guidelines for the EU employment policy for 2001, from the 
Commission’s remarks and from the recommendations to Portugal as per the Joint 
Report regarding the carrying out of the NAP in 2000 and from the structure and 
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measures included in the new Community Support Framework (2000-2006) which, 
because it identifies a large part of the financial support of the NAP, exerts a strong 
influence on the range of instruments available for its carrying out’ (NAP 2001: 8).  
On the contrary, the issue of tackling GPGs - as in Greece - did not gain any 
salience. Although after 1998 some policy initiatives were implemented, the 
measures focused mainly on awareness campaigns and training schemes aiming at 
altering attitudes, in order to ‘create behaviours conducting to an effective equality of 
opportunities both in the professional and in the family spheres’ (NAP 2002: 43). In 
other words, the PEP emphasised the need to spread the idea that gender equality and 
equal pay as well as reconciling work and family life is a right and duty of men and 
women (Gonzalez 2001). An additional measure, frequently listed in the Portuguese 
NAPs as a response in tackling GPGs, was the commission of studies to analyse 
various dimensions of the problem in different sectors of the economy.
156
 In addition, 
Portugal introduced some awards for organisations and companies with model 
policies on gender equality promotion. Thus, the PS government, in a rather 
dissimilar fashion to its counterpart in Greece, introduced a variety of measures in 
order to tackle the GPG.  
After the election of the PSD-CDS-PP government in 2002 and the 2003 EES 
revision, the major development of the 2002-2005 period was the launch of the 2
nd
 
PNI which covered the period 2003-2006, and included ‘100 commitments for 
family policy’. The Plan aimed at promoting gender equality in many areas such as 
education; employment; balancing work and family life; preventing violence against 
women; and social protection. Its implementation fell essentially under the CEWR 
and the CITE (Pizarro 2003: 7). In addition, inter-departmental teams were also 
supposed to be established in each Ministry, with responsibility for the coordination, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the integration of a gender perspective 
in all policies and programmes. According to the 2
nd
 PNI, the Ministries had to adopt 
positive action measures and develop human resource management policies that 
promote equality (Ferreira 2003).  
In addition, the new PSD-CDS-PP government extended the operating calendar 
of pre-school institutions in order to ensure a functioning scheme and a flexible 
timetable adequate to family needs (resolution nº 19 130/2002), and it updated the 
Pre-School Education Expansion and Development Programme (Decree-Law no 
342/2003). The PSD-CDS-PP government also regulated the access regime and 
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working rules of the financial support system for the pre-school education 
establishments of Lisbon’s social solidarity private institutions. In addition, the 
improvement of crèches was promoted by measures aiming to make their functioning 
schedule more suitable through the implementation of the positive differentiation 
principle by the Social Solidarity Private Institutions (Cooperation Protocol of 2004). 
Further, Portugal introduced a policy of providing support for the childcare expenses 
of the unemployed workers. This reform constituted a complete departure from the 
existing policy of childcare support, which supported care facilities directly rather 
than providing targeted support to the families which were most in need. Similarly to 
Greece, Portugal did not demonstrate any real progress in tackling pay gaps as 
existing measures were maintained, while a few new ones followed the previous 
sensitisation logic (see table 2.4 in Appendix II). This is quite surprising as the main 
problem of Portugal in terms of meeting the EES targets was the large pay gap. 
Although - contrary to Greece – the public sector’s gender pay gap was much more 
favourable and even reversed, Portugal had one of the largest GPGs in the private 
sector in Europe (Rubery et al. 2004: 41).  
After the 2005 EES revision, similarly to Greece, Portugal’s efforts to promote 
dedicated equality in PEP were confined to the extension of care facilities for 
dependants. Although the 2005 NRP focused only on childcare needs and neglected 
care facilities for other dependants, especially older people (Rubery et al. 2005: 219), 
the 2006 NRP included new measures focusing on reinforcing care services for all 
types of dependants: children, elderly and disabled people (NRP 2006 - see also table 
2.4 in Appendix II). According to the 2006 NRP, the PS government introduced 
three new programmes as a response to a country-specific recommendation on care 
facilities.
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 The first programme was titled ‘Enlargement Programme for the Social 
Amenities
158
 Network’ and stipulated effective planning for territorial needs and 
encouraged investment through partnerships ‘between the social sector, local power, 
and the business/private sector’ (NRP 2006). The aim of this programme was to 
improve living conditions for the elderly and the disabled by improving their 
autonomy and integration levels. The second programme, titled ‘Support Programme 
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 The country specific recommendation stated that Portugal should be: ‘Taking measures to combat 
the factors leading to differences in salaries between men and women in the private sector and 
increasing the availability of structures to care for children and other dependents as well as their 
accessibility in terms of price.’ 
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 Social amenities are all kind of facilities and/or organisations (such as care; sports; health; charity; 
educational; and community centres) that may contribute in reconciliation of work and private life by 
providing various activities to dependants, and therefore, alleviating women from their care duties. 
  
for Investment in Social Amenities’ (Order in Council no. 869/2006, 29th of August) 
encouraged investment in social amenities which supported private initiatives in 
order to increase care facilities’ capacity to accommodate dependants. Finally, the 
‘Network of Integrated Continued Care’ intended to boost the creation of units 
providing continued health care and social support teams for the elderly which 
operated at the community level. 
Further, the Network of Community Proximity Services was expanded. This 
network was made up of a group of social amenities aimed at providing social 
support and targeting the specific needs of people and families. Moreover, primary 
school opening hours were extended - children were required to be in school from 
09:30 to 17:30 - aiming to assist women in balancing their work and care 
requirements (Rubery et al., 2006: 137). In addition, the 2006 NRP introduced new 
targets for the provision of care to dependants that had to be achieved by 2009: a 
50% increase in the number of crèches to 31,161 units (meeting the Barcelona pledge 
for the provision of childcare facilities for at least 33% of children aged 0-3); the 
employment of 19,000 new staff in care facilities for the elderly; the provision of 
6,000 more places in facilities in the continued integrated care network (this goal was 
to be reached by 2008); and the provision of 1,850 additional vacancies in facilities 
for the disabled by 2009 (see also table 2.4 in Appendix II). Interestingly, the 
empirical evidence suggested that the majority of care facilities were owned by the 
large non-governmental sector, which appeared to be funded almost exclusively by 
national sources and the Catholic Church (Santos). Indeed, Portugal is an exception 
in the EU concerning the size of the non-profit or third sector - which is neither 
public nor private - in the provision of care services. These NGOs constitute almost 
90% of care facilities in Portugal with the remaining ones being private (9%) and 
only 1% state owned (Carta Social 2008: 10). Finally, in a similar fashion to Greece, 
Portugal again showed an absence of any measures to tackle GPGs in the private 
sector. GPGs and gender segregation of the labour market were acknowledged as 
existing problems but were not addressed at all in terms of policy measures (Rubery 
et al. 2006: 73). This is quite surprising considering that the GPG in the private 
sector remains high in Portugal as seen in tables 6.8 and 6.9 below.   
To summarise, unlike Greece, Portugal’s labour market was characterised by a 
very different set of conditions in female employment and unemployment rates. 
Nevertheless, a similar reform pattern is observed in the two countries: in order to 
promote GM following the emergence of the EES, Greece and Portugal gave women 
  
access to ALMPs aiming at (re) integrating them into the labour market. 
Additionally, both countries expanded extensively their care facilities and related 
social services in order to reconcile work and family. Regarding tackling gender 
gaps, furthermore, both countries implemented only a number of awareness 
programmes. The summary of the observed policy change is presented in the 
following table.  
 
Table 6.5: Promoting gender equality in Portuguese employment policy 
Gender Mainstreaming 
Reform Content Time Process 
 New institutional framework 
for implementing and 
overseeing the promotion of 
GM 
 Establishment of new 
organisations for gender 
mainstreaming 
 Expansion of vocational  
training for women 
 Educational programmes to 
change gender stereotypes 
 Studies on gender equality 
and mainstreaming 
 Improving databases to 
monitor gender 
mainstreaming of policies 
Change starts in 1998 and 
is intensified until 2002 
 
During 2002-2005 
changes subside 
 
The issue returns on the 
agenda after 2005 
 Vocational training and 
other employment 
creation subsidies 
 Administrative and 
organisational reform 
 Improvement of 
monitoring capabilities 
 Measures to address 
stereotypes 
 
Reconciliation of Work & Family life 
Reform Content Time Process 
Promotion of care 
facilities 
 Expansion of care facilities takes 
place from 1997 
 This expansion is subdued during 
2002-2005 and intensified after 2005 
Care facilities funded almost 
exclusively by national funds 
 
Pay Gaps 
Reform Content Time Process 
Public sector pay 
equalised but not private 
Measures to tackle the 
pay gap implemented 
from 1998 
Awareness-raising put in place; 
public sector pay gap is equalised; 
private sector gap remains 
unchallenged 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
  
3. Explaining gender equality promotion in Portuguese employment policy 
The measures and reforms presented which took place after 1995 constitute a 
significant break from the past with regard to gender equality promotion in PEP. 
However, the terms of GM, reconciliation of family and private life and pay gaps 
have never gained salience in Portugal’s civil society – although they were de facto 
significant challenges to gender equality (Santo, et al. 2007: 12; Ferreira 1998). 
Hence, an interesting puzzle emerges: why did Portugal promote these measures 
after 1995? 
As will be argued in this section, the empirical evidence collected in the 
fieldwork research of the thesis suggested that the observed policy change occurred 
because domestic actors used external stimuli, namely the UN Beijing Platform for 
action and the EES soft stimuli, to empower themselves and promote their pre-
existing pro-gender equality agenda. It appeared that these domestic actors were not 
the key ministerial elites identified in the Portuguese PES case - as the latter largely 
neglected this issue - but high level female feminist technocrats or ‘femocrats’. In 
other words, these policy entrepreneurs used the EES policy window (see: Kingdon 
1984 and Chapter 2). However, the value of the core team of PS policy entrepreneurs 
should not be undermined as the fieldwork suggested that these femocrats 
collaborated with them in their efforts to push their agenda. The research findings 
also suggested that this cooperation was generally smooth but also faced existential 
confrontations - especially when the femocrats felt they were ignored by their 
partners in government (interviews with: Leitão; Ferreira; Wall). Additionally, as 
will be shown below, the empirical evidence suggested that although the femocrats 
were always trying to promote gender equality, they were not able to put intention 
into action for a number of reasons including: the lack of policy windows in some 
areas of policy making, namely GM and private sector pay gaps; the lack of external 
empowerment during certain periods (e.g. before the mid-1990s and after meeting 
Lisbon targets concerning employment levels); and the lack of access to political 
power, namely during the PSD-CDS-PP term in office.  
More specifically, the empirical evidence suggested that these feminist top 
bureaucrats held key positions in Portugal’s bureaucracy (advisors to the Minister of 
Employment and/or Heads in Gender Equality bodies) during the PS governments 
(interview with: Ferreira). It appeared that besides the various female ministers 
involved in Gender equality, the main femocrats were (interviews with: Ferreira and 
Leitão): Maria do Carmo Nunes; Maria do Céu da Cunha Rêgo; Maria Josefina 
  
Menezes Leitão. Mario do Carmo Nunes was a long standing top-bureaucrat and 
advisor to Ferro Rodrigues during 1998-2002 and then head of the EQUAL 
department (Gabinete de Gestão EQUAL) in Portugal during 2005-2010 after which 
she retired. Maria do Céu da Cunha Rêgo is a lawyer; a trainer and a designer of 
training resources solely on Gender Equality issues; member of several NGOs 
operating in the field of gender equality; member of the Consultative Council of the 
National Mechanism for Gender Equality as an expert; and occasional invited 
lecturer to Master’s courses in the area of gender equality in several Portuguese 
universities. In the area of gender equality, she was Secretary of State for Equality, 
President of the tripartite Commission for Equality in Work and Employment (CITE) 
which is responsible for the application of gender equality law at work; a member of 
the first Board of Administration of the European Institute for Gender Equality; co-
organizer of the first post-graduate course on Gender Equality Law at the Faculty of 
Law of the University of Coimbra; member of the Advisory Committee on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men at EU level; and vice-president of the 
Commission for Equality and for the Rights of Women (CIDM) which was the 
precedent national mechanism for gender equality in Portugal. Until 2011, she was 
the Portuguese expert in the newly founded EIGE (European Institute for Gender 
equality). Finally, Maria Josefina Menezes Leitão was Deputy Director of the Labour 
Ministry regarding Gender Equality and President of CITE. 
As discussed in section 2.1, the first breakthrough in promoting gender equality 
in PEP was the ‘Global Plan for the Equality of Opportunities’, which was approved 
by the PS government in March 1997. This plan was the response to a specific 
recommendation of the UN’s Beijing Platform for Action as Portugal had to respond 
to the UN on how it would incorporate the Beijing Stimuli on equality in its domestic 
policy (CEDAW 1998; 2001; 6). Although gender equality was present since 1995 in 
the governmental agenda (CEDAW 1998: 25; Santo et al., 2007: 12), the PS 
government did not take any concrete action to implement gender equality in PEP 
until the emergence of the UN agenda (Ferreira). The importance of the Beijing 
Platform for Action in the adoption of the ‘Global Plan’ for gender equality appears 
to have been paramount since, as Portugal convincingly argued in 1999, there had 
been a historic commitment of all governments in the strengthening of welfare and 
family policy without concrete policy measures. Hence, the first policy change 
promoting gender equality in PEP was introduced by a non-EU related external 
stimulus - although it has been argued that the EU had a decisive role in shaping the 
  
UN Beijing agenda (Rubery 2002). The same applies to the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 PNIs which, 
nonetheless, also incorporated the EES soft stimuli, namely the EES guidelines and 
country specific recommendations (Santo et al. 2007). 
However, the empirical evidence from the interviews suggested that all of these 
plans gained little significance and were hardly implemented (Ferreira and Wall). For 
instance, the 2
nd
 PNI remained mostly on paper as the level of implementation was 
‘extremely low’ and according to the Portuguese member of the Expert Group on 
Gender, Social Inclusion and Employment (EGGSIE): ‘it is hard to identify 
significant changes in this field’ (Rubery et al. 2005: 73). It appeared that this lack of 
discernible impact on PEP applied to all plans (Ferreira and Wall). Unsurprisingly, 
their evaluations faced significant opposition from the rest of the Portuguese 
bureaucracy and after their completion they were not published to avoid negative 
repercussions. In other words, the three Gender Equality Plans were a ‘window-
dressing exercise’ (Ferreira). The limited impact of the three Equality Plans indicates 
that: (i) gender equality promotion in PEP mostly originated from external (mainly 
UN) stimuli; and (ii) Portugal’s femocrats had limited capacity in promoting gender 
equality in PEP as they could not implement policy change - the latter being 
controlled by ministerial elites who ‘did not prioritise gender equality issues’ 
(interview with: Ferreira). This assessment of the non-prioritisation of gender 
equality from the core ministerial elites in Portugal was confirmed by the numerous 
interviews with most members of the Portuguese ministerial elites: besides the 
femocrats, most of the Portuguese policy makers neglected the issue of gender 
equality when listing their priorities in office. Nonetheless, it appeared that the 
femocrats faced the biggest opposition during 2002-2005 when key gender equality 
bodies remained inactive due to the institutional stalemate created by the non-
appointment of heads to these organisations (interview with: Ferreira). As a result, 
the key actors of gender equality promotion in employment policy were rendered 
inactive. This neglect was not coincidental and it demonstrated vividly the incumbent 
government’s opposition to gender equality promotion (see section 3 of this chapter 
below). 
The research evidence collected in interviews suggested that after 1997 the 
UN’s Beijing Platform was replaced by the EES as the main external influence with 
regard to gender equality promotion in PEP (interviews with: Leitão; Ferreira and 
Wall). Although Portugal had still to report to the UN, the empirical suggested that 
the EES annual reporting process; the greater political clout of the EES and the 
  
Lisbon Agenda as well as particular indicators that Portugal had to meet rendered the 
EES the main external stimulus for domestic change in PEP. Hence, it appeared that 
after 1997 Portuguese policy entrepreneurs tried to exploit the EES window of 
opportunity and empower themselves in order to promote their pro-gender equality 
agenda in PEP by promoting GM and dedicated equality measures in employment 
policy (Leitão).  
However, these efforts were not equally successful in all the examined policy 
areas. Additionally, the pace of the observed policy change was intensified during 
1999-2001 and post-2005. The research findings of the thesis suggested that this 
variation resulted from the capability of Portugal’s femocrats to exploit the windows 
of opportunity created by the UN and EES external stimuli. More specifically, the 
UN’s Beijing Platform for Action and the EES provided an ideal opportunity for the 
Portuguese policy entrepreneurs to promote gender equality in PEP. The introduction 
of the GM stimuli in 1999 provided an ideal window of opportunity to promote their 
feminist agenda. The comparison between the first and second NAP clearly indicates 
the significance of the respective EES guideline. Although in the 1998 NAP the 
government declared that all listed measures would assume a gender equal approach, 
it did not give any other details. However, it was only after 1999, as a response to the 
GM guideline that Portugal: (i) expanded training to women; provided more job 
opportunities for women through the promotion of female entrepreneurship (business 
start-ups); started the formation of an advanced system of monitoring and evaluating 
gender equality in all PEP measures; and tried to change its institutional apparatus 
within the government (interview with: Leitão). Likewise, it appeared that the 
reconciliation guideline and, more importantly, the Barcelona targets on childcare 
facilities, opened a specific policy window which Portugal’s policy entrepreneurs 
utilised to promote their agenda. In both cases, Portuguese policy entrepreneurs were 
able to exploit the EES stimuli to persuade others about the necessity of reform and 
activate the rest of the government and bureaucracy (interviews with: Ferreira, Wall 
and Santos). As a result, Portugal began to target women in its ALMPs despite the 
high female employment rates and expanded its care facilities to promote the 
reconciliation of work and private life.  
Further, the periods of reform intensity and inactivity appear to be explained by 
the existence or absence of EES policy windows. In the GM case, even though the 
1999 EES guideline opened up a window of opportunity for domestic policy 
entrepreneurs, this window closed very shortly as Portugal’s female employment was 
  
higher than the Lisbon targets. The exceptionally high employment rates meant that 
the external empowerment soon reached its limits as, according to the interview 
material, Portugal’s femocrats could not persuade the key ministerial elites that GM 
constituted a policy priority (interviews with: Ferreira; Wall; and Leitão). The main 
reason for the closure of the EES policy window was that the key ministerial elites 
considered as absurd to pay attention to an issue that not only met but also exceeded 
the Lisbon targets (interviews with: Pedroso, Silva, Antunes; Ferreira; Wall; and 
Leitão). Thus, after 2002 there was no substantial progress in GM promotion. The 
inability of Portugal’s femocrats to further promote their pro-gender equality agenda 
after the relevant EES benchmark was met, suggests the low priority and shallow 
understanding of this issue from the key ministerial elites who felt that GM was no 
longer a priority (interviews with: Leitão and Ferreira). As discussed above, the GM 
requires a holistic recalibration of employment policy in order to ensure that public 
policy is gender equal as well as a significant development of monitoring and 
evaluation tools to ensure the latter (cf. Rubery 2002). Similarly, although the 
reconciliation guideline added legitimacy to expanding care facilities, it was the 
Barcelona targets that introduced a specific target for Portugal to meet. Thus, 
Portugal’s femocrats took advantage of this window of opportunity to push their 
agenda and mobilise the relevant departments in the Labour and education ministry 
(Wall and Santos). The fieldwork evidence suggested (interviews with: Wall and 
Leitão) that in their endeavour, Portugal’s femocrats collaborated with Jorge Lacão, 
Secretary of State for the Presidency Cabinet responsible for the Citizenship and 
Equal Opportunities. It appeared that Lacão assumed a very blunt and technocratic 
approach to reconciliation of work and private life: Portugal could not afford to stand 
out as a country which did not meet the Barcelona targets; hence, expanding care 
facilities became a key priority of his term (interview with: Wall).  
The research findings suggested that the success in gender equality promotion 
in PEP depended also on the control that Portugal’s femocrats and collaborating 
policy entrepreneurs had on the different policy areas. In other words, empowerment 
has an added value when policy entrepreneurs are able to exploit an available policy 
window to put into effect their agenda. In particular, in the areas of GM and 
reconciliation, where most of the change depended on public policy, domestic 
change was greater than GPGs (see also section 4 below). As discussed in section 
2.2, although Portugal managed to achieve equal pay in the public sector, it failed to 
promote equality of pay in the private one as policy change was confined only to 
  
awareness campaigns, studies and company prizes aiming at changing social 
stereotypes. According to the evidence collected in interviews the main reason for 
this limited progress in reducing pay gaps was the limited capacity of Portugal’s 
femocrats to promote change. It appeared that these policy entrepreneurs were 
restrained by Portugal’s economic model and structure of the labour market as 
fieldwork suggested that reducing pay gaps was considered by Portugal main 
ministerial elites to disadvantage Portugal’s competitiveness (interview with: 
Dornelas; see also below).   
More specifically, as mentioned in section 1, many Portuguese women are 
employed in low-skill jobs, such as textiles, agriculture and the cork industry. These 
sectors depend on cheap labour to be competitive and constitute big part of the 
Portuguese economic model of ‘a cheap labour in Western Europe’ (interviews with: 
Dornelas and Pedroso). Hence, reducing pay gaps in the private sector would 
negatively affect the profits and competiveness of major companies (both national 
and international) operating in Portugal, as their success was partly based in 
employing low-paid female employees. Besides the immediate negative effect on 
these companies, the risks were much broader including higher unemployment rates 
and reduction of state revenues. Nevertheless, it seems that the negative effects that 
the Portuguese economic actors anticipated with the promotion of equality of 
remuneration in the private sector, occurred with the EU enlargement: after 2002, 
many foreign owned companies relocated from Portugal to Eastern Europe where 
they would significantly increase their profit margins and overall competitiveness as 
the CEECs offered both cheaper labour and less taxation – something that meant the 
‘death of Portugal’s economic model and miracle’ (interview with: Dornelas). 
Consequently, since the early 2000s Portugal has experienced low levels of growth 
and an increase in unemployment. 
In addition, the research findings suggested that one of the major causes of the 
vast pay gap in the private sector was the huge sectoral divide in employment 
between men and women. Thus, reducing pay gaps in the private sector faced the 
obstacle of a labour force that is employed in completely different sectors: most 
women work in low paid jobs whereas most men in better paid jobs (interviews with: 
Ferreira, Wall, Pedroso, Capucha, Silva and Bernardo). According to one key policy 
maker (Capucha):  
Reducing the pay gap in the private sector would mean that we would have 
to re-allocate the labour force and try to have gender balanced workplaces. 
However, this is illegal – you cannot say to somebody ‘go work over there 
  
for the sake of equality’. That’s why we did many awareness campaigns to 
change the stereotypes of people regarding jobs. As you can imagine, it is 
very hard to persuade a man to work in the textile industry. This is why 
even trade unions sometimes are hesitant on this policy.  
  
However, one should not perceive this sectoral divide as prohibiting the 
implementation of additional measures beyond awareness and sensitisation 
campaigns. Thus, the aforementioned quote indicates that Portuguese ministerial 
elites did not perceive the reduction of the GPG in the private sector as a high 
priority. Indeed, according to one key gender equality expert (Ferreira), successive 
Portuguese governments were very reluctant to tackle GPG in the private sector – 
especially in traditional industries such as those of cork and textiles.    
Moreover, it appeared that the ideological stance of the incumbent party 
towards gender equality affected the ability of Portugal’s femocrats to exploit the UN 
and EES policy windows. On the one hand, all Portuguese governments have had 
similar positive views of the EU (Pizarro 2003: 5) and were in favour of an effort to 
catch up with the developed EU core while respecting the European Social Model 
(Pizarro 2003: 19). On the other hand, there was some nuanced differentiation 
between the Socialist (PS) governments (1995-2002 and 2005-2010) and Barroso’s 
centre right (PSD-CDS-PP) government (2002-2005) with regard to gender equality 
and reconciliation policies. Firstly, the latter had a more ‘familialistic policy 
perspective’ (Wall and Leitão 2008: 294) as the minister of employment was a 
member of the conservative People’s Party, the ideological foundation of which was 
based on Christian Democracy. Hence, the government was quite sceptical towards 
the EU's gender equality policy.
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 Secondly, the Portuguese Socialists were strong 
supporters of the OMC on employment and social protection, with input in key 
decisions related to the EU’s social and economic coordination (Cadeiras 2004: 1). 
On the contrary, the Barroso government viewed the OMC as a bureaucratic burden 
of low - if any - value for Portuguese employment policy (interview with: Antunes). 
Thus, the immediate incorporation of the EES stimuli, which was much faster than in 
the Greek case, was directly related to the policy preferences of the new PS 
government that came into office in 1995 which allowed Portugal’s femocrats to 
open a policy window and promote their pro-gender equality agenda. In other words, 
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external empowerment from the UN and the EU160 coincided with the election of a 
more pro-gender equality government (Wall and Leitão 2008: 294), which was also 
keen to reform the Portuguese welfare state (see among others: Silva 2009; Chapter 4 
of this thesis). According to Gonzalez (2001) this national pre-EES agenda 
underpinned a progressive approach to GM within the employment policy agenda. In 
other words, the interplay between the EES stimuli and governments’ preferences 
determined to a great extent the window of opportunity that the pro-gender equality 
policy entrepreneurs could exploit to promote their agenda; hence, the reform 
activism during 1999-2001 and post-2005 and the reform inertia during 2002-2005.  
Empirical evidence did not provide support for the other explanations of policy 
change. As indicated from the analysis above, despite the different ideological 
orientation of Portuguese governments on gender equality, no government 
implemented any concrete action before the appearance of external stimuli, namely 
the UN agenda on gender equality and the EES soft stimuli. In other words, the 
documented policy change did not originate from a domestic agenda. In addition, the 
research findings did not provide support for the other two Europeanization 
pathways. More specifically, the thesis empirical fieldwork did not trace any process 
of policy learning as the main actors promoting and defining the Portuguese agenda 
were committed policy entrepreneurs who exploited the EES policy window to push 
their agenda. These policy entrepreneurs were committed in gender equality 
promotion before the introduction of the external (UN and EES) stimuli. It appeared 
that the rest of the bureaucracy and the main ministerial elites responded to the 
suggestions of these policy entrepreneurs in order to satisfy external stimuli but they 
did not change their views on the priorities of PEP (interview with: Ferreira).  
Likewise, the research evidence did not provide support for the 3
rd
 
Europeanization pathway as it appeared that the ESF financial conditionality was 
largely irrelevant to the promotion of gender equality promotion in PEP (interviews 
with: Leitão, Santos, Ferreira and Wall). Although ESF funding was often used to 
implement pro-gender equality measures, such as training for women, and awareness 
programmes (see: Zartaloudis 2011b), the ESF conditionality was not employed in 
Portugal. As was discussed above, GM in PEP was introduced as a response to the 
UN’s Beijing agenda in 1997 and it was firstly implemented in 1999 as a response to 
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the EES respective guideline. In other words, GM was implemented before the 3
rd
 
CSF programming period (2000-2006) - contrary to Greece where GM measures 
were implemented only after 2001 when the new ESF programming period started. 
Additionally, the vast majority of Portugal’s (new) care facilities were not state 
owned and did not receive any EU subsidies (interview with: Santos). Therefore, the 
EU funds were used in a limited way, and did not seem to define Portugal’s agenda 
and reforms by any process related to financial conditionality.  
The above reform record and likely explanation for the policy changes differ 
substantially from those of the Greek case as follows. First, most reforms and policy 
changes in Greece appeared after 2001 while in Portugal GM was discussed from the 
mid-1990s. Second, the observed policy change in Greece was linked to the ESF 
conditionality while in Portugal it appeared related to the empowerment of domestic 
policy entrepreneurs (femocrats) who created a policy window by using the EES soft 
stimuli to promote their agenda. Third, besides the use of EU funds in the area of 
vocational training, Portugal used purely national sources to support the expansion of 
its care facilities – contrary to Greece which only relied on the EU funds. Fourth, 
Portugal reduced the GPG in the public sector while Greece did not. Nonetheless, the 
overall direction and content of the observed policy change were very similar in both 
countries as they both responded to the EES goals of gender equality promotion in 
employment policy through GM, reconciliation and GPG reduction. This is 
somewhat unexpected given the much better employment rates of women in Portugal 
compared to those in Greece. Hence, one could have reasonably expected to witness 
a more muted reform record in Portugal as the country already met the key EES 
benchmarks for female employment participation while Greece had to be more 
proactive in order to reduce the considerable misfit between its domestic conditions 
and the EES benchmarks. 
 
4. Evaluating change: between transformation and inertia 
In Portugal, the EES effect on GM was similar to the Greek case - despite their 
contrasting starting points in terms of employment/unemployment levels. Despite the 
pre-existing pro-gender equality agenda of the incumbent party, the goal of GM was 
included only in 1997 as a response to the UN Beijing Platform for action. Even 
though the EES was not the only external stimulus for domestic change, since the 
UN Beijing Platform was also important in empowering Portuguese policy 
entrepreneurs, it would be erroneous to underestimate the EES’ importance as it 
  
immediately overshadowed the UN stimuli in gender equality promotion. In 
particular, concrete policy measures were introduced only after the respective GM 
EES guideline in 1999. More specifically, after 1999 Portugal: expanded vocational 
training and business start-ups subsidies to women in an unprecedented fashion; 
developed a monitoring system providing evidence for GM policies; and 
implemented an institutional overhaul within the government to promote GM. Thus, 
the EES appeared to have produced a first order change or absorption in the Agenda-
setting and Policy-formulation stages of PEP, since only a few existing elements of 
the pre-EES agenda of Portugal’s policy entrepreneurs were adapted to the EES 
stimuli. Nonetheless, the EES appeared to have created a third order change or 
transformation in the Decision-making, Policy-implementation and Policy-evaluation 
stages because there a paradigm shift seemed to have taken place in PEP which now 
had GM as a key goal and introduced new institutions, policy tools and a monitoring 
system to evaluate the effect of public policy on women.  
The EES also produced a third order change or transformation in the 
reconciliation area. More specifically, Portugal introduced the goal of reconciliation 
in 1997, which would be promoted through: ‘sensitisation’ campaigns; the 
introduction of new ways of organizing working hours; the introduction of flexibility 
in working schedules and the creation/expansion of care facilities for dependants 
(children and the elderly). Undoubtedly, the greatest emphasis was put on the 
expansion of care facilities which transformed PEP. The expansion of childcare 
facilities during the period under study has been impressive. Compared to the mid-
1990s, coverage for both childcare categories (0-3 and 3-6) doubled by 2005. Despite 
this significant improvement, however, childcare facilities were still insufficient to 
meet working parents’ needs within and beyond school hours (EWCO 2005: 6). 
Childcare facilities’ occupation rates were very high (90%) and most of them were 
full – particularly for the 0-3 group (OECD 2004). Moreover, data showed that the 
existing facilities’ coverage remained low. In particular, in 2001, childcare facilities 
(crèches and nannies) covered only 15.4% of the 0-3 group (EWCO 2005). 
Nonetheless, care provision improved significantly over the following years (see 
tables 6.6 and 6.7). By 2005, 60% of children aged 3-6 were attending kindergartens 
(90% of those aged 5-6 years) (OECD 2006). Put differently, the pre-EES policy 
content was replaced with a completely different approach which promoted the 
expansion of care services. The new PEP paradigm also included a number of other 
tools aiming to alter social values and stereotypes including a different framework of 
  
working arrangements which would be friendlier to workers with caring 
responsibilities at home.  
 
Table 6.6: Percentage of children (0-3) cared only by their parents 
 2005 2006 2007 
EU 25 51 52 46 
Portugal 27 23 37 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
 
Table 6.7: Percentage of children (3-5/6) cared only by their parents 
 2005 2006 2007 
EU 25 12 11 10 
Portugal 27 12 11 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
 
Finally, in the pay gaps area the EES effect was low as Portugal - in an identical 
manner to Greece - implemented mainly sensitisation measures such as educational 
programmes and company prizes. Thus, similarly to Greece, the EES produced a first 
order change or absorption in Portugal since the PEP absorbed certain non-
fundamental changes in order to incorporate some elements of the EES stimuli for 
pay gaps without substantial modifications of existing structures by altering only 
parts of existing programs or policies. This absence of a substantial change may 
explain why the GPG in the private sector remained high in Portugal as shown in 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9.  
 
Table 6.8: Portuguese gender pay gap in public and private sector 
 1995 2000 2007 
Private 25 28 : 
Public -12 -17 : 
Total 5 8 7 
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
: denotes missing data 
Pay gap defined as the difference between men’s and women’s average gross hourly 
earnings as percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings (for paid employees at 
work 15+ hours). 
 
Table 6.9: Portuguese gender pay gap using comparable structure of earnings 
survey estimates (2002-2008) 
 2002 2006 2008 
Portugal  : 8.4 9.2 
EU-15 : 18.7 : 
  
Source: Eurostat (date accessed 20/06/2011) 
: denotes missing data 
Pay gap defined as the difference between men’s and women's average gross hourly 
earnings as a percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings (for paid employees). 
 
Table 6.10 below summarises the EES effect on the Portuguese gender equality 
policies case. As in the PES case, the degree of policy change in the Portuguese case 
is different from the Greek one. At all stages of policy making, the Portuguese case 
shows a much higher degree of policy change. This suggests that the EES soft stimuli 
may have higher degree of impact than the ESF conditionality. In other words, the 
higher degree of policy change in Portugal suggests that ownership may be more 
important than conditionality. 
 
Table 6.10: Summary of EES impact on Portuguese Employment Policy with regard to 
Gender equality promotion 
Policy stages 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
Reconciliation Pay Gaps 
 
Agenda-setting 
(problem recognition) 
 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
 
Policy-formulation 
(proposal of solution) 
 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
 
Decision-making 
(choice of solution) 
 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Absorption 
(first order change) 
 
Policy-implementation 
(putting solution into effect) 
 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
 
Policy-evaluation 
(monitoring results) 
 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES impact on the PEP with regard to gender equality 
promotion  
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter examined the reforms promoting gender equality in Portuguese 
employment policy. It argued that external stimuli (initially the UN’s Beijing 
Platform for action and since 1998 the EES) were crucial in promoting GM, 
  
reconciliation of work and private life as they empowered specific feminist policy 
entrepreneurs who were empowered by the EES policy window and promoted their 
pro-gender equality agenda. External empowerment was not sufficient for a similar 
effect in the area of GPGs, as there were structural issues to be dealt which went 
beyond the reach and capabilities of the Portuguese policy entrepreneurs. Although 
in both Portugal and Greece, the EES had a significant impact on promoting gender 
equality in employment policy, the respective Europeanization pathways were 
different in these two similar countries. This appears to be explained by the 
existence/absence of successful policy entrepreneurs. In Portugal, PS governments 
had put significant emphasis on the EES, and therefore, it was much easier for 
Portuguese femocrats to empower themselves against domestic inertia and/or 
opposition. In contrast, successive Greek governments neglected the soft elements of 
the EES stimuli, and therefore, reforms started only after 2001 when the ESF 
conditionality was enforced.  
  
Chapter 7: Incorporating Flexicurity? The divergent influence of the 
new EES mantra on Greek and Portuguese employment policies 
 
Introduction 
After 2006 the concept of ‘flexicurity’ became the new EES mantra. As a result, 
member states were asked to examine ways of incorporating flexicurity into their 
labour markets. This chapter will examine whether, and if so, how and to what extent 
flexicurity influenced Greek and Portuguese employment policies. It will also 
investigate the pathways of influence linking the EES to domestic policy. As in 
discussed in Chapter 1, the main focus of this chapter’s inquiry will be the post-2006 
labour market reforms due to the conceptual and methodological choices regarding 
the concept of flexicurity (see section 1 of this chapter below).  
The first part of the chapter discusses briefly the EES flexicurity stimuli. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, it is argued that, despite their high ‘visibility’ in the EES, the 
efficiency of these stimuli is limited by their low precision (four different pathways) 
and the lack of ESF funding. The second part juxtaposes the key features of Greek 
and Portuguese employment policies with the flexicurity stimuli, arguing that there is 
a very high misfit between the EU and the domestic levels in each country. The third 
part examines the empirical record of reforms arguing that there is a contrasting 
reform record between the two countries: in Greece, although the government initially 
favoured flexicurity as a policy goal and initiated a reform process aiming to 
incorporate flexicurity, it suddenly halted the reform process; by contrast, the 
Portuguese government, despite facing the same (and arguably higher) resistance to 
flexicurity, persevered and implemented a labour market reform in accordance with 
some of the flexicurity stimuli.  
The fourth part of this chapter evaluates the EES influence on domestic policy. 
It is argued that this divergent record of reforms is explained by: (i) the presence or 
absence of successful
161
 policy entrepreneurs who used the EES policy window to 
promote their agenda; (ii) the absence of ESF funding and financial conditionality 
which resulted in its neglect in the Greek case. In addition, as will be shown below, it 
appeared that in Portugal the EU was not the only external influence as the OECD’s 
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 As discussed in Chapter 1, successful policy entrepreneurs are those with access to power and 
resources.  
  
negative assessment of the Portuguese labour market had a significant influence on 
the observed policy change. Finally, in the fifth part of this chapter it is argued that, 
despite the variation between the two countries, flexicurity had a weak impact on 
domestic policy in both cases. 
  
1. Flexicurity: the new mantra of the European Employment Strategy 
Although the EU was concerned with establishing an employment policy 
tackling flexibility and security even before the launch of the EES in 1997 (see: 
Countouris 2007: 211-213; Keune and Jepsen 2007: 15-16; Gwiazda 2011: 549), the 
jargon-sounding concept of flexicurity was introduced as an EES stimulus relatively 
recently, and the term was used for the first time in November 2006.
162
 In November 
2007 the Council accepted a ‘final and consensual version of the common principles 
of flexicurity’ (Council 2007a: 3), which largely agreed with the Commission’s 
positions. However, in August 2008 the Council did not proceed in suggesting a 
policy for more efficient labour markets as proposed in the Commission's 
communication (EurActiv 2009). Although the Commission set a new ‘Mission for 
flexicurity’, which published an evidence-based report in December 2008, the 2007 
financial crisis overshadowed the EU’s efforts in promoting flexicurity. The adoption 
of flexicurity as best practice signified an effort by the EU to ‘square the circle’ by 
reconciling the previously antithetical concepts of flexibility and security as 
flexicurity did not assume them as mutually exclusive but a precondition for each 
other (EC 2007c: 10-11; Countouris 2007; Keune and Jepsen 2007; Špidla 2007; 
Gwiazda 2011). Thus, the EU tried to deviate from the traditional pro-flexibility 
stance of other international organisations – especially the OECD (Gray 2009). 
Despite being a new concept in the EES discourse, flexicurity was characterised as 
being ‘like old wine in a fashionable new bottle’  because it did not bring anything 
profoundly new to the EES in terms of policy recommendations (Keune and Jepsen 
2007: 16). However, the importance of flexicurity should not be underestimated as it 
acquired the most prominent place in the EES and overshadowed all other EU goals 
(Keune and Jepsen 2007: 16; Gray 2009; Gwiazda 2011). In other words, despite not 
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 The first EU document including the concept of flexicurity was the 2006 Commission’s Green 
Paper (European Commission 2006c). Flexicurity gained further salience when it was included in the 
explanatory memorandum of the Commission’s Proposal to the Council for the 2006 Employment 
Guidelines (European Commission 2006d). From 2006 onwards almost all EES related documents 
include flexicurity as one of the main goals to be achieved by EU member states.  
  
being an entirely novel policy recommendation since 2006, the Commission assigned 
high visibility to flexicurity.  
Flexicurity emerged as a home-grown labour market policy model in Denmark 
and the Netherlands in the 1990s (Gwiazda 2011). It provided considerable flexibility 
of employment and work organisation as well as job security for employees (cf. 
Wilthagen and Tros 2004). The thesis will not focus on the actual model of flexicurity 
and its Danish and Dutch variations (for a review of the meanings of the concept, see: 
Viebrock and Clasen 2009; Keune and Jepsen 2007; Vielle 2007), but on how the EU 
defined the concept of flexicurity as an EES stimulus. Although the EU started using 
flexicurity in 2006, the concept was and remained until 2007 relatively vague and 
without any concrete policy proposals attached to it due to the long deliberations 
between EU institutions; national governments; civil society; and social partners (for 
the summary of the extensive consultation process for flexicurity, see: EC 2007b; for 
a critique of flexicurity arguing that the Commission favoured flexibility over 
security, see: Keune and Jepsen 2007; Vielle 2007). In July 2007 the Commission 
published a dedicated Communication titled ‘Towards Common Principles of 
flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security’ assigning four axes 
to the term (EC 2007a: 12; see also: Gray 2009: 48): 
 Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements from the perspective of 
the employer and the employee, of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’;  
 Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies to ensure the continual 
adaptability and employability of workers;  
 Effective active labour market policies (ALMPs) that help people cope 
with rapid change, reduce unemployment spells and ease transitions to 
new jobs; and, 
 Modern social security systems that provide adequate income support, 
encourage employment, and facilitate labour market mobility. 
 
Since the concept of flexicurity as defined by the EU is multi-dimensional a 
number of analytical and methodological choices are required to clarify the use of the 
concept in this study. As the focus of the thesis is on employment policy, it will 
examine the first component of the concept only: flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements. This is done for the following reasons. The second and fourth 
components of flexicurity are not directly related to employment policy. Lifelong 
learning (second component) is more closely related to education, and the fourth 
  
component (modern social security systems) is mainly related to the area of social 
security and especially pensions and minimum income schemes. The third component 
(effective ALMPs) formed part of the wider EES stimuli for activation that existed 
since the mid-1990s and prior to the emergence of the flexicurity concept. As a result, 
including the third component of flexicurity (effective ALMPs) would pose an 
important methodological limitation in delineating the causal link between flexicurity 
and domestic reforms, particularly in the use of the temporal sequences method. 
The first component of flexicurity (flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements) was predominantly linked to the reduction of Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL)
163
 and was the only issue discussed in the relevant section of the 
Commission’s paper on flexicurity (EC 2007a: 12). According to the document, high 
EPL against dismissals is one of the key reasons for discouraging or delaying job 
transfers which results in harder transitions from unemployment to employment (EC 
2007a: 12). In addition, the Commission identified strict EPL as a factor with a 
considerably negative effect on vulnerable groups ‘such as young people, women, 
older workers and the long-term unemployed’ which results in the ‘segmentation of 
the labour market which flexicurity seeks to address’ (EC 2007a: 12). Unsurprisingly, 
the EPL score has been one of the key indicators for assessing member states’ 
commitment to flexicurity by both the EU and in academic research (EC 2006e: 81-
100; EC 2007a: 38; EMCO 2009: 5; cf. Auer 2011: 374-375; Maselli 2010; Chilian et 
al. 2010).  
 owever, the European Commission stressed that it was not aiming towards ‘a 
one-size-fits-all ‘flexicurity recipe’ for EU member-states. Since each EU country 
had a ‘specific labour market situation and culture’, instead of one policy model it 
suggested four different ‘pathways’ which would be jointly implemented by member 
states (EC 2007a: 22; cf. EC 2007c):  
 Pathway 1: tackling contractual segmentation; 
 Pathway 2: developing flexicurity within the enterprise and offering 
transition security; 
 Pathway 3: tackling skills and opportunity gaps among the workforce; 
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 According to the OECD, Employment Protection Legislation refers to (1999: 50): all types of 
employment protection measures, whether grounded primarily in legislation, court rulings, 
collectively bargained conditions of employment and customary practice. One of the more frequently 
used measures regarding levels of EPL is the OECD’s Employment Protection Legislation Index. It 
measures 18 indicators grouped in three main areas: employment protection of regular workers against 
individual dismissal; specific requirements for collective dismissals; and regulation of temporary 
forms of employment.  
  
 Pathway 4: improving opportunities for benefit recipients and 
informally employed workers. 
 
Subsequently, another analytical and methodological choice is related to the 
identification of the flexicurity pathway that is most relevant to Greece and Portugal. 
As mentioned above, the Commission argued very early on that - contrary to the other 
EES stimuli in this thesis (activation of the unemployed by the PES and gender 
equality policies) – flexicurity would not be implemented in a uniform fashion across 
member states. The Commission argued that each member state would be free to 
incorporate flexicurity according to its labour market model and focus only on one of 
the four pathways. For this reason, member states were divided into groups, each with 
a focus on a specific pathway, as asking for each member state to implement all 
pathways was perceived as unrealistic (EC 2007a: 22; EC 2007c). According to the 
Commission, both Greece and Portugal (as well as France, Italy and Spain) had to 
focus on the first pathway as this was the most relevant for their labour markets. 
These countries were required to focus on ‘providing opportunities for workers to 
move out of short-term and into long-term contracts, e.g. by limiting the use of 
consecutive short-term contracts’ (EC 2007a: 29). In addition, this pathway proposed 
the significant redesign of employment contracts for insiders and outsiders by either 
expanding a series of rights to outsiders (e.g. equal pay, health and social security 
rights to workers on fixed-term contracts, agency work, on-call work, etc) and/or 
redesigning their open-ended contracts by making them more flexible (e.g. companies 
giving all employees open-ended contracts with progressive build-up of job 
protection) (EC 2007a: 29). As the then EU Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities Commissioner, Mr. Vladimir Špidla, put it:  
‘The first approach [SZ: referring to the first pathway] is of interest for 
countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal or Greece, which are 
mainly facing the challenge of segmentation of the labour markets 
between the insiders and the outsiders. This aims to share flexibility and 
security more equitably amongst the working population. It provides 
points of access to the labour market for the newcomers and helps them 
to work their way towards better contracts.’ 
 
Consequently, the concept of flexicurity as an EES stimulus in this thesis refers 
to the first component of flexicurity (flexible and reliable contractual arrangements), 
which focuses primarily on reducing the strictness of the EPL score. It also refers to 
the first flexicurity pathway which stresses the importance of tackling labour market 
segmentation between insiders and outsiders by giving less job protection to the 
  
former (flexibility) and more protection to the latter (security) thus achieving a more 
‘flexicure’ labour market.  
However, it is argued that, despite its high visibility, the flexicurity EES stimuli 
were weaker than those in the other two examined areas (activation of the 
unemployed by the PES and gender equality policies) (see also: Chapter 1). First, 
contrary to activation and gender equality policies which suggested a specific and 
uniform ‘recipe’ for all member states, flexicurity’s starting point was that national 
labour markets were unique, and therefore, national governments could focus only on 
the most relevant pathway for them. Second, flexicurity tackled very controversial 
issues which touched the core of national employment policy by trying to reconcile 
flexibility and security – something that is far from common sense in most EU 
countries (cf. Rhodes 2005; Sapir 2007; Esping-Andersen 1990). By contrast, 
activation did not directly tackle issues of redistribution, labour relations, income 
policy, and social partnership (Goetschy 1999; Raveaud 2007). Finally, contrary to 
activation and gender equality policies there were no specific ESF funds to support 
the implementation of flexicurity (see also chapter 1). As discussed in chapter 1, these 
differences are presumed to have negative implications on the efficiency of the 
flexicurity EES stimuli rendering Europeanization an unlikely outcome because: (i) 
flexicurity represents a weaker stimulus than activation and gender equality as it has 
lower precision than the other two policy goals; (ii) the absence of ESF funding (and 
financial conditionality as a mechanism) further weakens the flexicurity stimulus 
compared with the other two policy areas where ESF funds were available; (iii) 
domestic opposition is expected to be higher than in the other two areas.  
 
2. Greek and Portuguese employment policy: flexicurity...Southern style 
Member states were asked by the European Commission, after the publication 
of the Green Paper in June 2007, to examine how they could integrate flexicurity into 
their labour markets. For Greece and Portugal this task was a very challenging one, as 
the misfit between the EES stimuli and domestic labour markets was very high (see 
below). In many respects, the Greek and Portuguese labour markets were at the 
antipode of the flexicurity model. The first major misfit between the EES stimuli and 
the Greek and Portuguese labour markets was the contractual segmentation. 
Contractual segmentation referred to the balance between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, 
the existence and use of flexible and reliable contracts. As the Council’s Joint 
Employment Report of 2006-2007 highlighted (Council 2007b: 13):  
  
South European countries often represent strongly segmented labour 
markets, resulting from previous policies to introduce flexibility at the 
margins without addressing the very static mainstream labour markets 
and rising undeclared work. 
 
Indeed, Greece and Portugal - as well as Spain and Italy - share some labour 
market characteristics which contradict the flexicurity model. First and foremost, all 
of them stand out as the ‘member states of the EU who have serious labour market 
problems’ (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 31) with the most significant being high 
unemployment. Second, they all have a division between the protected core of the 
labour market and the rest: between those with full-time employment and those in 
temporary and irregular employment (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 33-34). 
Katrougalos and Lazaridis (2003: 42) label this as the ‘Janus face of the Southern 
European Labour Market’, where one side is characterised by rigidity and the other 
by flexibility and irregularity. Third, a key element of the Southern-European labour 
markets is that some of the unemployed hold jobs in the informal economy whilst 
others supplement underpaid regular or irregular jobs with a second job. This has 
been greatly facilitated by a ‘tango’ danced between employers and workers aimed at 
evading the law and circumventing employment relations - another characteristic of 
the Southern-European labour markets. In addition, there are a relatively high number 
of small-scale units relying on the flexible use of family labour and flexible hired 
workers from non-EU member states (typically seasonal migrants from nearby 
regions or countries). Fifth, there is a limited diffusion of a ‘proletarianised’ 
manufacturing working class. Sixth in Southern Europe there are typically low rates 
of female participation in the formal economy (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 34). 
Moreover, young people and women constitute the two largest categories of the 
workforce that are unemployed - a direct consequence of the ‘male -breadwinner’ 
societal and economic structure. Therefore, non-family breadwinners face additional 
cultural difficulty to get employed (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 43).  
In addition, both Greek and Portuguese labour markets had a major misfit 
between the model of flexicurity with regard to their levels of internal and external 
flexibility.164 As mentioned above, the official labour market in both countries is 
characterised by high rigidity, which coexists with a relatively large unofficial 
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 Internal flexibility refers to flexibility inside the firm through the use of group-work, change of 
positions and skills to perform different duties. External flexibility refers to flexibility between firms 
or at the market – namely to part-time, temporary or sub-contracted work (Storper and Scott 1990). 
For a succinct discussion of the economics literature on the various types of labour market flexibility, 
see: Monastiriotis 2005: 452-453. 
  
economy where labour relations are not regulated. As a result, both countries have 
consistently stood out in all OECD evaluations of the EPL. They are considered to 
have the most rigid labour markets and have some of the highest EPL scores (see 
table 7.1). Although the high EPL does not represent the actual degree of rigidity of 
the Greek and Portuguese labour markets (since part of the economy operates under 
maximum flexibility in the unofficial sector), both countries have been consistently 
criticised for their high scores, and for providing unreasonably high protection to the 
formal sector of the economy (cf. OECD 2004: 68-125).
165
 The reported high EPL 
scores sharply contrast with the expectations of the EES flexicurity stimuli (EC 
2007a). Additionally, Greece and Portugal joined other EU countries in promoting 
‘flexibility at the margins’,166 which results in the promotion of employment 
segmentation (see Boeri and van Ours 2008; Boeri and Garibaldi 2007; Saint-Paul 
2002; EC 2010b: 121-124). As mentioned above, this also deviates from the 
flexicurity model which aims to ameliorate employment segmentation.  
 
Table 7.1: EPL data in Greece and Portugal 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 
Greece 3.56 3.50 3.50 3.50 2.73 2.73 2.73 No data 
         
Portugal 4.19 4.10 3.85 3.67 3.46 3.46 3.15 2.88 
Source: OECD Indicators of Employment Protection
167
 
 
In summary, both countries had a large (non-justiciable) misfit between their 
contractual arrangements and the EES flexicurity stimuli in terms of their EPL scores 
and the sharp labour market segmentation between insiders and outsiders. Hence, 
both countries demonstrated a high misfit between their domestic settings and the 
EES stimuli.   
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There is a fierce debate among economists about the role and effects of EPL in labour markets (for 
a review see: Boeri, and van Ours 2008: 199-224; Bertola et al. 1999; Skedinger 2010; Young 2003). 
However, the main focus of this section is to examine whether there is a misfit between the EES 
flexicurity stimuli and Greek and Portuguese employment policies. Thus, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to discuss the opposing positions about the importance and role of EPL in labour market policy 
outcomes. 
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 Flexibility at the margin refers to the deregulation of temporary contracts and / or the introduction 
or development of agency work and other contracts of limited duration. 
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 Source: http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_33927_42695243_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
  
3. Incorporating flexicurity in Greece and Portugal: similar conditions, 
different reform paths 
After the publication of the European Commission’s paper on flexicurity in 
November 2006, member states were asked to examine how they could incorporate 
flexicurity into their employment policies. This section discusses the reform process 
that took place after 2006 in Greece and Portugal respectively, arguing that although 
similar in important respects, the two countries followed different reform paths.  
 
3.1.  Portugal: promoting flexicurity by stealth? 
The Green Paper of the European Commission on flexicurity was published in a 
period when Portugal was already undergoing a labour market reform process. 
According to the evidence collected in the interviews, one of the key electoral 
commitments of the PS during the 2005 elections was to revise the PSD’s 2003 
Labour market reform, making this reform process highly politicised. It appears that 
the reform was extremely controversial and time-consuming: while it began almost 
immediately after the Socialists took office, its final article was passed in January 
2009, that is, after four years of intense negotiations between the government and the 
social partners. Overall, the new Labour Code extended external, working time and 
wage flexibility (see also: Zartaloudis 2011a). 
The Socialists initiated the 2005-2009 labour market reform shortly after their 
electoral win in the 2005 elections by appointing an Expert Committee which was 
asked to: (i) analyse the Portuguese labour market; (ii) trace its problems; (iii) offer 
suggestions and policy recommendations that the government and the social partners 
would discuss. The Committee concluded its work in April 2006 by producing the 
Green Paper on Labour Relations which was published by the Ministry of Labour 
(Lima and Naumann 2006). The Portuguese Green Paper assessed Portugal’s 
performance in comparison with other EU countries in all aspects of the EPL. 
Additionally, it criticised the OECD’s understanding of flexibility, which it argued 
focused only on external flexibility, and therefore, classified the Portuguese labour 
market as one of the most rigid in the world. The Green Paper argued that if all 
aspects of EPL (collective redundancies, temporary employment) were taken into 
account, Portugal would turn out to be quite close to the EU average or even more 
flexible than most of the other EU-15 countries. The Green Paper included the 
concept of flexicurity in its final chapter as ‘an issue that was currently debated at EU 
level’. After a brief discussion of flexicurity, it concluded that the concept was very 
  
useful for Portugal and identified priorities for action: (i) spending on ALMPs had to 
be increased in order to reach 60% of the EU average; (ii) tackling the proliferation of 
atypical, unregistered, short-term and precarious forms of employment should be 
intensified; (iii) Portugal should follow a ‘successful’ flexicurity approach which 
entailed a three-fold metamorphosis of Portugal’s labour law,  collective agreements 
and the role of social partners (Lima and Naumann, 2006). Regarding the latter, the 
Green Paper favoured a more active role for social partners through their greater 
involvement in the governmental agenda as well as through the expansion of their 
reach by making national agreements applicable on sectoral and firm levels of social 
concertation (Cerdeira, 2007: 48). When it was presented to the social partners, the 
Green Paper did not cause any serious controversy apart from the negative reaction of 
the largest and communist orientated trade union CGTP-IN, which argued that the 
document was favouring flexibility (Cerdeira, 2007: 48). 
The EU’s Green Paper on Labour relations was published a few months after 
the Portuguese Green Paper. Following the recommendations of the EU’s Green 
Paper, the PS government initiated a public debate on flexicurity in late 2006 (EIU 
2007: 20). This public discussion included numerous conferences organised by the 
Ministry of Labour which invited representatives from the social partners, academia 
and civil society (Lima and Naumann 2007c).
168
 The debate was somewhat impeded 
by the Portuguese Green Paper on Labour Relations (Cerdeira 2007: 47). 
Nonetheless, the Minister of Labour and Social Solidarity Vieira da Silva took an 
active role in the flexicurity debate. According to the evidence collected in 
interviews, his role was a balancing act between promoting flexicurity at the EU 
level
169
 - as Portugal held the EU Presidency during June-December 2007 - and 
avoiding the provocation of domestic reactions by appearing too one-sided in its 
policy direction (Dornelas). Hence, Silva, in his early speeches and interviews, was 
very cautious about adopting the flexicurity model and emphasised that importing 
foreign models was impossible (Lima and Naumann 2007c; Michalaki 2009); 
moreover, whatever the solution might be, it had to be found by the Portuguese social 
partners (Dornelas). On 1 December 2006, in an interview in Brussels, da Silva 
stressed that flexicurity cannot be applied mechanically to all EU countries. With 
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 Interviews with various participants of these conferences – until 2010 the Portuguese Ministry of 
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 Flexicurity was subject among the informal meetings of European Ministers of Employment and 
Social Affairs organised by the Portuguese EU presidency at Guimarães (July 2007) and Lisbon 
(September 2007). 
  
regard to Portugal, da Silva argued that ‘the debate is starting now and has to be very 
precise and include the active participation of the social partners’ (Lima and 
Naumann 2007). Gradually, however, he started to express a more favourable stance 
towards adopting flexicurity as he argued that this would be equally advantageous for 
both employers and employees (Michalaki 2009: 13; for a full record of Silva’s press 
statements see: Michalaki 2009: 13-14).  
However, social partners were immediately sceptical about the possibility of 
Portugal adopting the flexicurity model in the form proposed by the EU (Lima and 
Rego 2009). In particular, according to Manuel Carvalho da Silva – the leader of 
CGTP-IN – it seemed very difficult for Portugal to emulate the Danish flexicurity 
model as he doubted Portugal’s capacity to implement effective LLL policies and to 
increase unemployment benefits to the Scandinavian standards (Lima and Naumann 
2007c; Lima and Rego 2009). For the UGT leader Joao Proenca, the flexicurity 
model was ‘not exportable’ given the stark differences between Scandinavian 
countries and Portugal in levels of educational and vocational qualifications (high in 
Denmark and low in Portugal) and labour insecurity (low in Denmark and high in 
Portugal) (Lima and Naumann 2007c and Lima and Rego 2009). Hence, for 
Portuguese trade unions the real goal of the government was to promote flexibility in 
order to satisfy employers (Cerdeira, 2007; Lima and Rego 2009). 
Although Portuguese employers’ associations were also sceptical of the 
flexicurity concept their positions were more nuanced and some of them supported 
the idea of adopting the model. More specifically, the President of the Confederation 
of Portuguese Industry (Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa, CIP), Francisco van 
Zeller, argued that discussing the incorporation of flexicurity was premature for 
Portugal given the different and much more favourable economic and social 
conditions in Denmark and the Netherlands compared to Portugal and a number of 
other EU member states (Lima and Naumann 2007c). Nonetheless, Heitor Salgueiro – 
the Vice-President of CIP – was in favour of flexicurity as he highlighted the benefits 
of a labour market model focusing on employment rather than job security (Lima and 
Rego 2009; Lima and Naummann 2007c; for the difference between employment and 
job security and how Southern European countries promote the latter only, see: Sapir 
2006). The social partner representative who was the most favourable towards 
flexicurity was the President of the Portuguese Trade and Services Confederation 
(Confederação do Comércio e Serviços de Portugal, CCP), José António Silva who 
  
maintained that the implementation of the flexicurity model would be feasible in 
Portugal, although it would constitute a huge challenge (Lima and Naumann 2007c). 
Even though social partners and especially trade unions were already sceptical 
of the notion of flexicurity, the endgame began after the President of the Republic 
declared that he favoured flexicurity as a model for Portugal in a trip to India in 
Janurary 2007 (Cerdeira 2007; Michalaki 2009; Lima and Naumann 2007c). As a 
response to the President's remarks, the trade unions launched a full-blown attack on 
the European Commission’s ‘neo-liberal project’. According to the CGTP-IN, the aim 
of the flexicurity concept was to destroy the European Social Model and European 
workers’ rights. The more representative and rather PS leaning trade union UGT 
(General Union of Workers; in Portuguese: Unión General de Trabajadores; acronym: 
UGT) argued that the EU recommendations regarding flexicurity were driven by 
employers’ demands (Cerdeira 2007: 48). As mentioned above, both unions ridiculed 
the idea of transferring the flexicurity model to Portugal: the CGTP-IN highlighted 
the massive gap between Portuguese and Danish social protection levels, whereas the 
UGT stressed the great differences in qualification attainment between the workforce 
of the two countries (Michalaki 2009: 13-14; Lima and Rego 2009). It should be 
noted that the Portuguese debate was dominated by the social partners, while the 
academic community was divided over whether importing flexicurity was a good idea 
(for a review including a balanced discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of 
applying flexicurity to Portugal, see: Chouco and Brás 2008). Most Portuguese 
academics adopted a critical stance towards the concept and agreed with the view of 
the trade unions (cf. Antunes 2006), while some defended the idea and argued that 
Portugal should experiment with this policy model (Pinto 2008).  
Despite the negative reaction of the social partners, after the Green Paper’s 
publication the government appointed another Expert Committee with the task of 
making concrete proposals for the upcoming labour market reform. The work of the 
Committee was finalised with the publication of the 2007 White Paper on labour 
relations. According to the evidence collected in interviews, it appeared that due to 
the mentioned backlash against the concept of flexicurity, the White Paper completely 
omitted the concept from its analysis and recommendations (interview with: 
Dornelas). Nonetheless, the White Paper adopted very similar recommendations to 
the 2006 Green Paper by suggesting that a combination of internal flexibility and 
security should be implemented in the upcoming labour market reform (Lima, 
2008b). According to Antonio Dornelas who was the coordinator and editor of the 
  
Portuguese Green Paper and one of the key people in authoring the final version of 
the Labour Law in 2008 (see below): 
The White Paper followed an identical approach to the 2006 Green 
Paper. Although the term flexicurity was completely abandoned to avoid 
further confrontation with the social partners, it was certainly a guiding 
principle of the policy suggestions since there was continuity between 
the Green Paper, the White Paper and the final labour market reform law.  
 
The White Paper included numerous proposals tackling all aspects of labour 
law legislation. If one examines the main recommendations of the White Paper the 
conclusion is that it served two goals: (i) undoing of the 2003 labour market reform, 
namely serving the PS electoral agenda;170 (ii) reducing the Portuguese EPL - a goal 
that can be considered as in line with the flexicurity approach. The most controversial 
suggestions were the ones aiming to revise the following (Lima 2008c): 
 the link between labour legislation and collective bargaining: contrary 
to the 2003 Labour Code where the provisions of a collective agreement 
could replace the Labour Code either downwards or upwards,
171
 the 
White Paper suggested that in some sectors collective agreements 
cannot provide for fewer rights than the Labour Code (the trade unions 
asked for an expansion of the ‘no lower’ clause to all sectors and areas, 
while the employers argued that the existing 2003 provision should not 
change); 
 the regulation of fixed-term contracts: the White Paper suggested a 
return to the pre-2003 situation, that is, fixed-term contracts should have 
maximum duration of three years and could be renewed only twice; 
 individual and collective dismissals: in an effort to reduce the EPL, the 
White Paper suggested the facilitation of individual dismissals. The 
unions were against this measure, while employers welcomed it and 
asked for: more flexibility in individual dismissals; the complete 
abolition of compulsory reinstatement for workers found to have been 
unlawfully dismissed (which, in most cases, is allowed by the White 
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 The 2003 reform of the labour code was voted by the Barroso PSD-CDS-PP government and 
included a number of pro-flexibility measures which were vehemently opposed by trade unions and 
independent labour market experts (see below and Zartaloudis 2011a). When the reform was passed 
by the Portuguese parliament, the PS vowed to undo it when elected to office.  
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 According to the Labour Minister of the PSD-CDS-PP government who passed the law in 2003, 
Luis Pais Antunes, this was one of the most significant innovations of the 2003 Labour Code reform. 
Antunes stressed that this was not meant to promote social dumping but help ailing companies to be 
able to adjust their costs in order to save jobs and not hinder competitiveness.   
  
Paper’s recommendations); and relaxing restrictions on collective 
dismissals;  
 working time duration: likewise, in order to reduce the EPL, the White 
Paper favoured the abolition of the statutory rules on the maximum 
working day; the daily working hours would be agreed by collective 
bargaining or management decision (unions disagreed with eliminating 
the limit, while employers agreed); 
 length of force and lapsing of collective agreements: the White Paper 
suggested the partial reinstatement of the ‘sobrevigência’ rule,172 by 
allowing a 18th month extension after the end of term of a collective 
agreement and a maximum 10 year duration of collective agreements if 
not replaced by another one (trade unions were in favour whereas 
employers against as they perceived sobrevigência an impediment to 
labour market flexibility). 
 
The next step of the labour market reform was initiated on the 22nd of April 
2008 when the Labour Minister Vieira da Silva presented the Government’s draft 
Labour Law proposal to all social partners. The draft had the following guiding goals: 
(i) increasing firms’ adaptability; (ii) promoting collective contractual regulation; (iii) 
changing the law on redundancies; (iv) strengthening labour law’s effectiveness; (v) 
combating workers’ segmentation and precariousness; and (vi) promoting the quality 
of employment. Regarding the first goal (firm adaptability) the law included a 
number of measures (Lima 2008d): the increase in time-flexibility and decentralising 
collective bargaining as the new working time rules had to be decided at firm level;
173
 
the removal of the 2003 measure concerning the reduction of the maximum limits of 
working time and the quantitative definition of part-time work - a measure that was in 
accordance with one of the key recommendations of the White Paper;  the reform of 
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 The ‘sobrevigência’ rule meant that collective agreements would apply until they were replaced by 
a new one. However, the rule was abolished in the 2003 labour market reform of the PSD-CDS-PP 
government. As a result, after 2003 collective agreements which were not renewed or denounced by 
one party were becoming redundant. 
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 The new rules were the following: definition of annual ‘working time accounts’ (banco de horas) 
and variable daily and weekly working time limits; ‘concentrated schedules’ (horários concentrados) 
for some days of the week, which would be compensated by an increase in the number of holidays 
when the work demands would be lower; a shift from the traditional form of monetary compensation 
schemes, in favour of compensatory time off; pay reduction in case of absence, or compensation for 
absence by working extra hours; flexible setting of leave and holidays not required by law. All these 
issues would be defined by collective agreements at the firm level. 
  
paternity leave in order to promote reconciliation of work and family life (see also 
Zartaloudis 2011b); and the modernisation and strengthening of vocational training. 
Regarding the second goal (promoting collective contractual regulation), the 
law proposal echoed the White Paper’s recommendations on the relationships 
between labour law and collective agreements and collective agreements and 
individual contracts. More specifically, the draft law proposed some flexibilisation 
and decentralisation of social concertation by enhancing the role of social partners in 
evaluating their representation and stipulating that unions would be allowed to 
delegate their powers to the firm level provided the firm had 50 or more employees. 
Regarding the third goal (modifying redundancies’ law) the draft law followed once 
again the White Paper’s recommendations and focused on altering the legislation and 
penalties on illegal dismissals and the cost of redundancies. On the fourth issue 
(labour law effectiveness), the law proposal suggested new sanctions, improving 
mechanisms for complaints and a public record for labour offences. The law also 
included numerous changes with regard to the fifth goal (reducing labour 
segmentation and precariousness): the redefinition of dependent work to be eligible 
for labour inspection and judicial control aiming to combat fake independent work; 
limitation of fixed-term contracts to three years; the introduction of a novel open-
ended contract allowing part-time employees to enjoy full employment rights; and the 
ban of unpaid extra-curricular training. Finally, the labour law proposal included 
numerous amendments of the social security legislation with a particular focus on 
reducing or exempting social security contributions for some workers. The aim of this 
measure was to provide incentives for more hiring as non-labour costs were quite 
high in Portugal.  
All social partners expressed strong disagreement with most aspects of both the 
White Paper and the subsequent draft Law: employers asked for further time, pay and 
contractual flexibility, whereas employees more security (for an overview, see: Lima 
and Naummann 2007a; for the positions of employers, see: Lima and Naummann 
2007b). The reaction of the trade unions to the White Paper was so negative that it 
was argued that there were hardly any hopes of an agreement between the social 
partners and the government (Lima and Naummann, 2007). In addition, after the 
submission of the draft law to the parliament the largest trade union in Portugal, the 
Communist oriented CGTP-IN organised a major demonstration on the 5
th
 of June 
2008 (Lima 2008f). The mass participation in the demonstration showed that the 
government faced significant scepticism and resistance from workers –especially 
  
those in the public sector. Moreover, since the beginning of the labour market reform 
there had been three major demonstrations (Lima 2008f; Lima 2008e).  
Nonetheless, the government with da Silva persevered and presented a revised 
draft of the law that included a number of changes aiming to satisfy some of the 
concerns of the social partners. The revised draft was negotiated for 20 days between 
the government and the social partners, with the first round of negotiations closing on 
the 4
th
 June 2008.
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 After additional negotiations on the 24
th
 June 2008, da Silva 
submitted his final proposal to the social partners for discussion. Agreement between 
the government and all social partners with the exception of CGTP-IN was reached 
the next day. In other words, the social dialogue process was concluded two years 
after the publication of the Portuguese Green Paper on Labour Relations, or eight 
months after the White Paper’s publication (which itself was published two months 
after da Silva’s initial law proposal); and required more than a month of intense 
negotiations between da Silva and the social partners. 
The agreement was reached through specific concessions by the government 
towards the social partners (Lima 2008g). The concessions made towards the trade 
unions demands were as follows: (i) contrary to the White Paper’s recommendations 
to ease restrictions on firing and individual redundancies,
175
 only some minor changes 
concerning disciplinary procedures were made – an amendment that granted the 
agreement of the UGT; (ii) contrary to the White Paper’s recommendations, the final 
draft of the law removed most provisions for a significant change concerning time-
flexibility related to firm-level collective bargaining; (iii) although the law introduced 
new forms of time-flexibility, the final draft maintained numerous limits;
176
 (iv) the 
final draft of the law (in accordance with the White Paper) altered the 2003 provision, 
which allowed collective agreements to provide lower standards for workers, and 
made minimum legal provisions inapplicable to contracts where collective 
agreements provide more favourable rules only for ‘core’ parts of employment 
relations.
177
 The only concession to employers was that the final draft of the law did 
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 The first round of negotiations started on 7 May and was completed on 4 June 2008. 
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 According to the White Paper on Labour relations somebody could be fired legitimately based on 
‘failure to adapt’.  
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 The new forms of working time adaptability were (Lima 2008g): annual ‘working time accounts’ 
(200 hours); ‘concentrated schedules’ (horários concentrados); and the adaptability at the workplace 
on the grounds of its acceptance by a large majority of workers (75%), covering all workers. The 
limits concerned duration of working time, periods of work, rest periods, night-work, overtime, etc. 
177
 These core areas were (Lima 2008g): rights of privacy, equality and non discrimination; protection 
of maternity and paternity; children at work; workers with reduced capacity for work, including 
workers who are disabled or chronically ill; student workers; employers’ duty of information; limits to 
  
not abolish the basic provisions of the 2003 Labour Code on the duration and 
expiration of collective agreements. Surprisingly, the second draft included a 
completely new provision on extension of collective agreements to individual non-
unionised workers (Lima 2008g). The final text of the law was approved after a long 
(September-November) parliamentarian discussion on the 7
th
 of November 2008 and 
would be effective on the 1
st
 of
 
January 2009. However, after the CGTP-IN’s enquiry 
Portugal’s Constitutional Court necessitated some specific amendments to the law; 
hence, a revised version incorporating the Court’s decision was voted again on 
January 2009 which would become effective on the 17
th
 of February 2009 (Lima 
2009).
178
  
It should be noted that in the Portuguese NRPs, the 2006-2009 labour market 
reform was the key national response in altering existing contractual arrangements. In 
particular, the Portuguese NRP of 2007 did not mention the flexicurity term. 
However, it briefly mentioned that there was an ongoing labour market reform that 
would address the EU 2007 recommendation that Portugal had to inter alia 
modernise employment protection ‘including legislation which guarantees flexibility 
and security, in order to reduce the high levels of segmentation in the labour market’ 
(NRP 2007: 42). By contrast, in the 2008 NRP the flexicurity concept was mentioned 
and acquired a central role in the NRP as Portugal received a specific 
recommendation to reform its labour market legislation ‘in order to reduce the 
significant segmentation of the labour market within the framework of the flexicurity 
approach’ (NRP 2008: 4). Although the term did not have the same prominence in 
the 2009 NRP (used only once when the EU 2007 recommendation was mentioned), 
Portugal, in both 2008 and 2009 NRPs, reported three key initiatives that were in line 
with the EU flexicurity approach: the 2006-2009 labour market reform; revision of 
ALMPs and life-long learning (LLL) measures; and the modernisation of social 
security (minimum income and pensions) (NRP 2008: 13-15; NRP 2009: 99-103).179  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the standard duration of working time; minimum duration of rest times, including holidays; maximum 
duration of night work; guarantee of remuneration and forms of compliance; safety, hygiene and 
health at work; accidents and occupational diseases; transfer of the company or establishment; and 
rights of elected representatives of workers.  
178
 At the end of December 2008, after the Constitutional Court decided unanimously to reject the 
decree law which was voted on November 2008 on the grounds that it violates the right to secure 
employment and the principle of proportionality. Thus, after some amendments (changing the trial 
period for all workers from 180 to 90 days) the parliament on 21 January 2009 voted again the law 
(Lima 2009). 
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 As mentioned above, empirical research will focus only on the area of employment policy as the 
LLL and social security areas go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
  
3.2. Greece: flexicurity? Wrong number!  
Similarly to Portugal, the Greek centre-right New Democracy (ND) government 
welcomed the call from the EU to examine ways of incorporating flexicurity into the 
Greek employment policy. As a result, it established a special Expert Committee in 
March 2007 to examine whether / how flexicurity could be useful for the Greek 
labour market. The Labour Minister (Tsitouridis) asked the Expert Committee to 
‘answer the specific questions included in the Commission’s Green Paper’ 
(Makedonia 2008). The Greek Committee’s mandate was very similar to the one in 
Portugal to produce the Portuguese Green Paper: its work would be based on purely 
scientific evidence and would try to provide a set of policy suggestions that the social 
partners, political parties and the government had to discuss in order to reach an 
agreement on which measures could be implemented or alternatives (Makedonia 
2008). Another similarity between the Greek and Portuguese cases is that the Greek 
press and unions were quite sceptical on how realistic the transfer of the Danish 
model of flexicurity was, as there were very few similarities between Greece and 
Denmark (see: Michalaki 2009: 11).  
Nevertheless, besides these similarities, the Greek case shows a very divergent 
reform path compared to the Portuguese one: (i) contrary to Portugal, the government 
had not initiated a labour market reform process before the Commission’s Green 
Paper; in other words, it was the EU stimulus that initiated the whole process; (ii) 
contrary to Portugal, the Government disregarded the work of the Expert Committee 
and halted the whole process without ever initiating a labour market reform. These 
two observations lead into the thesis enquiry as to how these two initially similar 
Southern European countries (in terms of EPL, labour market structure, employment 
policy, welfare systems and similar levels of non-justiciable misfit between their 
domestic policy and the EES flexicurity model) showed different responses to the 
EES stimulus and a dissimilar reform record of policy change. 
Contrary to Portugal, flexicurity was mentioned in all post-2006 Greek NRPs. 
In the 2007 NRP, flexicurity was included in a separate very brief sub-section (less 
than half a page long) describing Greece’s efforts to promote the ‘adaptability of 
employees and enterprises’ (NRP 2007: 44). Surprisingly, the Greek authors of the 
NAP stated that Greece had an adequate institutional framework concerning flexible 
forms of employment – something that was not consistent with the academic 
literature on Greek labour market rigidities and problems (cf. Monastiriotis and 
Antoniades 2010; Ioannou 2009a and 2009b; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; 
  
Venieris 2006; Papadopoulos 2006). In any case, the flexicurity section did not 
discuss any new measures to be implemented for the promotion of flexicurity. It only 
presented the legislative changes introduced in 2004 and 2005 which promoted some 
flexible forms of employment – especially part time work (NRP 2007: 45; for a 
comprehensive analysis of these labour market reforms, see: Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008: 118-152). In the following section titled ‘Dialogue on the Green 
Paper on Modernising Labour Law’ the Greek 2007 NRP mentioned ‘an extensive 
social and political dialogue’ in order to form the Greek national position on the 2006 
EU Green Paper on labour law. In addition, the 2007 NRP mentioned that Greece 
established a Special Scientific Committee to examine the issues that the 
Commission’s Green Paper raised for member states. According to the 2007 NRP, the 
Commission was given the task of outlining policy recommendations aiming at 
‘expanding the protection to workers in informal forms of employment, defining the 
framework for economically dependent employment and clarifying the grey areas 
between subordinate employment and self-employment, tackling undeclared work and 
facilitating the transition between different employment statuses and unemployment’ 
(NRP 2007: 45). 
In the 2008, NRP flexicurity was mentioned only once but it was claimed that 
Greece was gradually developing a ‘strategic ‘flexicurity’ framework’ with a 
particular emphasis on improving ALMP efficiency, strengthening skills through 
more training provision, reforming Greek social security system (mainly pensions) 
and improving employment protection – especially for those workers with informal 
contracts. However, these measures did not appear to be new measures responding to 
the flexicurity stimuli but pre-existing reform efforts that were not directly related to 
the Commission’s Green Paper on flexicurity. In particular, the policy examples 
given for these objectives in the 2008 NRP were predominantly EU funded 
vocational programmes, the 2006 OAED reform discussed in Chapter 3, measures to 
tackle illegal immigration and a parametric pension reform aiming to simplify the 
existing social security framework (NRP 2008: 53-61; for the pension reform, see 
among others: Carrera et al. 2010; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008).  
Likewise, in the 2009 NRP Greece’s response to the Council’s recommendation 
to promote flexicurity
180
 was to list some EU (CSF and ESF) co-financed vocational 
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 The Council recommendation to Greece stated Greece had ‘in line with an integrated approach 
based on the principle of flexibility with security, to update the legislation on the protection of 
employment, reduce indirect labour costs on low-paid jobs, strengthen active policies in the labour 
market and convert undeclared work in official employment, and finally, to accelerate the 
  
training programmes (NRP 2009: 34). In other words, Greece did not present any 
new initiatives to promote flexicurity besides a renewed social dialogue process and 
the Special Scientific Committee which was set up to provide expert advice on the 
issues that the Commission’s Green Paper on labour relations had put forward. As a 
result, besides a few pre-existing or unrelated measures which were included in the 
2008 NRP in order to appear to have a coherent approach to flexicurity promotion, 
Greece did not report any flexicurity related measures that were promoted after 2007. 
The above record of flexicurity related reforms in Greece and Portugal is 
summarised in table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.2: Summary of flexicurity-related reforms in Greece and Portugal 
 Reform Content Timeline Process 
Greece 
 Efforts to 
incorporate 
flexicurity begin 
but are halted  
 
 No labour market 
reform takes place  
 Greece responds 
immediately to the 
European Commission’s 
call (2007)  
 
 However, the issue is 
‘buried’ 
 The government sets up 
an expert committee 
 The report of the 
Committee is not accepted 
and remains unpublished 
 The issue disappears from 
the agenda 
Portugal 
 Flexicurity is 
discussed as part of 
a wider labour 
market reform 
 
 The reform is 
completed and 
some measures are 
implemented 
 Portugal incorporates the 
concept before the 
Commission’s 
Flexicurity paper (2006) 
 The concept becomes 
part of the wider debate 
and is publicly supported 
by the President of the 
country and the 
Employment Minister 
(2007) 
 Labour market reform 
completed (2009)  
 Flexicurity included as a 
proposal by an already 
established experts 
committee.  
 Flexicurity becomes part 
of a wider debate.  
 The concept is finally 
omitted from the labour 
market reform process 
due to a hostile reaction 
from social partners  
 Reform is completed 
Source: Author’s analysis of the observed reforms 
 
4. Explaining Greek and Portuguese reform records: policy entrepreneurs 
and domestic empowerment? 
To solve the diverging reform paths puzzle, the thesis will focus on relevant 
differences between Greece and Portugal that may explain the divergent policy 
                                                                                                                                                                    
implementation of reforms in the field of education and vocational training, increase the participation 
in life-long learning programmes and facilitate access to the labour market, in particular for the 
young’.   
  
change and reform process. The empirical evidence collected in the thesis fieldwork 
suggested that the puzzle (and the differential impact of flexicurity – see section 5 of 
this chapter) can be explained by: (i) the presence or absence of successful policy 
entrepreneurs who used the EES policy window to promote their agenda; (ii) the lack 
of ESF funding which resulted in its neglect in the Greek case. More specifically, as 
will be argued below, it appeared that in Greece, a group of policy entrepreneurs tried 
to initiate a labour market reform, which would take advantage of the EES policy 
window; however, when this group was dissolved due to political developments the 
flexicurity stimuli were neglected. Since there was no ESF conditionality attached to 
the flexicurity stimuli, Greece neglected flexicurity, so the EES had no impact on 
Greek employment policy. In contrast, in Portugal a coherent group of policy 
entrepreneurs tried to take advantage of the EES window of opportunity, although 
they quickly discarded the term and continued promoting their pre-existing agenda 
when social partners reacted negatively to flexicurity. 
 
4.1. Portugal 
When examining the temporal sequence of Portuguese reforms vis-à-vis the 
EES stimuli it is notable that the EU’s Green Paper on flexicurity was published in 
late 2006, that is, after Portugal had initiated its reform process. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the EU stimuli initiated or caused the labour market reform. As a result, 
flexicurity probably only influenced the final content of the reform process. To 
examine whether this was the case, the thesis will examine the agendas of the 
government and its key actors when the reform was initiated and then compare these 
agendas with the final draft of the law that was agreed with the social partners on 
June 2008 (the final version of the law is not examined because it was amended to 
meet the Constitutional court’s concerns, and therefore, by definition went beyond the 
government’s preferences).  
As mentioned above, the revision of the 2003 Labour Code was one of the key 
commitments of the PS during its 2005 electoral campaign, as it had vowed to revise 
key aspects of the 2003 Labour Code. This PSD-CDS-PP labour market reform had 
caused an outrage on the part of all trade unions and several key legal experts who 
claimed that some of the articles in the 2003 Code went against the European social 
model (for the 2003 labour market reform and the usages of Europe see: Zartaloudis 
2011a). Hence, the Labour Code Expert Committee that produced the Portuguese 
Green Paper was set up before the European Commission’s Green Paper on 
  
flexicurity, and its mandate originated from an entirely domestic agenda: it appeared 
that the main goal of the Portuguese Expert Committee who authored the Green Paper 
was to provide a theoretical and technocratic framework for discussion which would 
materialize the PS promise of undoing the 2003 reform (interview with: Dornelas). 
The fieldwork suggested that this was also the case for the White Paper and the two 
draft laws that Silva presented to social partners (interviews with: Dornelas and 
Silva). As discussed in Section 3, the fact that some of this undoing did not happen, 
should be attributed to the strong opposition of employers’ associations who fiercely 
opposed such proposals. Consequently, the government had to compromise in order 
to achieve a tripartite agreement.  
However, empirical evidence collected in interviews, suggested that the 
government had - besides the undoing of the 2003 reform - another goal of equal 
importance which was never communicated publicly to avoid the fierce opposition of 
the unions: the reduction of Portugal’s OECD EPL score (interviews with: Dornelas 
and Silva). Reducing the EPL score meant that Portugal would stop being classified 
as the country with the highest EPL score in the OECD.
181
 Of note, Portugal has been 
utilised in academic research as an extreme case of EPL that contrasts with the USA, 
in order to examine whether EPL has an impact on employment (Blanchard and 
Portugal 2000). Although Portugal had this negative classification for the last two 
decades, reducing EPL became a pressing issue only since the early 2000s when 
Portugal started to experience rising unemployment levels. This development was 
quite unprecedented in Portugal’s recent history: as discussed in Chapters 1, 4 and 6 
Portugal was one of the few EU countries with very low unemployment levels 
combined with high employment for both men and women.  
The most plausible reason behind this trend appears to be the 2004 EU 
enlargement which weakened Portugal’s comparative advantage within the EU, 
which can be summarised as the provision of a cheap alternative for (foreign) 
companies which could enjoy access to the EU’s single market (EIU 1997: 12-13). 
More specifically, Portugal’s labour market has been characterised by: (i) low labour 
costs as, despite the strong wage growth since Portugal joined the EU in 1986, this 
was reduced during the 1990s and as a result Portugal still has some of the lowest 
wages in EU-15; (ii) limited bargaining power for most private sector workers as 
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 OECD’s classification is not unanimously accepted as the Portuguese EPL score is found to be 
lower if one takes into account other aspects of labour market policies or if an alternative to the 
OECD’s methodology is used (see: Cerdeira 2007: 41-47). 
  
unions are not particularly strong; (iii) weak job security due to the proliferation of 
the informal economy; and (iv) high rates of self-employment (EIU 1997: 12-13). 
According to the OECD, hourly manufacturing costs in Portugal stand at just 20% of 
German levels and 40% of Spanish levels (EIU 1998: 10). Low wages meant that 
Portugal was able to retain its export capacity, making up for lack of technological 
advance with low labour costs, thus keeping exports at a competitive price (EIU 
1996: 19). The 2004 EU enlargement, however, meant that foreign companies could 
find an even cheaper destination which would also offer closer proximity to the EU 
core, that is, the CEECs. Hence, since the late 1990s foreign direct investment slowed 
down, as many companies in Portugal relocated to the CEECs or other countries on 
the EU periphery (EIU 1999: 15) resulting in decreasing  economic activity and 
unemployment reaching unprecedented levels (up to 8% in 2006).
182
 The research 
findings of the thesis suggested that this unfortunate development for Portugal was an 
issue of concern for policy makers. According to Dornelas:  
Portugal’s economic model is dead. The main characteristics of this 
model were cheap labour and production costs within the EU. When the 
former Communist countries joined the EU, Portugal could no longer 
offer this benefit to foreign companies and investors. Thus, during the 
last decade Portugal has been in a very dire economic situation as it has 
faced recession and stagnation. [...] It is telling that when we had low 
growth it was considered to be good news as since 2002 there have been 
many years with negative growth. If we compare that with our golden 
decade after EU accession, it becomes evident how bad our situation has 
been since the early 2000s.  
 
It should be noted that during the 2000s all Portuguese governments have tried 
to reform the country’s labour market in order to make it more attractive for foreign 
companies. The 2003 reform meant a significant change in favour of flexibility, 
which nonetheless, did not alter the Portuguese EPL score and ranking. Hence, the 
research of the thesis suggested that the PS government tried to make sure that the 
upcoming reform would definitely reduce the country’s EPL in order to stop being 
labelled as the one with the highest EPL in the world. As Dornelas (inter alia (see 
Appendix I): Special Advisor to the Labour Ministry during 2005-10; President of the 
Committee for the Green Paper of Labour Relations) put it: 
A huge amount of effort when making our proposals - especially when 
drafting the labour law - was devoted to having a perfect match between 
the OECD criteria for the EPL measurement and our reform. The efforts, 
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 Portugal’s experience demonstrates that the discussions at EU level for a ‘Competitiveness Pact’ 
(see: BBC 2011), which would tackle inter alia labour costs is flawed and cannot provide an adequate 
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especially when writing the law, was immense as we wanted to fully 
meet the OECD criteria for a low EPL score. The target was very 
specific: we had to stop having one of the highest EPL scores in the 
OECD and the law had to provide a fairer evaluation of our labour 
market situation. And I believe that we succeeded in achieving this as 
Portugal’s EPL score was dramatically reduced after our reform (2008).  
 
When flexicurity officially appeared in the EU’s Green Paper, and member 
states were asked to examine how they can incorporate the concept in their labour 
markets, Portugal had initiated a labour market reform which aimed to provide further 
security to employees as well as promoting flexibility. As analysed above, although 
both goals were in line with the flexicurity approach they were not the result of an 
EES effect: (i) promoting security originated from a purely domestic goal of the PS to 
undo some of the 2003 reforms promoting flexibility; (ii) promoting flexibility was 
related to the domestic agenda of Portuguese governments since the 2000s to reduce 
the country’s EPL score and avoid the negative OECD evaluations and therefore 
attract foreign investment and companies.  
As discussed in section 2, flexicurity also necessitated a generous welfare state 
support to workers and the unemployed, which Portugal both lacked and would be 
unable to provide in the foreseeable future. As this goal was not included in the PS 
agenda this aspect of flexicurity was not mentioned in the domestic debates in 
Portugal. As mentioned in Section 3, the main official document mentioning 
flexicurity that was released in the entire period was the Portuguese Green Paper. It 
included the concept in its final chapter as an issue ‘that is discussed in European 
fora’ (Dornelas 2006: 185). Although Portugal’s Green Paper concluded that 
flexicurity would be positive for Portugal (Dornelas 2006: 195), the concept was not 
a central theme of the Committee and it did not constitute a specific policy goal or 
recommendation for Portuguese policy makers and social partners. The findings from 
the thesis fieldwork suggested that this explains the lack of reaction by the social 
partners to the concept after the publication of the Green Paper. Unsurprisingly, when 
the trade unions perceived that the country was thinking seriously about adopting a 
flexicurity approach in its labour market reform (especially after both the Labour 
minister and the President of the Republic warmly supported the concept) they 
reacted very negatively to the idea. Their argument that ‘applying flexicurity would 
necessitate another welfare regime’ was valid to some extent – although there were 
some measures that Portugal could have implemented in any case. The government 
quickly discarded the term to avoid a derailment of its reform process.  
  
 
4.2. Greece 
This section will examine the Greek reform process and try to gauge whether 
there were any differences between Greece and Portugal that can explain the 
divergent reform paths. It will argue that according to the fieldwork it appeared that 
the major difference between Greece and Portugal that can best explain the divergent 
reform record was: (i) the presence or absence of successful policy entrepreneurs who 
used the EES policy window to promote their agenda; (ii) the lack of ESF funding 
which resulted in its neglect in the Greek case. More specifically, as will be shown 
below the empirical evidence suggested that in Greece there was no pre-EES group of 
policy entrepreneurs with a pro-labour market reform agenda. As a result, the EU call 
to member states to examine ways of incorporating flexicurity initiated the Greek 
reform process and drove the incumbent ND government to set up a special Expert 
Committee to examine the issue. Another difference between Greece and Portugal 
was that the Greek Expert Committee faced significant opposition from within the 
government (interviews with: Tsitouridis and Ioannou). According to the research 
findings, it appeared that the key figures of the government - including the Prime 
Minister at the time K. Karamanlis - were indifferent or hostile to the idea of 
flexicurity. For instance, the centre-right Newspaper ‘The Kathimerini’ mentioned 
that the Premier was a key supporter of the ‘Irish’ model of low taxation, low welfare 
and high flexibility (Michalaki 2009: 11). Moreover, both Karamanlis and the 
Minister of Economy (Alogoskoufis) during 2006 supported the Irish model against 
Papandreou’s Swedish model183 - a viewpoint that was maintained in 2008 
(Michalaki 2009: 12).  
Another major difference between Greece and Portugal was that the members 
of the Expert Committee were long standing PASOK members, that is, from the 
opposition party. The head of the Committee - Professor Koukiadis - was a PASOK 
Member of European Parliament (MEP) during 1999-2004 with a very active 
involvement in ‘Social Europe’ issues. In particular, besides being the member of 
various Euro-parliamentarian committees - including that of Employment and Social 
Affairs - Prof. Koukiadis devoted a large part of his MEP activities (questions, 
reports, opinions, and speeches) on social (including employment) policy issues.
184
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His active participation and contribution to various social initiatives at the EU level as 
an MEP, was not coincidental. After studying Law in Greece, France and Germany, 
Koukiadis became a Labour Law professor at the Aristotelian University in 1976. 
Until 1999, when he became an MEP, Koukiadis devoted his academic career to 
labour law and labour relations by publishing more than 60 books and articles and 47 
legal opinions on labour law disputes. At least two of his books were exclusively 
devoted to European Issues and on Social Europe in particular.
185
  
In parallel to his academic career, Koukiadis was Minister of Employment 
during the Ecumenical Government of the Prime Minister X. Zolotas (1990). 
Moreover, Koukiadis was deeply involved in employment policy-making as he was 
President of the Committees, which prepared two very important Greek labour market 
laws: (i) the law for the new framework of collective bargaining of 1990 (Law 
1876/1990) which, was agreed with key social partners (GSEE, SEV, GSEVEE and 
ESEE);
186
 (ii) the law for the creation of the Greek Economic and Social Committee 
(Οικονομική και Κοινωνική Επιτροπή / ΟΚΕ) (Law 2232/1994).187 The 1876/1990 
law established - for the first time in Greece - the following: free collective 
bargaining; a framework for decentralised bargaining; and the abolition of 
compulsory arbitration. Likewise, for the first time in Greek industrial relations this 
law introduced two new levels of social bargaining: the sectoral level and the 
enterprise level. Subsequently, the traditional, professionally based representation 
became obsolete (Tsarouhas 2008: 353). The success of this law was immense: from 
the early 1990s onwards the legal framework established by the Law 1876/1990 
multiplied the incentives for mutually agreed pacts, which are signed either annually 
or bi-annually, so these higher levels of concertation came to dominate Greek social 
bargaining (Tsarouhas 2008: 353; Zambarloukou 2006).  
Another important change that this law brought about was the establishment of 
a fundamentally novel institution for Greek industrial relations, the Organisation of 
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Mediation and Arbitration (O.ME.D). OMED became essential in promoting free 
social dialogue as ‘its main purpose is to help the Social Partners under negotiation 
to conclude on a solution through mediation when the negotiations cannot lead to an 
acceptable solution by both Parties. [...] When the mediation process does not lead to 
a desirable effect, the next step of regulation is the process of arbitration.’188 It 
should be noted that since the introduction of Law 1876/1990, arbitration was never 
used, as social partners were always able to achieve compromise (Tsarouhas 2008; 
Zambarloukou 2006) - a development that may arguably have made Greek industrial 
relations more consensual.
189
  
As mentioned above, Koukiadis was also heavily involved in creating another 
novel institution of Greek industrial relations by Presiding the Parliamentary 
committee of the law for the creation of the OKE (Law 2232/1994). OKE became a 
key institution of the Greek social concertation system as ‘it must be consulted over 
industrial relations legislation and can also issue opinions of its own initiative on 
general issues of economic and social policy’ (Tsarouhas 2008:  353). The OKE is 
widely considered a prime example of Europeanization of Greece as: it replicated an 
EU organisation (Economic and Social Committee); its financing was based on EU 
funds; and it aimed at promoting consensual social dialogue (Ioakeimidis 2001; 
Sotiropoulos 2004; Tsarouhas 2008). The introduction of the OMED and the ΟΚΕ 
constituted a transformation of the Greek employment policy arena and contributed 
significantly to the normalisation of Greek industrial relations. Consequently, 
Koukiadis’ previous experience as a researcher; academic; labour minister; 
lawmaker; and MEP provided an immaculate background for the head of a 
Committee that would have to offer scientific advice and policy recommendations for 
social partners and political parties. 
Koukiadis chose seven people as members of his group.
190
 Two of them were 
prominent colleagues in the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki and Professors in 
labour law; collective agreements; social dialogue and social security. One member 
(Stergiou) had been recently appointed as President of the Law Committee for the 
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2011 pension reform in Greece, which took place in the framework of the Troika-
Greece Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The other members of the group 
were four OMED Arbitrators. Three of them were Law Professors (Leventis, 
Lixouriotis and Papadimitriou). The fourth was the economist
191
 Christos A. Ioannou 
who had been involved in numerous posts in Greek employment policy and was also 
a key advisor of a previous PASOK labour minister - Professor Giannitsis (see 
Appendix I and Chapter 3). Thus, the Greek Expert Committee on flexicurity had two 
key characteristics: (i) it was composed of people with high legal and economic 
expertise who also held key posts in Greek and EU policy making; (ii) most of them 
were also policy or law makers, evaluators and were involved in the application of 
labour law (especially the OMED arbitrators); (iii) most of them were already 
colleagues and thus constituted a relatively homogenous and cohesive group of 
people. As will be argued below, these characteristics were important in the formation 
of a group of policy entrepreneurs that would try to promote a labour market reform 
in accordance to some of the EU’s flexicurity principles.  
 owever, the selection of Koukiadis as the Committee’s chairman was rather 
uncommon for Greek politics as it was highly unusual for a ND Minister (Tsitouridis) 
to select as head of the Experts Committee a member from the main opposition party 
who would then select other centre-left experts. This rather peculiar deviation from 
the traditional party-based appointments can be explained by the background and the 
policy preferences of Tsitouridis with regard to social and employment policy: (i) he 
was a lawyer who was taught by Koukiadis as he studied law in the Aristotelian 
University where Koukiadis is a Professor; (ii) he had acquired a very long EU 
experience as a Commission technocrat as he worked for the European Commission 
in Brussels from 1981 to 1990 and 1995 to 1996 working in the arenas of agriculture; 
competition; state subsidies; and the internal market;
192
 (iii) evidence collected in a 
semi-structured interview with Tsitouridis suggested that, as a result of his EU 
experience, he had a very favourable view of the European Social Model and the 
European Commission’s efforts to promote a common policy on labour markets 
(interview with: Tsitouridis). Thus, it appeared that he was eager to embrace the new 
mantra of the Commission (flexicurity). In accordance with the literature on the EU 
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social and employment policy, which perceives the centre-right as being sceptical 
towards EU social (including employment) policy (see: Rhodes 2005; Gwiazda 2011; 
Graziano et al. 2011; Linos 2007; Featherstone et al 2012), Tsitouridis distanced 
himself and his party from the market-led scepticism against Social Europe. In his 
own words: 
Both as government and party, the ND was much more supportive of the 
European Social Model than other countries and other centre-right 
parties. During my term in the Ministry, Greece was always in favour of 
the European Social Model. In many cases, the Greek centre-right 
government was in coalition with other countries with centre-left 
governments. [...] I think the most important and telling example of our 
stance as both party and government was the Bolkenstein directive. 
Greece belonged to the countries that made an effort to radically trim 
down some of the extreme clauses of the directive that would lead 
mathematically to social dumping.  
 
The above statement sheds light on the rather uncommon selection of 
Koukiadis as the Head of the Expert Committee on flexicurity: Tsitouridis selected a 
very experienced expert with a long pedigree of reforms who also had similar views 
with regard to Social Europe. However, it appeared that the selection of Koukiadis 
was also a matter of political expediency on behalf of the minister in order to 
safeguard the success of his reform efforts against domestic opposition. In his own 
words: 
I decided to appoint Professor Koukiadis as head of the flexicurity 
Commission for two main reasons. On the one hand, very few people 
could doubt his all-round knowledge on labour issues and the Greek 
labour market and his long EU-experience. On the other hand, in 
retrospect, perhaps the most important factor was that I strongly believed 
that in order to be successful in implementing a significant labour market 
reform we should try to achieve consensus. Consensus can be reached 
only through synthesis of different viewpoints. This is how it happens in 
all European countries and the EU itself. And what could be better than 
having a centre-right government working with Social-democrats in 
order to reach a set of common principles and recommendations that the 
government could introduce to the social dialogue for the social partners 
to negotiate? [...] It was my firm belief that only through co-operation 
could we succeed.
193
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The fieldwork suggested that Tsitouridis and Koukiadis - as well as the 
members of the flexicurity committee - constituted a group of policy entrepreneurs 
with similar backgrounds, beliefs and a unified agenda: (i) all of them had studied 
abroad; (ii) most of them had a long experience with the EU and its policies; (iii) 
some of them were employment policy and labour market experts with practical 
experience; and (iv) key people of the group had a personal involvement in Greek 
policy making. Additionally, as described above, Tsitouridis, Koukiadis and Ioannou 
were known to be keen supporters of Social Europe and the Europeanization of 
Greece with regard to its employment policy. It appeared that for these policy 
entrepreneurs the EES call on flexicurity was a window of opportunity to promote 
their agenda (interview with: Ioannou). As Koukiadis had succeeded in doing this in 
the 1990s, the flexicurity Committee was another window of opportunity for him and 
his colleagues to transform Greek employment policy.  
However, Tsitouridis and the Koukiadis committee were rather isolated in their 
ambitious endeavour, as the clan-style political competition in Greece could not 
accept such a coalition. Both factions in the group of policy entrepreneurs were 
accused of ‘selling out’ to the ‘opponent’. On the one hand, Tsitouridis was criticised 
by his own party for choosing a prominent PASOK member to chair the Committee 
and that most members of the Committee were either PASOK affiliated or leftists. As 
Tsitouridis recalls: 
The reaction against my decision regarding the flexicurity committee 
was definitely hostile. The main criticism did not come from the 
opposition but from my own party. I vividly remember that all fellow 
ministers, MPs and various party members criticised the membership of 
the Committee. Their criticism had two parts: the first was that it wasn’t 
possible for a government to ‘do its job’ and promote a labour market 
reform by employing people from the opposition; the second was that 
ND party members or friends were neglected in this process. As I said, I 
was very adamant in the face of this criticism and I responded by saying 
they were insignificant. My answer was: why not have people outside the 
ruling party offering you scientific advice? And wasn’t it easier to 
achieve consensus? Who could criticise the government for being neo-
liberal or one sided when its key advisor was Professor Koukiadis?  
 
In parallel, Koukiadis and his team members were also accused as PASOK 
traitors who went to the opposite camp. Ironically, it was they who were criticised as 
neo-liberals. As Ioannou recalls: 
It was definitely a difficult period […] there was scepticism regarding 
the government’s motives for the upcoming labour market reform. I 
believe that this was the main reason why the pressure fell on us – what 
would the Expert Committee recommend? However, the strongest 
  
accusation was against the concept of flexicurity. Various academics and 
the trade unions described flexicurity as a neo-liberal concept of 
‘flexibilisation in disguise’. Consequently, the committee’s results and in 
some cases its members were accused as neo-liberals who wanted to 
bring down the existing labour market protection system.  
 
Paradoxically, although trade unions seemed to be hostile to the concept of 
flexicurity and the government’s efforts to initiate a labour market reform – especially 
after an unpopular parametric pension reform (cf. Featherstone and Papadimitriou 
2008; Carrera et al. 2010; Sotiropoulos 2011), Greek social partners never expressed 
their views on the concept as they did not address the issue directly in their position 
statements (Kwiatkiewicz 2011: 8). Trade union hostility to the concept of flexicurity 
was demonstrated in 2007 when the biggest umbrella trade union GSEE twice 
withdrew from the social dialogue on flexicurity in fear that even participation in a 
debate on flexicurity would imply acceptance of the term (Kwiatkiewicz 2011: 13; 
Michalaki 2009: 12). Moreover, social partners never reached any consensus on what 
Greece’s response should be on the EES flexicurity concept as their positions 
diverged remarkably (Kwiatkiewicz 2011: 13; Kapsalis 2009). More specifically, 
Greek trade unions - similarly to their Portuguese counterparts - perceived flexicurity 
as synonymous with flexibility and as serving the interests of employers. They argued 
that flexibility should be reduced and the provision of security for workers and the 
unemployed increased (Kwiatkiewicz 2011). Even though they did not publish an 
official position statement on flexicurity, the trade unions in other official documents 
argued that flexicurity was an example of the EU’s insistence ‘on a model of 
production according to which labour is taken to be a cost’ (Kapsalis 2009). In other 
words, the Greek trade unions appeared to assume a clear Euro-sceptic stance by 
rejecting not only the EES flexicurity stimuli but questioning the motives and goals of 
the EU in relation to workers. In addition, they perceived the EU policy 
recommendations of lifelong learning and activation as a rolling over of labour costs 
‘from enterprises to society as a whole’ making flexicurity synonymous with 
flexibility and they therefore ‘demonised’ the concept (Kapsalis 2009). Moreover, 
they argued that expanding the definition of dependence to include part-time workers, 
who despite being employed in a company are formally declared as self-employed in 
order to save their employers from making social security contributions, to be a 
fundamental pre-requisite for any debate on flexicurity.  
By contrast, employers were either indifferent to or against flexicurity. More 
specifically, the SEV never discussed flexicurity in detail. In response to the trade 
  
unions’ harsh critique of ‘EU policies’ SEV argued in for more flexibility, less 
bureaucracy and fewer administrative hurdles for businesses, as well as more time 
flexibility in the labour market. In other words, SEV took a rather similar stance to 
the Portuguese employers who favoured flexibility instead of flexicurity (see above). 
Although ESEE agreed that flexicurity should be discussed, it aligned itself with 
SEV’s position to focus on reducing the bureaucratic burdens that companies face as 
well as the non-labour costs of workers. Surprisingly, one of the employers’ 
associations - GSEVEE - joined the trade unions in criticising the EU and its policies 
by arguing that ‘in the case of Greece, the broader flexibility laid down during the last 
15 years has had an insignificant or adverse impact on the employment front’ 
(Kapsalis 2009). However, hostility between employers and employees was very high 
throughout the period and both parties launched attacks on each other and the 
government. As a result of this fragmented and hostile dialogue between social 
partners, the OKE decided that instead of attempting to make a synthesis of social 
partners’ views, it would simply outline their two divergent positions on modernising 
labour law along the European Commission’s line of argumentation (Predosanu and 
Pirciog 2008: 3). Further, not only did the government have to face the trade unions’ 
hostile reception of flexicurity, but also deal with PASOK – the main opposition 
party in Greece at the time. PASOK was another opponent of the flexicurity concept 
and a strong supporter of the unions. According to Mrs Maria Damanaki, a PASOK 
MP and Head of the PASOK group in the Select Committees on Social Affairs, 
Education and Culture, and Environment in the Greek parliament,194 ‘the Green Paper 
and the flexicurity issues it brings up are an extension of new-liberal policies on 
employment’ and the responsibility for this issue was entirely up to the ND 
government (OBES 2007: 1). 
The above hostility to flexicurity and the outright rejection of the EU 
recommendations as neo-liberal as well as the demand for more security, seems to 
confirm the characterisation of the Greek trade unions as actors who represent 
predominantly insiders and neglect the interests of outsiders of the Greek labour 
market (Matsaganis 2007; Zartaloudis 2011c). In particular, Greek social partnership 
is significantly distorted by both statism and clientelism which have marginalised any 
autonomous political organisation of the disadvantaged classes or societal groups 
(Diamandouros 1983; Haralambis, 1989). Firstly, trade unions have been highly 
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subordinated to party politics, while the pressure from civil society and other societal 
actors to promote redistribution based on need and not on political access has been 
extremely weak (Marinakou 1998: 241). Secondly, in Greece there is a stark division 
between the protected core of the labour market and the rest, that is temporary, 
irregular, informal employees and the unemployed (Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003: 
33-34). Thirdly, Greek trade unions represent mainly the public sector workforce 
(60% - a number that rises to 90% in Public Companies and Organisations (known as 
DEKO)). Only 18% of the private sector is represented, a figure equivalent to 3% of 
the total Greek workforce. Further, data for 2003 reveal that only 7% of the total 
population of wage earners is represented by the Greek trade unions (European 
Commission 2006: 24; Ioannou 2009: 15). Likewise, the Greek employers’ federation 
represents mainly big corporations (including wider sector public companies) and 
under-represents smaller companies (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008: 48). 
Consequently, Greek social partnership fails to represent large segments of Greek 
society; additionally, the young, the unemployed, women, the disabled and 
immigrants are not represented in the Greek social dialogue process (Matsaganis 
2007).  
This has led to a vicious circle of inefficient public policy which neglects large 
parts of Greek society, mainly those in most need of the strongest support and 
protection from social partnership. Moreover, Greek social dialogue has been 
dominated by issues of remuneration (e.g. pay and pensions) which usually favour 
insiders and public sector workers. More specifically, since the 1980s successive 
governments proceeded to award substantial salary increases which were above the 
inflation rate for (wider) public sector employees (Venieris 2006). This policy, 
however, had a negative effect on unemployment, which became an acute problem, 
and was especially pronounced among the young and women (Katrougalos and 
Lazaridis 2003: 59). In addition, all aspects of the public sector’s employment 
relations are regulated through state decrees and legislation which generally set more 
favourable working conditions than in the private sector (cf. Papapetrou 2006; 
Zartaloudis 2011). Hence, public sector personnel expenditures (including pensions), 
continue to constitute the principal item in the ordinary budget, despite a temporary 
slowdown in the mid-1990s (Papapetrou 2006: 451; OECD 2002). Further, other 
issues, such as social protection and gender equality, have been traditionally 
neglected in the social dialogue process (see also Chapter 5). Unsurprisingly, Greek 
social partners largely rejected the flexicurity model which meant a significant shake 
  
up of the balance between insiders and outsiders by lowering some protection of the 
insiders and giving more protection to the outsiders. This stance confirms 
explanations about lack of labour market reforms where social partners are divided, 
rent-seekers and do not represent society as a whole but act as special interests 
(Matsaganis 2007; Zartaloudis 2011c; Ioannou 2009a; Featherstone 2005; Pagoulatos, 
2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004; Venieris 2006).   
Despite the fact that opposition to flexicurity took place in both countries, the 
Greek case differed substantially in the conduct of the government in addressing the 
flexicurity issue. Indeed, the concept was hardly referred to by the Greek government 
in its public policy discourse (Kapsalis 2009). As a result, there was no meaningful 
public debate of the concept and its implications for Greece (Karantinos 2006: 2). 
Tellingly, although there was widespread opposition from trade unions and PASOK, 
it was the loss of governmental support that sealed the Committee’s fate. On the 28th 
of April 2007 Tsitouridis was forced to resign from his position as Labour Minister. 
Tsitouridis was the most significant member of the group in terms of power and 
access to resources. The research findings from the thesis fieldwork suggested that his 
resignation significantly weakened the group of policy entrepreneurs as the 
Committee was no longer supported by the central government. This became evident 
as soon as the Committee was ready to publish its results around 2009. The minister 
at the time was an old party member Mrs Fani Pall Petralia. It appeared that Petralia 
was appointed by the Premier Karamanlis as a person of confidence who would not 
cause further trouble for the government with the press and the unions (interviews 
with: Koutsiaras and Ioannou). Indeed, Petralia seemed extremely reluctant to 
proceed with any wide-ranging reforms that would cause additional problems to the 
government in a period when its public opinion ratings were very low due to the 
December 2008 unrest. More importantly, Petralia paid little attention to Koukiadis 
and his committee as she never met them publicly or privately (interviews with: 
Ioannou).  
Thus, it seemed that the Koukiadis team would be another Expert Committee 
whose work would be lost in the maze of the clientelistic political system, as the 
government would not take into account its results and recommendations (the area of 
social security, and especially pensions, constitute a prime example of such 
governmental behaviour; see Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008: 77-117; 
Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009: 15-17).  owever, Petralia’s behaviour towards 
the Koukiadis Committee went far beyond neglect as the government launched a full-
  
blown attack against it: (i) in an unprecedented fashion, the Ministry of Employment 
did not allow the Committee to publish its report which led Koukiadis to publish the 
report unofficially on his blog and also on various websites, such as scribd.com; (ii) 
the most controversial and union provoking measures of the report namely the ones 
suggesting more flexibility for the insiders, were leaked in the press resulting in 
extensive negative press for the Koukiadis Committee and their report (Monastiriotis 
and Antoniades 2009: 15); (iii) numerous government officials made demeaning 
statements on the Committee and its proposals; (iv) Petralia herself claimed that she 
had not read the report - even though it was submitted officially to the Labour 
Ministry (Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009: 15). Petralia’s stance and press 
statements were significantly different from the ones of Tsitouridis and Magginas 
who in 2006 and 2007 respectively had supported flexicurity, consensus-building and 
an extensive social dialogue process (Michalaki 2009: 12). 
Hence, in Greece the same government that initiated the process of examining 
how flexicurity could be imported into domestic policy, was the one which not only 
stopped the reform abruptly, but also ridiculed the whole process. According to an 
infuriated and frustrated Koukiadis - who was the main person to defend his 
Committee publicly - this was a political decision of the Minister Petralia. In his own 
words:
195
  
When the Committee was established in March 2007, by the then 
Minister for Employment, the Minister (SZ: Tsitouridis) gave his full 
assurance to the committee to work on the basis of the questions posed 
by the Commission’s Green Paper and to give the widest publicity to its 
findings and its proposals. Thus, our Committee was not set up to 
prepare or implement any governmental agenda as it was deliberately 
leaked to the press.  
 
[...] The Labour Minister’s (SZ: Petralia) statements created the 
impression that she wants to distance herself from the report’s findings. 
[...] My opinion is that the Minister was not ready to proceed in 
improving labour market legislation and was possibly frightened by the 
cost of financing.  
 
[...] The first big confusion which was created when we published our 
report was its identification with the Gargana’s report (Bank of Greece). 
This confusion and other false statements unfortunately created a wrong 
perception among the trade union movement. [...] Our report is not a 
report for further flexibilisation of labour relations and deregulation of 
the labour market, but a report suggesting minimising the insecurity and 
the inequalities that the existing labour relations create. We very stoutly 
stress in our report that in Greece the labour relations are not only 
flexible enough - something that applies only to the private sector which 
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 Interview at the Newspaper ‘Makedonia’ (Makedonia 2008).  
  
was the main focus of our study - but that with the existing provisions 
Greek employees enjoy the fewest social rights and least protection in 
the EU-15. Even worse, in our country there is a very big percentage of 
undeclared employment which constitutes the ultimate form of flexibility 
because in these cases employees cannot enjoy any of the rights that the 
labour law offers to workers. Thus, our report aims for the improvement 
of the status and position of workers.  
 
[...] From press reports it can be concluded that we suggest the abolition 
of the limits on firing. This is completely false and I cannot give any 
explanation for this misunderstanding. The fact that for the first time in 
Greek labour relations we suggest the limitation of unjustified firings (we 
suggest making firing impossible without a specific reason which would 
be independently justified as is the practice in many progressive 
legislations) is completely disregarded. [...] Regarding collective 
redundancies, there is another distortion of our report. Indeed, neither do 
we suggest raising the limit of collective redundancies, which is today 
2%, nor the liberalisation of firing.  
 
Indeed, Koukiadis’ report offered a holistic reform agenda aiming to tackle 
some of the long-standing problems of Greek employment policy. In a nutshell, the 
report offered the following main recommendations:
196
 
1. Extension of all labour law rights to the self-employed; 
2. Creation of an unemployment fund for the self-employed and 
abolishment of different categories of unemployment subsidies (e.g. in 
Greece if one becomes unemployed for a second time he/she gets less 
financial support than the first time he/she registered as unemployed); 
3. Electronic registration of all workers regardless of their category of 
employment (to tackle undeclared labour); 
4. Strengthening of the labour inspectorate and modification of its time-
schedule and powers for initiating inquiries; 
5. Drastic overhaul of the unemployment benefit: one benefit for all; other 
forms of employment could be allowed if the income was below the 
poverty line. From less than 50% of the minimum wage, the benefit 
should reach 70%. Pensioners could register as unemployed; 
6. Reduction of the EPL score and expansion of safety net: more 
flexibility for insiders combined with more income security for 
outsiders; 
7. Labour law codification and pre-court dispute resolution mechanisms; 
8. Recognition and acceptance of flexible forms of employment; 
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 Codified policy suggestions from: the actual report (Koukiadis 2007); Ioannou (2009b); and from 
Imerisia 2008.  
  
9. Reduction of non-wage labour costs; 
10. Improvement of ALMPs; and, 
11. Phase-in reforms: e.g. transforming severance pay legislation into a 
system of individual accounts (as in Austria). 
 
However, Petralia, and thus the government, completely neglected all these 
recommendations. In addition, Petralia did whatever she could to present the 
Koukiadis Committee as a group of neoliberals that the government could not 
possibly agree with. Contrary to the Portuguese case, where the government faced 
significant opposition but persevered, the Greek government did not even try to 
initiate a public debate on flexicurity; rather, it dismissed the Expert Committee as 
neo-liberals and tried to boost its social profile. In other words, in a Machiavellian 
fashion, the Minister Petralia created an artificial adversary (setting Koukiadis as a 
straw-man) who was supposedly aiming to reduce the existing levels of Greek social 
protection, whereas the ministry was aiming for social peace and was in favour of 
workers’ rights. It is telling that during March 2009, when the financial crisis was 
reaching Greece and Petralia, who was aiming for a short-term electoral benefit, 
claimed in numerous press statements that ‘Greece does not need more flexibility’ 
(Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009: 12) - something that goes against the entire 
literature on the Greek labour market and relations (for a brief summary, see: 
Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009: 1-7). The plan succeeded: the Labour Minister 
did not cause any further political problems for the embattled government. The price 
for that victory was that there was no actual discussion and no effort to improve the 
dysfunctional Greek labour market -something that almost all governments have been 
trying to do since the 1990s (see: Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008: 118-152). 
Above all, it is argued that the highest price was paid by all Greek labour market 
outsiders (part-timers, people working in the unofficial economy, young people, 
women and the unemployed) as the Koukiadis Committee introduced a number of 
proposals aiming to strengthen the social rights of the labour market outsiders.   
 
5. Evaluating the influence of the EES flexicurity stimuli on Greek and 
Portuguese policy   
The research findings of the thesis discussed above signify that the domestic 
impact of the EES was low in both countries. In the following two sections the 
  
evaluation of the influence of the EES flexicurity stimuli in Greece and Portugal will 
be presented.  
 
5.1. Portugal: flexicurity as a smokescreen?  
In the Portuguese 2005-08 reform the thesis findings suggested that the EES 
flexicurity stimuli did not initiate the labour market reform. Although flexicurity was 
incorporated in the Portuguese Green Paper and gained some salience in public 
debates, it quickly disappeared from the reform process. It appears that most of the 
policy changes originated from the government’s pre-election agenda and the desire 
to alter the Portuguese EPL score. The final policy change was achieved through 
lengthy negotiations and compromises between the government and the social 
partners and at the final stage by the Constitutional court. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence collected in interviews suggested that the EES flexicurity stimuli had a 
twofold impact on the 2005-08 labour market reform. First, they provided a tactical 
advantage for the government to distance itself from the OECD and the traditional 
pro-flexibility position (which was supported by the previous government and the 
employers). This may explain why flexicurity was included in the Green Paper even 
though there was no actual push at the EU level. Second, flexicurity appeared to have 
a low impact in the actual reform with regard to the promotion of internal flexibility. 
This apparent impact was confirmed by a key trade-unionist from UGT who 
participated in the negotiations as well as Minister Silva. The trade unionist said:  
What flexicurity brought in the debate was the issue of flexibility 
combined with security. However, we took a slightly different stance 
from the European Commission. We argued that we should promote only 
internal flexibility within the firm, that is, time flexibility. This would not 
only help businesses and workers, but also contribute to the 
reconciliation of work and family as parents would be able to make use 
of more flexible working arrangements.  
 
The influence of the EES flexicurity stimuli, as well as the other explanations, 
was confirmed by Silva when asked about the main causes of the 2005-2008 reform: 
Our 2005-2008 labour market reform was shaped by three agendas. First, 
we wanted to revise the 2003 Labour Code as we had committed to 
during the election period. In our opinion, the 2003 reform went beyond 
our country’s welfare model. The second reason was that we had decided 
that Portugal should not be the OECD country with the highest EPL 
score. And the last -but I would say not least- was the reform of internal 
flexibility. This aspect was clearly shaped by the flexicurity approach 
and we had a very fruitful discussion with the social partners who 
brought their ideas on how to implement this policy.  
 
  
In summary, flexicurity appeared to have a low impact on the Portuguese labour 
market reform since the latter was determined mainly by an internal agenda. 
Following the Europeanization typology of domestic change and the policy stages 
model (see Chapter 1), the EES effect in the Portuguese flexicurity case was 
absorption in the policy formulation and decision making stages, while inertia 
characterised the rest of the stages. More specifically, during the 2006-2009 reform, 
Portugal’s group of policy entrepreneurs headed by Labour Minister Silva tried to use 
the term to promote their agenda and gather some support from the social partners as 
this was an EU policy recommendation that was going against the traditional OECD 
criticism of Portugal. Thus, the EES appeared to have produced a first order change 
or absorption as Portugal’s policy entrepreneurs seemed to have adapted a few 
elements of their proposals and choice of solutions to achieve labour market reform 
without altering the core of their pre-existing agenda. Likewise, the EES flexicurity 
stimuli produced a first order change or absorption in the Decision-making stage, as 
the internal flexibility suggested by the EES flexicurity stimuli was promoted by the 
government but its terms were co-defined with the social partners - UGT especially.  
However, no change was observed in the other policy stages of PEP. First, the 
evidence obtained from interviews suggested that the 2006-2009 reform occurred 
predominantly for two reasons and therefore that the Portuguese policy entrepreneurs 
did not alter their Agenda-setting. The two reasons given were: (i) to reverse the 
PSD-CDS-PP 2003 reform; and (ii) to reduce the country’s EPL score to avoid the 
negative OECD assessment. Second, the Policy Implementation and Evaluation 
stages appeared to be unaffected by the EES since Portugal’s policy entrepreneurs 
discarded the EES flexicurity term following the negative reaction of the trade unions 
to the concept. Moreover, according to the interviews, it seemed that the PS policy 
entrepreneurs did not use the EES flexicurity stimuli to monitor the results of the 
2006-2009 reform process.  Rather, the main criteria chosen by the policy 
entrepreneurs to evaluate the labour market reform were the OECD’s EPL score and 
whether the PS’s electoral promise to reverse the PSD-CDS-PP 2003 reform was 
kept.  
 
5.2.  Greece: domestic empowerment nipped in the bud  
As discussed in Section 4.2., in Greece a short lived group of policy 
entrepreneurs tried to examine ways of incorporating flexicurity into the Greek labour 
market. Although they suggested innovative solutions to tackle key social and 
  
employment policy problems in accordance with the concept of flexicurity, their 
suggestions remained on paper – and essentially unpublished. Thus, the EES had a 
moderate impact on the agenda-setting and policy-formulation stages (upgrading) but 
no impact on the other stages (inertia). As discussed above, the Koukiadis Committee 
offered a multi-dimensional policy prescription which tried to adapt existing 
processes, policies and institutions to the EES flexicurity stimuli without changing 
their essential features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them. 
In addition, the Koukiadis Committee appeared not to suggest flexicurity as the new 
paradigm for PEP. However, the Koukiadis Committee’s problem recognition and 
policy proposals were neglected by the Greek government. Therefore, inertia 
characterised the other policy stages of GEP, in that the EES flexicurity stimuli had 
no influence on these stages due to ‘the resistance of domestic institutions, policies, 
beliefs to adapting to the European requirements’. The summary of the findings 
related to the impact of the EES flexicurity stimuli is presented in the table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3: Summary of EES impact - Flexicurity 
Policy stages Greece Portugal 
 
Agenda-setting  
(problem recognition) 
 
Upgrading Inertia 
 
Policy-formulation  
(proposal of solution) 
 
Upgrading Absorption 
 
Decision-making 
(choice of solution) 
 
Inertia Absorption 
 
Policy-implementation  
(putting solution into effect) 
 
Inertia Inertia 
 
Policy-evaluation  
(monitoring results) 
 
Inertia Inertia 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES impact on GEP and PEP with regard to flexicurity 
promotion 
 
Conclusions 
After 2006 the concept of ‘flexicurity’ became the new EES mantra. As a result, 
member states were asked to examine ways of incorporating flexicurity into their 
labour markets. Although the EES flexicurity stimuli were weaker compared to the 
  
activation and gender equality stimuli and the misfit between the EU and domestic 
levels was very high, in both countries domestic entrepreneurs tried to exploit the 
window of opportunity given by the EES. However, this occurred in a rather 
divergent fashion due to: (i) the presence of successful
197
 policy entrepreneurs in 
Portugal who used the EES policy window to promote their agenda, and their absence 
in Greece; (ii) the lack of ESF funding in Greece which may have otherwise provided 
another mechanism for the promotion and implementation of flexicurity domestically. 
According to the research findings of the thesis the EES impact was relatively weak – 
although in Greece it had a significant impact in two of the five policy stages. In 
addition, it appeared that in Portugal the EU was not the only external influence as the 
OECD’s negative assessment of the Portuguese labour market had a significant 
influence on the observed policy change. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 1, successful policy entrepreneurs are those with access to power and 
resources.  
  
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will first briefly review the main elements of the thesis (puzzle 
and research design). Second, I will discuss the thesis findings and then the thesis’ 
contribution to the field of study. Finally, I will outline the research limitations and 
suggest avenues for future research.  
 
1. Thesis puzzle and research design  
This thesis has tried to examine the conditions under which the EES can promote 
the Europeanization
198
 of member states’ employment policy. It attempted to answer 
this question by examining critical or ‘least likely’ cases -Greece and Portugal- using 
Mill’s method of difference ( anck  2009). These two countries showed a puzzling 
reform record: both of them implemented path-breaking reforms in their employment 
policy which, despite their numerous similarities (outlined in chapter 1), occurred in 
a divergent manner with regard to their timing and degree of change. The thesis 
puzzle was validated by the empirical evidence. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Greece and Portugal are similar based on a number of 
key features: they have similar levels of economic development (as measured in 
GDP and PPP) and demographic composition; they have very similar social policies 
and belong to the same grouping in all welfare system typologies (cf. Leibfried 1993; 
Ferrera 1996; Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003).199 Both countries share several 
characteristics inhibiting the Europeanization of their employment policies that make 
them unlikely to show any EES-induced domestic change. Their employment 
policies had a very high gap with the EES’ content.200 Moreover, Greece and 
Portugal have been ascribed as two countries with a negligent compliance culture 
with regard to the implementation of EU social directives (Falkner 2005; Hartlapp 
and Leiber 2010). In addition, both countries have several barriers to EU policy 
implementation: weak administrations and inefficient political systems; a significant 
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 As discussed in depth in Chapters 5 and 6, Greece and Portugal differ considerably in their female 
employment rates as Portugal has considerably higher employment rates.  
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 Börzel (Börzel 2005; Börzel and Risse 2003) has described how high levels of ‘misfit’ lead to 
inertia. 
  
gap between legislation and actual practice; and weak or no societal actors to 
pressure national authorities to comply with EU policies (Hartlapp and Leiber 2010).  
Yet, in the 1990s, they both broke with their reform trajectories and 
implemented a series of path-breaking employment policy reforms: activation of 
their Public Employment Service through the application of a preventative and 
personalised approach towards the unemployed; GM in employment policy; 
reconciliation of work and family life; and flexicurity. Despite their numerous 
similarities, however, these reforms occurred in a divergent manner with regard to 
their content, timing, process and significance.  
I argued that the EES is composed of two kinds of stimuli (see Chapters 1 and 
2): (i) soft law instruments (EES guidelines, country specific recommendations and 
benchmarks); (ii) financial conditionality (funding from the ESF). The ESF provides 
funding in accordance with the Structural Funds’ Regulations which since 2000 have 
been aligned with the EES soft law. Thus, the ESF operates as the EES’ financial 
tool, since member states are obliged to comply with the ESF regulations to receive 
funding. This conceptualisation of OMC diverts from most of the literature which 
has neglected the role of the ESF as an EES stimulus (cf. Hodson and Maher 2001; 
Regent 2003; de la Porte 2002; for a review, see: Trubek and Trubek 2005; Kröger 
2009b; Borrás and Radaelli 2010). The inclusion of the ESF in the EES stimuli added 
another Europeanization pathway (ESF conditionality) which enriched the possible 
ways that the EES can influence member states.  
I examined three different policy cases (the activation of the unemployed by the 
PES, gender equality (mainstreaming, reconciliation and pay gaps) and ‘flexicurity’. 
As argued in Chapter 1, the EES stimuli were not constant and differed along policy 
areas and periods. To assess the differences of the EES stimuli in the examined areas 
the thesis employed the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000) which has three 
dimensions: obligation; precision and delegation. In addition, the EES stimuli were 
categorised according to their ‘visibility’ as in areas of low legalisation visibility may 
matter in how the EES is perceived by member states. In addition, the EES stimuli 
differed across the examined policy in terms of the availability of ESF funding. The 
thesis assumed that the EES will have greater impact in areas where the EES stimuli 
have higher precision, visibility and where ESF funding is available. In other words, 
it was expected that the domestic impact of the EES would be the highest in the 
activation area, moderate in the gender equality area and the lowest in the flexicurity 
area. Further, by comparing cases with different EES stimuli, it attempted to draw 
  
wider conclusions concerning their efficiency in promoting Europeanization. The 
main characteristics of the EES stimuli in the three examined policy areas are 
summarised in the following table.  
 
Table 8.1: EES stimuli in Activation, Gender Equality Policies and Flexicurity 
 Obligation Precision Delegation Visibility ESF funds 
Activation Low High Low High 
Yes 
(post-2001) 
Gender 
Equality 
Policies 
Low Moderate Low 
High (97-
03) 
Medium  
(03-05) 
Low (05-10 
Yes 
(post-2001) 
Flexicurity Low Low Low High No 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES stimuli 
 
After the critical discussion of the mechanisms found in the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) and the Europeanization literatures in Chapter 2, I proposed 
three distinct but not mutually exclusive Europeanization pathways:   
i. Policy Learning: the observed policy change would be linked to a 
learning process in which national policy makers changed their 
preferences with regard to their country’s employment policy content. To 
empirically verify this pathway, the EES-induced reforms would have to 
oppose pre-EES government ideology, positions and policy makers’ 
preferences; 
ii. Domestic Empowerment: the observed policy change would be linked to 
a change in opportunity structures. To empirically verify this pathway the 
research would have to identify successful
201
 policy entrepreneurs (see 
Kingdon 1984) who would take advantage of the EES policy window to 
promote their own pre-existing agenda. The EES’ causal significance in 
this case would be twofold: opening a window of opportunity and 
determining the content of the reform as policy makers would go beyond 
their own pre-existing agenda. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, successful policy entrepreneurs are those with political access and 
resources (Zahariadis 2007).  
  
iii. Financial Conditionality: the observed policy change would be linked to 
identifiable ESF regulations.  
 
Hence, the hypothesis of the thesis was that ‘if the EES altered Greek and 
Portuguese employment policy at all, it did so through one of three main 
Europeanization pathways: (i) policy learning; (ii) the domestic empowerment of 
policy entrepreneurs; (iii) financial conditionality.’ 
In testing the hypothesis of the thesis and the different pathways that 
Europeanization may occur, the empirical inquiry did not presume an 
Europeanization effect. On the contrary, it followed a bottom-up approach (see: 
Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009), and examined whether alternative variables could 
explain the puzzle. As analysed in chapter 2, the main alternative explanations were 
other international influences (namely the UN Beijing Action for Women and the 
OECD Jobs Strategy) and/or purely domestic explanations, such as existing (pre-
EES) preferences and non-governmental actors (trade unions, NGOs, activists) 
demanding governmental action. This was achieved by employing the method of 
process tracing: the examination of the temporal sequences, rationale and goals of 
domestic reforms and the juxtaposition of national developments with the EES and 
other external stimuli. Besides process tracing, empirical evidence was also collected 
from: interviews with key informants including policy makers, experts, bureaucrats 
and trade unionists; primary and secondary documentary evidence (for the thesis 
methodology and sources, see chapter 1).  
The dependent variable in this study was the Greek and Portuguese employment 
policies. These were defined according to the traditional ‘stages heuristic’ policy 
cycle model (Breyer and de Leon 1983; Anderson 1984). This model was chosen to 
analytically separate the key parts of public policy in order to best explore each 
policy stage. If domestic policy was treated as a black box, the EES effects may have 
been over-estimated or under-estimated. Similarly, crucial factors operating within 
the policy making environment may have been omitted. Further, to measure the EES 
effect on domestic policy, I employed the Europeanization typology of EU-induced 
change (Radaelli 2003: 37; Börzel 2005: 58-59): inertia (no change); absorption 
(minimal change); accommodation (moderate change); transformation (maximum 
change); and retrenchment (further distancing from the EES stimuli).  
 
  
2. Thesis findings  
The empirical evidence supported the hypothesis of the thesis stating that the 
EES altered Greek and Portuguese employment policy. In addition, the evidence 
suggested that the divergent reform records could be explained by the different 
Europeanization pathways. Moreover, the findings suggested that two key conditions 
were conducive to the EES having a domestic impact: the existence of successful 
policy entrepreneurs who would actively use the EES as a policy window to promote 
their agenda and - when these were absent or lacked access - the existence of ESF 
financial conditionality. In the following three sub-sections, the thesis findings will 
be presented by country, by policy area and then linked with the wider literature.  
 
2.1. Country findings  
Greece and Portugal responded to the EES stimuli very differently (for a 
summary, see: Table 8.2). The fieldwork revealed that, besides a small group of 
policy entrepreneurs in the flexicurity area (see below), Greek ministerial elites 
regarded the EES goals and notions as too alien for the Greek context. Subsequently, 
in Greece the EES was largely neglected because policy makers perceived it as a 
mere bureaucratic burden in the form of NAP/NRP writing. Greece’s actual 
participation in the EES and the possibility of downloading or using the EES in the 
domestic arena seemed to be absent from the governmental and ministerial agenda. 
Even this administrative pressure appeared to have little discernible impact on Greek 
employment policy: Greece did not establish a centralised bureau dedicated to the 
EES; the NAP-authoring was outsourced to external experts who lacked any 
institutionalised support from the ministry until 2004; the required upgrading of the 
Ministry’s monitoring capabilities was intensified only afterwards and the interviews 
suggested that this was not an EES-induced change but occurred for internal reasons 
(see Chapter 3).  
Nonetheless, the fieldwork suggested that the EES had a significant impact on 
Greek employment policy as a result of the ESF conditionality. This EES stimulus 
obliged successive Greek governments to comply with the EES goals as inscribed in 
the ESF regulations. It appeared that all EES-induced policy change happened only 
after 2001, namely when the ESF conditionality for the 2000-2006 programming 
period was introduced. Until then, all the EES notions, goals, reports, country 
specific recommendations and benchmarks did not produce any discernible impact 
on Greek employment policy – despite being included in numerous official 
  
documents. In the flexicurity area there was no policy change and this was the only 
policy area where the ESF conditionality was not present. Although a group of policy 
entrepreneurs tried to initiate a labour market reform by using the EES policy 
window, this group lost access and resources due to political developments. 
Subsequently, the flexicurity concept was abandoned. Therefore, the empirical 
evidence suggested that the EES altered Greek employment policy through the 
financial conditionality of the ESF regulations (the 3
rd
 Europeanization pathway). 
This research did not support the significance of the other Europeanization pathways 
as domestic change was not linked to policy learning or domestic empowerment of 
Greek policy makers. This finding was consistent across all Greek case studies 
(chapters 3, 5 and 7). 
By contrast, it appeared that in Portugal the launch of the EES constituted a key 
development and was paramount for the promotion of the governmental agenda of 
the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS). During 1997-2002 and 2005-2010 the EES was 
not seen as just a bureaucratic obligation; rather, it was presented as a key part of the 
government’s employment policy. Accordingly, the NAPs/NRPs were presented as 
national reports in major press conferences where the government was announcing 
its policy objectives and evaluating its performance. The fieldwork suggested that 
meeting soft law and benchmarks was deemed critical in Portugal as ministerial 
elites were pushing the entire administration to alter procedures and policy in 
accordance with the EES. To increase efficiency, the PS government re-organised 
two departments within the Labour Ministry which would be specifically responsible 
for upgrading monitoring, planning and oversight capabilities in employment policy 
in 1997-8. Overall, the EES soft law had a significant impact on Portugal in the areas 
studied, though not in the area of flexicurity. The interviews indicated that this 
happened because successful policy entrepreneurs within the PS party used the EES 
policy window to empower themselves and promote their own pre-existing agenda 
(2
nd
 Europeanization pathway). Empirical evidence did not support the significance 
of the other Europeanization pathways as domestic change was not linked to policy 
learning or ESF conditionality. This finding was consistent across all Portuguese 
case studies (chapters 4, 6 and 7). 
The interviewees in this study reported that the main group of policy 
entrepreneurs in Portugal consisted of a close-knit group of former academics who 
entered Portuguese politics in the mid-1990s. They gained key positions in the 
Ministry of Labour’s ministerial elite (ministers, deputy-ministers, special advisors 
  
and heads of key ministerial departments) in all PS governments during 1995-2002 
and 2005-2010. These policy entrepreneurs had a wider agenda of reforming 
Portuguese social (including employment) policy in order to enhance Portugal’s 
welfare state (see: Chapter 4; Zartaloudis 2011a; Silva 2009). The interviews 
revealed that these entrepreneurs used the EES PES and flexicurity soft stimuli to 
promote their agenda as they empowered them against domestic opposition (internal 
party opposition; bureaucrats within the state apparatus opposing change; and 
parliamentary opposition). In the gender equality case, it was a smaller group of 
high-level feminist bureaucrats who were advisors to the PS Labour Ministers who 
exploited the EES equal opportunity soft stimuli to promote their agenda.  
In other words, the EES constituted a policy window which allowed Portugal’s 
policy entrepreneurs to ‘couple’ (see: Zahariadis 2007) existing problems (PES 
inefficiency; mismanagement of ESF funds; clientelistic practices; gender inequality; 
high Portuguese Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) score) with the politics 
stream (party ideology) and use their access and resources (obtained through their 
power as key ministerial elites) to promote their pre-existing agenda Additionally, 
the interviews suggested that the EES enriched their agenda as the EES-induced 
reforms went beyond their pre-existing agenda. However, empirical evidence did not 
indicate that this occurred due to ‘policy learning’. Rather, it appeared that this 
occurred due to an instrumental necessity: in order to implement their pre-existing 
agenda, Portuguese policy entrepreneurs had to adopt the EES goals. For instance, in 
order to make Portugal’s employment policy more inclusive, tackle the PES 
inefficiency and the mismanagement of ESF funds, the Portuguese policy 
entrepreneurs embraced the preventative approach of the EES. Likewise, when they 
wanted to revise the 2003 labour market reform and further reduce the Portuguese 
EPL score they argued that their reform was in favour of the flexicurity concept 
proposed by the EU Commission. In the gender equality area, despite the high levels 
of female employment, the feminist advisors to the Labour minister who constituted 
part of the PS ministerial elite exploited the EES policy window and promoted their 
own pro-equality agenda by adapting it to the EES stimuli.  
By contrast, as shown in Chapters 3, 5, and 7, the Greek ministerial elites 
involved in Greece’s employment policy did not have the same perspective as their 
Portuguese counterparts. According to a wide range of interviewees (ministerial 
elites, academic and policy experts, advisors in the Labour ministry and trade 
unionists), the Greek Labour Ministry’s policy makers prioritised budgetary and 
  
remuneration issues (e.g. income policy and pension reform) and reforming labour 
market legislation over the content of Greek employment policy (see especially 
Chapter 3; also: Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). Consequently, as the 
empirical evidence in each of the empirical chapters on Greece documented, an 
overhaul of the country’s employment policy was never part of the governmental 
agenda nor did it constitute a priority of the Greek ministerial elites. Thus, the 
opportunity for ‘coupling’ (Zahariadis: 2007) provided by the EES policy window 
was never used, as Greek ministerial elites did not find the EU developments in 
social and employment policy useful for their agenda. This finding is in line with one 
of the key assumptions of the multiple streams framework which states that policy 
makers can consider only a small number of issues while in office (Zahariadis 2007: 
68).  The only exception to this finding was the short-lived alliance between the 
Labour Minister and the Experts’ Committee in the flexicurity case. Even though 
these ministerial elites tried to exploit the EES policy window, the resignation of the 
most powerful member of the group (the Labour Minister who appointed the 
Experts’ Committee) meant that the remaining policy entrepreneurs were left without 
political access and resources to exploit the EES policy window.  
In sum, the empirical evidence suggested that there were two conditions which 
were conducive to the EES having a domestic impact: (i) the existence of successful 
policy entrepreneurs who would actively use the EES as a policy window to promote 
their agenda and -in the case of their absence; (ii) the availability of ESF 
conditionality to comply with the EES stimuli. The Greek and Portuguese response 
to the EES stimuli is summarised in the following table.  
 
Table 8.2: Summary of the Greek and Portuguese response to the EES 
Greece 
 Generally neglected: seen as a bureaucratic burden  
 Domestic change linked to identifiable ESF regulations (ESF 
conditionality) 
 A short-lived group of policy entrepreneurs tried to exploit the 
EES policy window in the flexicurity area but was unsuccessful 
due to loss of access and resources 
Portugal  
 Successful PS policy entrepreneurs took advantage of the EES 
policy window to promote their own agenda 
 Domestic change linked with the EES soft law which 
empowered domestic policy entrepreneurs (Domestic 
Empowerment) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES-induced observed reforms 
  
 
Although the thesis did not test systematically for the role of mediating factors 
outside the ‘policy hub’, that is, where decisions were taken (Radaelli 2003), the 
findings of this study seem to be in partial agreement with two of the three main 
hypotheses in the literature on the role of mediating factors (see: Borrás and Radaelli 
2010: 30-37). Government preferences (cf. Gwiazda 2011; Büchs 2008; Linos 2007; 
  ritier et al. 2001) appeared to be relevant only in Portugal. The ‘selective 
amplifier’ hypothesis (Visser 2005; Vanhercke 2009), where policy entrepreneurs use 
the EES window of opportunity to promote issues in accordance to existing domestic 
agendas, was relevant in all Portuguese cases and the Greek flexicurity one. 
Moreover, the thesis findings did not seem to provide support for the ‘consensus’ 
hypothesis, which claims that the more consensus over policy content the less the 
impact of the OMC (Mailand 2008): (i) despite the consensus of Greek policy makers 
to neglect the EES and focus on income policy, the EES obliged Greek policy makers 
to comply with the EES via its ESF conditionality; (ii) the very low consensus among 
different actors in the Greek and Portuguese flexicurity and equal pay cases made the 
EES effect weaker than in the other policy areas – something that goes against the 
hypothesis that the OMC impact is reduced when consensus is high.  
Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Europeanization literature has 
identified a plethora of additional mediating factors that may affect the domestic 
impact of the EU stimuli. The mediating factors most commonly used in the 
Europeanization literature are: veto points, facilitating formal institutions, norm 
entrepreneurs and political culture. More specifically, veto points existed in all the 
examined case studies of Greek and Portuguese employment policy. These included 
the PES personnel who resisted the EES-induced reforms, as well as the social 
partners who were unwilling to accept reforms promoting gender equality and 
flexicurity. However, the evidence from the case studies suggested that 
Europeanization outcomes were not significantly affected by the existence or the 
power of veto points, and occurred as a result of the existence of a group of policy 
entrepreneurs who exploited the EES policy window (Portugal) and the ESF 
conditionality (Greece). In particular, the PES in both countries was reformed 
significantly despite the negative reaction of the personnel and unions to the EES 
stimuli. Similarly with the gender equality policies, in both countries social partners 
and key ministerial elites both seemed indifferent (in the GM and reconciliation 
areas) or hostile (in the GPG reduction area) to the incorporation of the EES gender 
  
equality stimuli. Nonetheless, the evidence in all policy areas in both countries 
strongly suggested that the key factor in determining the observed Europeanization 
outcomes was the existence or absence of policy entrepreneurs or the ESF 
conditionality: GM and reconciliation of work and family life was promoted in 
Greece through the ESF funded programmes and in Portugal via the femocrats who 
used the EES policy window to promote their agenda. The only exception to this rule 
was the Portuguese GPG case which appeared to be significantly affected by the 
indifference and/or hostility of social partners who perceived GPG promotion as 
detrimental to Portugal’s comparative advantage. In the Greek case, it appeared that 
change occurred only in the presence of ESF conditionality (e.g. ESF-funded 
programmes). Finally, in both flexicurity cases most social partners appeared to be 
vehemently opposed to the incorporation of the EES flexicurity stimuli. Nonetheless, 
whenever a group of policy entrepreneurs was present and wishing to employ the 
EES policy window to promote its agenda (e.g. reverse the 2003 PSD-CDS-PP labour 
market reform and reduce the EPL score in Portugal; the Koukiadis Committee under 
Tsitouridis in Greece) flexicurity was promoted. In addition, in Portugal, the UGT 
contributed to the 2009 reform by suggesting its own agenda with regard to 
flexicurity. In other words, although social partners acted as veto points their 
behaviour was more nuanced and the Europeanization outcomes were not 
significantly affected by them. Finally, the presence of facilitating formal institutions 
seemed to be relevant mostly in the gender equality area as a number of new 
organisations were created to promote GM and reconciliation in both countries. 
However, in the PES and flexicurity cases their presence/absence could not explain 
the observed Europeanization outcomes. Additionally, norm entrepreneurs did not 
appear to be a factor in the observed EES-induced change in both countries. 
 
2.2.  Policy specific findings  
As mentioned above, the three policy areas examined were activation of public 
employment services (PES); gender equality policies; and ‘flexicurity’. The first 
policy specific finding was that the differences between the EES stimuli only 
partially explained the EES effect on these areas (for a summary of the EES effect on 
the thesis cases studies, see: Tables 8.3a and 8.3b). In fact, it appeared that domestic 
change was linked with either the existence of a group of successful policy 
entrepreneurs or the presence of ESF conditionality. In other words, it was the 
different mediating factors that determined the EES effect rather than the 
  
characteristics of the EES stimuli. More specifically, although the EES soft stimuli in 
the PES area had higher degree of legalization and visibility than in the gender 
equality policies area, the EES induced policy change did not appear to be 
determined by these characteristics but by the country-specific Europeanization 
pathway. For instance, both countries reformed their PES but in Portugal this was 
promoted through the domestic empowerment pathway, while in Greece ESF 
conditionality was required to bring about the policy change. This finding was 
further validated through the temporal sequences of the examined reforms: Portugal 
responded immediately to the EES guideline of 1998, while Greece responded only 
to the ESF conditionality which was enforced in 2001. Similarly, although both 
countries expanded significantly their care facilities in order to promote 
reconciliation of work and private life the reform process was different in each 
country: as shown in Chapter 6, Portugal started almost immediately after the 
relevant EES guideline and used only national resources while Greece responded 
only after 2001 and used mainly ESF funding.  
Further, the decreasing visibility of the EES gender equality stimuli cannot 
explain the Greek and Portuguese reform record in this area. In Portugal EES-
induced change was associated with the existence (Socialist governments of 1997-
2002 and 2005-2011) or absence (PSD-CDS-PP government of 2002-2005) of policy 
entrepreneurs (see Chapter 6). By contrast, in Greece it was the post-2001 ESF 
conditionality that seemed to determine the EES-induced change as domestic change 
did not appear to be linked to the EES soft stimuli. In the flexicurity area, where the 
EES stimuli had the lowest degree of legalization and no ESF funding, Portugal’s 
policy entrepreneurs employed the concept in their domestic reform; in Greece, 
which had neglected the EES soft stimuli in the other two policy areas, a group of 
policy entrepreneurs actively sought to suggest measures that would introduce the 
flexicurity model in Greece.  
The second policy specific finding of this research was that the EES had a 
stronger impact on domestic policy via domestic empowerment than the ESF 
conditionality pathway. In the former case, the EES affected more policy stages and 
to a greater extent. Thus, in Portugal, the EES effect was greater than in Greece in all 
policy areas examined (see Tables 8.3a and 8.3b). This finding suggests that 
‘ownership’ is much more powerful than ‘compliance’ in promoting 
Europeanization. However, this should not undermine the value of the ESF 
  
conditionality in promoting domestic change as the latter proved very effective in 
promoting Europeanization when national policy makers neglected the EES stimuli.  
The third policy specific finding is that the EES-induced change did not result 
from the non-justiciable misfit between EU and national policy content. Despite 
similar levels of misfit in the PES and flexicurity cases in both countries (Chapters 3, 
4 and 7), the EES-induced effect was dissimilar in Greece and Portugal (see tables 
8.3a and 8.3b). In addition, despite Greece having a much higher misfit than Portugal 
with regard to female employment levels, they both showed a similar reform record 
(Chapters 5 and 6). Moreover, it appeared that the EES had a greater effect on 
Portuguese employment policy with regard to gender equality promotion. Further, 
the empirical evidence suggested that Europeanization occurred in the absence of a 
justiciable misfit as demonstrated in four out of the six cases examined. 
Consequently, misfits appeared to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
Europeanization (see also the relevant discussion in Chapter 2). 
 The thesis research also suggested that in the Portuguese GM and flexicurity 
cases the EES was not the only external stimulus affecting domestic policy. As 
shown in Chapter 6, despite the pre-existing pro-gender equality agenda of the 
incumbent party, GM was introduced as a policy goal only in 1997 as a response to 
the UN Beijing Platform for action. However, the EES immediately overshadowed 
the UN stimulus as concrete policy measures were only introduced two years later, in 
response to the GM EES guideline. In the case of flexicurity, the very negative 
OECD EPL score for Portugal had an impact on Portuguese domestic reforms. By 
contrast, no other external stimuli were observed as influencing domestic reforms in 
any of the Greek cases. In other words, the empirical evidence suggested that in the 
Greek cases the ESF conditionality constituted the sole external stimulus inducing 
policy change.  
As argued in Chapter 1, to evaluate the impact of the EES on Greek and 
Portuguese employment policies, this thesis employed the traditional ‘stages 
heuristic’ policy cycle model (Breyer and de Leon 1983; Anderson 1984) which 
divides public policy into five concrete stages (agenda-setting; policy formulation; 
decision making; policy implementation and evaluation). For the thesis’ empirical 
case studies the evaluation criteria of EES-induced change were defined through a 
combination of the Europeanization outcomes typology and  all’s typology of 
policy change. The following tables summarise the EES effect in all cases examined 
in the thesis.  
  
 
Table 8.3a: Summary of EES impact 
(Public Employment Service and Flexicurity) 
Policy stages GR-PES PT-PES GR-FLEX PT-FLEX 
 
Agenda-setting 
(problem 
recognition) 
 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Upgrading 
(second order 
change) 
Upgrading 
(second 
order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
 
Policy 
formulation 
(proposal of 
solution) 
 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Upgrading 
(second order 
change) 
Upgrading 
(second 
order 
change) 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
 
Decision-making 
(choice of solution) 
 
Upgrading 
(second 
order 
change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
 
Policy 
implementation 
(putting solution 
into effect) 
 
Upgrading 
(second 
order 
change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Policy-evaluation 
(monitoring 
results) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES impact on GEP and PEP 
 
 
  
Table 8.3b: Summary of EES impact 
(Gender Equality Policies) 
Policy stages 
PT 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
GR 
Gender 
Mainstreaming 
PT 
Reconciliation 
GR 
Reconciliation 
PT 
Pay Gaps 
GR 
Pay Gaps 
Agenda-setting 
(problem recognition) 
 
Absorption (first 
order change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Policy Formulation 
(proposal of solution) 
 
Absorption (first 
order change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Decision-making 
(choice of solution) 
 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Absorption (first 
order change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Upgrading 
(second order 
change) 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Absorption 
(first order 
change) 
Policy 
Implementation 
(putting solution into 
effect) 
 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Absorption (first 
order change) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Upgrading 
(second order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Policy Evaluation 
(monitoring results) 
Transformation 
(third order 
change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Absorption (first 
order change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Inertia 
(no change) 
Source: Author’s analysis of the EES impact on GEP and PEP 
  
2.3. Discussion of findings 
The research findings engage this study with the wider academic literature in a 
multi-faceted fashion. The findings of this thesis concur to a great extent with the 
findings from the few other studies (Silva 2009; Sotiropoulos 2004b; Karamessini 
2006) dealing with the policy areas examined in this thesis. For Silva (2009), the 
EES affected the PES reforms due to both strategic and ideational effects; for 
Karamessini the changes observed in the Greek mainstreaming case were linked to 
Greece’s response to the EES soft law. Although this thesis agreed with 
Sotiropoulos’ analysis on the importance of ESF funds in the Greek PES reform it 
argued that Greek policy makers did not use the ESF funds but were obliged to do so 
due to the ESF conditionality; in other words, it complements Sotiropoulos’ analysis 
by adding the novel ESF conditionality pathway. Additionally, the thesis findings for 
Greece corroborate those of other studies demonstrating the power of the ESF funds 
to promote domestic change in Greece – even if it was purely instrumental and 
without any long-term effects. For instance, Koutroukis and Kretsos found that 
Greek social partners had developed ‘a pseudo-partnership, that is to say a social 
dialogue model without a simultaneous development of an authentic social dialogue 
culture, [...] which is EU-oriented and adapted to the preconditions of EU funding.’ 
(2008: 84)  
Further, it appeared that in both countries it was the ministerial elites who 
defined policy making and therefore policy change. Although Portugal has a semi-
presidential political system, it appeared that in employment policy Portuguese 
Presidents rarely intervene. Indeed, in almost all cases of this thesis the Portuguese 
President was not relevant. The only exception to this rule was the flexicurity debate 
where the President’s endorsement of the new EU term provoked an immediate 
reaction from the country’s trade unions. However, as was shown in Chapter 7, none 
of the empirical evidence indicated that the Portuguese President had any discernible 
impact on the country’s employment policy content and making and potential 
Europeanization process. The importance of ministerial elites decreased only in the 
policy implementation stage, as social partners either tried to or succeeded in 
blocking EES-induced change. This leads to the verification of a long-standing 
criticism against the OMC – the one of being an elitist process contrary to the initial 
expectations of a more open and participatory mode of EU governance (Chalmers and 
Lodge 2003; de la Porte and Nanz 2004: 284; de la Porte and Pochet 2005: 360; 
Hatzopoulos 2007; for a succinct review of the numerous studies supporting this 
  
argument, see: Kröger 2009: 6). However, it is open to debate whether this is indeed a 
negative characteristic as it appeared that the more closed a policy area is the more 
likely it is for Europeanization to occur. On the one hand, one could argue that the 
confirmed elitism of the EES poses a threat to the legitimacy of EES-induced reforms 
of member states’ employment policy, as a number of EES-stimuli and the 
subsequent domestic reforms were defined in a top-down fashion by the elites. On the 
other hand, one could counter-argue that it was through domestic empowerment by 
the EES and ESF conditionality that Greece and Portugal were able to either 
introduce or boost public policy provision to women, youth, and the unemployed. 
While both arguments have some validity, this thesis favours the latter based on the 
empirical findings. There was no evidence to suggest that the EES altered the degree 
of elitism in any significant manner in Greek and Portuguese employment policy-
making: in both countries public policy outputs were determined by national 
ministerial elites both before and after the introduction of the EES. Hence, although 
the EES failed to open up the policy-making process at the national level, it was 
successful in diverting political resources to include groups that had been previously 
neglected in employment policy: after the introduction of the EES women, young 
people and the elderly were put firmly on the Greek and Portuguese employment 
policy agenda.  
Additionally, the finding that the EES employs the ESF conditionality to 
promote Europeanization supports the argument that it constitutes a new form of 
governance. In this reasoning the EES, besides constituting a new variant of the 
existing soft law practices (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; Regent 2003; Hodson and 
Maher 2001; Héritier 2002), is also uniquely tied to ESF funding. Second, it implies 
that the debate between hard law and soft law supporters (as documented in Trubek 
and Trubek 2005; Zeitlin 2005; 2009; Kröger 2009) is incomplete because it neglects 
a significant part of EES stimuli. Third, it provides support to the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy argument’ (Scharpf 2002;   ritier 2002) because when the EES’ soft law 
was not effective the EU employed stronger policy instruments.  
In addition, the thesis findings have provided a qualified support to the argument 
that the EES produces ‘cheap talk’ or a ‘window dressing’ discourse (Kröger 2009a; 
Büchs 2007; for a summary, see: Borrás and Radaelli 2010: 30-37). More 
specifically, the Greek PES and gender equality cases showed that the inclusion of 
the EES terms in the Greek and Portuguese NAPs/NRPs and other national 
documents did not result in any actual policy change nor policy learning. However, 
  
the evidence suggested that the existence of ‘cheap talk’ does not necessarily mean 
that the EES will not have an impact on domestic policy. In the Greek PES and 
gender equality cases it appeared that despite the existence of window-dressing in 
official documents, the EES had a substantive effect on domestic policy via its ESF 
conditionality. Consequently, this indicates that the domestic impact of the EES 
cannot be gauged from documentary analysis only and that this method should be 
triangulated with interviews with key informants.  
The empirical evidence did not provide support for the thesis’ initial expectation 
that Europeanization would occur through policy learning. This original hypothesis 
was derived from two observations: (i) the EES was designed as a tool to spread best 
practices; (ii) most OMC studies have used a learning/socialisation/ideas/discourse’ 
framework (Zeitlin 2005; 2009; Borrás and Radaelli 2010). These findings cast a 
doubt on the OMC literature’s assertion that the EES induces domestic change 
through policy learning (Kröger 2009; Hartlapp 2009), as two EU countries with 
relatively weak institutional frameworks and underdeveloped welfare states appeared 
not to have ‘learnt’ from the EES.  
Nevertheless, policy learning among the interviewees may have occurred outside 
the timeframe of this research. For instance, many of the Greek and Portuguese 
policy entrepreneurs had a previous professional relationship with the EU: some of 
the Portuguese policy entrepreneurs were working before they entered politics as 
EU/ESF evaluators and the Greek Labour Minister who established the flexicurity 
Experts Committee was a former EU Commission employee. Verifying this plausible 
link between former EU employment and ministerial behaviour would entail 
examining their preferences before and after their EU employment which was 
practically unfeasible.  
Finally, the study controlled for similarities in welfare regimes, discrepancies 
between EU and national policy content and bureaucratic structures. The findings 
suggested that the Greek and Portuguese reform records were not linked to any of 
these factors, but with either the existence of a group of successful policy 
entrepreneurs or the presence of ESF conditionality. Moreover, the research findings 
suggested that the EES can break path-dependency, which has been long regarded as 
the dominant explanatory framework in European welfare states (Hemerijck 2002). 
Additionally, the inclusion of Greece and Portugal in the ‘world of transposition 
neglect’ (Falkner et al. 2005;  artlapp and Leiber 2010) may not justified by the 
absence of a certain ‘compliance culture’ but by the absence of policy entrepreneurs 
  
and/or by the absence of benefits from complying with the EU social directives such 
as obtaining ESF funds.  
 
3. Contribution and implications 
The findings of this thesis aim to offer both empirical and theoretical 
contributions to the existing literature
202
 as follows: it is the first comparative study 
of the EES impact on Greek and Portuguese employment policy (PES, gender 
equality and flexicurity); it updates the Govecor 2004 study with material on 
Portugal beyond 2003; it examines novel pathways of Europeanization by 
incorporating a variety of alternative explanations in the study design. 
The thesis tried to highlight a neglected aspect of the EES as it argued that when 
examining the EES influence on member states the ESF funding should also be 
included. While the ESF role in promoting Europeanization has been recognised in a 
number of other studies (Lopez-Santana, 2006; Jacobsson and West, 2009; 
Weishaupt, 2009; Zartaloudis, 2010; Graziano et al., 2011; Verschraegen et al., 
2011), this thesis contributes to the existing literature by adding an additional 
mechanism of EES influence: the ESF financial conditionality. This has one key 
policy implication: in order for the EU to strengthen its influence on the EU 
(peripheral) countries in terms of social policies, strengthening of their welfare 
systems, and consequently a Social Europe and the European Social Model, the EU 
should make better strategic use of its structural funds to incentivise and promote 
compliance with EU policies among domestic actors. This forms an alternative 
solution to the suggestion that soft law should be linked to hard law either by using 
instruments of soft law to facilitate the implementation of hard law, or by using hard 
law to ensure the implementation of soft-law directives (Rhodes 2005: 302; 
Hatzopoulos 2007; Scharpf 2002). Structural Funds and financial conditionality may 
be more effective in promoting domestic change in the absence of policy 
entrepreneurs aiming to download the EU stimuli.  
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 As discussed in Chapter 1, for comparative projects see: Govecor 2004; Linsenmann et al. 2007; 
Zeitlin and Pochet with Magnusson 2005; Foden and Magnusson 2003; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; 
Kröger 2009; Graziano et al. 2011; for Greece, see: Petmesidou and Mossialos 2006; Dimitrakopoulos 
and Passas 2003; Featherstone 2005b; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; Sotiropoulos 2004; 
Johnson 2003; Feronas 2007; Karamessini 2006; Ioakeimides 2001; for Portugal see: Guillen et al. 
2003; Silva 2009; 2011.  
  
4. Thesis limitations  
This section expands on some of the limitations mentioned in chapter 1. The 
study’s time-frame spans from the mid-1990s until 2010. Therefore, there may 
have been factors prior to 1995 influencing the policy changes observed in the 
study. For example, the ESF was established in 1957 and may have hypothetically 
caused the observed change in Greece regardless of the EES. However, the 
temporal sequence analysis and the interview findings strongly indicate a more 
immediate association between the EES as a stimulus for change and the observed 
changes in domestic policy. The second limitation is that this study focused only 
on two countries and three policy areas, which limits the generalisability of the 
findings. As argued in Chapter 1 and in the beginning of this chapter, however, 
Greece and Portugal typify the world of neglect and have the highest gap between 
the EES and domestic employment policy: examining these two countries is a 
sound test for the EES impact on member states’ employment policy. Therefore, 
one could argue that the findings of this research may be transferable to countries 
with similar characteristics (high gaps between EU and national policy; weak civil 
society and public administrations; underdeveloped welfare states; and lack of 
consensual or corporatist traditions) such as the other countries of the EU 
periphery, namely Southern, South-Eastern and Central and Eastern European 
ones. Similarly, it would be unlikely that the findings of this study may apply to 
countries with very different characteristics from those of Greece and Portugal 
(e.g. developed welfare states; low gaps between EU and national policy; strong 
bureaucracy and civil society). 
Further, the dependent variable was limited to changes in employment policy. 
As a result, the study did not explore the ramifications of EES-induced changes in 
other areas such as EU and national governance, democracy and legitimacy of 
policy making (cf.: Borrás and Radaelli 2010; Zeitlin 2009; Tholoniat 2010; 
Jacobsson and Viffell 2007; de la Porte 2002). However, the change in 
employment policy is the EES’ primary focus. The examination of the impact on 
democracy and legitimacy in national and EU policy making can be taken up in 
further research.   
Europeanization was conceptualised in accordance with the ‘downloading’ 
approach (the EU influence on member states) and did not include the ‘uploading’ 
approach found in some Europeanization studies. This may have added some 
interesting complexity to the concept of Europeanization, however, as argued in 
  
chapter 2 this would broaden the definition of Europeanization beyond a practical 
use. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 2, this study did not include all the 
Europeanization mechanisms suggested in the OMC literature as a result of the 
thesis definitional and theoretical choices.  
This research aimed to examine the formation of the policy agenda rather than 
conduct a policy evaluation (for the features of the types of public policy studies, 
see Howlett and Maresh 2003). Hence, it examined the reasons behind certain 
policy outputs (such as reforms’ rationale and content) and not policy outcomes 
(such as employment/unemployment rates) or the implementation on the ground of 
policy outputs. The latter are affected by many factors, such as GDP growth; 
macroeconomic, fiscal, monetary and trade policy; social values; and immigration 
which make the delineation of the EES’s impact almost impossible. To conduct 
such an investigation would have required a different study design including a 
sampling process of all relevant policy measures, surveys of 
recipients/beneficiaries, control groups (e.g. the unemployed who received training 
against the unemployed who did not).  
  
5. Suggestions for further research 
Further research is necessary in other countries and policy areas to investigate 
whether the findings can be replicated and the conclusions generalised. The focus 
should not be restricted to Europe’s periphery (Southern, South-Eastern and Central 
and Eastern Europe), but to all member states as all EU countries receive ESF 
funding. For instance, the UK House of Lords published a report recently on the 
importance of the ESF for the UK’s employment policy to tackle the UK’s social 
problems (House of Lords 2010). Additional policy areas to replicate  the thesis 
findings and conclusions are those where the EU stimuli are primarily based on soft 
law (other EES areas, other OMCs) and EU funding is available, such as life-long 
learning, research, education and health (cf. Papadimitriou and Copeland 
forthcoming). Another promising path for further research appears to be the new 
flagship EU initiative ‘Europe 2020’ as most of its seven flagship initiatives are 
based on soft law and use Structural Funds.  
Additionally, evaluating the efficiency of the EES stimuli and their effects on 
domestic policy is another area of potential enquiry. This could include whether the 
activation of the unemployed by the PES improves the efficiency of employment 
policy; the effect of training, GM and expansion of care facilities in gender equality 
  
promotion; and the efficiency of EU funded training in countries with structural 
unemployment and low growth (cf. Seferiades 2006). Finally, a new avenue for 
research relates to the recent developments in the Eurozone where three of its 
members (Greece, Portugal and Ireland) are under the ‘Troika’ (European Central 
Bank (ECB), European Commission (EC) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)) 
supervision to implement lengthy and unpopular reform packages in return for loans 
to service their debt. The importance of policy entrepreneurs and financial 
conditionality should be examined as, according to the findings of this thesis, these 
two conditions seem paramount for the success of these programmes.  
 
Conclusions 
Since 1997 the EES signalled a fundamental shift from hard law to soft law and 
from employment protection to employment promotion in an EU-wide effort to 
increase employment rates. This thesis tried to shed light on the impact of the EES 
on national employment policy and found that there were two key conditions which 
promote Europeanization in these cases: the existence of successful policy 
entrepreneurs who can exploit the EES policy window and -in their absence- the 
availability of ESF conditionality.  
In view of the recent financial and sovereign debt crises which have made 
externally imposed reforms an emergency, it seems that recent developments are in 
accordance with the findings of this thesis: financial conditionality is an essential 
component of the Eurozone policy toolkit. However, this thesis would like to 
conclude that the European South is not a lost cause and that the use of a 
combination of policy avenues and instruments may lead to more sustainable 
economic and political outcomes. The findings of the thesis suggest that 
entrepreneurship and policy windows can be a realistic alternative to financial 
conditionality. As the 33
rd
 President of the United States (1945-1953) Harry S. 
Truman said: [...] in periods where there is no leadership, society stands still. 
Progress occurs when courageous, skilful leaders seize the opportunity to change 
things for the better.203 
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 Source: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/leadership.html.  
  
Appendix I: List of interviewees  
A. Greece 
1. Christodoulakis, Nikos (1996-2000: Deputy Minister of Finance. 
Responsibility for the Budget and the management of Public Debt; 2001-
2004: Minister of the Economy and Finance; Jan - Jun 2003: Chairman of the 
Finance Ministers Council (ECOFIN) in the European Union, during the 
Greek presidency; Jul 2002-Jun 2003: Chairman of the Euro-group) 
2. Drakou, Kyriaki (EMCO member; assistant to the General Secretary of 
Employment Dimitris Kontos 2005-09) 
3. Giannitsis, Tassos (Professor, University of Athens; member of the OECD’s 
Economic Committee during 1993-2000; and advisor to PM Simitis roughly 
the same period (1994-2000); Minister of Employment and Social Security, 
2001-02) 
4. Ioannou, Christos (MSC and PhD in Economics, LSE; scientific advisor to 
OAED; advisor to Giannitsis; Special Advisor to the European Commission; 
Expert of the European Commission; Expert of EESC, European training 
Foundation, EMCO member, member of Expert Committee on the 
Modernization of Labour legislation; Member of the Scientific Committee 
assigned to evaluate the impact of the EES on Greek employment policy; 
Member of Committee of Experts, who authored the Report on flexicurity and 
Labour Law Modernisation, Ministry of Employment and Social Protection; 
Author of the Mutual Learning Report in the EES framework 2009. Since 
1992 mediator in OMED (Organisation of Mediation and Arbitration)) 
5. Karamessini, Maria (PhD in Economics; Panteion University; Since 1996 
Member of the EC’s Expert Group on Gender, Social Inclusion and 
Employment / EGGSIE assessing gender equality and mainstreaming in 
Greek NAPs) 
6. Karantinos, Dimitris (PhD in Economics, University of Edinburgh; Expert on 
the EEE – written numerous evaluations on the process and impact on Greece 
– employed as a researcher at National Centre of Social Research / EKKE) 
7. Karastamati, Iliana (Staff at the European Commission, Responsible for 
negotiating with Greece, and Cyprus to define the new ESF rules for 2007-
  
2013; after the deal since 2008 employed at the Special Unit of Coordination 
and Monitoring of ESF Actions (EYSEKT), Ministry of Employment and 
Social Protection.) 
8. Kontos, Dimitris (General Secretary of Employment, Ministry of Employment 
and Social Protection during 2005-09) 
9. Koukoula, Eleni (Head of Evaluation Unit of Human Resources Interventions 
– Special Unit of Coordination and Monitoring of ESF Actions (EYSEKT)) 
10. Koutsiaras, Nikos (Advisor to the Minister of Employment and Social 
Protection 2001-02 (Giannitsis); member of Expert Committee on the 
Modernization of Labour legislation; Lecturer in International and European 
Studies in the University of Athens; associate researcher in ELIAMEP.) 
11. Lyberaki, Antigoni (Head of the Team responsible for writing the NAPs 
2001-2003, Adviser to the Minister of Labour (Giannitsis) and Professor in 
Panteion University) 
12. Matsaganis, Manos (Advisor to the Minister of Economy 1997-98; Advisor to 
PM’s Office 1998-2001 on Social Policy –particular expertise and advice on 
Health Policy, Professor in Athens University of Economics and 
Business/AUEB.) 
13. Mavri, Despoina (economic advisor to PM Simitis - responsible for the EU 
dimension / policy on employment at the beginning, then the EES and then 
Lisbon- during 1996-2000; advisor to Minister Giannitsis for the EU; 
recommended by Giannitsis as the ‘right person to talk about your topic’) 
14. Mouriki, Aliki (member of the NAP authoring team (same with Lyberaki) 
during Giannitsis (2001-02) and responsible for Gender Equality with a 
particular focus on reconciliation policies; employed as a researcher at 
National Centre of Social Research / EKKE) 
15. Polyzogopoulos, Christos (Head of General Confederation of Greek 
Workers/GSEE which is the ‘umbrella’ trade union of private sector during 
1996-2006; President of the Greek Economic and Social Committee/ESC 
during 2007-2010; Vice-President of the ETUC Steering Committee from 
August 1996 until June 1997 and he was re-elected in October 2002; Member 
of the ETUC Steering and Executive Committees.) 
  
16. Protopapas, Christos (Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Protection 1997-
2001; PASOK’s Parliamentary Representative at the Employment and Social 
Protection Committee 2004-05. According to his website as a Deputy Minister 
of Labour ‘he was actively and deeply engaged with the sectors of ALMPs of 
the ESF, Health and Safety at the Workplace and the promotion of Social 
dialogue between Government and Social Partners’ – i.e. with all the EU 
issues). 
17. Stratigaki, Maria (Staff at the European Commission – DG Employment and 
Social Affairs responsible for the promotion of females in the decision 
Centers of the EU and the development of the GM policy during 1991-99; 
Director of the Research Center for Equality Issue (KETHI) – responsible for 
the development of positive actions in favour of women in the 3
rd
 CSF with a 
particular focus on employment policy (such as Consulting Centers for the 
promotion of Employment and Social Inclusion of Women) and Education 
(Teachers’ Sensitivisation regarding gender equaliy) during 1999-2002; 
President of the Consultive Committee on Gender Equality of the European 
Commission during 2003 and Vice-President during 2002; Member of the 
Gender Equality Committee of Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Greek 
EU presidency; Member of various Evaluation Committees of the Ministry of 
Education) 
18. Toutziarakis, Yiannis (General Secretary of EU funds – Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security 1996-1997) 
19. Tsagkris, Yiannis (Staff at the European Commission; adviser to Anna 
Diamantoulou since she was EU commissioner) 
20. Tsakogklou, Panos (member of the Council of Economic Experts (Advisory 
Body to the Minister of Finance) 2002-05 and of the Council of Experts on 
Employment and Social Security 2001-02, Professor in Athens University of 
Economics and Business/AUEB.)  
21. Tsitouridis, Savvas (Minister of Employment and Social Security, 2006-07) 
22. Tsoutsoplidis, Konstantinos (Secretary General for the Management of 
Community & Other Funds, Ministry of Employment and Social Protection 
2005-2009; Staff (A4) of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers 
  
1994-2004; Advisor to the General Secretary of the DG Political Affairs – 
responsible for the negotiation of the CSF 2007-2013). 
 
B. Portugal  
1. Antunes, Luís Pais (Labour Minister during 2002-2005) 
2. Bomba, Teresa (Research Fellow in the Department of Studies, Statistics and 
Planning of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour; Head of Research 
Unit of Institute of Social Security (Instituto da Segurança Social, I.P.). 
3. Capucha, Luis (Assistant Professor in the Sociology Department at ISCTE; 
Senior Researcher at the Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology 
(CIES); European Anti Poverty Network - Portugal (1994-1999); Secretary of 
State for Social Security (1999); Director General of the Department of 
Research, Forecasting and Planning of the Ministry of Labour and Solidarity 
(1999-2002); EMCO member during 1999-2002; NAP coordinator during 
1999-2002; General Directorate of Curriculum Innovation and Development 
(DGIDC), Ministry of Education (2006-2008); Member of the Economic and 
Social Council (1999-2002); Member of Committee of the Lifelong Learning 
of the European Union (2009); Head of the National Agency for Qualification 
2008-2011) 
4. Correia, Deolinda (Permanent Representative of Portugal to the European 
Union on: European Employment Strategy; Labour law; Health and safety at 
work; Equality between men and women) 
5. Dias, Mário Caldeira (IEFP director during 1995-2004 and President of the 
Observatory for Employment and Vocational Training (OEFP) during 2004-
2010)  
6. Dornelas, Antonio (Professor at Lisbon University Institute (ISCTE) and 
researcher at the Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology (CIES-IUL); 
Special Advisor to the President of Portugal on Social Policy (social security 
and labour markets) from 1995 to 2001; Deputy Labour Minister (Vocational 
Training and Employment) during 2001-2002; Special Advisor to the Labour 
Ministry during 2005-10; President of the Committee for the Green Paper of 
Labour Relations) 
  
7. Ferreira, Virginia (Assistant Professor in Sociology, Faculty of Economy of 
the University of Coimbra and Centre of Social Studies; member of the 
European Commission’s Group of experts on Gender, Social Inclusion and 
Employment (EGGSIE) during 2004-2006. 
8. Figueiredo, António Manuel (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, 
University of Porto; international consultant conducting international studies 
for the European Commission and OECD, particularly with regard to the 
evaluation of the EES, the ESF and other Structural Funds in Portugal) 
9. Fonseca, Vanda (UGT member) 
10. Guimarães, Luisa (Director of Institute for Social Security, Portugal; Member 
of the Permanent Representation of Portugal in Brussels (1999-2000); 
Member of Social Protection Committee (1999-2000); High Level Group of 
Social Protection Committee (2005-2010); Member of Social Protection 
Committee (2006-2010); Responsible for NAP inclusion (2008-2010)) 
11. Leitão, Maria Josefina Menezes (since 1976 Director of Collective 
Bargaining, Labour Conditions and Labour Relations departments, Ministry 
of Labour; Deputy director of the Labour Ministry regarding Gender Equality; 
President of Commission for Equality in Labour and Employment (CITE)) 
12. Madelino, Franscisco (Visiting Assistant Lecturer ISCTE - Lisbon University 
Institute, Department of Economics; member of the executive board of the 
IEFP (responsible for the organisation’s financial responsibilities and 
vocational training) during 1997-2002; President of the IEFP during 2005-
2011) 
13. Ministro, Antoineta (Head of Research and Statistics Office, Ministry of 
Labour; Member of the EMCO since 2006; Member of the EMCO indicators 
group during 2006-2010; Member of the Committee for the Green Paper on 
Labour Relations) 
14. Paula Bernardo (deputy secretary general of the UGT; ) – UGT 
15. Pedroso, Paulo (Invited Assistant Professor at Lisbon University Institute 
(ISCTE); Member of the Portuguese Parliament (2002-2005); Independent 
Evaluator at Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity; Minister of Labour and 
Solidarity (2001-2002); Secretary of State of Labour and Vocational Training 
(1997-2001); Head of the Portuguese National Action Plan Committee (1998-
  
2000); President of the Commission for Launching the Guaranteed Minimum 
Income (GMI) (1995-1996); Political Adviser to the Minister of Solidarity 
and Social Security (1995-1997); head of the Guaranteed Minimum Income 
(GMI) taskforce of the Socialist Party (1992-1995)) 
16. Santos, Paulo (Head of Sector for Cooperation and Profit Establishments, 
Department of Social Development Unit / Social Responses, Institute of 
Social Security, IP) 
17. Silva, Pedro Adão (Advisor to the Minister of Employment during 1995-
2001) 
18. Silva, Vieira (Labour Minister (2005-2009); Minister of Economy, Innovation 
and Development (2009-2011); Secretary of State for Social Security (1999-
2001); President of the Parliamentary Labour and Social Affairs (1995-2010); 
Coordinator of the Socialist Party Parliamentary Group for matters of 
Solidarity and Social Security in the Parliamentary Labour and Social Affairs; 
Member of the Secretariat of the National Socialist Party; Invited Lecturer at 
the Higher Institute of Labour and Business (ISCTE); Director-General of the 
Department of Statistics, Research and Planning, Ministry of Solidarity and 
Social Security (1992-1995); Director-General of the Department of Studies, 
Forecasting and Planning of the Ministry of Labour and Solidarity (1995-
1997); Member of the EMCO (1998-1999); ESF negotiator – Portugal; 
Coordinator of the National Employment Plan (1998-2001); Counselor of 
Economic and Social Council) 
19. Soares, Maria Candida (Head of the Strategic and Planning Office, Ministry 
of Labour; since 2002, NAP/NRP coordinator; long-standing member of the 
Employment Committee (EMCO) and the Economic and Social Council) 
20. Wall, Karin (Lecturer at the Higher Institute of Work and Employment 
(ISCTE) during 1980-2001; member of the European Observatory on National 
Family Policies of the European Commission (1994-2004); since 2003 
coordinator of the Research Network Sociology of Families and Intimate 
Lives in the European Sociological Association; currently a member of the 
Committee of Experts on Social Policy for Families and Children and a 
member of the International Network on Leave Policy and Research. Principal 
investigator at the Institute of Social Sciences at Lisbon University.  
  
Appendix II: Gender Equality Measures in Greece and Portugal204 
1. Greece 
Table 1.1: New Organisations (7) to promote Gender mainstreaming  
 13 Regional Centres for Equality (1998) 
 Regional Equality Committees (2000) 
 New Branches of KETHI (1999-2002, 2007) 
 Inter-Ministerial Committee for Gender Mainstreaming 
 Regional ‘Information and Counselling Units’ for women 
 Regional ‘Social Integration Units’ for special groups of women 
 The Equality Implementation Guide (2003) 
 
Table 1.2: New Measures (32) promoting female employability in Greece 
 Higher Amount of subsidy for women in all job creation schemes (NAP of 1999); 
 Quotas for women in all employability measures equal to the female share in Employment 
(NAP of 1999); 
 Work Experience programme for the improvement of women’s skills in rural, 
mountainous or insular areas (NAP of 2000); 
 Promotion of part-time work and other forms of atypical employment (2639/1998) (2000) 
 New Jobs programme: subsidies for full-employment four-year programmes, part-time 
four-year programmes and limited contracts of 9 months duration. The programme 
provided for gender mainstreaming through the provision of special incentives for women 
(2000, 2001, and 2002). 
 Pilot project for the social integration of Muslim women in Metaxourgeio – Athens 
(2000); 
 Exemption from social security contributions for full time-employees receiving the 
minimum wage (2837/2000) (2001) 
 Training of job counsellors of the Employment Promotion Centres (KPAs) to assist 
unemployed women (2001) 
 Introduction of individualised counselling for women in the regional action plans in the 
context of KPA (2002) 
 Education and training programmes for women in new technologies, e-commerce, 
management, etc. financed by the social partners (2001) 
 Programme to combat exclusion from the labour market of single-parent families (2001) 
 A quota of 60% for women in training programmes and in subsidised employment (2002) 
 Vocational programmes focusing on the promotion of equal opportunities for access to the 
labour market and improving women’s access to the labour market  (O.P. Education and 
Initial Vocational Training’) (2002) 
 In the Community Initiative Equal the training contributes through integrated 
interventions to combat discrimination and gender inequality in the field of employment  
 New job programmes for women, intended to provide work experience and promote the 
employment of unemployed women aged 18-65. It provides 5,000 jobs and lasts for 21 
months (2003). 
 Programmes to provide vocational experience (Stage) in IT and Communications skills for 
unemployed graduates, with a special stage for facilitating entry of women into the ICT 
labour market (Part of the O.P. ‘Information society’) (2003). 
 Actions to promote tele-working, with priority given to business plans which will help an 
increase in employment in regions experiencing difficulty of access to productive centres, 
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and to vulnerable population groups and women (Part of the O.P. ‘Information society’) 
(2003). 
 The development of a network of community services acting as a stimulus to the creation 
of new jobs and as a precondition allowing women to seek employment (2003). 
 Employers’ contributions for hiring unemployed women with at least two children are 
subsidized for one year (2003).  
 This measure is strengthened and upgraded in NAP 2004 as it is included in the Law 
3227/04 “Measures for the remedy of unemployment and other provisions” (2004) 
 Employers’ contributions on behalf of replacements for women on maternity leave are 
also subsidized (2003). 
 OAED implements a ‘New Jobs Programme’ for 5,000 women aged 18-65 (18 months) 
(2003) 
 Policy measure on the promotion of part-time employment in the public sector to fill 
vacancies in new kinds of social services developed by the public sector: not only are 
‘mothers of minor children’ are considered to be one of the target groups of this initiative 
but also the 60% quota for women applies in the case of other target groups comprising 
unemployed individuals (2004).  
 The provision of accompanying support actions to 9,000 unemployed women and their 
promotion in employment policy actions, with co-financing from various Operational 
Programmes (the project will also continue during 2004-2005) 
 Further increase of subsidies to the amount of the employer’s contribution for businesses 
employing unemployed mothers (2004) 
 Distance learning education programmes with a particular focus on ‘working students or 
women obliged to stay at home’ (2005) 
 New law on working time which enhances temporal flexibility for the employer by 
encouraging flexible weekly working time, working time over a four month period and 
permits annual working time whereas combining flexible working-time arrangements with 
overtime hours is also permitted (2005). 
 New law on part-time work in the public sector which has been specifically aimed at 
women. Albeit part-time work contributes to raising employment rates this particular law 
is quite problematic since all jobs offered are offered are fixed-term and do not provide 
either employment security or a stepping stone to longer-hour jobs neglecting thus one of 
the most beneficial aspects of part-time employment (2005).  
 Special programmes for unemployed women, whose participation is encouraged by the 
provision of special incentives (2005, 2006). 
 Signature of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the General Secretariat for Gender 
Equality and the Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility, aiming at further 
promoting equal opportunities between women and men in enterprises (2006) 
 A new institutional framework for the promotion of Women’s employability, aiming at 
the reconciliation of work and family life, based on the application of individualized 
approach. This new institutional framework will be put into force after the 30th of April 
2007 (2006) 
 New Program «Positive Actions in favour of women in Small-medium and Large 
Enterprises» implemented by the General Secretariat for Gender Equality in the 
framework of the O.P. “Employment and Vocational Training”. Approximately 1,300 
women have benefited in 2006 and in the first semester of 2007. For the second round of 
this project 143 Plans, with a budget of €14.2 million, have been approved and the 
beneficiaries will be in total 19,800 women (2006, 2007) 
 In all New Self-Employed Programmes, women who have children under 6 years old, or 
who take care of relatives with disabilities, are given the option of using their own 
residence as the headquarters of their enterprise. As a result, a total number of 40,500 
women benefited from the employment and self-employment programmes during the 
period 1.1.2006 – 30.4.2007. 
 Special integrated intervention, combining counselling on how to enter into the labour 
market by either acquiring work experience, subsidization of an employment position, or 
setting up an independent business activity (beneficiaries: 3,880 women) (2007)  
  
 New Programme “Improvement of the conditions for the inclusion of women from 
disadvantaged groups into the labour market” (2007) 
 
Table 1.3: New Measures (18) promoting Female Entrepreneurship in Greece 
 Higher Amount of grants to unemployed women for business start-ups in areas of high 
unemployment (1998) 
 Creation of structures for Female Entrepreneurship (through NOW initiative) (1999) 
 Special programme for women entrepreneurs in manufacturing (1999 and 2000) 
 Support and networking of women’s cooperatives and businesses in rural areas (2000) 
 Measures providing financial and technical support to unemployed women willing to start 
a small business (2001) 
 Special incentives (mainly subsidies) and training to women entrepreneurs (2001, 2002) 
 Subsidies to Young Entrepreneurs to create new businesses. The programme incorporated 
the equal opportunities dimension through the provision of special incentives for women 
(2001, 2002) 
 Support of female entrepreneurship in rural areas and in rural tourism, handcraft and 
cottage industries (2001) 
 Removal of administrative barriers to business start-ups for women (2001) 
 Development of local networks, on the initiative of the Confederation of Industry, to 
provide counselling with the aim of promoting female entrepreneurship (2001). 
 A series of Female entrepreneurship programmes starting from January 2003 (2003) 
 The General Secretariat for Equality, in collaboration with the OAED, implements 
numerous projects for the reinforcement of women’s entrepreneurship during 2004-2006. 
Two innovations were introduced: 
 Young women/entrepreneurs can (this is financed by the OAED) to establish their 
own small business, to use their home as their place of business, in case they have 
pre-school children or care for relatives with a disability, and  
 The fees paid to the day care centre for children will be considered in the documents 
required (for approval of the proposal) (2004 - 2007). 
 Implementation of action plans for equality in businesses, aiming at promoting equal 
opportunities and the hierarchical advancement of working women within businesses. It is 
estimated that 7,000 working women will benefit (the project continues also during 2004-
2005) 
 Special programmes for unemployed women, whose participation is encouraged by the 
provision of special incentives (2006)  
 Special integrated intervention, combining counselling on how to enter into the labour 
market by either acquiring work experience, subsidization of an employment position, or 
setting up an independent business activity (beneficiaries: 3,880 women) (2007)  
 New Programme “Improvement of the conditions for the inclusion of women from 
disadvantaged groups into the labour market” (2007) 
 
Table 1.4: Promoting dedicated equality measures  in Greek Employment Policy 
1. Tackling Gender Gaps (23) 
 Information and Entrepreneurship Centres for Women – Now Initiative (1998) 
 Creation of Regional ‘Information and Counselling Units’ by KET I for women (1999-
2002, 2007) 
 Review of curricula and textbooks in primary and secondary education to remove gender 
stereotypes (1999, 2001) 
 Training and activation of trade unionists on gender equality issues (1999, 2000) 
 Awareness of teachers on equality issues – Pilot programme (1999) 
 30% quota for the representation of women civil servants on promotion panels (2000) 
 Research projects on pay differentials by gender and career advancement of women 
  
(1999, 2000, 2002) 
 Development partnerships to promote measures for equality at the workplace and 
employment of women in new economic sectors (2001)  
 Completion of 13 studies directly related to the guidelines in Pillar 4, as part of the 
programme «Development of KETHI structures – O.P. Combating Exclusion from the 
Labour market» (2001) 
 Extension of provisions to protect pregnant and breast-feeding women in all workplaces 
(2001) 
 Indicators-based monitoring and evaluation of the progress made on equality issues (2002) 
 Creation of an Observatory for Equality Issues (in the framework of the EPEAEK) (2002) 
 Reform of undergraduate curricula and creation of inter-departmental programmes, 
seminars or lessons on issues of gender equality (EPEAEK) (2002) 
 Incorporation of gender perspective into production of new teaching material for primary, 
secondary, general and technical education, on the basis of the specifications of the 
Pedagogical Institute and the Interdisciplinary Framework for Curriculum (2002) 
 Changes in the Careers Guidance lesson at school in order to reconstruct stereotyped 
attitudes to men’s and women’s professions (2002) 
 Positive actions for equal opportunities between men and women in small and medium-
sized enterprises and large businesses (2004) 
 Provision of supportive services to women belonging to vulnerable groups by specialised 
structures of the Research Centre for Gender Equality (2006). 
 To promote equality between women and men in the educational procedure – combating 
stereotypes: 
 Implementation of education programmes for teachers promoting gender equality 
(2006)  
 Establishment of an Observatory for Gender Equality in Education in Greece to 
promote gender studies and gender equality in higher education which is going to 
operate as a Documentation Centre for the effective and scientific collection, record, 
and processing of data concerning this field. The Programme is a product of 
cooperation between the General Secretariat for Gender Equality, which is responsible 
to plan the gender equality policy in all fields, and the Κ.Ε.T .Ι., and has a total budget 
of € 951,000 (2006) 
 Integrated intervention schemes for unemployed women only (2006) 
 12 projects (in eight Universities and four Technological Education Institutions) in 
order to reform the undergraduate curricula, by including therein courses on equality 
(2006) funded by the O. P. “Education and Initial Vocational Training”.  
 Three major Research Programmes (Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Archimedes) within which 
several research projects on equality issues have been developed (2006) 
 Educational visits/ informational lectures to teachers and pupils of the three last classes 
of elementary schools/secondary schools/Technical Educational Schools all over 
Greece (2007) 
 
2. Reconciliation of work and family life measures (29, excluding continuation of 
measures). 
 Extension of opening hours of public kindergartens – pilot programme (1998) 
 Daylong Kindergarten (1999 - 2006) 
 Daylong primary school (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006) 
 Increase of the financial support available for existing after-school Centres of Creative 
Activities for Children (1998) 
 New after-school Centres of Creative Activities for Children (1999 - 2006) 
 Extension of opening hours of public nurseries – pilot programme (1998) 
 Child-care and nursery centres to be open in the late afternoon (1999-2006) 
 New public crèches and nurseries (1999 - 2006) 
 Home help programme for the elderly – pilot programme (1998) 
  
 Creation of Social Welfare Units for Care of the Elderly (1999 - 2006) 
 Institutions for Social Support and Reintegration of Disabled Individuals, under the 
Operational Programme ‘ ealth-Welfare’ 2000-2006 (2001) 
 Pilot implementation of afternoon hours in ten public services (2001) 
 Development partnerships to promote new patterns of work organisation, facilitating 
reconciliation of work and family life (2001) 
 Programme of cash maternity allowances to working women who cannot claim these 
benefits from any insurance fund or are uninsured, and also do not have a satisfactory 
standard of living (2003)  
 Programme of subsidies for single-parent families, prepared by the Child Welfare 
Department of the EOKF (National Organization for Community Care) (2003)  
 Children’s Country Camps (EOKF and Social Welfare Department of the local prefecture 
(2003) 
 Proposal to provide incentives for large corporations to run day-care centres (2005) 
 New Code of Civil Servants (Law 3528/2007) (2006):  
 The further prolongation of the facilitation of reduced working hours for two more 
years is provided in case of a fourth child.  
 Facilitations are provided for the mother who adopts a child, in order to make the 
transition to her new family life easy.  
 Positive programme of policy action in a new law on Equal Treatment in employment 
relations focusing on the private sector. This programme obliges employers to promote 
equality at the workplace and to provide information to workers and their representatives 
about a) the gender composition of employment at different organisational levels and b) 
the measures they intend to implement in order to improve imbalances. 
 The Κ.Ε.T .Ι, as a coordinating agency, implements a programme entitled: «Equal 
Partners: Reconsidering Men’s Role at Work and Private Life», which is co-financed by 
the European Committee (80%) and the General Secretariat for Gender Equality (20%). 
The project aims at informing and raising public awareness, mainly of men and fathers, in 
the need of reconciling and harmonizing their work obligations and family life, through 
redefining stereotypes concerning the role of father (2007) 
 The O.P. «Administrative Reform 2007-2013» includes a special priority axis entitled 
«Reinforcing gender equality policy» (2007).  
 
2. Portugal  
Table 2.1: Institutional changes (7) to promote Gender mainstreaming in Portuguese 
employment policy  
 Establishment of an Observatory for Equality in Collective Bargaining to follow up the 
equal opportunities area in the instruments regulating collective bargaining (1998) 
 Gender mainstreaming committees at the office of the presidency (1999) 
 Committee for Equality in Work and Employment (1999) 
 Committee for Equality and Women's Rights (1999) 
 The creation of a NAP indicators system, which will allow the follow-up and evaluation 
of the progresses made in this area. Such system includes two great components: 
methodology of the indicators analysis (completed at the end of 1999) and a data 
collection system (to be developed in the first semester of 2000), aiming the creation of a 
data collection model, the monitoring and follow up of equal opportunities as a cross-
disciplinary issue in the NAP. (1999-2002) 
 In May 2004 a Gender Data Base (hosted by INE) of general access was launched and 
divulged, and updating mechanisms were constituted; about 100 indicators disaggregated 
by gender in domains such as Population, Family, Activity, Employment and 
Unemployment, Education and Training, Conciliation of Work and Family Life, Decision, 
  
Health, Crime and Violence (2004) 
 
 
Table 2.2: New measures (25) promoting female employability in Portugal 
 Launching of the REAGE initiative: Integral and individual follow-up methodology to 
prevent the adult unemployment, building Employment Personal Plans to ensure a new 
opportunity (1998-2006). 
 Launching of the  INSERJOVEM initiative: as REAGE; main difference is that this 
programme targets only young people (1998 - 2006) 
 New Programmes aiming to fight against long term unemployment of women (1999). 
 Adaptation of the target related to the increased weight of vocational training for 
unemployed by 25% per year with the goal of reaching 20% of the male unemployed and 
female unemployed (1999) 
 Adaptation of the objective (Guideline 1 - 1998) to increase the training of the employed 
population in order to reach, in 5 years, 10% of the trainees in the total employed 
population. This target has to be achieved «with a balance between genders» (1999) 
 New instrument introducing greater incentives for young women to acquire professional 
experience in professions where women are significantly under-represented – pilot 
programme (1999). 
 Systematic improvement of the measures to support employment in professions 
significantly marked by gender discrimination (2000-2005). 
 Greater incentives for hiring unemployed women over the age of 45 (1999). 
 Creating a national list of professions significantly market by gender discrimination in 
order to provide a reference framework to the application of improvement of incentives 
within the scope of active employment policies (1999) 
 PESSOA (Professional Stage Programme): attended predominantly by women (64%) as 
compared to men (36%). (1998, 1999)  
 Under the 2nd CSF Sub-programme INTEGRAR: a new measure whose goal is to support 
the professional inclusion of Long Term Unemployed (main beneficiaries young and 
women) (1999) 
 Extension of the REAGE Initiative to the Long Term Unemployed registered for 24 
months in all areas covered by pacts and regional employment networks (with a focus on 
gender) (2000) 
 To promote training and competence certification in ICTs – particular focus on women 
through increasing participation (above 70%) (2005) 
 Intervention Programme for the Unemployed with Higher Education Qualifications 
(gender focus) (2005, 2006) 
 (Within the framework of this Programme):the FORDESQ measure (almost 75% women); 
 Professional Work Placement Measure which covered about 20,000 young people with a 
particular emphasis on women; their employability rate was about 70% (2006) 
 ‘Professional Training Periods in Public, Central and Local Administration’ which has 
disproportionately benefited women (2006) 
 Women are, however, the potential beneficiaries of substantial government investment in 
Centres for the Recognition, Validation and Certification of Competences (2006) 
 
Qualitative Objectives 
 Including contents in the areas of the Information and Communication Technologies in 
50% of the continuous vocational training actions, with a minimum of 20 hours and with a 
proportion in the actions’ duration of at least 10%, in which the balanced participation of 
men and women is promoted (2001) 
 Covering at least 26,000 apprentices in alternating training actions within the scope of the 
Learning System. Special focus on encouraging the representation of the under-
  
represented gender (2001) 
 Increasing the training of employees as to reach, in five years time, 10% of trainees in the 
total of active employed people, with a gender balance (2001) 
 Reducing by 25%, by 2003, the differences between unemployment rates of women and 
men, and in at least the same percentage in the youth group (2001) 
 Under the Local Employment Initiatives Programme, it is awarded a prize for gender 
equality – when the projects of job creation originate, at least, 5 jobs and these are not 
fulfilled in more than 60% by persons of the same sex – whose amount corresponds to 
10% of the total value of supports granted (2001)  
 Ensuring 16,500 professional traineeships for young people, in the light of the gender 
equality objective (2000, 2001, 2002) 
 To raise employment rate for women from 61.7% in 2004 to 63% in 2008 (2005) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Promoting dedicated equality measures in Portuguese employment policy 
1. Tackling Gender Gaps (31, excluding continuation of measures). 
 Training in the area of equal opportunities area creating innovative modules, 
methodologies and materials aimed at strategic groups (1998) 
 Inclusion of a module about equal opportunities in all the public training developed by the 
Portuguese Institute for Employment and Professional Training (1998) 
 ‘Equality is Quality’ prize: Rewards to the enterprises and public services with model 
policies in the area of equal opportunities (1998-2005). 
 Provision to youngsters with school and professional information and guidance adapted to 
their personal and professional projects, and making them aware of the options which help 
them to overcome the asymmetries between men and women in the labour market (1999, 
2000). 
 Inclusion in the school curricula of training components in the field of equality of 
opportunities, which will have an impact on the attitudes. (1999) 
 Progressive introduction of equality of opportunities award in the employment supporting 
regiments. (1999) 
 Promotion of training and professional certification of consultants/trainers under equality 
of opportunities between men and women. (1999) 
 Studies to investigate disparities on wages and innovating models of wages practices, in 
order to promote equal remuneration for men and women. (1999) 
 Promotion of studies on the application of the legislation related to the fight against 
Table 2.3: New measures (5) promoting female entrepreneurship in Portugal 
 Programmes aiming to promote the support of women setting companies or independent 
workers (1999) 
 Supporting the creation of 12,000 jobs through active measures for business start-ups, 
taking into account on assigning supports, the gender balance (2001) 
 Programmes for the development of women entrepreneurship , in particular in the areas in 
which they are underrepresented (2003) 
 In October 2003, Local Employment Initiatives within families’ support services was 
created, trying to contribute, through the stimulation of entrepreneurship and employment 
creation, for an increase in the offer of families’ support services and to stimulate a greater 
participation of women in the labour market (2004) 
 Training and re-adaptation to new professional areas and mechanisms for creating an own 
business, as well as instruments to support geographical mobility, including a positive 
valuation of women’s entrepreneurship (2005) 
  
discrimination and to the promotion of equality of opportunities. (1999) 
 Adaptation of the priority related to the training of teachers, by introducing the fight 
against discrimination theme into the labour market in the fields of development of 
competencies (1999). 
  “Including Equal Opportunities in the Social Dialogue” in order to build new methods, 
programmes and pedagogic resources for the training of trainers of social negotiators in 
the field of equal opportunities between men and women in employment and at work 
(within the scope of the Initiative Leonardo da Vinci) (1999)  
 Publicity campaigns on equal opportunities between women and men in the access to 
employment and to all professions and professional ranks (2001) 
 Intensifying information and public opinion awareness actions with regard to gender 
inequalities both in working and family life (2001) 
 Training several levels of actors in the processes of vocational and professional guidance, 
recruitment and placement, with a view to diversify women’s and men’s professional 
options (2001) 
 Training social negotiators in areas related to equal opportunities and non-discrimination 
on the grounds of gender (2001) 
 Training Frameworks for trainers in the area of gender equality (2003) 
 12 Television programmes promoted by CITE in order to facilitate sensitisation and 
training to change behaviours to promote equality of opportunities in work and 
employment (2004) 
 Information/training actions on equality and conciliation (EQUAL) (2004) 
 Publication in print (sent to 3000 organisations) and online of the Training for Trainers’ 
Manual in Equality of opportunities between men and Women (2004) 
 Incentive to female participation in initial and continuing training in the ICT’s domains 
and the spread of other audio vision material (2004) 
 The Green Phone Line created in the RAM by the Regional CITE, to deal with questions 
related to equality and non discrimination, maternity and paternity leave rights protection 
of working parents¸ as well as the conciliation of working and family life (2004)  
 Project “Micronesian cooperation network for the Equality of Opportunities – Violet 
Project”, in which is intended, among other actions, to launch a Resources on Equality of 
Opportunities Guide, as well as another for the introduction of the gender perspective in 
quantitative and qualitative diagnostic studies (2004) 
 Reforms in the Labour Code regulation (2004):  
 employer’s duty to spread, in the enterprise, information about workers’ rights and 
duties in this domain;  
 definition of direct and indirect discrimination, equal work and equal value, and 
broadening discrimination factors helping to make these rights operational;  
 enlarging protection against retaliation actions;  
 reinforcement of vocational training to workers of the under-represented sex in 
occupations where it exists; 
 establishment of a greater precision in the concept of “equal pay for equal work”, in 
order to eliminate any discrimination based on the gender 
 Deepening of social dialogue and sensitisation of Social Partners to reanalyse the content 
of collective agreements in a gender equality perspective, namely revaluating occupations 
and professional categories’ definitions and their remunerations and forecasting clauses 
that favour conciliation of work and family life (2004) 
 Better suitability of the functioning schedule of crèches, through the implementation of 
the positive differentiation principle established in the Cooperation Protocol to 2004 with 
Social Solidarity Private Institutions (2004) 
 Separation of the administration of minimum wage levels from social benefit levels, thus 
potentially allowing higher minimum wage rises (2006) 
 
  
2. Reconciliation of work and family measures (39) 
 Giving priority to activities that respond to the growing social demand for proximity 
services, necessary for the improvement in the quality of life of families and women, 
notably those involving the development of occupational or extracurricular activities, 
providing child care to school children when parents are unavailable. (1998) 
 Implementation of the Parental Leave Agreement, assuring the equality of rights and 
opportunities for both parents with professional activity. (1998) 
 Creation of the Codes of Best Practices in areas such as maternity and paternity protection 
and positive action regarding conciliating work with family life. (1998) 
 A more general use, in all initial and on-going training addressed to both sexes, of the 
teaching of skills required to carry out family life support activities. (1998) 
 Expansion of the national pre-school network. (1998-2006) 
 Promoting care services for dependants. (1999-2006) 
 In the Regional Action Plan for Employment: in the Alentejo of the AJUDA network: a 
network of services rendered to the community for home support to aged people and other 
dependants, which allows qualified people to be recognised as such by the Social Security 
and receive, in the likeness of nannies, a subvention to cover the lack of means by the 
elderly to pay for the services rendered. (1999) 
 (Similar to the above): Network in the Oporto Metropolitan Area, where tele-service 
centres will also be implemented, aiming at an articulation of the services rendered to 
dependent people. (1999)  
 (Similar to the above): the promotion of an experimental project Employment-Family 
sharing of housework and working post, creating incentives for easier management of the 
total work load. (1999) 
 Definition of aid for the recruitment of the unemployed to substitute workers absent from 
work due to their legal rights associated to the protection of maternity and paternity. 
(1999) 
 Crèches 2000: a financial aid measure for the expansion of the network of crèches (2000, 
2001 - 2006).  
 Recognition of the indispensability of the right to paternity leave and of the fathers’ legal 
protection in the exercise of this leave, equal to that of the working mother, namely 
against dismissal and in matters related to levelling absence time with effective work 
(2001) 
 Father’s leave entitlement of five working days in the first month after the birth of the 
child (2001) 
 Financial support to baby sitting and looking after dependants of person attending training 
actions. (2001) 
 Ensuring, by 2006, pre-school education attendance to all 5 year olds and to 75% of 3-4 
year olds, by building and equipping another 1,800 classrooms during that period (2001) 
 Guaranteeing actually receiving 100,000 children aged up to 3 in day nurseries (2001) 
 Extension the pre-school institutions functioning calendar, in order to ensure a functioning 
scheme and a flexible timetable adequate to family needs (resolution nº 19 130/2002) 
(2003) 
 The National Equality Plan 2003-2006 (2003) 
 Support the recruitment and training of unemployed hired to replace workers absent from 
their job, under the terms of the legislation concerning maternity and paternity (1999-
2003) 
 Equality Plans in enterprises: Support of employer bodies in the development of 
innovative solutions, within the scope of work organisation, which facilitate the balance 
between work and family life for women and men (2003) 
 Free telephone number and on-line information concerning equality between women and 
men at work, in employment and vocational training, as well as maternity and paternity 
rights (2003) 
  
 The 5-day paternity leave is made compulsory (2004) 
 Institutionalisation of the right to training after childcare leaves (2004) 
 Payment of a share of up to 80% of the substitute worker’s salary, as well as training costs 
in case of recruitment of an unemployed to replace an employee on maternity, paternity, 
parental or other leaves for taking care of children (2004) 
 Increase of the leave due to adoption, from a minimum of 10 to 14 days, of the living 
spouse in case of dead of the adopting worker (2004) 
 Extension of the worker’s right to miss work up to 15 days per year, for essential 
assistance in case of an emergency situation which cannot be postponed. The patient has 
to be a relative of the side line second degree (2004) 
 Provision of support for the unemployed workers’ childcare expenses is another positive 
example, particularly as it represents a complete departure from the usual policy of public 
support for childcare, which tends to direct support to institutions rather than families 
(2004) 
 New Law to update Pres-School Education Expansion and Development Programme 
(Decree-Law no 342/2003, of 24th of April), making the annual update of the Cooperation 
Protocol and agreements to be in force, regulating the access regime and working rules of 
the financial support system to the pre-school education establishments of Lisbon’s social 
solidarity private institutions. (2004) 
 The launch of the Enlargement Programme for the Social Amenities Network (Order in 
Council no. 426/2006, 2May): effective planning for territorial needs, and stimulate 
investment through partnerships between the social sector, local power, and the 
business/private sector; in this way it will promote improved living conditions for the 
elderly and the disabled by furthering their autonomy and integration levels (2006). 
 Support Programme for Investment in Social Amenities (Order in Council no. 869/2006, 
29th of August): stimulates investment in social amenities, supporting private initiative, 
namely lucrative private initiative, contributing to the increase the capacity of responses in 
the social domains of children and youth, disabled and elderly population, by means of 
resources deriving from social games (2006) 
 New programme ‘Network of Integrated Continued Care’ which is intended to boost the 
implementation of continued health care units and teams, social support, originating in 
community proximity services (2006) 
 Extension of Primary school opening hours. Children are now required to be in school 
from 09:30 to 17:30 (2006)  
 Ability to choose between having 120 days of maternity leave on full pay or 150 days 
leave at 80% of the full pay (2006) 
 New measure for unemployment subsidy to take into account family obligations (2006) 
 Expansion of the Network of Community Proximity Services (made up of a group of 
services and social amenities, aimed at providing social support and targeting the specific 
needs of people and families) as an important instrument to foster the conciliation of 
professional life with personal and family life and to provide equal gender opportunities, 
but it also contributes to generating many new jobs in the service sector (2006): 
 A 50% increase in the number of crèches, by 2009 - 31161 (meeting the Barcelona 
pledge: 33%);  
 Strengthening social responses for the elderly, creating 19,000 new vacancies by 2009;  
 Provision of 6000 places in facilities in the continued integrated care network by 2008;  
 And an additional 1850 vacancies in social responses for the disabled by 2009. 
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